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The thesis has four mm contentions;
1. that neutrality nas undergone a fundamental cnange since tne
advent of the Nuclear Age and that this is most apparent in neutral
States whose neutrality is a product of the Second World War
settlement. Within this, the importance of foreign policy has greatly
increased. The legal doctrines established in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries are no longer applicable in the former
manner.
2. that Austria's common history with Germany, especially in the
period 1938-45 has had a profound effect on the conduct of postwar
Austrian foreign policy, directly affecting relations with
neignbouring States and the victorious allies. Here too a disturbing
divergence between the statements of the political establishment in
Austria and political reality since 1955 emerges. The development of
a global-scale foreign policy has been in part a response to tne
growing importance of markets in the developing world and partly a
reaction to the stifling effects of this historical legacy.
3. that Austria's foreign policy is based on an unstable equilibrium
between the status of permanent neutrality, which since 1955 has had
to operate in the context of two ideologically opposed groups, and
allegiance to liberal democracy and nence to one of tiie parties to
this ideological conflict. One of the important functions of Austrian
policy has been to prevent tms reality from becoming the object of
manipulation from abroad. This difficulty has been most apparent in
the debates over detente and the E.E.C.
4. that the continuing success of Austria, along with other small
States in manipulating the World System to their advantage suggests
that pure 'realist' and 'world systems' models of international
relations are oversimplistic.
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"The essential is invisible"
A.de St.Exupery, 'The little Prince'
Analysing Austria's presence as an actor on the international stage
presents a number of problems. Not least of these are the obstacles
resulting from those most Austrian of institutions, 'Social
Partnership' and 'Proporz'. In essence, the Second Republic has built
its domestic base on the efficient co-option of all organised social
groups under the umbrella of one or the other. No other West European
country can claim tne same degree of corporate integration.
Historically, these institutions are most easily understood as a
'reconciliation of the irreconcilaole", initially an agreement for
domestic 'peaceful coexistence'. Under the First Republic, the Social
Democrats, despite great internal cohesion and organisation, were
eliminated as active participants in the political arena in 1934 by
troops loyal to the Christian Social government of Doll fuss. These
groups had been bitter opponents throughout tne First Republic and had
developed as parallel 'States within States' organised at every level,
including private armies. The discipline of permanent opposition
maintained an internal hierarchy in both groups with leadership coming
from above. Although the Austrian Social Democrats were more
thoroughly organised in tne Trade Unions tnan many of tneir
counterparts elsewhere, here too the direction was top down. The
leadership remained essentially bourgeois, indeed tne Austro-Marxist
intelligentsia provided the most coherent alternative to Leninism
during the entire period. The requirements of defending the 'lager'
encouraged the creation of a movement led by a virtually autonomous
elite. In this tney built upon Habsourg traditions, maintained today
in the phrase 'Untertanenkultur'(a culture of subordinates).
The Christian Social Party had its roots in the Catnolic Churcn and
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the rural peasantry, reflecting its make-up in its organisational
structures. They were encouraged by much of the post-imperial
aristocracy and a cnurcn hierarchy hardened by years of opposition to
secularism and socialism. The party encouraged the creation of
private armies and more importantly still, could claim the allegiance
of the national army. The sharp division between these two groups was
highlignted by Christian Social control of the provinces and Socialist
domination in Vienna. The Social Democrats began an internationally
recognised attempt to create a new 'Red Vienna' with vast programmes
of public utility building (including housing), financed largely by
taxation of the wealtny bourgeoisie. Tnis merely exacerbated tne gulf
between the imperial capital which had lost its ninterland and the
alpine provinces under Christian Social control.
Tne picture is not complete without reference to the third 'lager',
the so-called German Nationalists, wno represented tne dissaffected
and anti-clerical bourgeoisie. In alliance with the Christian
Socials, they isolated the Social Democrats into permanent opposition,
despite tne latter's preference for unity with Germany. This group
was to be a fertile recruiting ground for the NSDAP, especially after
1933.
It is not our task here to outline tne circumstances in wnicn tne
First Republic collapsed (see below). Suffice to say that Austria's
disappearance into tne Third Reich resulted in an eventual, if slow,
realisation on behalf of Christian Social and Social Democrat
activists that the recreation of Austria after the War would only be
possible if the pre-War pattern was not repeated. This was confirmed
by the experience of four-power occupation and in the process of
seeking a new State Treaty. The postwar successors to the two larger
'lager', tne SPOe and tne OeVP began a twenty-year coalition, while
their affiliates agreed an institutional framework to secure social
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peace, known as Social Partnership. This semi-rituallsed 'burying the
hatchet' has outlasted the period of party coalitions.
The lager agreed that employment in the public sector should be on
the basis of 'proportionality' or 'Proporz', to ensure that the Social
Democrats would not be isolated as before. At cabinet level tnis was
a reflection of election results, but its influence extended into
every area. The need to preempt the Soviet Union led the new
government to nationalise all key sectors of the Austrian economy (eg.
banking, cnemicals, steel, energy etc.) creating the largest public
sector outside Eastern Europe. This created a readily available
network for a new 'Proporz' policy, supplementing the already
legendary Austrian bureaucracy.
The socioeconomic success of postwar Austria nas nevertheless had a
consideraoly darker aspect. The creation of a system consciously
based on party carve-ups has institutionalised the parties still
further into semi-State institutions. Even more tnan before, they
have become the great providers. Employment in the public sector
became largely a matter of party affiliation. Virtually nothing is
free of party gift eg. banxs, heavy industry, teacning posts,
television, sports clubs, pensioners cluos, football clubs etc. are
all party identified. Such a systat invites corruption.
Universities have also been affected. The state takes a direct
interest in University appointments through the Ministry of Education.
As such they too have come under the influence of proporz. The power
of the 'lager' is combined in many writings with the influence of
legal reasoning stemming from the concepts of the 'Rechtsstaat'. In
general, the debate on Austria's political history, goals and function
show an unlikely bias towards legal experts and economists acting in
close consort with the party elites. All parties represented in the
Nationalrat are entitled to public funding for research institutes,
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which claim the allegiance of many academics.
The degree of unanimity among the establishment, political, legal,
economic and academic as to tne nature of Austria's status is
remarkable, at least on the surface. This tendancy to 'conxnitted
history' is not unique, but the problem arises because of tne
domination of the proporz parties (ca. 90-95% of the vote at all
elections 1945-83). Thus the description of neutrality nas been
overwhelmingly by those who had a stake in its creation and have
benefitted directly from it. The official unanimity over neutrality
corresponds only to the multiplicity of definitions (some directly
opposed to the Austrian version) stemming from observers elsewhere.
During the Nationalrat debate on Neutrality, the representatives of
tne third Group isolated by the other two parties, the VdU, objected
that the Proporz-party's version of events was at minimum 'economic
with the truth'. Yet in tne legal writings of the time, even this
finds little echo. For a true alternative version we seem to have to
resort to Moscow's loyal domestic deputy, the KPOe.
Arising out of this scenario is the raison d'etre of this project.
The task at hand is to reassess Austria's international activities
both as a State and as a neutral State. As such it will be necessary
to engage in a dialogue with those theories and versions presented so
far. Ultimately we will be engaged in a task of reconstruction along
alternative lines. .
dr being non-Austrian
As a non AusLnuiT, the main advantages^come from a stance outside
of the Proporz premises and additionally as someone untrained in the
logic of tne Rechtsstaat. In admitting this certain 'otnerness'
between the observer and the observed, no new objectivity can be
claimed but at least new light can be shed on existing versions. If
it succeeds in challenging accepted dogma, it will have succeeded as a
whole.
It is my contention that a serious discrepancy exists between the
reality of Austrian activity and political experience and the widely
accepted version of events. The discrepancy emerges in respect of tne
two key areas of Austrian experience; in relation to Austrian
relations to Germany before and after 1945 and in relation to
Austria's position in the Cold War. In both cases, the Proporz elite
has successfully imposed a system of justification and explanation
whicn ultimately fails to convince.
Officially, foreign policy activity is circumscribed in a strictly
limited way by certain 'absolute' legal commitments under the heading
'permanent neutrality', chosen freely by Austria. It is my contention
that the reverse is true. All individual political decisions and
neutrality 'law' are actually justified in the light of goals agreed
in general by the Proporz parties and the powers. Through the medium
of widespread repetition, inconsistencies are ignored to present an
official picture justified in terms of law but actually comprehensible
only in terms of tne political preferences of the proporz parties.
Increasing distance from the State Treaty and neutrality make the
traditional version seem increasingly untenable, and inter-party
unanimity under Kreisky was often threatened. A series of decisions
at local, EEC, military and UN level serve to outline the pre-eminence
of the political, also for neutrality. This has been made unavoidable
bg tx>tb sides
by the ideological differences espoused,m the Cold War.
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Austria has developed a neutrality adequate for the Cold War but
ineffective for 'Hot War'. Hence it has lost its primarily military
purpose. Neutrality on the Iron Curtain has undergone a fundamental
change since the advent of the nuclear age, and this reality has also
become clear most quickly in the neutrals established since World War
II. These countries have had to adapt nineteenth century certainties
to fit twentieth century insecurities. The nuclear age may also mean
that traditional theories of 'power' and 'domination' as represented
in realist or world systems schools have to be revised, or at least
reorientated.
Austrian neutrality is based on a fundamentally unstable dicnotomy
between the status of permanent neutrality in a systemic conflict with
allegiance to the entire system of one of the parties to that fight le
the West. Thus the 'neutrality' of a particular act will have to be
determined by those to whom there is no natural allegiance, ie. the
USSR. Austrian Foreign Policy thus seeks to prevent this dilemma
becoming too acute.
Neutrality is also a mechanism by whicn Austria can develop an
international profile separate from Germany. Thus Austrian histories,
both collective and individual (eg. Waldheim) have tended to recognise
that their security lies in emphasising their distance from Third
Reich activities. Where the integrity of conflicts predates tms
historical revision this version breaks down (eg. Slovenes). Foreign
policy co-opts law and particular counter-examples to 'explain' or
'justify' actions in line with these political goals. This presents a
far more coherent picture of Austrian neutrality than an official
explanation.
The unanimity of the Proporz parties and the tacit desire of the
four powers to steer Austria away from Germany have made speculations
as to the true nature of Austrian nistory look unfounded.
Nevertheless, events of late have tended to suggest that the old
version is now in terminal decline.
Finally, I should make one remark about the structure of this work.
The first two chapters are concerned to sketch the debate in the light
of two characteristics commonly held to define or even predetermine
Austrian foreign policy behaviour. The following four sections
concentrate on policy in certain areas which have been divided
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somewhat arbitrarily for the purpose of clarity. The seventh section
is an attempt to assess the place of defence policy in Austrian
thinking. The reader may note the absence of a section dealing
directly with the domestic roots of policy and their relation to
neutrality. This is largely because it proved less cumbersome to deal
with domestic attitudes to each policy area and it is to be hoped that
domestic factors will be adequately assessed within this structure.
The choice of areas was, of course largely given. Where I have had to
select (eg. EEC in preference to Council of Europe, particular aspects
of cross-border relations) I have done so because it seemed to bring
out particular themes more clearly.
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CHAPTER ONE
Small States in International Relations: an outline
"Equality of possessions is no douot
right, but, as men could not make
mignt obey right, they have made
right obey might. As they could not
fortify justice they have justified
force, so that right and might live
together and peace reigns, the
sovereign good"
B. Pascal, 'Pensees' No 81
Introduction
There are, of course numerous theories, developed on a general
level which are designed to explain various aspects of the position of
a State. In Austria's case, tnere are several immediately obvious
issues; political geography, physical size and neutral status and
their application to this particular historical situation.
Austria is one of two Western neutral countries to share a border
with tne Eastern bloc (the other being Finland) and tnis fact nas been
(unsurprisingly) central to Austria's conception of her own role in
the European System.
"Whoever lives in Vienna, Berlin or Helsinki, has, even from tne
fact of geographical position, a totally different evaluation of
Detente from tnose wno live, for example, in Houston, Texas.
Of course, the role of geography in international relations is tied
to the relative powar and size of nations. As the Danish author Bjol
points out:
"It should be stressed that security geograpny is not a 'pure'
geographical category, fixed by nature. It varies considerably with
tiie political environment, with the type of international system in
which the State finds itself and with the state of that international
system"^
The Benelux countries' experience of neutral status in two World
Wars led them to a fatalistic view of the role of a small neutral
state caught geographically between competing powers (at that time
Germany and UK/France.^ Austria's postwar position might appear
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to resemble the position of Belgium rather more than that of Sweden or
Switzerland. Certainly military strength and rationale have often
appeared decisive. As Vital remarked;
"Military force is not everything in the relations between States,
but where there is both tne capacity and the will to employ it, it
necessarily overshadows all ends"'*
Yet Austria's postwar behaviour has not resulted in the fate of
Belgium even though the giant arsenals of the superpowers and their
allies make it surprising that small States continue to exist at all,
were military capacity to be the only issue. War in Europe may have
declined in scale and frequency but wars in general have continued and
the threat of war is even greater given the emergence of weapons of
mass destruction.
As we examine tne case of Austria we will be confronted with tne
problems of geographical location. We will also be concerned to
isolate the influence of the status of Neutrality and to understand
its changing role and content. In this chapter we will address one of
the classic factors used to assess tne effectiveness of States as
political actors - size. In Austria's case this is important, as many
of ner limitations and possibilities are attributed to a vague notion
of 'smallness'. We will be concerned to ask whether this concept too
must be retnougnt in the light of weapons which threaten a wider
destruction than previously possible. As such we will be compelled to
address issues of power and violence.
Size has even been a domestic issue in Austria. Following defeat
in the First World War, tne Habsburg Bnpire was broken up into
'National' states. The German-speaking population, particularly in
Vienna, had been the most committed to tne Empire and tne resulting
Austrian state was considered by many (indeed the majority) as being
too small to be viable. Adjustment to the size of the new German-
Austrian State and especially to the loss of the industrial heartland
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of the old empire (in Bohemia, now part of Czechoslovakia) was to be a
long and painful one.5 Nevertheless, the most pressing concern of
Austrians in this period was not the military weakness of the new
State but its cultural and economic viability. Clearly size of
country refers not only to security but also to tne economy. Fear of
becoming an economic backwater has motivated many states to seek
alignment or integration with larger allies.
We shall examine both the security aspects and the economic
implications of 'smallness' in an international global system. How
much does size - geographical, military and economic - determine the
foreign policy activity and options of states? How far do small
states shape their policies purely because of their modest position on
a
the scale of power? What is the scope for policy in system which at a
superficial level appears so unbalanced?
Small States, unable to compete on a global scale may be forced
into more imaginative forms of foreign policy activity. The question
is whether this leads merely to "futile exercises in
international morality in place of a responsible foreign policy"^ or
whether small States, free from particular interest, can establish a
more general interest? It is possible, however, that in the light of
the destructive power of modern war technology, the destiny of all
States, especially on the 'front line' in Europe has or may become a
collective matter. In sucn a scenario, small States may be essential
in the prevention of the outbreak of total conflict.
The Austrians have discovered tneir own community to be a
separate 'nation' only since World War II and perhaps for this reason
the concept of 'national' or 'patriotic' morality in which the primary
duty of the individual citizen is towards the nation personified in
the State, has a somewhat hollow appeal. In any case, postwar Austria
living in the shadow of the superpower confrontation seems to have
10
linked the notion of national interest to an early perception that
defence depends on the maintenance of a fragile peace.
A definition of smallness?
In the postwar era, the breakup of the European overseas empires has
meant that on a world scale more small States have been established
than destroyed and boundaries in many cases remain matters of dispute.
Decentralisation, as Christmas-Moller points out has paralleled
centralisation. The system of nation-states and of power in
fixed territorial communities has divided the world up into actors of
uneven capacity.
As an analytical tool, however, the concept of tne small State has
been criticised as both unhelpful and indefinable, even though
practical politicians appear to use it as a working concept. The
first post-war contribution to the debate was Annette Baker Fox's The
Power of Smal 1 States^, a work which was to be as controversial as it
was influential, stressing 'security'. The 'Realist' school laid its
stress on the military capabilities of States as decisive in terms of
the maintenance and securing of power. Many European observers,
especially wnere tnere were already schools of thougnt on small State
theory, felt that the Fox approach was inadequate to explain the
largely favourable fate of small States after World War II, and
additionally resented an American 'Great Power' approach to the
question of national dependence and independence.
"Neither Fox nor any of her reviewers seemed to have the least
knowledge of European predecessors and demonstrated a lack of
historical perspective... This starting point also rendered the
approach one-sided, since the American scholars, having no personal
insight into and experience with the problems related to small states,
limited tne focus of interest to that of the security problem."^
In terms of a security-orientated model, then, the small State was
a unit with very little real power. Robert Rothstein, another
American writer, attempted to show that small States were not merely
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small versions of great powers. Rejecting the idea of a mere
continuum of power on which the categories of 'great' and 'small' lose
their meaning, he defines the small power as;
"a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily
by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on
the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do
so. "9
Robert Keohane objected to this definition by arguing tnat if it
were accepted, all states other than the 2 superpowers would have to
be considered small States. In so doing ne did not attack the
usefulness of the small State concept as such, but rather, proposed a
new definition, applying a behaviouralist analysis whereby the world
was divided into great, middle and small powers, the last being
"a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or
in a small group, make a significant impact on the system."-*-^
By such a definition, most of the European 'small' States would
have to be considered 'middle' powers. What is already becoming
obvious is that there is no standard by wnicn analysts were able to
agree on the categories applicable to individual States. This fact
alone speaks against an overly literal approach to size as an abstract
concept in relation to States.
Another American, Peter Baehr, rejected the idea of the small
state as an analytical unit. He saw the existence of a multiplicity
of small national units as having a basic destabilising effect. He
was thus uninterested in Keohane's attempt to rescue the notion of a
small State as specifically different from a great power:
"Whatever criterion is adopted, small states form too broad a
category for purposes of analysis. There does of course exist a
continuum of size of states in international relations. However,
notions of a snarp dicnotomy between large and small states snould be
discarded. ... If all states with the possible exception of two are
small, one might as well abandon smallness as a focus of study"-*-!
If abstract measures of 'size' of States prove unrewarding, a
more promising approach may be to start with the identification of
specifically small State behaviour. David Vital made perhaps the most
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successful attempt to give empirical evidence for the notion of small
State behaviour. He accepted that beyond the category of
'Superpower', subdivision becomes more difficult, and recognised that
a concrete, systematic classification would prove impossible. He
overcame this problem by concentrating on 'paradigm cases' of
individual instances where a state can be seen as having exposed
characteristics which we want to study.
"In practice, a state so placed will generally be, for that reason,
an atypical member of its group: not a model but a paradigm."^
Paradigm states will be limiting cases which illustrate those
characteristics which are used intuitively by political observers.
"It is clearly easier to divide great or primary states from the
rest than it is to divide the rest into tertiary and secondary
states."13
Nevertheless, in terms of capacity, we do differentiate between
Germany, Austria, India and Sri Lanka.
Vital's solution is to avoid aostract presuppositions by
establishing characteristics which might be attributed to size imbalances
in the international relations of individual States and to use them as
practical 'markers' from which to illustrate intuitive concepts. This
involves an important shift in method, in that small is here not
defined in the abstract but in relation to other political actors
wnich are defined as larger in the crucial areas at particular
points in history. 'Smallness' is thus defined more precisely in the
context of particular relationships.
Yet this still does not give us any real idea of wnat 'small State
behaviour' might be. The only definitions which can have a more
universal validity must take account of the fact that 'smallness' is
always relational and not a simple measure of military capacity. If we
examine the foreign policies of all countries except perhaps the
superpowers, we will discover that there are times when countries
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negotiate with others as small states and times when they assume a
more dominant role. The Danish writer Bjol makes this point
succinctly;
"By itself the concept of a small State means notnmg. A state is
only small in relation to a greater one. Belgium may be small in
relation to France but Luxembourg is a small state in relation to
Belgium and France a small state in relation to the USA. To be of any
analytical use 'small state' should tnerefore be considered shorthand
for a 'a state in its relationships with larger states'."14
By sucn a definition we avoid the impossible task of establishing
a sort of international 'pecking order' by those quantitative criteria
(GNP, area, population, armed forces) so beloved of behaviouralist
science but which in this case only serve to obscure. I agree with
Bjol that we should rather speak of small State 'roles' into wnich
only two or three powers can never by truly cast. We can now deal
with the Norwegian Hoist's ooservation that;
"Norway is obviously not a small State in any negotiation which has
to do with maritime shipping, but Norway is not a large power wnen you
talk about limitation of strategic arms. In a lot of dimensions, Red
China will come out as a small power".1^
Likewise, Peter Hansen's point that small States so similar in size
as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, tne Netherlands and Austria have taken
very different views on the EEC. Relations to the partner, in this
case the EEC, are dependent on a series of individual factors which
may or may not be matters of imbalanced capacity but which certainly
lead to different conclusions in each separate case. There are some
activities which are influenced by the relative capacities of the
actors, but as we shall see below, there are implications for both
smaller and larger actors in all contacts, and it should not be
assumed that small always entails handicap.
'Foreign policy' is an object of analysis not an analytical tool.
Some commentators suggest that we may thus find more parallels if we
do not compare States according to foreign policy but rather divide
the foreign policies of countries into those whicn follow
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active (passive) policies in certain areas or those whicn follow
routine (extraordinary) policies. Similarity of behaviour of States of
similar size will appear to be more important and significant where
the type of foreign policy may be classified as active (eg European
neutrals on detente at CSCE) and negligible in areas of passive
policy.
Size and interdependence
We must now explore the influential schools of thought on the
international system and their theories of the existence and actions
of States. Is what has been assumed about violence and power still
valid? All of them are based on assumptions about the nature of power
and its distribution throughout the political world. They focus on
various areas and sources of power emphasising various degrees of
importance between politico-military and economic factors.
In dominant States, the most influential tradition is encapsulated
in the school of political realism. This underlines the ultimate
importance of brute force in international relations. The centre of
tnis type of analysis in the West was thus the USA, precisely that
country which stands to gain most from a theory which reduces the
effective actors on the world stage to two. Interestingly, writers in
the USSR have a similar world view, remarkably similar to that of
their rival and 'ally in power' tne USA.
The militarily defensive posture of small States would
seem to suggest the importance of size in this area. Yet for most
European states, military survival has ceased to be the main component
of their relations to other States. Amstrup writes in his book on
Danisn foreign policy:
"To Denmark as to other small states the preservation of
sovereignty supposedly is the basic goal of foreign policy, but as
this is not contested by any state in tne present international
system, it becomes almost meaningless to try to analyse Danish foreign
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policy behaviour from that perspective."]^
From Amstrup's use of the difficult term 'sovereignty' we can
imply that he means territorial sovereignty. As we shall see,
International Law signed by States tends to concentrate its attentions
as to the nature of sovereignty on the purely territorial which gives
rise to problems in the sphere of neutrality. We might legitimately
interpret his statement to mean that military attack is no longer
the greatest danger facing European small States. Clearly the issue
of economic challenges to the power of the nation state, sociological
factors such as internal cohesion and identification with the state as
well as military and political cnallenges are all real. What I will
now try to suggest is that military stalemate and the overriding
threat of total destruction have led to a major change. Individual
small States, especially in Europe, are no more threatened than other
states in military terms. The military threat to sovereignty of some
has been replaced by tne military threat to the existence of all.
This development is in spite of the fact that the hardware possessed
by both competing blocs in Europe has greater destructive potential
than anything before known to humankind. Indeed it is pernaps to tnis
apparent paradox that we must look for the explanation of the shift in
concern in small States. Perhaps precisely because small States are
now patently unable to defend themselves in the military sphere that
the issue has been transformed. In reality, as we have already
remarked the destruction of a small unit in nuclear terms could
endanger larger units also and small States now rely on tnis de facto
collective security. Austria's approach to this is best examined in
relation to ner empnasis on continued and continuing detente.
Although the concept of smallness is elusive its continued
existence must be considered a notewortny feature. If we accept that
it has relational rather than predefined origins, then it is a concept
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which will continue to be valid as long as States continue to compete
for degrees of dominance with one another. Nevertheless it is clear
that the criteria for definition and for the degree to which tney are
determinant of international relations has undergone change in the
postwar era.
"Many classic beliefs about military power and economic resources
and their importance for the survival of States seem to be
contradicted by the continued existence of small States. Or it might
be supposed that the small political unit offers other qualities to
the citizens, sufficient to explain their loyalty."1^
The realist school assumed States to be the sole or most important
actors;
"The state forms the institutional framework and is the guarantor
of the nation's safety. It is the surest means of realising
unfulfilled national aspirations. In serving these ends, the state
becomes enshrined in the exclusive sympathies and emotions which
nationalism evokes. It is tne symbol and expression of the national
will."18
Small States are accorded roles on the 'causal' and 'impact'
(effect) levels.
"It is obvious tnat in the great power tradition tne causal level
imposing its power on the level of small and medium sized countries
consists of members of an international oligarchy. The focus is in
other words on the patterns of dominance and exercise of power."1^
By power is meant;
"man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By
political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among
holders of public autnority and between the latter and the people at
large."20 The threat of violence, in international affairs war, is an
intrinsic element of politics, tnough the actual use of violence
signifies the abdication of a belief in political power. "In
international politics in particular, armed strength as a tnreat or a
potentiality is the most important material factor making for the
political power of a nation... The actual exercise of physical
violence substitutes for the psychological relation between 2
minds.
In this view, politics is a Machiavellian struggle to achieve
dominance.
"The essence of international politics is identical
with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international
politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different
conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and
international spheres."^1
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In such a struggle the role for small states is ultimately that of
also-rans i.e. decision-making is not a sphere for activity. The
process is ultimately one of fusion, not fission; small states can
only remain independent if large states see this as being in their
interest, e.g. as buffer states. 'Only' in quite exceptional
22
circumstances can a small country rely on other States for security.
According to this approach small powers become merely pawns in the
game. Politics is merely the struggle for power, and thus Morgenthau
argues that the degree of involvement in international politics varies
from USA or USSR to Switzerland or Venezuela to Leichtenstein and
Monaco. Spain was thus more involved in international politics in the
sixteenth century than she is now (also Austria, UK). USA and USSR
have risen more recently.^3
Power is always the immediate aim. Components of power indicate
astute diplomacy, national prestige, quality of government in the
conduct of foreign affairs and the dubious notion of national
character. Vital argues that
"given the intricacy and primacy of the connection between force
and policy for all states and the central impact on the structure of
contemporary international relations caused by the widening gap
between the military capabilities of a very small number of states on
the one hand and all tne other states on the other, the effect is not
- as many suppose - to constrain the strong vis-a-vis the weak. On
the contrary, it is slowly and inexorably to heighten the latter's
vulnerability and narrow the political no less than military options
open to them.
This explains the arrogance of the Soviet Union in dismissing
Finland as 'a peanut' or of Roosevelt who did not bother to inform
Congress of Siam's declaration of war during World War II.25 The
Middle East Crisis, Latin American crises, Vietnam War etc are, in
this view, not primarily about anything other than great power
conflict in a small State setting.
In fact, in the postwar era, tne superpowers have increasingly been
faced with the autonomy of regional conflicts which they are powerless
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to control. Classic examples of this include Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam
and Ethiopia.
Political realism is based on a concept of human nature wnicn
entails a struggle for individual domination defined as 'power'. As
such International Law is a temporary agreement which reflects the
state of the struggle at a given moment or period in history. Small
states sandwiched as they are suffer from a permanent security dilemma
which can be removed "only by system-wide measures, not by their own
initiative."2^
Three methods mignt be suggested by which a small State could seek
security; a stable balance of power, the existence of a hegemonial
protecting power or a remote geopolitical location making tnem
unattractive in terms of imperial ambitions. The most elusive of these
is tne concept of the balance of power. Nevertheless European
experience has been dominated in the recent past by a search for this
illusion. Haas has noted eleven definitions of wnat might constitute
a 'Balance of Power'. Yet all States continue to drive to achieve
preeminence.
Aron uses the term 'multipolar equilibrium'2^ to describe the
desired state of affairs between rivaling powers. Small powers can
hope to participate only if the ambitions of the powers are balanced,
but this may necessitate alliance with one of the great powers, thus
losing independence.
As we can already glean, the 'balance of power' can only ever offer
permanent instability. In the nuclear age this instability has taken
on a new dimension. The actual outbreak of conflict now threatens to
engulf not only the smaller 'bystanders' in the manner of Belgium in
World War I but threatens the combatants themselves. The result in
Europe has been an uneasy equilibrium of competing coalitions between
which rivalries have become more permanent and even more fierce.
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In the realist school, Small States, not part of either coalition,
depend fundamentally on great power relations. One view would suggest
that detente would thus improve the position for the small power, a
minority, however, maintain that detente may lead to the hegemony of a
great power condominium which although it would not physically
28
threaten the state would curtail its room for manoeuvre.
The empnasis, then, of the 'power' school is on 'survival' of
states. Yet those dependent on balance must be aware, as Morgenthau
points out, that all political balance is long-term unstable.
"Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the
distribution of power at any particular moment in history is correct,
it must at least make sure that, whatever errors it may commit, they
will not put the nation at a disadvantage in the contest for power ...
To that effect all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power
must actually aim jriot at balance - that is equality - of power but at
superiority of power on their own behalf.'
Even tne principle of national self-determination can be used
against originally dominated groups. It emerged as an anti-status quo
and anti-imperialist idea, but Hitler used it effectively against
those nations who had been most successful initially and as an
effective instrument of imperialism, wnile Czecns, Poles and Slovaks
used the concept of nation to defend the status quo. Nations who
defend a status quo witn wnich others are unnappy (e.g. UK Inter War,
Czechoslovakia 1920-38 etc) cannot simply declare their policies as
non-imperial ist but must find some mechanism of justifying tne status
quo e.g. 'peace' or by means of international law which of course
reflects tne established view in 'objective' terms.
Realism is now widely under attack as inadequate. World Systems
Analysis highlights economic relationships and the associated
redistribution of power. In this view, economic integration has
eroded the scope of independent national political action. The very
stability of alliances has thus resulted in the new challenge to the
sovereignty of the State by encouraging increasing integration witnin
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blocs. Fran the perspective of a small State, this world economy
would seam to threaten the state's freedom of action through growing
dependency on a particular larger state's economy, growing dependence
on a foreign monopoly or increasing concentration of production and a
seeming drift to tne status of economic backwater.30
World Systems Analysts divide this model into core, semi-periphery
and periphery, the precise nature of whicn remain somewnat elusive
(especially regarding the placement of nations in the lower 2
categories). Wallerstein believes that it is position within this
model which defines the state's ability to control events;
"Within a capitalist world economy, the state is an institution
whose existence is defined by its relation to other 'states'. Its
boundaries are more or less clearly defined, its degree of judicial
sovereignty ranges from total to nil. Its real power to control the
flows of capital, commodities and labour across frontiers is greater
or less. The real ability of the central authorities to enforce
decisions on groups operating within state frontiers is greater or
less. The ability of the state authorities to impose their will in
zones outside state frontiers is greater or less."2*-
Thus the role of the State is secondary but remains ill defined.
Various groups inside, outside and across state frontiers attempt to
influence the power of the state by changing power constellations
because these changes will improve the group's ability to profit
directly or indirectly from the changed market. The state thus acts
as 'convenient intermediary' in tne establisnment of market
constraints in favour of or against specific groups.
State power exists tnen, especially internally, but tneir
political and military capabilities are eventually dependent on
success within tne capitalist world economy.-*2 Naturally this is true
mostly of those export-orientated economies seeking constant growth
(ie most small States). Gartner puts it as follows:
"The laws of the international market determine the actions of the
national state. The internal outworkings of this are nevertheless the
role of the respective national conditions and politics. The state
can try to create tne best conditions for its own economy, but even
this internally orientated accumulation is externally determined as the
standards of the internationalisation process are given by tne World
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Market."33
World Systems analysis tries to account for the economic
pressures on states and additionally for the idea of uneven
development. As the world economy goes through cycles based on
capital accumulation and investment patters. Expansion normally
benefits the core leading to calls for trade liberalisation and
increasing penetration into the economically peripheral areas and the
shifting of power to the core. Each individual core member may be
affected differently and in the long-run new core rivalries are set up
which may lead to calls for protection. If trading blocs involving
various nations result then the predicted reduction in penetration may
not occur. Thus upward mobility for a deprived state is selective.
The relative stability of this model is explained by the individualist
competitive role played by semi-perlphera1 states, wnich compete
against one another and thus prevent the emergence of a polarised
core-periphery model.^ Austria is thus 'semi-peripheral' in this
model.
Some writers such as Wallerstein see the world as a single world
economy with a solitary division of labour, although divided into
nation states. Nevertheless the system functions as a 'World
Empire'35 Economic forces dictate the making of political rules.
Otner commentators sucn as Andersson see economics and politics as
complementary processes.
"The capitalist world economy cannot be understood only as a
historic and geographic concretisation of the capital-relation. Tne
capital-relation constitutes together with the nation-state-relation a
totality, tne capitalist world economy, which can and must be studied
on different levels of abstraction"^
In tnis view, States face 3 main economic trends; concentration,
transnationalisation and increasing prominence of technology.
"Nation states and tneir politico-bureaucratic machineries operate
in the international economic environment guided by these factors.
Political activities are in many ways based on existing economic
capacity but no deterministic relationship can be discerned; the
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wealthiest nations are not always the most powerful, nor vice versa"37
From the above it is clear that we have moved away from purely
physical definitions of power. World Systems Analysis would suggest
that military capacity is more closely shaped by economic factors
given the military dependence on technology.
"A basic point of departure is that an increase in a nation's
economic power almost invariably correlates with its military
capacity. Baran and Sweezy with great clarity make the point that
military capacity is needed to maintain or to improve a nation's
position in the exploitative hierarchy. This concerns primarily
leading nations, the core of the world economy, which are also drawn
into intra-core competition and the show of force" ^8
Normally, then, it is assumed that a nation's military and
economic standing will correlate: economic growth will lead to
military growth, and stagnation too will be mutual. Superficially at
least, empirical evidence does not necessarily support this
contention. Austria in particular has undergone 25 years of post-
State Treaty growth without increasing military expenditure in real
terms. There may indeed be conerent and concrete reasons for this,
but they may correspond with another analysis of the position faced by
Austria. Perhaps as a State whose experience of war was largely
negative, Austria provides an example of a new approach where military
expansion is seen to restrict growth without improving security.
In a small state, the chances of influencing this world-economy
for individual gain appear very slight. In order to move up in the
international hierarchy, the state must have some form of military and
economic power. Yet under Systems analysis, many European small
States are considered semi-peripheral, and thus should be in the
forefront of economic competition. Vayrynen puts this discrepancy
down to the concentration in Systems Analysis on generalities,
focussing on the mode of production and the nature of state power.
Research in the European small States themselves, on the other hand,
has generally assumed premises whicn might be considered
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'Structuralist'.39
Structuralist theories tend to concentrate on the notions of a
'power structure', involving a hierarchy of nations based on
overlapping and at times reinforcing areas of power. Keohane's
definition of a small power as that country which can never act alone
or in a small group to make a difference to the systam would tend to
be accepted by such analysts. At its most basic, the world power
structure would then tie seen as a fairly permanent hierarchy in wnich
those at the bottom have very little freedom or mobility. The
structuralist approacn is not limited by the concentration in realist
thinking on military power or the world systsns preoccupation with
global economic logic. Nevertheless, small States remain weak units
in this analysis also.^®
Small States are nevertheless able to utilise various resources
and opportunities to improve their position. Smallness as we have
seen is relational; the strength of the structuralist conception of
international hierarchy is that as rule of thuxib it is attractive to
the small nations themselves, being more 'realistic' tnan eitner
realism or world systems analysis. Hence some structural analyses
have pointed out the importance of the actual interaction between
nations as important.
"Those on tne receiving end or otherwise subordinated to the
dominance of greater powers have been regarded as small states"^
This allows us to view small States in tne context of tneir
relationships rather than purely in the abstract. The weakness of
structuralist analysis is that it does not really explain how
countries adapt to their subordination to external powers internally.
The absolute lack of resources in small powers might lead to what
might be called 'asymmetrical structural dependence on larger
partners, which is reflected in economic dependence and long-run
instability. Small states are thus sensitive to snail changes in
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partner States and vulnerable to major political changes.
Structural analyses use the concept of 'structural scarcity';
relative deprivation in absolute terms of population, size, GNP,
military or combinations of the above. The variety of indicators and
definitions used is, as we outlined before, the main problem. Indeed,
the dichotomy between small 'size' and small 'power' has not even been
fully recognised. The comparison of indicators leads to a rather
static model of state activity. Structural scarity of any sort,
however, can in a multi- and transnational system only lead to varying
degrees of 'interdependence'. In this sense, structural theories are
a clear advance on 'realism' which concentrates on competition and
'dependence'.
Vogel outlines in his scheme the forms this might take;
Figure _142
structural scarcity —
(GNP, pop, area, defence etc)
external economic dependence
(% of exports (trade) in GNP)
-external sensitivity
(instaoility of export revenue
domestic instability trade induced)
Probability of foreign penetration
In most cases the result is a combination; dependence to
sensitivity to foreign penetration. Empirical research however seems
to suggest that while small countries are economically dependent (ie
there is a correlation between size and economic dependence, even
stronger between high population density in small states and economic
dependence), they are not particularity externally sensitive. Coppock
found in 1962 that
"high involvement of a national economy in international trade
means participation in wider markets both as supplier and demander,
and that such a participation will contribute to stability of export
proceeds (and of the domestic economy) rather than lessen it"42
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Vogel maintains that the cole of foreign policy (including if not
sometimes led by foreign economic policy) is to find a means to
interrupt the forms of dependency. This might be otherwise expressed
as exercising sovereignity. A State can either concentrate on
strategies to reduce the negative effect of existing interdependence
by means of degrees of isolationism or self-sufficiency, or seek to
reduce economic sensitivity by concentrating on certain commodities,
diversification of trading partners, participation in international
organisations and taking up specific roles requiring individual or
informal talents or reputation. The application of this or a
combination of sucn policies will be the role of the respective
governments. In general, governments have rejected isolationism, and
in Europe this is universally tne case except in specific areas. The
t
EEC has reduced tariffs amongst its own members but still operates
protectionist policies towards tne rest of the world. Austrian
agricultural production is largely politically determined and Austria
has remained almost self-sufficient in production.
Trading groups are always likely to see their interests being
damaged by protection and point out that the greater the level of
involvement in international markets the greater the chance that the
country can have some influence. Indeed, as we shall see, tnose
politicians most keen to support Austrian (eventual) entry into the
EEC constantly stress this point.^4
In international trade, small States stress the need to reduce the
degree of sensitivity to external forces. There is some evidence from
Coppock's research of interdependence without excessive sensitivity.
Switzerland has sought a very liberal trade regime and has been
very wary of 'political' interference in trade policy. Swiss writers
emphasise the importance of free trade as the basis of small State
success. This nelps to explain the urgency in the EEC negotiations
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and, in Austria the importance of abolishing trade barriers.
In Switzerland commercial diplomacy is paramount with emphasis on
state co-operation with private enterprise though strictly without
state involvement with ownership. In Austria the Social Partnership
system has ensured an important degree of domestic unity in the
approach to foreign competition. It should be noted that Austria
supports a liberal trade regime but has a high level of corporatism and
State involvement in the domestic economy. In both cases there can be
no divergence of interests between producers and State. The
complexity of large economies by their very nature tends to give rise
to domestic conflicts of interest. Being small is both the stimulus
to such policy and also a necessary condition. No large state with
measurable effect on the world economy could introduce Swiss style
banking, for example, or have as much freedom with monetary and fiscal
policy as Austria or Finland. The repercussions would be too great.
Small states gain expertise in areas of international affairs which
other states can only imitate. The Swiss experience suggests that
small States face fewer clashes of interests as the choices are so
stark as to be widely accepted. This requires domestic consensus and
loyalty to the concept of the State itself however.
In certain circumstances, foreign policy can be higher-risk than
those of larger states, because the effect of the international system
becoming destabilised is less e.g. Iceland can initiate the Cod War
against UK. This applies more generally not so much in terms of the
imposition of dominance as in the realm of agenda setting. Small
States have been able to provide local experiments for policies which
have then become more widely acknowledged eg Benelux, Austria and
Hungary. On the other hand, both World Wars have been catalyzed by
local power rivalries involving lesser military powers.
Austria's position has been different to Switzerland. Economic
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dependence on West Germany has continued to a degree virtually
unparal lei led in Western Europe and thus a theoretical export
sensitivity exists, which has as yet not come into play. Foreign
policy has had a much more active profile especially through
involvement in international organisations, developing specific
politico-economic skills (East-West trade and diplomacy) and most
importantly a mucn less isolationist foreign policy aimed at creating
a peaceful political environment more than reducing control.
Austria has attempted to reduce her own exposure by this active
foreign policy aimed at both blocs. Nevertheless, despite a highly
corporatist economic structure (in philosophy if not in effect the
opposite of Swiss practice) there has not been any real domestic unity
on foreign policy between 1966 and 1983 (at least). Even where tne
direct economic interest has been threatened there was little real
unity at political party level. Since 1983, and the ending of
superpower detente trade issues have predominated and there has been a
return to oligarcnic foreign policy led by trade/economic issues.
Structural theories offer little to explain this change. In Austrian
terms we must look partly to historico-political factors to understand
Neutrality, foreign policy and internal corporatism. Structuralism
explains some of these features but cannot be held to be complete.
Pure theories of structural scarcity would lead inevitably to a
notion of inevitable assymmetry, arguing that West Germany though
dependent on her EEC partners has more freedom than either Belgium or
the Netherlands. while in long-run 'economic' terms this may be
intuitively obvious, on a 'political' level this can scarcely be a
consistent rule eg Denmark, Ireland and Greece have had considerable
influence in the EEC while West Germany came under considerably more
pressure from the US to deploy US missiles than did the Netherlands or
Belgium.
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Smal 1 Powers; living with the threat of domination
"Nought's had, all's spent,
Where our desire is got without content
'Tis safer to be that which we destroy
Than by destruction dwell in doubtful
joy."
Shakespeare 'Macbeth' Act 3 Sc 2
What then are we to conclude regarding small states as an
analytical unit for international relations. Power politics nations
i.e. great powers will inevitably seek to emphasise the final
character of military superiority. Certainly in small bloc-bound
nations (especially in Eastern Europe) the experience with small
states taking independent foreign policy approaches has been largely
negative. In terms of foreign economic policy (as opposed to domestic
applications) nations appear to be lined up on one side of an economic
divide or another. The fate of small States in pre-war Europe seemed
to suggest that where great powers unite, smaller States can only
adapt.
Insofar as small countries attaupt to compete on an equal
level with countries with greater military capacity they are doomed to
failure. There is thus an imperative to avoid military sanction.
Nevertheless, their very smallness can be an advantage at this point,
leaving them open to more flexible opporunities. As such there can
develop a mutual interest between States, but the roles must be
clearly differentiated.
European postwar experience suggests tnat small States have been
remarkably successful in this role, with noteable improvements in
standard of living without increasing security risks. Nevertheless,
it is true that all co-operation takes place in the shadow of the Cold
War, which seems to be the sterile alternative to Armageddon. As long
as this sword of Damocles hangs over States and populations all co-
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operation is necessarily uncertain. This uncertainty applies to all
sizes of political unit, although the decision remains that of those
in control of the superpowers. The challenge which this climax of
reciprocal escalation in force now raises is one with implications for
the conduct of international relations between all States.
Perhaps a more radical critique of all these theories is required. It
appears that the logic of the Balance of Power is that of permanent
and reciprocal escalation. Where neither party gracefully departs
from the competition the final and traditional method of establishing
superiority is through direct military conflict. The development of
weapons of mass destruction may be a decisive turning point in human
history in this respect. Destruction will not now be limited to the
opponent. Any dominance which mignt emerge after such a conflict
would be somewhat hollow. Ironically, were such an armageddon to
occur between the present superpowers it would occur in the defence of
'liberty' on one side and of 'equality' on the other.
Most analyses assume crude notions of power that assume increases
in the power of a particular nation to be achieved only by the
victimisation of all who stand in their way and the cooption of those
who accede to their dominance. Technology now threatens to consume
both dominated and potential dominators in its destructive capacity.
The most basic struggle of states for survival is now the sane at all
levels of military potential.
Realism has also assumed that military victory improves the
standing of the State. The question is merely one of brute force.
Yet this is to take a static view of history which does not allow for
the dialectic which this very power sets in its own chain, one which
tends to the same reciprocity and escalation. It is clear tnat tne
act of War changes all participants, making all judgements as to
victory and defeat merely temporary. Since the First World War this
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tendency has been apparent. In how far can the UK be said to have
been a 'victor'?
Domination has merely ensured that the power will be faced with
competitors and imitators at a later date. This seemingly endless
repetition provides the appeal of realist analyses. Yet tne act of
War risks the total destruction of all societies existent prior to
that war (e.g. Lebanon) after which simple mathematical calculations
as to victory and defeat are impossible. In the end, realist thinking
merely serves to provide a justification for the desires of the powers
involved in struggle.
The apparently simple win/lose calculations are in fact mucn more
complex. The attempt of one group to dominate another by force may
embroil tne country in a permanently escalating battle for control
which can only be solved by a unilateral admission of defeat or lead
to total war. The stateless Jews of East and Central Europe were tne
outcasts of Europe for 1,000 years. They retained a strong sense of
communal identity heightened if anything by attempted domination from
outside. In modern times we have actually seen the attempt to
eradicate this group by genocide.
With this example and the technological weaponry now available,
the implications of future struggles for dominance are frightening.
Realist thinking which accords an 'importance' only to those States
with vast arsenals now threatens to engulf even those States
themselves in its inexorable logic. Until now, the implications of
Atomic War have held back even the competing superpowers and have
afforded a new debate in the role of States in total rather than based
on military size.
What has always been true, ie that War threatens all participants
eventually, has now become reality. This fact allows the reemergence
of small States as tnose with the only capability of breaking the
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logic of competition. The power game as it has emerged over the
centuries (and is accepted as 'unavoidable' or 'realistic') merely
ensures that in the search for elusive 'power', force becomes
enshrined as essential, justified as the means to an end. Any group
or State which would seek power must first create the weapon to do so.
As a result, small groups with communal or sectional roots, devise new
mechanisms of power struggle against which the State can only react
with further violence. Hence we see the development of terrorism
which shows all the signs of escalation on the classic war pattern.
In this sense the real lesson of nuclear weaponry is not in the last
analysis the powerlessness of the small but, surprisingly, tne
futility for all of the striving for might as a means to power.
Between States in Europe this has become reality, at least in the
inter-bloc issue.
Large military powers who attempt the domination of another
community may destroy the institutions of State but beyond mass
murder, they cannot ensure the dissolution of tne smaller community.
This is an important lesson of domination. If the dominated community
can survive until a moment of weakness in the larger community
emerges, a chance may develop for the smaller group itself to escalate
the stakes, if this succeeds in reestablishing new State
Institutions, the future domination of that same small State by the
same large State becomes very unlikely. An example of this is the
relationship of Ireland to the UK. Poland excercises a virtual veto
wnich makes invasion of Polish territory by either Germany or USSR a
matter of wider implications than simple invasion.
In these circumstances even the appearance of calm for a
considerable period does not ensure that the emotions, well-founded or
not, cannot be rekindled at particular points.(eg Ireland,
Scotland (?) for England, Czechoslovakia for Germany, USSR, Saarland
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for France)
It is clear that the increasing role of transnational corporations
in international decision-making reduces the role of the individual
State and makes any discussion of International Relations which fails
to take this into account misleading. At the same time States have
themselves moved into the economic sphere and any strict division
between the 'political' and the 'economic' becomes absurd.
A potential conflict of loyalties between 'Nation' represented in
general by the State and 'Capitalist expansion' has not yet been
decided in favour of Capital. The conception of a single world
economy is distorting in this sense. The slow progress towards any
degree of EEC unity is some indication of the strengtn of national
identity. The urgency of EEC integration lies in the attempt to
create a new 'power'. What is not clear is whetner small States are
losing their effectiveness more quickly than large States. Even
position in relation to a Core-Periphery model fails to provide
decisive answers.
Until now, the struggle for dominance has been the pre-eminent
feature of international 'polities'. This has been true in economics
as well as military struggles. In the military 'State' tradition, the
nuclear bomb puts a questionmark on the purpose of such struggle. In
its shadow, small States nave boundaries as secure as those of large
ones. These states face challenges from transnational integration
whicn reduces the effectiveness of localised power groups. The
stalemate in territorial expansion has indeed been the seedbed of this
development. It is nevertneless a poisoned equilibrium where the
struggle for power has been driven to new spheres rather than removed.
I am not contending that Realism and Systems Analysis do not describe
the situation as we have known it, but rather that they fail to
question the underlying brutality of their maxims.
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Size is only one of a number of aspects of any state. A small
State in central Europe is likely to have as much in common with
larger states in central Europe as with similar sized states in
another continent. This is not to say that size is not important, but
merely to give it a context as one of a series of attributes.
Rothschild found that while change of size after World War I had had
devastating effects on Austria, size itself but was not in itself a
fundamental economic concept.
"There are, of course, times when one may consider changing the
size by customs unions, fusions etc just as one may consider
evacuating areas where the climate is rough or the soil poor.
Decisions of this sort will have far-reaching consequenes for the
whole way of life (including economic conditions and opportunities) of
the population. Decisions on size are therefore major political
decisions in which the economic argument is but one (and not
necessarily the most important) aspect. Once the decision about size
is made (by history or by deliberate action) the main problem seaus to
be not so much what the actual size is but whether the economy is
adjusted to this structural element."^
In small state approaches we have perhaps even more than in other
tneories to avoid generalising from the particular. Perhaps we should
emphasise once more that structural scarcity, even if we accept some
of its insights is a relative concept both in terms of overall
indicators (e.g. population - Austria = Switzerland = Canada = Guatamala
or GNP - Austria = China or Military capacity - Austria Central
American States) and within indictors (e.g. various sectors where a
small country might be powerful).
Size of country and resources clearly plays a role in the position
and influence of States in the present hierarchy. Structural scarcity,
dependence, military capacity, technological imperialism, core-
periphery influence, transnationalism and theories of dominance in an
interdependent system all influence small States though in varying
amounts and with differing significance. We should however avoid the
trap of considering size to be an ultimate handicap to the activities
of States or more importantly of their citizens. It is certainly
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unclear that citizens of large countries enjoy significantly more
freedoms than those in smaller States.
I propose now, to turn to areas of international affairs where
small States' size might be expected to play an important part; where
coercion and interference exist, with specific reference to Finland
and in international interchange without war.
Coercion and Interference in an Interdependent World
"If there is anything that the literature about the role of small
states in international relations has accomplished, it is to bring the
relativity of the notion of 'independence' sharply into focus. Full
independence, in the sense of governments making their own decisions
without being subject to influences from beyond the borders of their
territory, simply does not now exist if it ever did".^
In the present system, States which have relative shortages of
military and economic power are especially likely to suffer if
measures are implemented against them or their vital interests.
Coercion in international relations is thus one element in the power-
dominance-violence spiral which threatens the existence of all
entities. Coercion may involve a degree of meddling in internal
politics, or in a concerted international effort against a specific
target and is usually in the form of
"mounting a convincing threat to introduce or eliminate some
element into or from the otner states total circumstances ... or in
the actual and deliberate alteration of the target state's
circumstances coupled to a promise to restore the 'status quo ante'
should certain conditions be fulfilled;^
Nevertheless, it is a problem which in its implications is likely
to have profoundly unequal effects, as it is likely that were
sanctions to tie imposed against a major economy then the interests of
small partner economies may be even more harshly affected than those
of the target state itself.
5
The classic example of such a dilemma, was the attempt in 193# on
the part of the League of Nations to impose economic sanctions on
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Italy. Switzerland came under great pressure as the economic measures
threatened to pull the delicate local relationship out of balance,
compromising all pretensions of 'neutrality' and endangering, in Swiss
eyes at least, the credibility of Swiss status. In trade terms
Austria and Hungary were in an even worse position;
"Italy was Austria's second most important market, and was
moreover, heavily in debt to Austria at the time. Hungary exported
13% of all its exports to Italy, including no less than 52% of its
surplus wheat. In contrast only 2.4% of Italy's exports went to
Austria and 2.5% to Hungary. It is extremely rare, if not impossible
for a small state to attain this kind of regional paramouncy"
This degree of vulnerability can be linked theoretically both to
notions of structural scarcity and of dependence. Small states appear
to face challenges even in sovereignty over their own decisions, if
they do not maintain friendly relations with influential great powers.
Vital describes the demise of Czechoslovakia in 1938 as the
classic paradigm illustrative of the power shortage in an isolated
small State.5® Despite a functioning advanced economy, a reasonably
sized army and an armaments industry larger than that of Italy, Vital
interprets Czechoslovakia's fate as the result of agreements made by
Great Powers about issues which had Czechoslovakia as a means but not
as an end.
"When and in so far as they touched upon Czecnoslovakia, the
Czechs were at liberty to try to amend or alter these policies but
that is all"^
Czechoslovakia indeed capitulated, despite the fact that German
military commanders were convinced that unaided the Czech army could
resist for a considerable period (probably several months). Indeed on
a world scale, Czechoslovakia was far from being the weakest of the
small states; indeed only in terms of relative comparisons witn a
State so powerful as Germany was there structural scarcity. It would
seem then to be the classic paradigm of political realism.
Morgenthau points out that Czechoslovakia became independent of one
dying and defeated empire only to be swept up within 20 years into
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another and into yet another by 1948. Yet this too is an
unsatisfactory conclusion. Where a cartel of brute force exists,
acting in effect as one mammoth monopoly, it is clearly impossible for
a small 'scapegoat' State to provide territorial resistance. It is
only where we take a static view of history that the matter can be
seen to end there.
The Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 is an obvious case where a
dialectic already clearly in progress in Europe since at least 1933 if
not 1918 merely escalated further and as history shows continued to
escalate. The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia by the British and French
was, rather, part of the realist struggle for power, and points to the
unending upward spiral of violence that lies behind its precepts. It
cannot be denied that the struggle for power over Czechoslovakia
contributed to war which claimed 55m lives and set the scene for the
nuclear nightmare.
The immediate reason for tne collapse of Czechoslovakia in 1938
was indeed lack of force. Yet the lesson cannot be that small States
must join tne arms race or perish. Pernaps it is rather that all
States and communities must abandon this form of activity or all risk
disaster. As we have seen, the arsenals of the superpowers which
threaten everybody are the climax of this logic. As such
Czechoslovakia in 1938 is not so much a paradigm of tne power shortage
of small States but an important step in exposing the warped logic of
violent reciprocity.
"Small state - great power confrontations are probably
confrontations of power only in crisis situations ... One may identify
at least 3 different meanings of 'power'; power to persuade somebody
to do something you wish him to do, power to dissuade ... and the
power not to do what somebody wants you to do""'"'"
It is this last power which gives the numerous small States cause
to resist Great Power pressure. It also has increasing force in the
military if not the economic sphere. Now that the use of a great
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power's ultimate sanction tnreatens the user also, the smaller power can
attempt strategies of 'refusal'. Raymond Aron has pointed to the
existence of tnis strategy in many small States, especially highly
integrated units such as Sweden and Switzerland. Sweden took a
wholeheartedly neutral position on US involvement in Vietnam from an
early stage, much to US annoyance. By so doing, she was able to
expose the conflicts of interest in US policy, something which is
likely to hinder a great power more effectively than a small power, if
only because more 'conflicts of interest' are likely to exist. In the
'normal' definition of interest there is an assumed desire for
'control' and hence large powers seek more complex 'control'.
In the light of the enormity of military threat and the rise of
economic manipulation across boundaries a paradox emerges. Small
States are as likely to be coerced by powers viewed as broadly
'friendly' as by those defined as enemies. It was tne defection of
'friendly' France in 1938 which changed Czechoslovakia's conditions.
This same process can be observed in Austria's dogged resistance to
manipulation by USSR over the EEC, despite eventual compromise, as
opposed to the speed of government reaction to requests for regulation
of technology transfer in the 1980s from the USA. West Germany's role
within the East-West scheme makes it much more open to manipulation
from USA than from the USSR. The threat of violence or other forms of
coercion may sometimes have tne opposite effect.
Ultimately the coercion of small states is possible only in
certain forms, if genocide (and suicide?) is not considered a suitable
option. All competing powers are faced with the question of how far
they are prepared to take their conflict, and this is always as much a
question for great powers as for small states. Swiss defence tactics
have always taken the concept of 'raising the price of entry' as the
guiding principle - ie making 'victory' impossible. In World War I
victory was certainly pyrrhic, but this deterrence logic failed.
Deterrence is no substitute for security. Small States which have no
possibility of mounting a suitable deterrent, eg Holland, Belgium,
Austria were made aware of this fact in the 1930s and 40s. Swiss
success in World War II may have created an overreliance on the logic
of escalation.
Vital's maxim that small state survival;
".. depends on the role the small power plays in the overall
purposes of the great power with whicn it is in conflict. Where its
role is central - as was Czechoslovakia's for Germany - it will fare
badly, where its role is essentialy peripheral - as in Finland's to
this day - it will fare better"^
.. is only a partial explanation. It fails, for example, to
explain why Polish resistance has never faced Russian tanks, while
Czech political reform brought direct and swift military occupation.
It fails to explain why Ireland is immune to attack from the UK.
During World War II, Ireland was able to declare herself neutral.
The extension of military conscription to Northern Ireland was also
impossible.
We are dealing witn notions beyond military calculation; those of
civilian resistance. No state apparatus has ever put its faith in
these untestable concepts but their existence in Ireland and Poland
is unquestionable. These states may be said to have created
c
"a contradiction for (tneir) [text: its] opponents to the prima
facie advantages of some alternative course"-"
on an almost permanent basis. Coercion of a non-military type in
particular, requires of the great power a degree of risk. If it
fails, it may in fact reinforce tendencies orientated against that
state. Perhaps the literature in this field concentrates too much on
instances of successful interference or coercion and is inadequate in
dealing with successful resistance.
What is clear, is that sheer structural or power scarcity in a
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vulgar form is insufficient to explain behaviour. The level of
internal unity, linked to stability and political unanimity are
fundamental. Hence the tendency of powers to intervene in domestic
politics of small states destabilising them where this might bring
about conditions more favourable to them eg US in Chile, 1973, USSR in
Czechoslovakia, 1948. Small states are more vulnerable to force than
larger ones, and the military factor cannot be explained away. For
some States already subsumed in blocs this is a painful reality.
Nevertheless the scope for coercion varies enormously, and only wnere
no large power opposition exists is 'success' assured. The use of
force commits the State to a longterm reliance on that force and tne
escalation of its capacity.
In Europe, the blocs are so established by force that any attempt
to break them by force would lead to 'mutually assured destruction'.
Every small State not in this system is a possible field of conflict
for the superpowers, but as that conflict becomes more dangerous so it
emerges that the large States are now as threatened as the small State
over which they dispute. Examples of this include Cuba and Israel.
Afghanistan caused a crisis but not a war. Economic manipulation may
create in its own time a monster which will threaten the power of the
large States to act as much as it does that of smaller units.
At CSCE., the neutrals found that they could not force others to
accept tneir proposals, but they could nevertheless propose.^ small
states are forced to accept interdependence, but the degree of
influence any one state has is not necessarily simple, nor without
costs for the larger State. As a 'predator' State emerges so an
'anti-predator' State or group tends also to emerge. Thus the
decision to attempt manipulation or brute force on a small State is
always a double-edged sword. Only through the mechanism of the
unanimity of sufficient actors, acting in effect as the law-makers is
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this feasible in the 1980s.
For states like Czechoslovakia, the agreements at Yalta and the
Bomb suggest that for the time being the USA and USSR have agreed her
fate. The opposition of church and people in Poland shows how even
this calculation is not simple. In the case of Austria, the use of
brute force to dominate Austria by either power would be contested by
the other. But this is an equilibrium which is so unstable as to
inspire as much apprehension as enthusiasm.
Finlandisation coercion by stealth?
Vital, writing in 1967, wrote;
"The rising difficulties of maintaining a deterrent capability do
mean, however, that the last autonomous basis of the independence of
states is in process of erosion and that the unequal and assymetrical
relations between them and certain major states are solidifying. For
the future, Finland may be the paradigm of the small independent
state, not Sweden"^
By this, Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union is taken to
show that in the long run, small states will have no alternative but
to adopt a 'pilot fish' approach to foreign policy.
During the 1970s, this notion was part of propaganda about creeping
Soviet domination. The term 'Finlandisation' was coined by the right-
wing German commentator Richard Lowenthal during the period of
Brandt's active 'Ostpolitik'. It was a loose term used to describe
and discredit close ties with the USSR, and indeed Finnish writers
constantly point this out:
"The historical facts suggest 2 major conclusions. First, the
'Finlandisation' debate is not so much a cold war as a detente
discussion. In otner words, Finland's assumed example has been used
to oppose detente rather than to fuel the Cold War. Second, those who
have employed the term 'Finlandisation' have not been so much
interested in Finland's position but rather in utilising their own
purposeful interpretations of it as a psychological instrument for
wider purposes''^"
Various conservative writers tried to define Finlandisation during
the 1970s. Conservative commentator, William Buckley, described
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finlandisation as "the subjugation of the spirit to the Soviet wili"57
and even more damning was the writer Punasalo who concluded that it
was;
"Soviet influence in the country's foreign and domestic policy by
maintaining political control with the co-operation of its leadership
using direct or indirect pressures when required. Finlandisation is a
continuing process. It is a form of communist revolution without
barricades""
Garfinkle concluded that finlandistion was a threat to everybody;
"the process whereby the countries of Western Europe - including
members of NATO - gradually lose their military capabilities, economic
vitality and political willpower, and stripped of its allies are
slowly transformed into isolated neutralised states, fearful of
Russian might and unable to resist Russian desiderata."^
Two superficial observations might be wortn making at this point.
First, on such a scheme as Garfinkle's, Austria would seem to be the
most vulnerable candidate for finlandisation. More importantly, the
description of Finland as lacking economic vitality and political
willpower bears no relation to the reality of Finnish experience.
Indeed, Finland's political willpower appears to have been a major
factor in preventing incorporation into a fully Soviet system.
The evidence for this is based largely on two events : the "Night
Frost" of 1958 where those who suspect Soviet domination point out
that the Russians put pressure on Kekkonen to cause the collapse of a
coalition led by Social Democrats and again in 1961, when it appeared
that the Social Democrats would oppose Kekkonen as president.
Given the central role of the presidency in foreign policy this
analysis claims that the Soviet invocation of military talks under the
1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA)
was a direct attempt to influence Finnish internal politics. Kekkonen
returned from a trip to USA, called a General Election, entered into
some theatrical diplomacy and ultimately ensured the withdrawal of the
Social Democratic candidate amidst much bitterness.^
Writing in the 1980s, Liebowitz points out that in 1958, the
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suspension of the Soviet-Finnish Trade Agreement was not primarily of
domestic party significance. Rather, it was a result of a widening
trade imbalance caused by the devaluation of the Finnmark in 1957 and
the Finnish request to USSR that the debt be financed in hard
currency. In 1961, concern about Finnish involvement with the EEC was
the prime motive.*^ so even here, finlandisation means little.
Liebowitz points out that quite apart from ideological imperialism,
it is ridiculous to expect that Finland could or would want to adopt a
permanently anti-Soviet position. Geography alone ensures that
Finland maintains relations with the nation with whom she shares by
far the most extensive border. Historically, this is reinforced by
the fact that despite Western praise for Finnish heroism, Finland lost
two wars to USSR in the 1940s, while the direct historical connections
between the two states (as Russia not USSR) go back centuries.
Within the context of post-Yalta Europe, Finland's independence
from the USSR is in fact remarkable. Finland was a defeated state in
1945 and hence had no allies (far less than Austria). They had, unlike
Austria, no Western support and were faced with one dominant power.
Paasikivi, whose diaries of the period have recently been published,
records his own pessimism that Finland would avoid the fate of Poland
let alone tnat of Estonia.
Finnish post-war foreign policy has been based on principles,
proposed by Mannerheim and continued by Paasikivi and Kekkonen as
Presidents, that Finland's strategic position vis a vis Leningrad has
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to be recognised and that Russian fears of Germany are real. As
Bjol point out, the very 'model' status of Finland, gives Finland a
6*3
degree of scope which could never be considered that of a satellite.
This status would also disappear were the Finns to be bullied by the
USSR.
Liebowitz underlines this by analysing Finland's relations with
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the USSR. Firstly, although Finnish trade with USSR is greater than
that of any other Western state, 80% of Finnish trade with Coraecon is
with USSR. Petroleum accounted for 62% of Finnish imports from USSR.
Indeed in all other products Finland operates large surpluses.®^
Politically, Liebowitz shows that based on Singer's index, Finland's UN
voting record in 1975 and 76 was clearly that of a neutral not a
satellite, and very similar to that of Sweden. (see Note)
Thus finlandisation appears to be a misnomer. As Liebowitz says
"the price Finland has had to pay for its high living standards
following 2 wars with the Soviet Union has been quite small."
For other small states, the Finnish example is encouraging. If
Soviet influence in Finland can be shown to have been selective, then
its extension to other countries is no certainty. Far from facing
increasing Soviet colonisation, Finland has established an independent
profile, and has in fact reaffirmed the possibility of small States
utilising seemingly negative political constellations.
Areas of Activity in the International System for Smal 1 States
This cannot be and will not be anything more than a brief outline
of some highly selective areas where small States as such have been
active and have been able to exercise a degree of influence. The
powers which small states have are most apparent in international
organistions and especially through the UN. In a European context,
smaller European states were far from inactive at CSCE. Additionally,
small state diplomacy may be useful either in mediation beween blocs
or between allies. This may also be tied up with concepts of
neutrality, the subject of a further chapter. At this point I wish to
concentrate on small state roles before conflict has broken out.
In many ways, small States have tried to claim the mantle of 'the
conscience' of Europe. Holland, Sweden, Austria and the other
Scandinavian states have at times adopted 'moral' poses in defending
policies or attacking others. Small states have thus used the forum
of the United Nations in a remarkably active fashion. At its
inception the UN was intended as a tool to maintain peace by
continuation of the wartime alliance and the doctrine of collective
security. Yet within a very short period the concept had broken down.
This left open the way for small nations to take an initiatory role
in the UN process. As membership has grown so also have grown the
role of smaller states at the UN.^ At the Nobel Symposium in 1970,
Schram pointed out how small states had widened the scope of
discussion eg in 1968 the Swedes first raised the issue of the
environment at the economic and social council. In 1967, Malta first
proposed to the General Assembly that the UN consider laws to govern
sea-bed exploitation leading to the 'Law of the Sea' conference, an
idea admittedly more attractive to smaller than to large countries.
Iceland used the 1968 and 1969 General Assembly to tighten up on
ocean pollution.*^
This cannot be interpreted as extending beyond the scope of snail
state capability;
"precisely because their very smallness, their democratic status
and their relative non-alignment makes them comparatively non-suspect
in the field of international relations [they have] an important role
to play"68
The UN is nevertheless dominated by the spirit of superpower
debate and crisis. As a result the neutrals have been seen as best
suited to also play the leading role in providing forces for peace¬
keeping forces and in providing settings for numerous conferences. It
is true that also at the UN the actual decisions require 'Big Five'
consent, however the existence of these forums also allows smaller
States to distance themselves from large power action and set new
agendas. At Helsinki, Hopmann found that although the Neutral and
Non-aligned group accounted for much of the text of the final
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agreement, this 'proposal' ability had to be set against the ability
of the larger powers to ultimately decide by liberal use of blocking
or vetoing power. Nevertheless, smaller European states could be seen
as playing a similar role to sani-peripheral states in a core-
periphery analysis in the sense that they prevented the continent from
being divided into two poles with only hostile conflict.
Small states have been prime movers in much of the disarmament,
and detente discussion in Europe. In physical terms also small States
prevent the direct confrontation of the Superpowers and their
satellites.
Yet increasingly European small states hold technological cards.
The development of nuclear technology has lead to a natural and
necessary concentration on the politics of those wno possess the
weapons of total destruction. The ultimate logic of proliferation to
smaller countries (eg Sweden) of independently controlled nuclear
weapons has been seriously considered. Superpowers living in the
egocentric world of political realism have been slow to recognise
this.
"We (US) snould not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear
proliferation would mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power
which our great wealth has long given us"°^
Non-proliferation remains, of course, for the vast majority of
small states an economic necessity, but if it is possible for
Argentina, Israel and South Africa, the pariahs of international
affairs to develop appropriate technology, it may well be possiole for
advanced neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland. Voluntary adherence
to non-proliferation should also be recognised as a small-state
contribution.
Diplomacy is a further worthwhile sphere of activity. Where
conflict has not occurred, this can be a singularly effective weapon.
As Vital points out, even here there are resource differences.^
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Nevertheless, small state diplomacy has often been remarkably
effective 71 Yet' wilere effective it can also be deceptive.
Vital attributes Benes' success and international recognition as
reasons for his faith in the power of reasoned argument in the attempt
to avoid being crushed in the German Empire.
Final Observations
There are two obvious traps which must be avoided; the romantic
notion that small states exist with complete dominion over their
own realms but equally the schools of dominance who seek to suggest
that the power and success of a system are to be measured in terms of
ability to impose one's will by force. More and more the truth of the
maxim that existence is coexistence becomes clear.
Military size is but one aspect of an inter-State relationsnip
and to ignore the systemic implications of a developing world economy
in the light of military stalemate would result in a highly
inaccurate analysis. We must, however, remain aware that the world
economy too is run on the principle of a struggle for dominance,
although the major participants in this case are companies and
individuals rather than States.
Nevertheless, the existence of military forces commanded by State
Institutions ensures that the struggle at inter State level remains
immediately relevant. Foreign policy has traditionally been
understood as the attempt to maintain and develop the power base of a
state in an external environment. The manipulation of foreign policy
in a bloc-divided continent imposes a series of very delicate
problems, and in terms of Austria the implications of being a
relatively small state within the West European core have to be set
against the implications of neutrality. As we will see this gives
rise to a number of delicate problems in Austrian affairs.
A 1
Neutrality in both Swiss and Swedish traditions is linked to
notions of national independence. In the legal tradition of
neutrality, the areas where neutrality applies are based on 19th
Century Liberal divisions designed to encourage the development of a
capitalist market economy. Yet the threat to national independence
would seam to come as much from the economic sphere as from direct
military intervention. Indeed the division of Europe into blocs is
justified by the participants as a battle of socioeconomic systems.
All the European Neutrals are 'small' in terms of relative
resources and capitalist in orientation. We must now approach the
question of how these states manipulate neutrality as a unifying
political myth (in an anthropological sense) and ask whether it
addresses the real questions facing States in the Cold War. We can
also examine the degree to which neutrals as small States have
themselves determined the development of new applications and
definitions of neutrality relevant to the Cold War and International
Economic Integration, and to what extent neutrality has enabled them
to steer clear of overt dependence on external agents.
In a permanent battle for power, size is perhaps seen as
paramount. But now 'power' itself must by relativised if it can only
be achieved by threatening 'existence'. The small States of Europe no
longer have to compete to be assured of 'safe' borders. In fact, the
small States have suffered NO appreciable economic disadvantage since
1945, indeed they provide a remarkable example of internal coherence
and economic success. Having, hopefully, established the relativity
of size in international relations we must now turn more specifically
to Austria in order to examine the importance of neutral status and
its content.
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Permanent neutrality and the Austrian case.
"Justice is as much a matter of
fashion as charm is"
B.Pascal 'Pensees' No. 61
The Latin root of the word neuter (ie ne-uter) gives an original
meaning "neither of both". Thus from the outset neutrality has had at
its core the concept of standing between alternative forces.
Interestingly though, 17tn century writers such as Hugo Grotius used
the term 'amici' (friends) or 'medii' (intermediaries) to describe
neutrals in the modern political sense.
Even from the beginning then, there are two definitions which
while not necessarily exclusive, do leave significantly different
images: that of the more withdrawn, fortress ne-uter strand or that of
the fundamentally involved amici. As we shall see, this duality has
not yet been reconciled, with the result that a unanimously held
definition of neutrality remains unachieved.
As a political force, neutrality appeared in trade treaties, as
rising merchant classes demanded that wars should not be allowed to
affect the flow of trade. By the 16th century, the appearance of non-
participation clauses in treaties became acceptable, and developed
into a principle of international law over the next two centuries. It
was trade considerations which led the newly independent USA to
declare herself neutral in old-world conflicts particularly after
events in France in 1789.
At this stage there was very little codification of neutrality
beyond individual cases. Although neutrality is universally defined
as non-participation in wars between other states, sane definitions
maintain that it implies the continuation of friendly relations while
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others emphasise strict non-partisanship.i Thg codlfication of
neutrality in the 19th century defined it very much in terms of the
former.
The Swiss, in their fragmented, largely mountain communities had
actively participated in foreign wars in mercenary or religious
causes. Despite bitter divisions, the cantons abstained in the Thirty
Years War which devastated the German states (1618-48), resulting in
the the so-called "Defensional of Wil"(1647) wnich united the cantonal
military more than ever before and simultaneously gave rise to the
notion of a political 'armed neutrality'. During the peace
conferences in 1648, astute diplomacy on the part of the
representatives of Basel resulted in the Swiss Confederation being
recognised as independent of the Habsburg-dominated Holy Roman Empire.
Despite this, Swiss mercenary contingents continued to fight in
foreign wars.^
Until 1815, neutrality was not secured by joint treaties, but
depended on the non-participation of the neutral country in individual
conflicts. The notion that such a policy on benalf of the state or
national military would directly affect the expression of individual
opinion was irrelevant.^ The relevance of views beyond those of the
elite was seldom considered.
Swiss participation in tne Napoleanic War, though never officially
in alliance with the French, amounted to over 16,000 men. Only in
November 1813, aware that Napoleon's star was now firmly on the wane,
did the Swiss Cantons declare their wish to remain neutral and outside
tne war. They requested international recognition of this
declaration, claiming that international law had recognised Swiss
Neutrality as a condition of Swiss national existence. Strupp in his
book shows that such a claim has very little validity, especially as
both law and Swiss practice were so ill-defined.^
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Napoleon had a clear interest in a neutral Switzerland and
recognised it immediately. The advancing allies remained unimpressed
and in December 1813 they marched through Swiss territory with 100,000
men. They maintained that the Swiss had become so dependent on France
tnat they had de facto lost their independence. They expressed the
hope that Switzerland might regain her independence with the rest of
Europe.
"They were not however in the position to recognise a neutrality
which in truth did not exist".^
This fact is often omitted in the theoretical legal writing on
neutrality. This relational aspect of the notion, ie that being seen
by others to be neutral is as important as the withdrawal of troops
and any declaration of neutrality is conveniently forgotten by those
who wish to restrict the horizons of neutrality (ie mostly writers in
the neutrals themselves). We shall, however, return to this point.
After Napoleon's defeat, the allies met at the Congress of Vienna to
decide the shape of the new Europe. They decided that a neutral zone
around the Alpine passes was in the interests of all the powers.
Control over these would have disturbed the very delicate "Balance of
Power" being constructed. This very dubious notion of balance was
reaching its zenith. After considerable Swiss lobbying to this effect
the treaty contained the powers' promise "de reconnaitre et de
garantir la neutralite perpetuelle".
Considerable amounts of literature have been produced, especially
by Swiss writers, wrestling with the question of whether the Swiss
chose this neutality themselves through the declaration of 1813 or
whether it was brought into being by the powers in 1815. This again
avoids full recognition of the idea of neutral "in relation to"
another. Writers in Switzerland nave sometimes insisted that the
allies' decision of 1815 merely confirmed that of 1813. Strupp^ snows
that only Swiss foreign policy was confirmed. Neutrality only entered
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tne vocabulary of others in 1815. The importance of this point can be
understood if we recognise the need (or obsession) in neutral
countries to claim the exclusive rights to interpretation. This
argument has also been important in Austria.
The powers also used neutrality when the state of Belgium was
set up in 1831, and neutrality became a part of its constitutional
form, [in many ways the Belgian example corresponds more accurately
to Great Power activity leading up to Austrian neutrality 1955, though
many Austrians would dispute such an interpretation.]
What remains important to our understanding of the development of
neutrality is the change from a national guarantee to an
internationally recognised principle of international law, grounded in
diplomatic activity. The result was a new codified concept; tnat of
"perpetual" or "permanent" neutrality. As part of the agreement, the
powers undertook to guarantee the neutrality of Switzerland if that
came under threat, although the primary responsibility for the defence
of neutrality rested with the Swiss themselves. The independence of
Switzerland was secured for the first time, and the Swiss were thus
spared the ravages of the Franco-German "spneres of influence"
conflicts which affected other areas of Allemanic/French proximity (eg
Alsace-Lorraine, Saarland).
This is not to say that internal unity resulted from the Treaty of
Vienna, indeed a major civil war over the role of the Jesuits
threatened the whole foundation of the Swiss state(the Sonderbund War
1848). Nevertheless, the connection between national sovereignty and
neutrality had been established. Neutrality seemed to offer a means by
which a small country might avoid becoming the battlefield for
competing powers.
The codification in legal terms of the status of permanent
neutrality reached its zenith with the signing of the 5th and 12th
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Agreements (sea and land wars respectively) in tne Hague in 1907. At
this stage, and until 1939, the Netherlands was also a neutral state.
The exact content of these agreements will be dealt with at a future
point, especially in terms of their implications for Swiss and later
Austrian practice but the three most important aspects can be
summarised as follows: neutrals are obliged to prevent the use of
their territories by warring parties (inclusive of airspace), they
must treat parties with equal preference, this to be in the estimation
of the neutral, and governments must contain all support for warring
parties (neither war materials or loans for military purposes).^
Neutrality was now more widely accepted than ever.
Neutrality was generally regarded as successful during the period
from 1815-1918. A neutral state was regarded as being entrusted witn
the special task of strengthening peaceful relations among the members
of the international community and as having the mission under
international law to safeguard peace, national freedom and progress in
international relations. Perhaps the foundation of the Red Cross with
its symbol of the Swiss flag in reverse is the best example of this.
Two world wars were to shatter this consensus on neutrality,
leading as we shall see to its lowly status by 1945. Symbolic of this
decline was the position of Belgium. Neutral since its establishment,
Belgium was to prove to be the battleground for much of the first
World War. incapable of stopping the German armies, it provided the
excuse for Great Britain to enter the war. The image of 'poor little
Belgium' soon faded in a sea of mud and death, hut Belgian and later
Dutch (after 1945) views of neutrality remain, as we shall see,
somewhat cynical. Some of this change can be seen by contrasting two
Belgian views. Speaking to the Belgian Academy of Sciences in 1875,
Gustave Rolin-Jacquemyns proclaimed:
"It is the special mission of neutral states to strengtnen peaceful
relations between all human beings. Modern international law entrusts
to nations endowed with a guarantee of neutrality the task of
safeguarding peace, national freedom and progress in international
relations."®
In 1924, his son, Baron Alberle Rolin, underlined the change of
atmosphere when he said:
"The organisation of the federation of states is the negation of
neutrality. The covenant of the League of Nations has abolished this
neutrality."^
By 1940, this attitude was even wider spread. In America Quincy
Wright totally dismissed its validity
"In guaranteeing appropriate spheres both., to the state, and to
the world coinmunity, international law must recognise that the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts. This implies that states of war
and neutrality recognising the power of the part, through violence or
indifference, to invalidate the will of the whole are by nature
1CI
inconsistent with the law.1'5
Neutrality was firmly out of favour by the time of the setting up
of the United Nations in 1945. What, then, had happened?
By 1918, while Belgium had rejected neutrality for herself, the
international community continued to recognise the status elsewhere.
Switzerland, Scandinavia, Holland and Iberia had all successfully
avoided direct involvement in the War, and the new League of Nations
was prepared to make a compromise agreement to allow Switzerland to
join without obligation to participate in military sanctions.
Following a referendum, in which a majority for membership was
obtained, the Swiss joined the League. The Swiss agreed to take part
in all non-military activities of the League. In the text of the
Agreement the Swiss acknowledged the problem of reconciling neutrality
with collective security but saw this agreement as
"the compromise of the idea of a perfect peace organisation and the
political possibilities of today.
Nevertheless in a different climate fifteen years later
"the Swiss government repudiated the promise they had given in
London; and Switzerland, almost alone among League members declined to
share in the economic sanctions which aimed at preventing Mussolini's
conquest of Ethiopia."-^
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The political problem of imposing sanctions on a large and
expanding neighbour was seen as simply too dangerous for the Swiss to
risk. By 1938 Switzerland had withdrawn from all punitive activities
of the League, a fact merely noted by the dying body, whose
S ....
headquarters had been pited in Geneva in more optimistic times.
World War II was to prove an even greater test for neutral states.
Many were quickly overrun (eg Holland, Denmark, Norway) while others
watered down and then abandoned the concept. In passing the Lend-
Lease Acts, the USA abandoned the 1815 idea that warring parties
should be treated with equal respect while remaining outside the
conflict itself. This was justified by maintaining that no pure
neutrality was possible where one party was clearly the aggressor.
This "just war" type of reasoning provides perhaps the most consistent
threat to modern as opposed to classical neutrality. Quincy Wright
justified Lend-Lease on the basis that
"a community of nations cannot exist unless each of the members
recognises that it nas a common concern in the observance of the
common law by all the others. Impartial treatment of the law observer
and the law violator is a repudiation of such concern. Therefore,
impartiality in the presence of hostilities undertaken in violation of
international obligation is a denial of the existence of a community
of nations and a repudiation of international law".-^
This form of common-law reasoning also marks out the Anglo-Saxon
legal commentator from the more positivistic tradition developed in
Continental Europe, and the triumph of this group of countries in tne
west must have had some influence on the lowly standing of legal
neutrality in 1945. In addition, the two most influential examples of
wartime neutrality, by virtue of their very geostrategic position, had
only faced the threat of occupation from one side and hence had
granted concessions largely to the Germans. After 1940, Sweden
allowed German soldiers on leave to travel to and from Norway through
Sweden, the transit of German war materials through her territory and
,in summer 1941, allowed tne transport of a fully armed German
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division from Norway to Finland.14 ml_ _ . , , . . . .The Germans also had unlimited
access to Swedish iron-ore reserves around Kiruna.
The Swiss, in an even worse strategic position made several
concessions. Despite the consistent pre- and post-war denials of
ideological neutrality, the Swiss Federal Council was forced to make
several changes to suit the Germans. The first major agreement was
the German-Swiss Trade Agreement (19 August 1940). Under the terms of
this, Germany would supply raw materials, most importantly coal and
iron, while Swiss industry supplied Germany with goods required for
the war effort, and transport facilities for German trade with Italy.
Additionally, the Swiss were forced to enter a finance agreement,
whereby Switzerland gave Germany a credit of SFr 150m (increased under
pressure to SFr 317m in February 1941, and later to SFr 350m). This
cooperation led to a tightened British blockade.^ Further
concessions included a blackout imposed on 9 November 1940 after
complaints by Mussolini that Swiss lighting aided Allied pilots
bombing Italy, the transportation of supplies through the St Gotthard
Tunnel, and handing over of war materials belonging to interned Polish
and French soldiers after the defeat of France. In 1941, the Federal
Council also asked Britain to discontinue broadcasts of news
bulletins.
Yet the fundamentally exposed position in a total war (like World
War II) was illustrated in the problems facing the press in wartime.
In 1942, Goebbels warned that Switzerland and Sweden were lacking in
the most elementary appreciation of the security of their nations and
their future existence, and further referred to bourgeois states that
would not survive the war. Paul Schmidt, Press Chief at the German
Foreign Ministry threatened recalcitrant Swiss editors and journalists
with deportation to Siberia or liquidation after the occupation.^
Most chillingly of all for our purposes, Schmidt quoted Bismarck's
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phrase that
"governments often have to pay for window panes smashed by their
newspapers".
This dilanma illustrates the real problem regarding an
ideological dimension for neutrality, a problem about which much
legalistic rationale has been employed but whose actual dimensions
become apparent in this instance. We shall return to it in detail
below. The Swiss did of course impose some press censorship. The
traditional defence that the Swiss or Swedes could not have made any
useful contribution to the war by merely entering into it is not
entirely invalidated by anything we have so far discussed.
One point should be emphasised; the ideological dimension of
the Second World War, absent until then in Europe, posed a threat to
classical neutrality, with which it has not and I suggest cannot
satisfactorily deal; the non-combattant neutral is no longer able to
expect a merely reformed international system in which the main
changes are in the relative powers of its neighbours with only
indirect effect on the neutral itself. It is clear from Nazi writing
both before and during the war, that 'bourgeois' neutrality of a
Western type would be completely unacceptable in the 1,000-Year Reich,
Thus the long-run survival of Liberal Neutrality was now dependent not
just on a militarily successful deterrence policy but on the actual
victory of one side over another; ie to the survival of Swiss
neutrality, a self-defence solution was adequate in the Franco-
Prussian War, whichever side emerged as victor. This was not the case
in 1939-45 where a German victory meant something quite different from
an Allied victory. The present East-West conflict poses a similar
problem. The body of law which had developed in the 19th Century
circumscribing neutrality had thus proved vulnerable in the mid-20th
century, a vulnerability which remains.
Many socio-economic and power-political factors had combined to
61
undermine the assumptions on which the law had developed. Liberal
thought and its attached capitalism had recognised a basic diversion
between the individual and the state. Nineteenth-century Switzerland
saw considerable internal debate on the morality of neutrality. The
economy was largely the province of capitalists while the pursuance of
foreign policy was left to the state. Ideally, the role of government
was regulatory, in Switzerland, this fitted neatly into traditional
patterns of cantonal independence and a jealous defence of individual
rights. In such a context, the Confederation was accepted as a
guarantor of an individual or communities right to freedom of action,
and was not to function as a centralised state. The rotating
presidency of the Swiss Federal Council illustrates the structural
safeguards designed to prevent the emergence of a single person or
group who might act as a pole.^
These oimpliotic Liberal notions have been cnallenged by the major
developments of the twentieth century. The realm of the individual
and that of the state can no longer easily be defined. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, the international nature of capitalism
has created a fledgling world system whose character can no longer be
analysed purely from a domestic perspective. The state now intervenes
directly in the economy, security (including police/secret services),
education, social services, health etc. The notion that 'spheres of
action' for the state and the individual exist has become blurred.-^
It is now more important that individual decisions of foreign policy
are taken with wider consultation, as these decisions have practical
day-to-day implications. Mass news media have increased the access of
individuals to central issues of foreign policy. As we have seen, the
development of wars justified by ideological systems division has
undermined the extent to whicn the 'state' can distance itself from
the views and actions of individual citizens and vice versa.
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Even the Swiss have been victims of this process. The Austrians
who have never known neutrality under any other conditions adapted
faster to the conditions of post-war world. Interestingly, Sweden has
actively created a more corporatist structure under the Social
Democrats.
Since 1945, a further structural factor has made the ideological
dimension more urgent ('actuel'). The results of the Yalta Agreement
have meant that Europe has seen 40 years of unchanged division into
recognised 'spheres of influence'. This contrasts sharply with the
nineteenth century where alliances and powers were unable to find a
permanently stable balance (except perhaps 1815-48). Europe is now the
stage for a conflict whose nature has become global. Neither
superpower is European ie Europe has been relegated from the centre of
the 'system' of dominance to a 'sub-system' of a wider struggle.
Thirdly the nature of war, so neatly defined in international law
and from which neutrality tries to take its reference, has changed in
the twentieth century. War appeared to be of a predictable nature in
which only a few states participated. Switzerland merely went one
step further by guaranteeing its non-participation. Now that any
systemic war in Europe would almost certainly be total and this risk
has produced more conflicts of a guerilla or civil war type, the role
of a neutral state becomes open to question. The effect which these
conflicts have or could have on a neutral state all mean that the
traditional answer that neutrals have no duty to neutrality in these
circumstances sits very uneasily today. To deny the existence of
these conflicts as wars or to pretend that the reaction of a neutral
state to these conditions has no effect on the perceived neutrality of
that state in international affairs may be logistically satisfying but
it is politically absurd. Should a neutral state supply both sides in
a civil war or neither side? Is the PLO a terrorist organisation? Is
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recognition of it an interference in Israeli affairs or a real
neutrality? More importantly, today's international conflicts have
not yet broken down into 'legal' wars eg North/South, East/West
scrambles for energy etc, yet they effect the neutral states just as
directly as they effect those in alliances. A traditional majority
opinion that neutrality should be restrictively interpreted so as to
maintain wartime as the only sphere of application requires that we
return to a legally codified type of war.
Yet the Cold War is real. To a 'wertfrei' legal mind, war may be a
strictly definable concept, yet the effects of undeveloped conflict
are real on considerable numbers of people. To reduce neutrality from
* this is firstly to assert that there is a fundamental division between
the actual outbreak of war and the causes, or indeed that the nature of
war is all-important ie a 'subtle' war does not require neutrality
whereas a 'crass' war does. If this is true, it reduces the notion of
neutrality to an irrelevant anachronism. The traditional rivalry war
which leaves states intact, systems intact and the fabric of the
society at least available for reconstruction has disappeared from
central and western Europe for the forseeable future. The nature of
technology has made such destruction possible that all in its field
may be destroyed. The continued existence of an identified enemy for
both east and west has meant that internal west/west or east/east wars
are unlikely and thus an ideological element will continue to exist
for the neutral in all wars. Meanwhile subtle 'Cold Wars' are
conducted, guerilla wars and civil wars continue and the
political/economic implications of these directly affect all those
with any connections. If neutrality has no effect or relevance to any
of these it is an irrelevant concept.
And yet the neutrals do find a role in the Cold War system.
Despite legalistic complaints to the contrary, the neutrals have
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developed a new notion of the concept. This has to operate in a
changed world in which the scope for a legal neutrality is reduced.
"In the 19tn century, the system of the balance of power was
approximately translated into reality; the flexibility of political
alliances and the conception of war as a legitimate means of restoring
the equilibrium in unbalanced situations gave the neutral power a
relatively wide scope for action."
By the end of World War II neutrality's international status was
at a new low. On New Year's Day 1942, 26 nations signed the anti-Axis
'Declaration by United Nations'. A further 21 were to sign it by
1945, with the exeception of Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Denmark.
All these States bar Switzerland eventually joined, and the prestige
of permanent neutrality was at an all time low. It was widely accepted
that the status of neutrality was incompatible with membership.
"At the end of World War II, neutrality as a legal institution had
virtually ceased to exist."^
Since then the status has undergone a revival, with Austria
becoming a further permanently neutral state in 1955 and international
attempts in Laos. Furthermore Finland now follows a policy which she
describes as neutral, a description largely (if not wholly) accepted
by the international community.
We should perhaps briefly allude to two further factors. Firstly,
how far does neutrality require an international balance of power and
secondly, how or why did neutrals manage to remain neutral during the
Second World War?
According to Black, Neutralisation;
"is relevant primarily to geographically definable areas in which
two or more external actors have substantial and competitive
interests.
This may be due to an exchange between opposing states of
disadvantages, which cancel each other out. Accordingly Austria might
be seen as the removal of the Soviets from Austria in exchange for a
bargain of permanent neutrality. Thus sovereignty was seen to be more
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important than a pro-Western stance. The West saw a Russian
withdrawal set against a neutral status instead of a Western status.
For peacetime this might be seen as a fairly reasonable assessment;
many of the neutral states of Europe have been set up or have arisen
in competitive situations, eg Austria in 1955, Switzerland 1815 or
Belgium in 1831. The position of Finland might also be roughly
considered a strategic calculation (though not legally enshrined)
between the Soviet Union and the Finns based on the idea that a
Soviet-dominated Finland would send presently neutral Sweden into
NATO. It should be noted however that the most deeply rooted of all
European neutrals , Switzerland has seemingly outsurvived its roots as
a territory of power rivalry.
Most observers claim that neutral states must be small states; ie
an element of external balance or of deterrence against dropping a
policy of neutrality appears necessary eg
"Since the beginning of the Atomic Age, there is no longer this
alternative. No real large power can be neutral any more."
Writers in Neutrals (eg Frei ^5) argUe that a large (or even
medium) 'neutral' power would become an incalculable risk and thus
prove be an intolerable factor in international affairs [This in
answer to those who proposed neutrality as a status for West Germany.]
This would all seem to support the thesis that a balance is required.
Two examples might be given to counter this. First, Sweden could not
be said to occupy the same position as the Low Countries in 1914-18
nor of Switzerland at least in 1939 and certainly after 1945. The
balance which set up Swiss neutrality was not the same as the
isolation which allowed Swedish neutrality to flourish. In addition
Swiss balance has disappeared since 1945, and yet the Swiss claim that
neutrality remains relevant as it is a means of guaranteeing
sovereignty in all circumstances.
Swedish writers (eg Hagglof ^®) have indeed argued that balance
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of power is a basic condition of neutrality. Although the First World
War seems to bear this out, both Sweden and Switzerland were behind
Axis lines for much of the Second World War, and Ireland was behind
Allied lines. Where balance was most equal, eg Norway, Benelux and
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Denmark, the fighting was more urgent and more destructive. Thus
while being a contributory factor in the establishment of the status
balance may not necessarily contribute to wartime survival.
While neutrality must be in relation to an existing rivalry and
not alone in a vacuum, this can be expressed either in the form of
distance from or 'immunity' to attack or in the form of a balance with
some degree of participation by the neutral, ie where both sides take
a direct interest in the maintenance of the status. 'Legal'
conferences are only likely to be called about those states or areas
which find themselves a potential flashpoint of rivalry, whereas
neutrality may occur by self-determination in more distant areas (eg
Ireland or originally Sweden). Any neutrality on the part of a medium
or large power would have to be self-declared, as few states could
guarantee the neutrality of a state of any larger size.
Why did World War II develop in the form it did? As we have noted
5 neutral states were overrun by the Axis in 1939-45. Two survived.
Clearly, geographical position contributed to Benelux collapse in
1914-18 and 1939-45. Norway and Denmark fell in 1940 as Hitler
attempted to outflank the Allies. Sweden and Switzerland on tne other
hand had considerable geographical advantages. Few German generals
would aim to attack France through the Swiss Alps, and the Brenner
Pass ensured easy German-Italian communication. Sweden's vast size
meant a commitment of resources to little immediate strategic benefit.
The Germans were able to force Sweden to provide the valuable iron ore
without invasion, and by allowing the mines to remain in Swedish hands
ensured Swedish protection against sabotage. Reliable neutrality in
an historical sense may have contributed to Swedish and Swiss success.
Dutch or Danish reliability seems not to have counted. Certainly
Norway and Denmark had invested little in their military, compared to
Switzerland and Sweden yet a nation prepared to take on the combined
might of the British, French and later Russian and US forces , ie Nazi
Germany, was surely not more than temporarily deterred by Neutral armed
strength. The combination of strategic irrelevance, difficult terrain
and adequate deterrence may have provided sufficient short-term
protection.
Two other features might be considered: first, Swiss capital and
her willingness (if under pressure) to grant loans to Germany added to
Swiss defences, as did tne number of Germans with considerable
investments in Switzerland. The military was never tested, and so the
argument that Swiss survival was based largely on the 'entry price'
might be at least as much of an illusion as any other interpretation
(and on this interpretation hangs much of the argument that neutrality
must be of an armed nature). Secondly, strength and weakness cannot
be assessed in a simplistic sense. Austria's army in 1938 was
relatively strong yet her resistance was nil.29 The Danish resistance
was considerable if based on no military strength.
Irish neutrality provides an interesting single case. Despite the
fact that the Allies could have injured the Irish economy with
impunity and have used Irish harbours as ports, the will of the Irish
to defend tneir neutrality, combined witn the historical role of the
Irish in English affairs was more than the UK or USA could face.
This was achieved and is maintained within a loyalty to western
democratic forms and anti-communism (refusal to join NATO in 1949);
and with no real pressure from domestic or external Fascism.^! The
power to maintain independence is here again a feature not definable
in legalistic or military form. The idea of power as the dominance
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of one unit over another appears very threatened. Within every 'Pax
Romana' are the seeds of its own destruction.
Development of Neutrality in Austria
"I have myself only recently got up
the courage to recall some of my
former adventures, which up until now
I have always skirted - indeed with a
kind of anxiety'
F. Dostoevsky, 'Notes from
Underground' Bantam, NY 1974
The development of Austria as a neutral state can be dated most
plausibly to the declaration of neutrality issued as a Federal
Constitutional Law on the 26 October 1955. Yet to understand its
significance in Austrian affairs we have to look at least briefly at
the historical context in which the neutral status came into
existence.
The history of the First Republic is superficially at least an
unhappy one. Clemenceau had announced that Austria was merely the
"leftovers" of what had been taken from the formerly Habsburg
territories ("Autriche - c'est ce qui reste"). With the loss of the
industrial heartland in Bohemia, the new republic sought initally a
unity with Germany. This was, however, politically unacceptable
to the French whose view was essentially that a war of such mammotn
proportions had not been fought to create an enlarged version of
12
Germany. The result was literally the "state which nobody wanted".
The noted legal expert Stephan Verosta attempted to trace the
roots of a neutral Austria back to 1919 and the period of the Treaty
of St Germain. Nevertheless
"decisive men in Vienna of 1919 did not want permanent
neutrality...some because they sought Anschluss with Germany and
others again like Ignaz Seipel rejected Anschluss but found this
'Verschweizerung' (making a Swiss-like solution) an inadequate
solution for the Austrians".^
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In fact, the notion was never resurrected during the whole
period. The Inter-war years were dominated by a permanent economic
crisis and an accepted view that Austria was not viable as an economic
unit which reinforced the conviction that salvation could only be
achieved through unity with Germany.
This view was put most strongly by the German Nationalists and the
Social Democrats under Otto Bauer. The rise of the Nazis to power by
1933 changed this situation in Europe. Suddenly Anschluss meant the
integration of Austria and Article 88 of the Treaty of St Germain
which stated "Austrian independence is inalienable" became a Social
Democratic conviction. The Social Democrats suddenly approved of
Austrian independence, a notion which Bauer had always seen as a means
of perpetuating an anti-worker majority in Austria. He further
demanded international support and protection against possible German
aggression. The Social Democratic Party Conference in October 1933
confirmed this as party policy.-^
Civil war in 1934 resulted in the banning of the Social Democratic
Party and the exile of many of its leaders. At the latest with the
assassination of Dollfuss in July 1934, the threat from Germany was
apparent.^ within four unhappy years, Austria was removed from the
international map.
The event was greeted with virtual silence in the international
community. Of the members of the League, only Mexico, Spanish exiles,
Chile, China and Russia protested at the annexation of Austria. The
European powers appeared to accept this as a legitimate attempt by
Hitler to reverse some of the more unfair parts of the Treaty of
Versailles, especially as Austrian reaction to being integrated into
the German Reich appeared to be far from hostile.
The nature of Hitler's takeover and the Austrian involvement both
in Nazism and the German forces have long been issues of debate. The
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most sympathetic view (and most pro-Austrian) has been put by Verosta:
"On the 11 March 1938 Germany invaded Austria with military power
and unilaterally declared on 13 March the annexation of Austria in
breach of general international law and several treaties, as was
clearly established by the international court in Nuremburg in 1946.
The members of the League of Nations did not fulfil their obligations
towards a member state, but made do with protests."36
Yet this whitewash is both dishonest and inadequate. It is not
our purpose here to make an evaluation of the moral status of Austria
during the War or more importantly during 1938. Suffice to point out
that the British kept well clear of the situation. Oliver Harvey, a
British diplomat, noted in his diary:
"My instinct is not to take this too tragically; the prohibition of
the Anschluss has been wrong from the start; it was a flagrant
violation of the principle of self-determination and perhaps the
weakest point in our post-war policy."-^
The Austrian army and people showed little or no resistance as tne
German army overran the country. Admittedly with Italy's support now
lost, this might have been a futile exercise, but even minor
resistance would have made claims that the invasion was unpopular
somewhat more credible. In Vienna the jubilation on the faces of
those on the Mariahilferstrasse in 1938 can only be compared to the
welcome given to the Germans in the Sudetenland. This was pointed out
by Adenauer in 1955 as relations over repartions to Austria had hit a
new low, when he said;
"... it is perhaps known to Herr Kollege Schmid (he compared our
attitude to Austria with that to America) that we have had a war with
the USA! In Austria the situation was of course very different;
nowhere was Hitler so jubilantly accepted as in Vienna."^
The 99% vote in favour of Anschluss returned in Hitler's plebiscite
in April 1938 must be treated with extreme caution. Both Cardinal
Innitzer ("On the day of the plebiscite it will be for us bishops a
national duty to declare ourselves as German, for the German Reich,
and we expect also from faithful Christians a sense of debt to their
race"39) and Karl Renner declared that Austrians should now de facto
accept the Anschluss. The divisions within the anti-Nazi camp (dating
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back to the Civil War of 1934) were at this time still extremely deep.
It could be argued that being German-speaking there were
considerable difficulties in organising a resistance. Yet this fact
creates as many opportunities as it destroys. The improvement in the
employment situation must have gone sane way to assuring the
overriding sense of passive acceptance.
We must add that soon after the Nazi arrival, the seeds of the new
Austrian identity were sown. Firstly, in the elimination of the
Austrian identity, by the imposition of 'Ostmark', and later the
'Donau und Alpin Gaue', and the reorganisation of the Bundeslaender
revised in 1939. Secondly, in the growing hostility of the Catnolic
Church. The initial determination of the Cardinal to show himself not
against the Germans changed as the Nazis made inventories of the
possessions of monastries and abbeys, dissolved Catholic
organisations, banned Catholic schools and introduced the German laws
on marriage. On 20 September negotiations broke down. A
demonstration of 10,000 Catholics in Vienna was attacked by SS and SA
men on 7 October, and all this only stimulated the Catholic Church to
further defence.*^
The worker's movement was largely Social Democrat-educated and was
difficult^ for Nazi propaganda. Despite Austrian commentaries to the
contrary, the overall sense of passive obedience was undoubtedly
extremely different to the atmosphere in future conquered countries.
If Austria _i£ to be upheld as a mere conquered victim of Nazi
aggression (as we have seen, she is), then in no other victim was
there more obedience and less resistance.
Austria became a laboratory for the theories of National Socialism.
One group in particular were persecuted ; the Jews. Between 1938 and
1946 their number fell from 203,000 to 5,000. Only a third managed to
emigrate abroad.41 The Austrian resistance also suffered. According
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to official figures 2,700 Austrians were condemned as active in trie
resistance, 9,700 died in Gestapo prisons and 6,420 died abroad.
The other side remains that Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, Eichmann,
Skorzeny and others were Austrians who participated actively in
Hitler's plans. Hitler's views too were formed in part by his own
Austrian background and hundreds of thousands of Austrians fought as
Germans in the war. There may well have been conflicts of loyalty.
But it is perhaps in this final fact that the ambiguity of Austria's
post-war position lies. It is frankly inconceivable that Czechs,
Poles, French or Dutch would have adapted to the German occupation in
the manner of the Austrians. There may well be reasons for this.
Yet, no other occupied country became a part of the German core (ie
not an occupied country but a part of Germany). In Austria, the term
used internationally and domestically to describe what happened in
1938 is Anschluss, ie 'attachment to' or 'becoming united with', not
'conquest' or 'colonisation'.
The role of the Austrians as brave and courageous soldiers in
Germany's war effort cannot be merely ignored, any more than the
resistance can. As Weinzierl points out, the reports of resistance
given by exiled Austrians to the Allies were much coloured by wishful
thinking 1^2 Resistance to German invasion was in many
ways more comparable with resistance in Germany itself than with
resistance in other occupied countries. Even pro-Austrian historians
admit
"far more worrying is the thought that a crime of such magnitude
could be perpetrated against so little opposition."^
and the comparative scale of Austrian resistance is small, even if
growing especially after 1942.
I have dwelt on the above point for two reasons: first because it
is inadequate to whitewash Austria's wartime record. It is essential
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to understanding problems of national mythology and to understanding
why the rehabilitation of German generals can bring the country into
crisis ( see later chapter) Secondly, because it starts to justify
the ambiguity felt by the Soviet Union and to recognise that there is
a real problem in the postwar legal status of Austria.
The official legal view is quite simply this: the occupation of
Austria by Germany breached not only international law but also
against a whole series of multilateral and bilateral treaties, in
which the political independence and territorial integrity of Austria
was assured. Exactly as in the case of Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and
Albania an international legal and foreign policy 'frozen' status
became applicable in Austria through the unilateral declaration of
Annexation, a condition which Dr Karl Renner accurately described as a
'Scheintod' (apparent death) The result in legal terms is that
Austria received a State Treaty reestablishing the state, not a peace
treaty, and was not considered a part of Germany, ie as aggressor and
defeated nation. Austria could even claim reparation against Germany.
While for a legal expert this may be adequate, as a political observer
one must add that the ambiguities involved go some way to clarifying
why four-power occupation of a victorious ally (I) lasted so long and
secondly why Austrian independence or reestablishment was far from
unconditional.
It should be pointed out, that the greatest relief of Austrian
negotiators in May 1955 was the last-minute acceptance by the USSR
that the State Treaty should not include a reference to Austria's war
guilt. This was considered the most important Austrian victory of the
entire negotiations, but the difficulty with which this was achieved
should be noted.
Felix Kreissler insists in his monumental defence of the 'Austrian'
that the Austrian participation in Hitler's experiment was involuntary
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from the start. He emphasisies the polar opposites of 'Prussian' and
'Austrian' as stereotypes of different notions of Germany. The lack
of physical resistance is attributed to internal confusion dating back
to the Civil War of 1934. Yet this is unsatisfactory. Even Kreissler
admits;
"It goes without saying that the great mass of the Austrians were
neither convinced and enthusiastic supporters of the Anschluss, let
alone National Socialism, nor committed resistance fighters. The
majority simply wanted to survive.
While the mass of the population seldom resists actively, it is far
from 'selbstverstaendlich' in any other State that there would be any
ambiguity about Anschluss itself. While resistance is always
difficult, the Danes, Poles and Czechs had no doubt that annexation by
Germany was bad. It is the existence of this ambiguity - at the very
least - which creates constant doubts about Austria where clarity
reigns elsewhere. Even given internal division, the degree of
passivity which created the war criminals/dutiful soldiers mock debate
of the postwar years was extreme in Austria. Austria had known that
she was a candidate for Anschluss since at least the Nazi Putsch of
1934. Yet it was 1942 before the exiles could report domestic
resistance. While it remains true that the postwar elite were
reconciled 'on the road to Dachau'^^, the internal reality was
different.
In effect, Austrian obedience to Germany seems to have been
parallel to German success. Although Hitler's Anschluss referendum
was highly dubious, the fact remains that only in Austria could such a
mechanism be afforded. Resistance emerged as the tide of war turned.
By 1945, everybody was against the Germans!!
Kreissler quotes a 1974 Opinion Poll which asked respondents to
date the emergence of an Austrian 'Nation'. Only 2% mentioned 1938,
while 14% chose 1945 and 26% 1955.^ This is not necessarily to
dispute Kreissler's central thesis that Anschluss marked a critical
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point in Austria's relations with Germany, but merely to suggest that
the nature of the outcome, i.e. increased distance, was established
first after Hitler's defeat. There is no reason to suppose that the
Austrians would not have sought their role in the 1,000 Year Reich as
part of the Super Race. Certainly enough died in active service of
the cause.
The political realities and the legal statements are here shown to
paint somewhat contradictory pictures which have been used in Austrian
propaganda in an attempt to remove war memories, though with only
limited success. The spectre remains, tinged with both collective
fear and guilt. We might add finally that such interpretations are
only possible by a continual substitution of the notions of state and
people: ie the Austrian state ceased to exist, and though Austrians
took part on the German side in the war their post-war institutions,
successors to the eliminated state, are not liable. Hence Austrians
have no liability.
Important in the re-establishment of the state was the Allied
"Moscow Declaration" of 1943. This took place after the Soviet army
appeared to have turned the tide against the Germans in the east, and
be poised to liberate Kiev. The result was a statement which affirmed
Austria as a separate state and dismissed the Annexation theory:
"The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the
United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free
country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression shall be liberated
from Germany. They regard tne Annexation imposed upon Austria by
Germany on 15 March 1938 as null and void."^'
The dubiousness of Austria's position was also apparent in order to
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encourage Austrians to help work against Germany.
"Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which
she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite
Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be
taken of her own contribution to her liberation."^
This was a major victory for Austrian diplomacy which had
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persuaded the British of the strength of the Austrian case. Until
1940 the official British view was that
"the Austria of 1919 turned out to be an artificial creation...It
may be that an independent Austria after this war will be even more
artificial."49
Churchill, who had supported the prohibition of Anschluss as early
as 1919 was much more positive towards Austrian independence, even if
only to limit the size of Germany. As such he is similar to
Clemenceau after World War I. Thus on the 9 November 1940 he
included Austria among the nations "for which we have drawn the
sword". In December, Roosevelt named Austria as one of the countries
forcibly overrun by Hitler. On 10 December 1942, Eden announced in
answer to a Parliamentary question that Britain had never recognised
the Anschluss.^ The Moscow Declaration was a reflection of tne
Allies wish to encourage those who sought to break up Germany. This
encouragement has continued to the present. Stalin held up a State
Treaty for ten years, illustrative of the depth of suspicion.
The postwar experience, and particularity the 1980s have shown how
unstable the consensus on Austria's wartime role have been. Fritz
Fellner warned of tnis in 1981;
"Because the question of Austrian identity has been answered in
terms of its 'German nature' since the end of the Holy Roman Empire..
and because this German orientation led to the National Socialist
catastrophe, the word 'German' has been taboo since 1945, and the
interdependence of Austrian History and past with german History and
present has been repressed, or even more every historical discussion
about this theme has been portrayed as nigh treason. In truth,
Austria has never been more 'German' than she is at present, in which
interdependence at cultural, economic and societal levels has become a
silent reality.
As we shall see, the Waldheim and Reder affairs have tragically
highlighted the postwar repression.
"Hermann Bahr once pointed out that the Austrian is a master of
repression of unpleasant truth, and thus we drag a huge burden of
tabooised past with us while we try to hide behind an Austrian history
with a Jugendstil facade. It is true that one can keep deadly silent
about certain aspects of the past, but one cannot silence these things
to death, because events cannot be undone through silence."^2
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Seen in this light, the rationales constructed for Austria's image
appear not so much as those of an 'Island of the Blessed' but rather
as a desperate cover for unpalatable truths. We will see that this
tendency to provide post facto rationalisations, central to the
foundation of the state has become widely used in areas of more recent
origin, eg army, UN, EEC etc.
By 1945, Austria was exhausted and decimated. Under the terms of
the Allied agreements, it was divided up into four zones separate from
those of Germany. The atmosphere was far from the jubilation of other
liberated parts of Europe. The new Austrian unity must in part have
been due to the rise (inevitably) of a political elite who had been
largely active in the resistance, some of whom had met in
concentration camps. The traditional antipathy of the Socialist and
Catholic camps was put aside, and the federal Bundeslaender declared
their support for the Provisional Government set up under Karl Renner,
the old Social Democrat, and recognised by the Russians in Vienna.
This unity is held by many to be tne cornerstone of ultimate Austrian
success, and the government prevented a German-style breakdown."^
"The recognition that Austria must suffice for all the future,
filled many circles with an until then unknown confidence. With this
confidence that Austrian independence would be a permanent and
necessary constant for the political form of our existence, grew in
the Austrians precisely in those dark times the so-long absent belief
in the viability of their state."->4
It must be underlined tnat the change in Austria's outlook was in
many ways an about turn. At the end of World War I, the overriding
sense was that Austria's future depended unity with other ethnic
Germans. After World War II, the accepted dogma of the new political
elite was the opposite; Austria can only survive if it is separate
from Germany. The degree to which Austrian establishment figures in
both major postwar parties, (politicians, lawyers, academics and
civil servants) have managed to present pan-Germanism as an anathema
to Austrian culture has been remarkable. This unity and the
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deliberate exclusion of those who remained openly sceptical of an
Austrian 'nationality' is largely responsible for the periodic crises
which emerge when the more sordid realities of the historical
experience come to light. The label 'Deutsch' has a different
significance in the eyes of the political generation educated in the
Habsburg multi-ethnic state and of those who experienced the Third
Reich.
The main foreign policy task (outside the South Tirol question) was
the establishment of Austrian sovereignity. So began the ten-year
negotiations which ended in 1955 with the State Treaty and the
Declaration of Neutrality. This is detailed by Stourzh-'-' in his
history of the State Treaty, and documented by Csasky. We shall not
be concerned to repeat their studies but we must nevertheless outline
some of the key events which led to 1955.
The first Austrian views on neutrality to be widely reported were
those of Karl Renner. In April 1946 he declared:
"We never again wish to be built into a powerful 'Reich', into any
'imperium'."56
Already the brother of the future leader of the OeVP and State
Treaty Chancellor, Heinrich Raab, had suggested from his own
experience in Switzerland that a Swiss-style status appeared
appropriate for Austria;
"The Austrian must learn, in order to be prepared against every
form of German-speaking Irridenta, to base himself firmly in
himself.. In this the Swiss (so securely based in his own being) is an
example to him.. Switzerland is based on her integral neutrality as on
the hardest granite. This is what Austria must seek to achieve as
their most important foreign policy goal."-*7
This was influential on the thinking of his brother Julius. In
1947, Renner reinforced his own position when he wrote:
"Just as Switzerland lies between the three great nations of
Western Europe, so is Austria's position between the five peoples of
Central Europe...Both republican states together provide a closed
bridge of the peoples right across Europe, whose existence does not
only guarantee the connection of these peoples in peacetime but
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creates a healing divide in case of intended wars and above all,
something which affects ourselves, creates the likelihood that our
'Volk' will come to peace just as Switzerland after the Congress of
Vienna."^
It is interesting to compare this sudden enthusism for Switzerland
with Seipel's scornful dismissal of 'Verschweizerung' in 1919. To the
uninformed non-Austrian, comparison between Austria and Switzerland
may seem valid and self-evident. In fact, as we shall see, with the
noteable exception of Vorarlberg, Austria has fewer ties with the
Swiss than with any other of her neighbours. Necessity is, as we all
know, the mother of invention!
In 1947, the SPOe at their Party Conference included in the foreign
policy section a demand for an "international guarantee of Austria's
neutrality". The Socialists saw themselves as a third force between
capitalism and Stalinism as an alternative, something which they were
to maintain, even once neutrality had been established in 1955.
It was the OeVP under Raab (who replaced Figl in 1953) which was to
be most enthusiastic in favour of neutrality. The organiser of the
1949 OeVP Party Conference, Alfred Kasamas, wrote:
"As Realpolitiker, we have long realised that our only chance of
maintaining independence lies in absolute neutrality."^
We certainly have neither the time nor space to fully examine the
negotiations which finally led to the recreation of Austria as an
independent state through the State Treaty. Suffice to note at this
point that the issue of neutrality had emerged by 1950.
Austria had already been a major recipient of the aid which
followed the Marshall Plan and was a founder member of the OEEC. This
had not occurred in any of the countries fully occupied by Soviet
troops nor indeed in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Austria's liberal
democracy appeared established, especially after two failed general
strikes led by KPOe supporters in 1947 and 1950, thanks largely to
complete SPOe opposition.
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The resulting situation was, however, complex. By 1950,, Austria
was firmly outside the Soviet bloc, but still occupied by Four-Power
troops. The Cold War had induced total stalemate in Europe and
movement appeared impossible. Plans drawn up by the western powers in
1947 left a number of problems unresolved, especially the problem of
reparations for German possessions.
As progress was made on this issue, the Soviets raised the
Slovenian minority problem. Following Tito's break with Stalin in
1948 the Russians again raised new problems, eg prohibition of Fascist
organisations, payment for food deliveried after the war (so-called
Erbsenschuld) and in May 1951 announced that the Trieste Question must
be solved simultaneously.^ Further they decided that the Austrian
question could not be resolved separate from the German question.
This seemed to be the final blow to hopes that Austria would be
quickly re-established (and this in a victor, or at least victim,
country!).
In 1952, the Austrian government produced a report on the state of
negotiations for members of the UN. Brazil took up this question, and
on 20 December the UN passed a resolution 48-2 (tne Eastern bloc
abstained) calling for further negotiations based on the obligations
contained in the Moscow Declaration pointing out that
"such a situation hinders Austria from taking full part in normal
and peaceful relationships with the international community of nations
and in carrying out the rights of sovereignty
After a break of twenty-six months, the special envoys of the Four
Powers finally met twice in February 1953. Raab was to become
Chancellor in April, and in the same year, Stalin's death was to usher
in a new era in the Soviet Union. In June, Foreign Minister Gruber
met the Indian Prime Minister Nehru in Switzerland. Nehru emphasised
that the most important problem for the USSR was the future
international alignment of Austria.*^
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The question of whether permanent neutrality was first accepted
after or before Stalin's death by the Soviet Union is not clear.^ In
any case, by November, the USSR declared herself willing to take part
in a conference of Foreign Ministers, which was duly arranged in
Berlin for January/February 1954. By now ex-Chancellor Figl had
replaced Gruber as Foreign Minister. Gruber had long been regarded as
one of the most pro-Western in the Austrian government, whereas Figl's
experience in dealing with the Soviets made him a more suitable
Minister. In Berlin Figl declared that Austria would do everything to
remain outside foreign military influence after withdrawal, and
particularly to prohibit the location of foreign military bases on
Austrian soil.64 Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, welcomed this
statement but insisted tnat there could be no agreement on Austria
separate from an agreement on Germany. Dulles, the US Secretary of
State, declared:
"A neutral status is an honourable status if it is voluntarily
assumed by a nation... In terms of the Austrian State Treaty, as it
has been drawn up until now, Austria would be free to choose to become
a neutral state like Switzerland."^
He further warned against an enforced neutrality.
Still, Molotov's connection of Austria with Germany seemed to put
an end to further hopes of a quick settlement. Events moved quickly,
however: in June 1954, France left the European Defence Community
concept. In October an agreement was signed over Trieste.
Simultaneously, Khruschev's star was on the rise in Moscow. On 8
February, Molotov declared that the State Treaty must make it
o
impossible for Austria ever to be united with Germany again and must
ensure that no foreign military bases could be set up on Austrian
territory. The Austrians accepted this position adding that they
welcomed every effective guarantee of Austria's security and suggested
an exchange of opinions.
On 24 March, the Soviets invited Raab to Moscow. Accompanied by
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Figl, Socialist Vice-Chancel lor Schaerf, State Secretary Kreisky and a
team of legal experts, Raab flew to the Soviet Union. The result was
the so-called Moscow Memorandum, which cleared all the remaining
obstacles to direct negotiations on a State Treaty. We will deal with
some of the problems involved with the Moscow Memorandum and the
subsequent Treaty and Neutrality Law in a later section. Suffice to
say at this point that the SPOe representatives were much less
enthusiastic about the notion of neutrality than their OeVP
colleagues.
"It is well known that particularly Scharf but also Kreisky
preferred the status of non-aligned and would have liked to avoid the
ultimately chosen term. On the basis of the available evidence, the
main reason for this appears to have been that Austria would be
saddled with a 'neutralism' and with a prohibition of public support
for liberal democratic forms, both internally and externally."^"
The OeVP, particularly Raab, felt that the 'Realpolitik' of Soviet
foreign policy had already accepted that Austria was Western. The
result was the agreed formula.
"In the spirit of the declaration made by Austria at the conference
in Berlin in 1954 on the question of not joining military alliances
and permitting military bases on its territory, the Austrian
government will make a declaration, which will put on Austria the
international obligation to maintain a form of neutrality in
perpetuity, such as Switzerland maintains."
They also agreed to seek an international guarantee by the Four
Powers of this neutral status. There was no question of the USSR
accepting Austrian membership of NATO, and as Maleta had pointed out
in his speech to the OeVP in 1951, neutrality was clearly the only
acceptable mechanism. It offered the chance to contribute to ending
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the Cold War and thus appealed to the West.
The Austrians were now able to call a conference to discuss a State
Treaty held from 2-15 May 1955, culminating with the signing of the
Treaty in the Belvedere Palace on 15 May. As Allied troops withdrew,
the Austrian Parliament debated neutrality, culminating in a Federal




In the Moscow Memorandum, the practice or at least the status of
one country was anchored in the tradition of another. At a later
point we will examine some of tne problems and questions arising from
this model. Suffice to say at this point that Austria's declaration
of October 1955 made her Europe's second permanent neutral on the
Swiss model. In November 1954, the Political Department of the Swiss
Federal Government published a document detailing the Swiss concept of
neutrality. This is the most detailed post-war statement of the
Official Swiss self-understanding of their own neutrality.
Much of the legal framework of the model comes directly from the
two relevant Hague Agreements, updated in part or adapted by Swiss
practice. They contain the idea of precautionary peacetime measures
(Vorwirkungen) for permanent neutrals. It should be noted that this
document was first brought to widespread attention by Alfred Verdross
in 1967 and this does pose the question of how widely available they
were in 1955.^ However it is inconceivable that a legal department
in a country seeing its best hope of settlement in permanent
neutrality would not have consulted widely with the Swiss.
It should be observed that the mention of a Swiss model for Austria
is restricted to the Moscow Memorandum and is not repeated in the
Constitutional Act of October 1955.
The conception draws a distinction between neutrality and permanent
neutrality, the latter being pledged to remain neutral in all wars.
Peacetime has normally no call on neutrality and only under permanent
conditions are there obligations, summed up as:
"(a) a duty to start no war;
(b) a duty to defend neutrality or independence;
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(c) so-called secondary duties or antecedent effects of permanent
neutrality.
These can be suntned up as the role of a permanently neutral
country to do everything not to be drawn into war and to refrain from
anything which could draw it into war, ie it must avoid taking part in
conflicts between third parties."^
The document emphasises that there is a need for a neutrality
policy, the nature of this to be a matter of internal discretion. The
conception develops the ideas of political, military and economic
implications of a neutrality policy. Political neutrality involves
not signing treaties which would involve a duty to wage war, either
defensive or offensive, in conjunction with other states. This does
not apply to humanitarian operations. There is no ideological or
moral neutrality. The press is free. Participation in international
organisations etc is possible provided the political character is
fairly universal. Even so both parties to any conflict must be
present, and Switzerland must avoid taking sides.Mediation of
'good deeds' may be possible. Peacetime military neutrality involves
only tne non-conclusion of military treaties. Economic elements are
only present..
".. in so far as the perpetually neutral country may not conclude
any customs or economic union with any other country where it would
have to give up to a greater or lesser extent political independence
as well. The condition for this is that the neutral country is the
weaker partner and so becomes dependent on a stronger one."
This latter qualification could be interpreted as an attempt to
distinguish between the existing customs union between Switzerland and
Liechtenstein where Switzerland is clearly the 'stronger' power and
any other union where the Swiss might be weaker. It is only fair to
point out that the 'Liechtenstein' conception of neutrality clearly
finds customs unions quite satisfactory! Do we have here already a
post-hoc rationalisation of a mutually satisfactory political
arrangement?
Wartime permanent neutrality is tne same as ordinary neutrality;
intervention on behalf of one party is prohibited, and a general
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principle of equal treatment prevails. This has been (as we have
seen) qualified by wartime experience, but also gave rise to the
question of what 'equal treatment' means in economic terms.
The official Swiss policy during World Wars I and II was the so-
called courant normale or in other words a doctrine giving the widest
possible flexibility. This too would be seen by most writers as
outside the scope of neutrality law and within the scope of policy.
Thus it can be determined by the neutral alone. Yet at this precise
point we see the nonsense of such a statement: clearly the neutrality
felt by one country is now not the same as that adopted towards
another. The experience of tne Abyssinian War and the dangers
involved in imposing sanctions on a larger neighbouring country became
very stark. Behind the economic questions lay the very real threat
that the result might be policies towards Switzerland which no longer
regarded her as neutral and hence in the long run threaten to make
neutrality law a mere formal piece of paper.
The result in political terms has been a great reluctance vis-a-vis
sanctions, and Switzerland did not follow UN directives on Rhodesia.
Austria, by contrast, did. This may legitimately be held to show
that sanctions against distant or economically less important partners
are politically possible. Nevertheless, while Switzerland still
labours under the more potent example of 1935 there is far greater
institutional pressure to maintain consistency and remain non-
committed. Austria without such historical reminders, and under
pressure as a UN 'good boy' took a mucn more internationally palatable
position.
While this may show that neutrality has no laws which can be
imposed, the resulting policy can by no means be called neutral, and
neutral status is not a justification for the implementation of one
policy or another. The crunch in such a policy is in the end how much
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negative effect this is likely to have on security (ie a pro-power
policy) which can never be a policy of 'neutrality': geopolitical,
military or power political realism perhaps, but it is not neutral.
Nor is the one act more neutral than the other, as the Swiss argued in
1935 in withdrawing from sanctions.
The remainder of the conditions of the Swiss pattern are summed up
in the legal implications of the Hague Agreements of 1907. According
to the Swiss the obligations in military and political terms consist
of the following:
"(a) a veto on hostilities against a belligerent;
(b) no supply of troops;
(c) sovereign rights must not be given up by the neutral to any
belligerent;
(d) the duty to defend the inviolable territory of the country.)
This includes the particular prohibition of any military
operations, troop transit, munitions or supply columns, recruitment or
propaganda offices, overflight, maintenance of radio stations or the
giving up of any territory for manoeuvres. All these duties are to be
fulfilled with the means at the disposal of the neutral. Economic
neutrality exists
"only in so far as the neutral country is bound not to grant the
belligerents any financial support - meaning of course loans and
financial services for direct use in waging war, but not loans for
commercial purposes, especially for the maintenance of normal trade -
nor to deliver arms and munitions, thougn both parties are to be
treated alike. Should any bans be decided upon, the neutral must
apply them equally to all belligerents. For the rest there exists no
economic neutrality.
All this smacks again of post-hoc rationalisation of what is seen
as necessity, ie trade continues, even loans continue, but not for
military purposes. What this means in real political terms is
unclear: eg a loan for the export of agricultural produce, some small
part of a machine used to make another machine used in the arms
industry etc may of course be of crucial importance in this or that
belligerent's war effort.
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In understanding neutrality we must concern ourselves with a
Liberal notion that economic or political consequences either do not
exist or are none of the neutral's business: ie what the belligerent
does with the neutral's 'purely peaceful' trade is not the neutral's
business and it can never be accurately predicted. Only if we
understand trade in these terms could neutrality possibly remain a
feasible interpretation of neutral wartime activity. To supply food
may be as vital as to supply arms. It is not seen as such.
Fortunately for the neutrals, this form of reasoning is indeed
widely understood, as a consequence of the notion of 'national
interest'. What becomes clear is that neutrality in practical terms
then becomes dependent not on 'free measurement' by the neutral, but
on what the 'tnreat' countries will accept as a neutral stance, hence
Swedish concessions to Germany over iron ore and troop movements,
hence Swiss concessions to Italy over lighting bombing routeways or
loans totalling over SFr 350m to Germany. What tne 'loans' were used
for is ultimately irrelevant in that it must have had at least a
diversionary effect within the German economy.
This underlines more sharply two points already made: first that in
a country which maintains its neutrality in a war, the political
elements are the substance of that neutrality and, even more
obviously, that neutrality is a relative concept which involves some
identified belligerents between whom the neutral country is required
to be neutral and upon whose (political) determination of what is
neutral the security of the neutral state depends as much as upon the
legal definition of a status.
In order to leave the State as free as possible, the Swiss
definition of 'restrictive interpretation' applies.
"If a neutral country, especially one like Switzerland, does more
than the duty of permanent or ordinary neutrality would require then
it happens not by way of fulfilling a legal duty but from political
considerations in order to strengthen the confidence of the
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belligerents in the maintenance of neutrality."70
What I have argued here is that the Swiss model is so restrictive
as to have very limited application for a country on an ideological
divide. The caveat, that a neutral may undertake (freely) a policy
designed to strengthen confidence in the reality of the status, has
been taken advantage of by Austria to create a practical model whose
content seems largely determined by this.
This was seen as a clear goal of Austria's negotiations;
"Austria's interest in the securing of her international position
consisted of maintaining her freedom of decision as far as
possible...The limitation of Soviet neutrality conceptions was served
in Austrian neutrality by means of the Swiss pattern - especially in
relation to the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. Through it,
Austria is permitted to interpret her neutrality in a legal framework
herself, without the chance that another state could assume a 'right
of interpretation' over Austrian neutrality."7^
As has been pointed out, Swiss neutrality is by definition an armed
neutrality.
"Swiss neutrality is not only to be seen as military but also by
necessity as armed. This is felt to be a contribution to peace in
that it is seen as a limit to hinder the spread of war."
Although Swiss neutrality is spoken of as in the service of peace,
the nature of peace is negative in that it refers specifically to the
absence of war, not in any positive creation, ie "a negative concept
of peace".75 In Switzerland the role of neutrality is to defend a
specific piece of territory. The two means by which Swiss territorial
independence are to be maintained are first, through the will of the
nation and second,
".. the principles which Switzerland follows to realise her goals,
namely permanent armed neutrality, which is supplemented through
solidarity, bring the result of universality."'^
Swiss neutrality is thus understood as a contribution to peace in
the sense that it itself is not party to any war and its territory is
in itself stable,
".. and is thus also thought of as an obstacle to the spread of a
war, and thus in the service of peace in the negative sense of non-
war."75
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Such a negative concept is more concerned to promote the solution
of international conflicts by creating legal means which ensure
lasting rules and promote liberal concepts of nation and property and
its promotion in individual cases of international conflict.
This form of neutrality relies entirely on a 'national' model with
boundaries and cultural norms accepted by a broad consensus of people
in the country. This has been true of Switzerland. Neutrality has
become a deep rooted notion in Swiss culture, and has played a role in
maintaining or even at times creating a 'Swiss' identity from such a
culturally diverse and independent group of communities (loosely
organised in cantons).
Switzerland has promoted legal mediation for international
disputes, and is at pains to promote solutions whereby international
law can be universally applied. Such a situation would provide the
line of defence and security in a more concrete form, sought by
neutrals in a codified status. It does leave open the question of how
valid permanent neutrality is in post-war Europe given that Liberal
concepts of neutrality refer ultimately only to territorial battles
which no longer appear feasible today. If all other disputes are
irrelevant to neutrality then there is now little or no apparent
difference between neutrality and alliance.
In the Austrian case it appears that even if this Liberal
interpretation of the Swiss model is allowed, it is clearly not what
was agreed in political terms at Moscow in 1955. Ginther sums up the
essence of the Swiss model as follows;
"the strengthening of the concept of law in interstate relations
both through a clear definition of international law positions and a
legally ordered method for the solution of conflicts and secondly the
significance of the fulfilment of obligations of international law,
especially where this is tied to questions of self help to maintain
one's existence as in the case of strengthening one's defence power
for the purpose of affirming independence and neutrality in the event
of a crisis or war."^
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We might add that it involves a strict separation of foreign policy
under neutrality and neutrality law. Swiss vocabulary seldom talks of
neutrality policy as a cover for foreign policy (as is the case in
Austria). Yet this division of neutrality law and politics is
unconvincing and we shall examine it at a later point.
The principle that neutrality is merely the means to another goal
is always emphasised.
"It is a means for the maintenance of freedom and independence and
not an end in itself. On the contrary neutrality is conditional upon
independence, since it would otnerwise be inapplicable and not
credible."^7
This emphasis has developed in the light of a new searching for a
role for the Swiss model, given that 'independence' is now a relative
political concept and in no way absolute. Bindschedler talks of a
"distribution and differentiation of unavoidable dependencies to
secure possibilities of choice."^
Nevertheless the need to go beyond the minimum, especially in
defence is still emphasised. Bindschedler also holds out the
possibility that an all-European federal state might protect small
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states' interests sufficiently to allow neutrals to take part.
Although it is admitted that this is far off, this intriguing
possibility leaves two questions: if this is so, does it mean that
Swiss neutrality is only applicable to a European scenario and
secondly does it again suggest that law, here acting as a surrogate,
is merely a subset of temporary political conditions and power battles
to be changed if (admittedly unlikely) favourable circumstances
emerge?
Soviet Responses
Officially, the Soviet Union has taken the Swiss model as the
original and hence (or seemingly) binding in some degree. It was on
Molotov's insistence that the Swiss reference was contained in tne
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Moscow Manorandum.79 Yet the persistent Soviet use of neutrality in a
pro-Russian form has led not only to suspicion but to certainty that
the Soviet view has to be qualified.
From official statements it appears that neutrality in the Soviet
doctrine is not 'equal' treatment of all participants but is used as
an instrument of revolutionary politics and is thus identified with a
notion of Soviet power-seeking. Under Soviet interpretation all law
is ultimately subject to the will of the CPSU as vanguard of the
proletariat.
Marxism clearly sees the state and lawgiving as a unity and thus in
purely Leninist terms the law is a class phenomenon. Thus Liberal
law, of which neutrality is perhaps the ultimate symbol, is certainly
in its bourgeois form a product of a repressive bourgeois state. It
cannot be separated from the will of the ruling class. Still, such an
analysis restricts the ability of the Soviet Union to co-operate with
the Western world, and especially since the post-Stalin doctrine of
'peaceful co-existence' it has become politically unfeasible.
Accordingly international law, though the will of the ruling class
is no longer dictatorial, in that it has now become an inter-class
phenomenon (because it involves Socialist countries). Those states
for which these relations are of primary importance are the same
states which decide the nature of international law and thus
ultimately it is the material conditions of these states which
determines international law.®0
Soviet legal doctrine sees international treaties as part of the
'common law' of international affairs though still maintaining that
they receive their validity from the unanimity of the parties, which
to a Western lawyer appears very much as a paradox. The international
principle 'pacta sunt servanda' is applied with certain limiting
cases, eg unequal, enslaving treaties are always the result of
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capitalism and its states and thus do not qualify as 'law' to be
obeyed. Any new government is not bound by enslaving treaties
concluded by a previous, less progressive government.79
As Bindschedler-Robert points out:
"Thus international law is only so binding the USSR insofar as it
corresponds to the current view of the CPSU."
The relations between the Soviet Union and her socialist allies are
officially the complete result of socialist principles of fraternity.
Yet other states too must be allowed full sovereignty and peaceful
co-existence is seen as a means to guarantee non-interference in
internal affairs. The USSR has thus been keen to support the
principle of unanimity in international organisations whose decisions
might affect the USSR. International law is only law so long as it
has universal acceptance, this acceptance applying to both sides of
tne ideological divide. Thus the Soviet Union too has a veto on what
can be considered international law.
In such a view what can be the role of neutrality? If the world is
divided into socialism and capitalism there can be no such thing as
neutrality because historical progress is inevitable and there can be
no neutrality against the laws of history, which once fulfilled will
make neutrality unnecessary and irrelevant. Clearly 'permanent'
neutrality is at best a misnomer. Certainly there can be no return to
an 'less developed' pnase of history (as witnessed by the Hungarian
experience of 1956) once the proletariat has seized power. Yet under
certain (temporary) conditions, neutrality may be acceptable. The
atomic danger may mean that war is 'for the time being' postponed as a
means of settling international class warfare. This was the basis of
the post-Stalin doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' which allowed
Austria's neutrality to become ideologically acceptable. Such
neutrality is to be part of the struggle for peace; when relations
between neutrals and the Soviet bloc are stable (ie mostly), the USSR
refers to the neutrals as part of the peaceloving community of
nations.
This involves a very positive political role in contrast to
Ginther's notion of a negative concept of peace. Neutrality must play
an active part in peaceful co-existence on the side of 'progressive'
forces. Soviet writers see neutrality as part of the struggle of the
socialist countries for peace and security which makes detente easier,
which simultaneously gives the neutrals a chance to increase their
Op
perspectives. Under the Soviet doctrine, neutrality does involve a
notion of 'just war'.
"Just wars are those which have a revolutionary content, while
imperialist wars, i.e. those taking place between capitalist states can
only be unjust."*"
Opposition to a progressive force is reactionary and thus is
automatically aggressive. Neutrality can only be understood as
socialist eg USSR's neutrality vis-a-vis capitalist wars 1917-41. In
World War II this had to be altered. The invasion of the USSR changed
World War II from a capitalist conflict into a class war and hence a
natter of liberation from the aggressive imperialist.
Yet between 1945 and 1955, the changed attitudes of the USSR
changed 'the law' on the compatibility of neutrality with membership
of the UN. In 1956 the Russians demonstrated by their action in
Hungary that in this interpretation, only bourgeis States could be
neutral, and not those who had alredy 'achieved' the Socialist phase.
Soviet views on Austrian neutrality show that the most important
aspect of the 1955 agreement was a neutral policy in peacetime; ie
through non-participation in military alliances and blocs.
To restate this in a different form; in a Russian bipolar
worldview, the USSR accepted that the KPOe was incapable of seizing
power in Austria, but the State Treaty ensured that Austria did not
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become a committed opponent of the Soviet Union. To this end, the
USSR had more than sufficient leverage in Austria to ensure its
acceptance.
It should be pointed out that all powers have ignored or
'reinterpreted' International Law according to their perception of
interest; eg USA and Nicaragua, Libya. In Russian eyes, Austria's
power as an enemy of the USSR was 'neutralised'. Austria would now
always be inclined to seek contact with the USSR. Within this context
the Austrian obsession with distinguishing Neutrality from
neutralisation is spurious. From the start, the USSR considered
Austria to be a 'neutralised' part of Germany and of the West. In the
eyes of the USA also, Austria was now no longer a direct location of
superpower conflict, being 'neutralised'. This reality the Austrians
knew and accepted in 1955.
In the same manner, the Soviet Union proposed neutrality for Laos
in 1962. For the USSR, neutrality in a Capitalist economy allows more
leverage than NATO membership. The USSR thus sees neutrality or
rather neutralisation of former enemies;
"a means of changing the Balance of Power and rather than preserving
it."84
The Western powers saw neutrality as an attempt to maintain rather
than alter the power structure since Swiss neutrality began in 1815.
As early as 1958 West German commentators defended membership of NATO
on the grounds that Austrian, Finnish etc. experience of neutrality
had shown that for the superpowers the internal structure of the State
was irrelevant and all that mattered was the military/political
orientation.88 The KPOe and the East German SED were thus able to
desribe neutrality in Austria in glowing terms;
"The State Treaty and Neutrality have struck a blow against the
plans of imperialism... The decisive power for the defence of the
neutrality of Austria is the working class, who must maintain a
permanent struggle against NATO and German militarism."88
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The end result was however, that in periods of reduced
international tension, the neutral States had lower priority for the
Superpowers. This is particularily true in the USA, who appear to
have had no formulated policy towards neutrals except through the EEC.
The USSR nas taken a more active interest, especially in those
neutrals (Austria and Finland) in whose coming to being they have
played a direct role.^ Ermacora points out that at least de facto,
if not in legal terms, the real partner in Austrian neutrality is the
Soviet Union.^ Right wing writers such as Max Beloff have
continuously warned of a problem of Finlandisation, and maintain that
once established there is no end to Soviet influence.*^ Yet depite
attempts at steering aspects of policy, the Soviet Union has been
unable to determine events in Austria.
As we shall later establish, Soviet pressure was decisive only in
the case of the EEC debate of the 1960s. A promise by Khruschev that
the USSR would guarantee Austria's neutrality against those who would
seek to destroy it (!) was greeted with fear and shock;
"We have awoken from a dream. From the dream that Austrian
neutrality would be a well-made bed on which we could merely drift off
into gentle slumber on the pure-white pillow of our innocence"^
Konrad Ginther is convinced that the Austrian commitment to active
neutrality as the most suitable defence of Austrian independence and
the corresponding revaluation of the role of the army in defence is
both politically misjudged and legally mistaken. Dating change in
attitude back to Waldheim, Austria moved under Kreisky towards an
acceptance of the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence. While
accepting that neutrals cannot join alliances, Ginther attacks the
development of a new 'obligation' to seek peace ie a 'positive' peace
policy. The stages by wnich this occurs involve firstly a reduction
in the importance of military defence followed progressively by a
change to political rather than legal justifications in neutrality, an
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assumption that peacetime performance is central to neutrality-
involving an obligation to take part in detente, the integration of
the terms Foreign Policy, Peace Policy and Neutrality and the
increasingly persuasive use of the 'neutralistic peace myth'. Ginther
sees this all as inherent in Austrian policy in the 1970s and as
fundamentally flawed.91
This line of argument can be countered on several levels. First,
activisation of policy because of changed circumstances is not the
same as a sell-out to the USSR. The Austrians have certainly accepted
a notion of 'peaceful coexistence' largely because the alternative is
total destruction. Given the type of war tnat might now be expected
in Europe, independence and sovereignty can no longer be assured
witnout an active commitment to conciliation. Secondly, neutrality in
the atomic age must be active, not merely because of Soviet pressure
but because Austria must make decisions merely by existing in the
midst of a divide where the antagonists constantly demand support.
Political statements or actions of any sort are automatically
interpreted within the context of the systemic divide. Thus as
Oehlinger points out, the requirement is now to eliminate the
conditions that lead to wars.92 This was perhaps always the most
astute role for all human relations, but the existence of weapons of
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Sucn a policy of coexistence must accept the need to enter dialogue
from within the reality of divided worldviews. Dialogue is a western
rather than a leninist point of emphasis, and this very fact
emphasises how deeply Austrian political thought is anchored in the
West. This very fact exposes an underlying schizophrenia in those
wartime neutrals whose continued existence in unchahged form after a
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war depends entirely on the victory of one side yet who proclaim tne
right to remain distant. This was already the case for neutrals in
World War II.
As a postscript, it is worth pointing out that within the Soviet
doctrine of peaceful coexistence, the neutrals self-understanding
separates them from the self-understanding of the non-aligned. While
neutrality in Europe involves some relation to the ideological battle,
this is more widely accepted in the 'new' neutrals. The non-aligned
have given no absolute guarantees about 'war1 per se, rather about
unjust or diversionary wars such as the East/West confrontation.
Nordic Examples
This section will be no more than a basic introduction to the
theory and practice of Swedish and Finnish neutrality. Finland and
Sweden together with NATO member Norway have created a zone of
stability in Northern Europe which has become an assumption of
International Relations. I will avoid any repetition of the
Finlandisation debate already covered, and will rely on the conclusion
that the attacks on the credibility of Finnish independence fail to
convince.
Wartime neutrality in Sweden has been more or less maintained since
1815. The Swedes have never declared their neutrality in formal legal
documents and their attitude is shown in the essentially 'political'
definition offered by Andren;
Neutrality is difficult to define. Perhaps the best definition of
a policy of neutrality is 'the policy conducted by countrie who claim
to conduct such a policy.
Sweden officially desribes herself as neutral only in wartime.
Thus in 1949 as NATO was being formed, the Swedish Government spoke of
Sweden as being not allied between power blocs in peace, in order to
be able to remain neutral in war. More recently the definition has
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been shortened to not allied in peace, to remain neutral in war.
This notion of NOT-a 1 ignment is in the Swedish view separate from
NON-alignment and is usually described simply as neutrality. The
flexibility of the Swedish linguistic use contrasts sharply with
Switzerland and indicates an absence of a need to refer to a codified
and given legal framework. It is important to note that Swedish
neutrality is established by unilateral Swedish decision and it is
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neither institutionally guaranteed nor constitutionally prescribed.
This clear position contrasts sharply with the perceived need in
the 'legal' neutrals to constantly reemphasise that neutrality was a
matter of neutral choice. From our investigation, it is already clear
that the sharp profile of the Swedish case does not apply elsewhere.
Perhaps Yugoslavia's non-alignment is the closest parallel in
contemporary Europe, although Austria under Kreisky has shown marked
similarities of approach. As in the Swiss case, the Soviet
involvement in domestic affairs is nil. In 1963, Foreign Minister
Ulden described the motivation of Swedish neutrality as 'political' in
the sense that so long as collective security was inoperable, Sweden
did not wish to be drawn into any conflict. This political pragmatism
distinguishes the foundations on which Sweden makes decisions from
those of Switzerland. It has led to a firmly active policy in
peacetime and a positive understanding of peace. Sweden has been one
of the most vocal nations on questions of disarmament, the
environment, economic development and Superpower conflicts such as
Vietnam.
Despite the fact that during the War restrictions on the press were
imposed, there is officially no ideological neutrality, and indeed
Sweden nas been tempted at times to play the role of the conscience of
the West. This has been narked throughout the post World War II
period under the Social Democrats and continues in the 1980s.
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Sweden's position assumes that the very existence of her neutral
status is an important stabilising factor.
Sweden's independence in Foreign Policy has resulted in an active
role in International Organisations (Peacekeeping Forces, Arms
reduction talks, Dag Hammersk jo Id at the UN.) and has led Sweden to
open up and continue debate on a number of issues at international
level. Sweden has in general been discrete over issues of East/West
controversy leading to accusations of latent Social Democratic
neutralism. It is in the area of international activism that Austrian
Foreign Policy under Kreisky has most come to resemble that of Sweden.
Swedish criticism of th USA during the Vietnam War had some
negative results but in the light of discoveries made as to the
dimensions and nature of the conflict it has taken on a more positive
aspect. Swedish figures maintain that outspoken honesty has never
been the cause of a military attack.
There is nevertheless some division in Sweden between the
'moralists' wno claim that Swedish policy is the result of a political
and moral motivation involving ever-maturing wisdom, implying in its
extreme forms that other nations will eventually discover the error of
their ways and the 'realists' who accept much of the moralist view but
who prefer to stress strategic factors (eg that Sweden was an active
power in the 18th century and only when Northern Europe experienced
new strategic conditions did neutrality emerge).
Sweden's defence policy assumes that threats to Sweden will be
primarily a result of Bloc rivalry and that Sweden itself will not be
a direct target. It is assumed that there is no possibility of an
isolated attack on Sweden. As a result Sweden is directly interested
in reducing bloc rivalry and has been active in seeking disarmament
talks between the superpowers. Defence spending has remained at a
high level, and the emphasis has been on the construction and
100
installation of high quality defence including submarine and air
i ■i ■. 96 Sweden's National Defence Research Institue is widelycapability. "
acclaimed and it has been able to present alternative proposals on
Arms control, while subjecting superpower claims to analysis. High
defence spending has been justified as;
"the feeling that - well founded or not - a stronger defence could
have saved Sweden from humiliating deviations from the principles of
neutrality and other problems during and after World War II. '
It is certain that Sweden's international profile is much greater
than her military or economic strength would immediately suggest. The
Swedes have been able to play the role of antagonist and of honest
broker with an independence and forthrightness that would be foreign
to Switzerland, which has concentrated much more on tne provision of
technical services. Swedish activism is on a par with much larger
countries eg France, United Kingdom, West Germany as6&. This
observation applies to a wide variety of themes eg North/South,
environment, welfare etc. It is partly the very obvious success of
Sweden's Social Democratic model and its subsequent role as model for
other Socialist parties (eg West Germany, Austria, Spain) which has
put Sweden among the most daring political 'experiments' in postwar
Europe. Both Willij Brandt and Bruno Kreisky spent their wartime exile
in Sweden and this fact alone may be of major importance in
understanding why neutral Austria's Foreign Policy in the 1970s bore
so much similarity to that of Sweden.
Finland provides a further model of neutral behaviour wnich must be
placed in a slightly separate category. Neutrality has grown up
simultaneously with neutral practice in Austria and hence is a
contemporary of rather than a model for Austrian development.
Nevertheless the strategic exposure to the East/West problem makes
Finland an appropriate example for comparison. For geopolitical and
historical reasons, the USSR has been able to exert pressure on the
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Finns far more easily than on the Swedes. Finland has also responded
much more directly to such pressure than Austria.^ Despite this,
Austria shared with Finland some of the internal weaknesses not
apparent in Sweden or Switzerland.
The longer established neutrals base their neutrality on a domestic
consensus alone. Location, political culture, national identity,
historical survival and strong economies after World War II have given
neutrality strong domestic roots. Much more so than Austria, Finland
has continued a policy of passivity and 'fortress polities' in times
of high tension (eg Madrid follow-up of CSCE 1983). Finland has
sought foreign approval of her policies more directly than Austria.
The two Foreign Policy 'crises' of 1958 and 1961 have been discussed
elsewhere, but they illustrate the degree to which the Finnish State
is dependent on Foreign Affairs. Finland has followed a policy of
building 'active functional relationships' with Eastern Europe rather
than the Swedish approach of independent policy.^ The Finns have
signed important agreements with the Eastern Bloc. Austria, as we
have seen, is faced with a problem of wishing to play both these
roles, the former for trade and economic reasons and the latter as a
preferred political strategy under Social Democracy. Neutrality has
really only developed as a part of Finnish political vocabulary since
the 1950s as Swedish and Austrian politicians sought to develop a role
for neutrality in the Cold War. The person of Kekkonen was associated
with this development after he took over the leadership from
Paasikivi. Paasikivi had himself been responsible for the development
of a new relationship with the USSR.
For the Soviet Union, Finland is an important 'example' of what is
possible in Soviet Foreign Policy. It is widely admitted in Finland
(unlike Austria) that;
"Foreign Policy beyond doubt holds the key to security policy. A
small nation such as Finland cannot safeguard its safety mainly
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through the use of arms. The objective of defence policy is to
maintain territorial sovereignty and to create the confidence that
Finnish territory will not be used for military action by other
States."100
We shall return to the military question in a later chapter, but we
might add that despite Austrian protestations, Austria's actual
defence spending is very similar to that of Finland. The Finn, Bjorn-
Olof Alhorn has referred to the Finnish model as 'discrete
neutrality'.101
Finally, Kekkonen's views on the essentially political and
ideological requirements imposed by an East/West divide are very
perceptive and contrast sharply with the reluctance in other neutrals
to express such opinions candidly. Perhaps the very fact that legal
jurisdiction is a nonsense in the Finnish position allows for this
clarity;
"We cannot plead our right to remain neutral if in the next breath
we assume biased attitudes to international politics... The totality
of the Cold War has given many questions which were earlier purely of
internal interest a foreign policy connotation."103
We shall return to this when we examine the ideological content
which Austrian neutrality has adopted both in terms of rhetoric and
policy.
An Austrian model of Neutrality?
Clearly then there are several models which might guide Austrian
behaviour. There have been various classifications offered; ex vice
Chancellor Fritz Bock describes Austria as having an 'active'
neutrality, Sweden as having a Foreign Policy involving definite
political stands on issues and Switzerland's policy as the 'absence
of policy'.103 Another Austrian, Hanspeter Neunold emphasised the
'permanent' element of legal models (Austria, Switzerland), Sweden as
practicing neutrality as foreign policy and Finnish as 'asymmetric'
neutrality (ie pro-Soviet).10^ However, if Finland is to be considered
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asymmetrically pro-Soviet, then all the rest are assymetrically pro-
Capitalist and the West. The most dismissive classification comes
from the American Kruzel, where Austria is described as 'nominally'
neutral, Finland as 'bounded' neutral, Sweden as 'actively' neutral
and Switzerland as 'passively'.105
There are thus numerous means of desription for each neutral
State's policy. Each depends on the political position of the author.
At the risk of entering a competition I offer my own classification;
Switzerland practices 'fortress' neutrality, Sweden 'independent'
neutrality, Finland 'partnered' neutrality and Austria has developed
'active' neutrality.
Even by 1959, influential writers in Austria were proclaiming the
uniqueness of Austria's experiment;
"In the final analysis Austrian neutrality is to be compared
neither with Swiss nor with Finnish practice. It has other roots,
other areas of application and different tasks to undertake;
incomparable Austrian neutrality.
Certainly Austria's peacetime behaviour has been markedly different
from that of other neutral States (eg EEC negotiations, Cold War
problems (1956, 1968, 1981), Sanctions and defence policy). One is of
course tempted to describe this merely as the normal variation in the
policies of sovereign States. Yet this is too simple. It ignores tne
fact that much of Austrian activity has been done in the name of
'neutrality policy'. We will in later chapters compare UN activity,
East/West activism, EEC negotiations and the importance of
geopolitical location. Austria has been involved in a search for a
lasting positive peace which is not simply a sell-out to Soviet dogma.
As Schulmeister points out;
"In fact Austria's neutrality policy is as distant from its
beginnings as the economic and social conditions are from theirs."107
The only qualification to be made is that social and economic
change is not veiled behind a curtain of laws agreed in 1815 and 1907.
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Perhaps the most important development is the rise of an entire world
market and the fact that division between State and individual can no
longer be cleanly made, particularily on the East/West frontier. Thus
neutrals are faced at periods of tension with a stark choice.
Some, like Finland, withdraw into silence because relations to one
party in the dispute remain paramount despite societal preferences.
For Austria and Sweden it has become clear that activity at foreign
policy level is necessary to prevent war. The Swiss relied as late as
World War II on the possibility of making no political stance. A
'guaranteed' defence inside Switzerland ensured that warring parties
were deterred from entry. The result was that neutral States were and
would be committed de facto to adapting to any world structure which
might emerge from a War. Until 1939, the internal ordering of the
State was not in question and did not depend on the outcome of the
struggle. Hence neutrality was a purely territorial question and
individual preferrences were largely irrelevant. The Austrians were
perhaps the first to face the fact (in 1956) that this was now an
insufficient conception and that internal order and system would
depend on the outcome of a systemic war. No non-nuclear defence could
even guarantee territorial integrity. It is an unfortunate truth that
neutrality, if it is to have any meaning, must extend into all the
areas over which the warring parties are fighting. In the modern age,
this includes the ideological and structural realms. Peaceful
coexistence is thus no longer a pious hope but a necessary
precondition for existence.
Both East and West compete with a concept of the struggle being
'essential', 'legitimate' and even 'just'. In such circumstances, a
refusal on the part of the neutral to participate in the war leaves
that State open to allegations from both sides of cowardice and
untrustworthiness. In peacetime this wariness can already be seen eg
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technology transfer. This element of the 'moral' and 'systemic' was
already apparent by World War II and hence the neutrals were seen as
having failed to differentiate between the Nazis and the Allies. The
pr-«.-fer-»-ecJ
UN Charter thus proffered collective security.
Austria's neutrality has only existed after these changes in
affairs had already occurred. Dependence on trade and the continual
political considerations this created as well as and Austria's
location at the centre of the Cold War blocs meant that neutrality had
to find a meaning in this context, which always carries the danger of
opposing one side or the other. A mere negative declaration of
neutrality is insufficient and the previously voluntary aspects of the
Swiss definition have become essential. An active political
participation is now essential if neutrals are to become anything
other than quasi-allies of one side or the other or pawns in a
superpower game. Thus confidence-building, mediation, 'good deeds',
and independent views (eg Olympic boycott,Poland, Afghanistan) have
direct implications for the wider understanding of the nature of
neutrality. Not taking a stance has the sane implications as it too
is a political decision.
The only possible alternative to a willingness to attempt
coexistence is a territorially formalised system of International
Legal Jurisdiction which could ensure a system of judicial
enforcement (Schiedsgerichtbarkeit). This was one of the main planks
in Swiss proposals at CSCE and in Austria it has been supported by
political conservatives. Of course it assumes that the system of
enforcement would be based on a Liberal theory of justice and not on a
Soviet one, because otherwise the system the Swiss hope to protect
would disappear but with judicial sanction. In the absence of such a
system, any neutral State faced daily with the possibility of terminal
crisis (on the Iron Curtain), will seek to ensure that war does not
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break out and will conduct a search for such a positive peace. This
<2asq
then becomes the essential role of neutrality. Ginther's rather esass
limitation of the options open to Austria to the Swiss model and
Soviet domination is clearly unreal. The dimensions of the problem
can be clearly spelt out;
"As long as there exists no sovereign and independent body capable
of taking the place of the injured party and taking upon itself the
responsibility for revenge, the danger of interminable escalation
remains. Efforts to modify the punishment., can only result in a
situation that is precarious at best. Such efforts ultimately require
a spirit of conciliation that may be present but may equally well be
lacking. "I0**
We can now introduce the notion of 'significant time'. The
historical experience of States in Europe in the twentieth century is
far from uniform and far from linear. Collective views of historical
experience have been influenced not by a regular flow of events of
equal importance but ratner punctuated by experience of particular
significant moments and events. We have seen that Swedish defence
policy may be influenced by a perception that more appropriate
facilities might have prevented humiliation at the hands of the Nazis
while the Abyssinian crisis still affects Swiss attitudes towards
sanctions and international organisations.
This type of experience is not restricted to 'States' let alone to
neutrals, but we shall limit ourselves to an examination of its
effects on the neutrals of Europe. Austrian history from 1914 to 1955
contained a series of dramatic events almost unparalleled elsewhere.
The most profound territorial result of World War I was the break up
of the Habsburg Empire. Austria then suffered hyperinflation (1922),
Bank collapse (1931), mass unemployment, civil war (1934), invasion
and annexation (1938), World War II (1939-45), total collapse (1945),
two attempted communist takeovers (1947, 1950), four power occupation
(1945-55) and the State Treaty (1955). If we make a simple comparison
with Swiss experience we have a considerably different picture; World
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War I neutrality (1914-18), League of Nations membership (1921),
Abyssinian crisis (1935) and World War II neutrality (1945) all within
a generally improving economic climate.
This recurring nightmare in Austria must have had an unquantifiable
effect on the goals of the Austrians after 1945. In addition, many of
the future political elite had been in concentration camps or in
exile, and knew in even more depth the nightmare of the previous
years. Yet we can trace direct lines of ancestry back from the second
to the first Republic; the Civil War was replaced with 'Proporz' and
'Social Partnership', the economic conditions of the 1920s and 30s led
to the widespread antipathy towards unemployment and inflation and the
starvation of the post war periods led to the immense pride in the
economic miracle which followed and the lack of understanding between
generations of Austrians when the young seemed to reject many of the
tenets of the previous generation. In many respects the second
Republic appears as the mirror-image of the period 1918-45.
In terms of neutrality, experience of defeat and collapse had led
to war becoming an anathana. Even for those who had always been anti-
Nazi, World War II was an Austrian tragedy (contrasting sharply witn
the British folk memory of War). There is no assumption in Austria
that the country would survive a major war, unlike the feeling abroad
in Switzerland and Sweden. In part, this explains the ambiguity of
the relations between the Bundesheer and the populace since 1955.
For Austria then, 1922, 1934, 1938, 1945 and 1955 are significant
times and tne sum of these events is not just an adopted policy but an
entirely new perspective on what the nature of the tasks at hand is.
Austrian collaboration with the Nazis is not emphasised (part of the
reappear, either in propaganda from other States or in times of crisis
(eg Reder, Waldheim affairs).
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•mirror-image we referred to)
For a significant minority the Nazi period is not saddled with the
same guilt feelings as for the majority. It might even be suggested
that the development of the 'Island of the Blessed' image around the
economic miracle is in itself the result of the need for a national
'positive myth' in response to the burdens of the humiliations of tne
past. Seen from abroad, the chief role of Austrian neutrality is as a
function of the Cold War. By this definition, neutrality depends on
its relationship to other variables ie the blocs."-®® j^s raQst
extreme, in Realist thinking, this is the sum of Austria's role. This
view would reduce Austria to the status of a pawn, and while the
influence of the blocs is of course the fundamental security problem,
it could lead to a failure to recognise the domestic contribution.
The result of significant events in recent history make Austria
fundamentally disposed to an active policy of reconciliation existing
parallel to the pressures of international power and western economic
expansion.
We have now established some of the poles for understanding
Austrian policy. Many writers have dismissed the transferability of
models in today's world;
"Swiss neutrality is cited as a model for Austrian neutrality in the
Moscow Memorandum... There may be no differences in principle but
Austrian neutrality is based on Austrian constitutional law, Swiss
neutrality on international agreement."-'--'-®
Those who do compare, mostly compare Austria with Switzerland. One
of the most avidly pro-Swiss was ex-Foreign Minister Toncic-Sorinj who
wrote;
"While a parity between emotion and political content exists in
Switzerland, it is illustrative that in Austria there exists a
disparity between elements of feeling stemming from tne past and the
requirements of the Foreign Policy of the future."HI
For such writers, the role of the Swiss model was as a protection
against the Marxist-Leninist variation which did not appear to have
any continuity."-"-"' The precise role of the Swiss pattern will be
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examined later. Some Swiss writers have become alarmed by the
flexibility of Austrian politicians under Kreisky in their
interpretaion of neutrality. Thus Kirschlaeger spoke of the need to
be involved with the problems of peace beyond the introverted domestic
State. As Bonjour remarks this sounds like a major change from the
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principle of non-partisanship (Unparteilichkeit).
The necessities of living on the Iron Curtain coupled with a more
appropriate historical experience in relation to the nature of
destruction in modern warfare have meant that Austria has been by far
the more dynamic of the two. Certainly the Swiss division of
neutrality and foreign policy has been blurred in Austria. As Ginther
says;
A changing use of terms can be understood as a changing view of
Neutrality."114
The conservatives in Austria sought a return to tne old
usage, though this appears unlikely, but they also seemed to be
inspired by the conservatism of Swiss policy and the alliance with
Capital. The leader of the OeVP Alois Mock stated in 1930;
"The directive for Austrian neutrality 'as it is practiced in
Switzerland' should inspire us in the realm of politics and not only
in legal practice. Every Austrian viewpoint - particularly in
questions outside our immediate region, as they constantly recur at
the UN - must always be measured against the primary interest of the
country as a democratic industrial State in the European theatre of
the East/West conflict. These are our permanent interests, for whose
fulfilment we need permanent friends."1 5
A glimpse at Social Democratic Sweden shows emergent similarities
with Social Democratic Austria. Apart from the legal position, two
other features distinguish the models. First, Austria has taken her
primary role to be in the East/Wdst arena. The withdrawal of troops
■»
in 1955 was and is one of the few concrete achievements of detente.
Sweden, on the other hand, has never attempted to cultivate relations
in the eastern Bloc, nor sought a role as mediator except in the field
of disarmament. Swedish neutrality in its active form means a role
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for Sweden in questions of economic development and liberation
movements. Thus even Sweden's role in the Vietnam War is part of the
clashes.
policy. Sweden seldom comments on East/West d«a4H5.116 A second
difference is that despite OeVP claims to the contrary, Austria has
been far more cautious than Sweden on questions of Human Rights etc.
Falldin described the persecution of the signatories of Charter 77 in
Czechoslovakia as an infringement of Human Rights and a danger to the
1 1 f)
detente process. Kreisky usually qualifies his public statements.
Swedish and Austrian policy remain comparable in their clear
statements of position on a wide range of issues and their espousal of
active involvement in peace seeking. All of these correspond to a
Social Democratic worldview common throughout Western Europe.
Finally, we should examine the party-political basis of decision
making in Austria. The divide in the 1970s arose primarily because of
K
a recognition in SPOe circles that tne only longterm security lay in
'S*\
coexistence. Thus 'Die Presse reported Kirschlaeger;
"..it appeared to nim that in the present situation, foreign policy
had a greater share in security policy than defence policy."-'--'-'
In 1975, Bruno Kreisky's Declaration of Government programme said;
"As a neutral State, Austria sees it as her task to put herself
actively in the service of the community of nations... The security of
our State must be based on several elements; an active foreign policy,
inner stability and a preparedness for defence of our freedom,
independence and neutrality."-'--'-^
Throughout tne Kreisky period, the OeVP attacked the low level of
spending on the military, although 1960 spending had been at similar
levels. The coming of tne FPOe into government seems to have changed ,
(s<z& Ckapkr S&QysJ
the approach to the military somewhat, though spending remains "-ow^
Even the core doctrine of Swiss neutrality, Self-defence, has not
escaped controversy. In this sense Austria has provided a new model
for neutrality. We shall now examine some of the debates which have
led to the reshaping.
Ill
International Law, Neutrality, Foreign Policy
This rather vexed combination arises primarily from the 'legal'
aspects of the declaration of neutrality in 1955 and the continuing
dominance of legal experts in the debate. Legal experts have
tried to impose a rigid analytical purity on the subject and in
neutral countries with a legal tradition (Austria, Switzerland) it is
constantly reiterated that tnere is a clear separation between
neutrality, permanent neutrality, non-alignment and neutralism.
English-speaking commentators have often been tne worst culprits from
this point of view. Both neutrality and International Law are strong
doctrines of those seeking to preserve a status quo. International
law, like any legal order is seen as a static force. Permanent
neutrality is an attempt to ensure a national security tneoretically
in all future wars. A nation with a policy of the status quo seeks
primarily to preserve tnat power whicn it already has.
For countries such as Switzerland, the long history of using
military means for defensive purposes has resulted in an
internationally recognised position. Other States, unhappy with the
status quo may feel that a desired political status is beyond tne
status quo and hence cannot accept law which exists to maintain it.
Thus the Nazis could never have justified their claims through
International Law as it stood and replaced it with a self-justifying
system. All anti-status quo groups need an alternative to status quo
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law eg Marxist notions of the movenent of history.
Nevertheless status quo law is never sufficient. It is the subject
of permanent dynamics. Herein lies a problem for a legalistic notion
of neutrality. Under a status quo view, neutrality can be reduced to
the letter of the law. Everything undertaken beyond these duties is
purely at the discretion of the neutral. Yet this fails to make clear
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that the relations which develop between States are dependent in large
part on the expectations generated by political activity. The
dynamics of the Iron Curtain and of technology no longer allow the
purity of 'stillesitzen' so sought after by legalists.
The exact role of the Swiss pattern for Austria has been in dispute
from the outset. This very uncertainty has allowed various parties to
claim or disclaim the Swiss example at significant political moments.
Some writers have considered the agreement in Moscow which introduced
the 'pattern' to be a legally binding arrangement. "*"^ This is usually
interpreted as meaning that the fact that Swiss neutrality is a legal
fact was the most important security for the USSR.
"The reference to Switzerland in the Moscow Memorandum srves only
to determine the status of neutrality, as Switzerland was at that time
the sole example, but does not mean that Swiss practice of neutrality
must be followed in every aspect."121
Other writers, especially on the political right, have sought to
reduce the importance of the Moscow Memorandum and to date Austria's
legal obligations to the Constitutional Act of 1955. In large part
this can be interpreted as a desire to reduce tne leverage of the USSR
in Austrian affairs. At its most extreme, Ermacora claimed that as
such, neutrality was an internal political decision which could be
revoked at any time by the Nationalrat.1^ seen literally in statute
law tnis is actually correct. What makes it impossible is that
neutrality as a Constitutional Act does not stand in a vacuum but in a
political web of relationships which entail an international guarantee
of neutrality's 'permanence'. By 1970, even Ermacora had accepted
that Austria had international obligations arguing through legalistic
rationalisations based on formal notification.-*-^ Nevertheless he
still spoke of the possibility that in certain cases Austria could
halt her commitment to neutrality. The difficulty lies in the fact
that legal logic which gives no weight to any neutrality declaration
except that of the Constitutional Act must presume that the law giver
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can also reverse the law. The fact is, of course, that Austria's
neutrality is part of a triangular agreement between East, West and
Austria itself. Others tried to support Ermacora's viewsl24 but tney
have proved too dangerous for the State to adopt than officially. The
fact tnat the four Austrian negotiators in Moscow were not lawgivers
or institutions of State does not reduce the political significance of
the memorandum. Any Austrian statesman ignores this fact at his
peril. We return once again to the web of political relationships. As
one communist commentator points out
"It is quite simply absurd to imagine that in such a situation as
this, such governmental negotiations were merely carried out with the
goal of personal and private obligations."-'-^^
The very fact that the USSR negotiated with these individuals on
behalf of Austria indicates the degree of importance attached to the
Memorandum. At the very least it was a moment of 'Significant Time'
more central in international terms than even the declaration itself,
which can be seen as the culmination of the process set in being by
the Memorandum.
The established view (Verdross, Verosta) is that although the legal
basis was established in October 1955, the document was based on a
pledge tnat Austria was to be permanently neutral. The proceedings in
Parliament show that the Government was anxious to fulfil the
commitments made in Moscow and as such tne measures must be understood
as derivative.^26 This is a useful compromise for the Austrian State
in that it recognises the political realities and hence placates
foreign observers, while maintaining the central decision in the hands
of the Austrians. Perhaps the only comment to be made on this is that
it neatly avoids any definition of the degree of political influence
it allows except in that the prime role is reserved for Austria.
The reality of this ambiguity is confirmed by the way in which the
Swiss pattern is used in political argument in Austria. Where a
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political advantage might accrue, politicians have not been slow to
emphasise the importance of the international obligation to follow the
Swiss pattern. Where it is disadvantageous, the 'uniqueness' of
Austria's postion is underlined. We can trace this manipulation back
".. to the understandable desire that tnere be no possibility that
any impression should arise that Neutrality was not declared in
complete freedom."127
The status of Neutrality in Austria within the political divide in
Europe of 1955 was clear. We must not be confused by the ingenious
twists of legal language. To a legal mind, there may be a distinction
between formal laws (important) and other documents (unimportant). in
the case of the Moscow Memorandum, we are dealing with something which
falls into a different category and which in a political
interpretation makes it an essential. The Memorandum illustrates tnat
Neutrality is an international concern and integral to Austria's
relationships with her partners. The fact that it entered statute law
through a domestic Constitutional Act does not diminish its political
role. Precisely to avoid an identity of Austria with the West or
Germany, the Memorandum was signed. This political commitment is at
the core of the Austrian model and cannot be seen as 'peripneral' or
'secondary'. In Austria, neutrality has always been directly relevant
to the Cold War and hence to the condition still known in
International Law as peacetime.
The 'Swiss' element was a clear signal from the Soviets that they
needed a guarantee that Austria would not join NATO. For the Austrian
negotiators, it provided a ring of defence against outside
interference by reference to an established code. Nevertheless, it
was only referred to in negotiations with the USSR and is not repeated
in the Constitutional Act. It nevertheless reappears in key political
debates eg defence.
The Moscow Memorandum crystalises Austria's fundamental, and
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original, dilamia. It ensures that the most pro-Western elements in
Austria are faced with the reality of what was agreed; the Cold War
and neutrality are inseparable.
This has one further major implication. Items introduced by one
side or another as issues of the 'Cold War' now demand a response from
neutral States. It is against this response that the actual content of
neutrality and not just of foreign and security policy is measured.
The crises of 1956 and 1968 underlined this fact. We shall see that
Soviet opposition was the crucial element in Austria's negotiations
with the EEC. The East/West confrontation has created a situation in
which neutrals must at times show their neutrality in a real political
sense. The active pursuit of stability is no longer an optional
'Vorwirkung1 but has taken on the crucial role in the modern context.
Indeed, the legal requirements have become part of the international
demonstration that there is a political will to remain outside wars,
rather than vice versa.
Neutrality for Austria was a mechanism by which Austria could play
a valid role without posing a threat to the superpowers. This was
true both as an independent State and as an entity separate from
Germany. The Allies agreed to remove their direct military interest
in Austrian territory. Austria's neutrality is essential to her
existence as a political actor in Central Europe. Where conflicts
were expressed purely in territorial terms, neutrals had merely to
ensure their sovereignity. Where conflicts are widened, the neutral
must seek a new role in this conflict. This is not to say that
neutrality must be extended to all areas in the form of a policy of
total compromise, but to point out that attachment to one bloc or
another is measured at several levels.
Neutral States have tended to claim that neutrality is self-
determined. Growing integration at all levels shows that the notion
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that any political policy emerges from a vacuum is increasingly
untenable. The Sanctions Crisis in 1935 showed that the
interrelationship of politics and economics, wartime and peacetime,
held to be separate spheres in Liberal notions of law, was an
unavoidable fact. The interrelationship of States was now crucial for
Neutrals. Policies of promoting positive peace are made credible with
the status of neutrality, while at the same time providing the only
longterm chance of security in the atonic age. At the risk of
repetition; neutrality can only be maintained if it relates to the
environment in which it is supposed to have significance and this is
essentially the web of political interrelationships. The relationship
of the EEC to the East/West question is unclear in legal terms but
crystal clear in political terms and any attempt by neutrals to ignore
this fact would put a questionmark over the entire status of
neutrality. A blind application of Swiss rules is simply absurd.
This explains in part why Austria under Kreisky chose a policy
closer to the Swedisn notion of NOT alignment and based on
independence rather than compromise. It also underlines the
importance of maintaining good relations at local/regional level
especially as at this level Austria participates as at least an equal
partner. Kreisky's obsession with tne Middle East as a possible
source of world conflict emphasises this search for positive
stability.
What, then, is the real role of neutrality law under such a view?
We have already hinted at our answer to this; the legal framework can
act as a line of defence which limits or allows certain political acts
by neutrals and, more importantly, limits the degree of intervention
which can be legitimised by an outside agent. Nevertheless the
'absoluteness' of the law cannot be tested until it is used in
political debate. The UN Charter and the law of permanent neutrality
117
have been rationalised to produce a new if ill-defined compromise.
Nevertheless, the assumption that codified law, ignorant of late
twentieth century conditions is the sum total of all obligations
contained under neutrality (Ginther's 'Neutralitaetsrecht'-'-^ can
only be maintained if one ignores history, technology, psychology and
economics. The relations in which neutrality exists, change
neutrality also, and the political/legal system of 1986 is not that of
1815. There can be no abstract eternal law if neutrality is to have
continued relevance.
Of course, all political actors have attempted to manipulate
neutrality law and have found interpretations to suit their cause. It
will not do for Liberals to counterpose Soviet 'propaganda' against
establishment 'objectivity'. Right wingers continue to insist that
neutrality is not economic. This of course presumes notions of
seperate private and public spheres and separations between the
economy and politics. It is no longer a convincing division. The
State is now threatened by international Capitalist integration. Yet
this great threat has officially no relevance for neutrality. Under
traditional interpretations, neutrality is military. Hence Soviet
claims that dependence on the West (or West Germany) brings political
dangers are dismissed as communist interference while claims that
agreement with the Eastern Bloc leads to dangerous dependence and
neutralism, are credible.^29 The equation does not add up.
The reality of atomic, chemical and biological war technology is
that purely territorial defence is no longer feasible. Thus a
neutrality based on 1815 conceptions of the nature of war is absurd.
Legal experts have tended of course to justify a desired political
position, in the case of Austrians, except for KPOe supporters this
has naturally taken the form of seeking to reduce the rights of
leverage for outsiders. This attempt to create political room for
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manouevre is in itself normal. However, the attempt to make a
universal right out of a political manouevre is highly dubious.
Austrian politicians have long recognised this, especially since
Waldheim's acceptance that neutrality was more than military. New
policy involves a recognition that neutrality is rooted in Cold War
and must not wait for total war to find its relevance. (The same might
be said for the two alliances which have developed since World War
II.) Some writers (eg Zemanek131) nave tried to move towards this
position by pointing out the difficulties in defining policy within
nineteenth century legal definitions, as neither East/West or
North/South truly existed before 1945. Nevertheless, the full
implications of a reassessed relationship between neutrality, war and
peace have only been tentatively approached, if only because of fear
that new laws might further restrict policy.
At its most basic; the political Right wishes a limited realm of
application for neutrality because it wishes to be involved in
capitalist expansion. Moscow has produced a wider definition
precisely because it sees this as the main threat. Social Democrats
in Europe are strongly pro-Capitalist but not necessarily pro-NATO.
Not surprisingly, the SPOe has tried to create new distinctions
between NATO and the West and this has characterised policy since
1970. Capitalists as much as Communists attempt to manipulate law.
If agreements in tne West are given universality it is because of the
acceptance of the law by the Western States and hence capitalism. The
seeming ease with which legal scholars nave justified their political
leaders comes from the fact that this was precisely what their
political leaders wanted to hear. What we have shown, is that the
emergence of a parallel legal system into which neutrality must also
somehow fit has created new conditions such that old interpretations
can no longer be accepted as beyond question. This has been reflected
119
in actual Austrian policy if not in the opinions of legal experts.
Anchorage in International Law provides a framework in which
political debate can take place. As such, it is preferrable to an
anarchy based on brute force. However, the law is only useful if it
has not broken down or is not simply disregarded at the whim of a
large military power. Wars have never yet been stopped by a law which
outlaws them, indeed, it is argued by experts that large powers can
never be neutral because their neutrality depends entirely on self-
discipline.
Neutralisation and Neutrality
The question of whetner Austrian neutrality was imposed or freely
chosen has exercised Austrian attention for some time. Ideological
neutrality in the Cold War is regularly ridiculed but with equal
regularity reappears and not only because of an ill-informed
misinterpretaion of the nature of State neutrality. Apologists for
neutrals always seek to reassert the freely chosen nature of the
status. Both OeVP and SPOe continually reassert this in propaganda,
and the text of the Neutrality Act restates it ('aus freien
Stuecken'.) Yet internationally, this assertion has been greeted with
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widespread scepticism much to the chagrin of Austrian politicians.
As Oehlinger points out, the grounds for this lie in the political
situation which led to the State Treaty and Neutrality which though
legally two separate acts are both part of a unified process of
Statehood. The agreement to be neutral was an essential precondition
of the State Treaty.132
Despite attempts to trace deep roots in Austrian political culture
for neutrality, the actual agreement, particularily of the SPOe was
only finally forthcoming in Moscow. As Gordon Shepherd wrote, if
neutrality had been the objective of Austrian Foreign Policy between
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1945 and 1955 the Austrian Government had 'managed brilliantly to keep
I OO
this a secret from all four Allies'. J
It is beyond doubt that independence was dependent on neutrality.
Austria's freewill was, of course, qualified. On the other hand, we
may legitimately claim that within tne realms of possibility it was
the preferred option of the Austrians as well by 1955. The attempt to
paint neutrality as the culmination of Austrian achievement has
political value but little historic substance. Nevertheless, an
opposing 'Great Power' tnesis that Austria merely passively received
neutrality from outside is equally untenable.
One of the differences in FPOe policy from that of tne OeVP has
been the insistence that neutrality to which they were not a party was
a bargain. This was partly a result of German Nationalist objections
to the 'Austrian' nation but also it fits more easily with an
examination from outside the process. Other writers have described
Austria as 'self-neutralised'"--^ but this too is inadequate.
The wealth of description testifies to the degree of ambiguity
surrounding the establishment of Austrian Neutrality. The Moscow
Memorandum was in its time understood by all parties as the
significant step in the reestablishment of an Austrian Republic. Yet
it remains true that it is an unprecedented form of recognition-^
leaving many questions with unclear answers.
"Fortunately for Austria this issue has never been pressed by one
of the relevant States so that it has never been put to the test.""--"-"
It is now essential that we recognise this dual nature in Austrian
neutrality; it has both international and domestic roots and these
cannot be competing theses. Divided Austria from 1945 until 1955 and
the uncertain relationship of this territory with similarly divided
Germany was simultaeously a domestic and an international concern.
The agreement which transformed this issue was thus also a domestic
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and international matter. Austrian neutrality has its roots in a
political dialogue.
Until now, Austria has maintained the final word. On many issues,
however, there is a clear adaptation to international pressure; eg
EEC, technology transfer. The success of this constellation depends
in part on policy being tailored so as to avoid it becoming the
subject of direct international confrontation. The very fact that the
superpowers are divided allows a neutral to vary her responses by
making an independent response (Poland, Middle East), but where the
objection of one power is very strong policy must take this into
account (EEC). It should be noted tnat many writers have assumed that
the USSR was Austria's interfering partner. Differences between
Kreisky and the USA over Poland and technology transfer suggest that
western leverage is just as powerful, with the proviso that until the
1970s there was a coalition of interests.
In fact, Austrian neutrality is a permanent dialogue and those like
Ogley who see the Austrian case as neutralised without choice miss
the central point as much as those who claim that Neutrality is a
domestic affair.
The question of ideology remains controversial. Wartime experience
illustrates this dilemma. Although both Sweden and Switzerland
resisted Nazi demands to fully control the press, any attempt by Swiss
newspapers to concertedly attack Germany would have left Switzerland
lined up as one of Germany's enemies. De Motta was forced to demand
responsible and restrained criticism and declared that the Swiss
Government could not follow a policy of neutrality without the backing
of the Swiss media. Otherwise Switzerland would be drawn inexorably
towards the war. This failure to distinguish between the supposedly
'good' violence of the allies and the 'evil' violence of the Germans
left the Swiss deeply mistrusted by 1945. In Sweden too, even mild
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criticism led to panic in Government circles. Of course, in botn
countries there were those who actively supported the Nazis. The
pressure on them was considerably less.137
The cynical view would point to the ease with which the superpower
(Germany) forced the smaller States to conform. Others might suggest
that in conforming they had already ceased to exist. Neither of these
views is entirely satisfactory. A completely neutralised State has no
real foreign policy existence except as a 'weathervane' in the balance
of power. A failure to respond to outside pressure positively may
lead to invasion. The problem lies not so much in the legal
definitions of what neutrality is but in the fact that political and
systanic differences during World War II and now during the Cold War
demand some response even if this does not appear in International
Law. This lack of official existence does not explain its actual
urgent necessity. Thus it is all the more surprising that in the
light of World War II, writers in neutrals have not grappled with
ideological neutrality except to dismiss its existence. In modern
warfare based on modern States and systems, old dogmas are
insufficient.
As we have seen, Kekkonen expressly recognised the ideological and
systemic dimensions of neutrality from the more exposed position of
Finland. The essential link between public and private, State and
citizen was also underlined;
"I do not want to claim that., [anti-neutral] attitudes are common
in our country, but even a few cases of this kind especially where
politicians are concerned may, in a period of international tension,
lead to the failure of our neutral policy as a whole. To succeed, a
neutral policy requires the support of a uniform public opinion."^-^
Kekkonen adds that the Cold War has given many issues of previously
domestic concern an international aspect. Austria has not faced the
same degree of exposure as Finland. Yet at the height of the
Hungarian crisis in 1956, the OeVP Secretary of State for tne Interior
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was quoted;
"It should be the duty of the citizen to refrain from anything
which might make the policy of neutrality more difficult to carry
out."139
During both 1956 and 1968 crises, Soviet-bloc attacks on Austria
were mostly centred on allegations about the neutrality of the press.
The response of the government suggests that this problem is left
alone because nobody has a convincing answer. 14^'141 In times of
crisis cracks emerge in the policy of refusing to recognise an
ideological element to neutrality.
At root there is a fundamentally unsolved question in Austrian
neutrality between identity as a neutral and identity as a western
State. The only credible conclusion is that Austria's survival
depends on this dichotomy remaining untested. An unstable equilibrium
exists which again suggests tnat Austrian neutrality has its function
in peacetime but no reality in any imaginable European total war
scenario, in any test through war, Austria will nave to choose betwen
Western and neutral identity.
The emphasis on the necessity of detente underlines tnat Austrian
Governments have accepted this as a factual state of affairs. Even
the Swiss have accepted that there is a problem
"Themaintenance of the independence and freedom of the State
precedes the freedom of the individual and public media, for where the
State itself could be threatened by misuse of the right of freedom [!]
tne State could no longer find enough authority to protect this
right."142
The political dimensions are clear in Grubhofer's calls for more
press controls in 1956.
The EEC issue is here crucial to understand tne dilemma. The
declared aim of the OeVP...
"..to undertake, also in the future, everything to ensure that our
bond which today ties us to the Western community is not loosened"141
shows that Austria is not unbiased in tne East/West issue. The
implications for Austria in the event of the outbreak of an East/West ;
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become clearer.
Daniel Frei points out the ideological dimensions for modern
neutrality and finds that classical territorial neutrality does not
apply. Yet the political realities of the foundation of the Austrian
State show that rather than being restricted by classical concepts,
neutrality was intended to play a role in the postwar world. The
division of Germany and Austria was part of a power game between the
victorious allies of World War II. From the outset there was no
possibility of Austrian neutrality being merely territorial in
concept, as was the case in Switzerland. Austria's location and
geography together with the spread of competing if parallel systems
has blurred the boundaries of loyalties.
"If the State served as the most important identity then States
would appear as the only actors on the world stage..^political
activity would then be activity between States and conflicts would be
conflicts between States. Then all conflicts between non-State groups
would appear irrelevant and one would act neutrally towards them."-'-^
The fact is that this unique loyalty to 'States' is not absolute,
and relies on the continued strength of political and cultural
institutions. In Austria this is furtner complicated by the ambiguity
of the terms 'People', 'Nation' and 'State'. If domestic loyalties
were severely tested, the strains of tnis Western versus neutral split
might paralyse the country. Thus Austria has attempted to use
neutrality to forge a national identity, wnile at the same time being
able to use the fact of neutral status as a platform to build contacts
abroad.
Stourzh speaks of neutrals facing two paradoxes; an 'affinity
paradox' arising where the neutrals' affinity to one bloc is balanced
by the need to placate a potentially hostile bloc, and a 'credibility
paradox' arising because neutrality is officially a means to another
end but at the same time it must be permanent. Where neutrality seems
to become an end, then the 'total neutrality' spectre appears.^ ^ yet
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even this description tends to obscure the problem. These are not
paradoxes in any true sense in that they have emerged as unforeseen
results of clear agreements. These are real dilemmas which result
from the European divide which is at the heart of Austrian neutrality.
They are dilenmas in that they call for real choices. The entire EEC
debate was not about paradox but about the dilemma which was so
brutally exposed by the economic dependence on one hand and the nature
of Cold War neutrality on the other. Austrian neutrality is not
subject to paradox. It has always been an unstable equilibrium
dependent on Austria being Western and neutral at the same time.
Without both these aspects, the triangle whicn was seen to be
essential in the State treaty agreement could not have occurred. By
blurring over the contradictions, agreement at a practical level was
possible. The maintenance of a state of affairs which does not expose
this contradiction to the detriment of Austria is essential; hence
detente. A Soviet advance in Europe would destroy neutrality as it is
rS
currectly practiced in the same way as Nazi victory in 1945 would have
destroyed the 'Liberal' basis of Swiss and Swedish practice. The
mention of an 'affinity crisis' (rather than paradox) exposes this new
element; in 1815 Switzerland became neutral between States, none of
which could be desribed as friends or enemies. In Austria since 1955
there is a clear identity with one side and against another. The
neutral must seek to avoid all war not seek merely to stay outside a
war between others.
There are at least two further questions. Firstly where does
nationality start to compete with ideological allegiance? Switzerland
found tnat by 1945 putting nation before ideology led to exclusion
from the UN and the devaluation of neutrality. Secondly, the need for
an unquestioning approach to establishment tninking and 'Liberal'
neutrality has been met by the total domination of the two 'Proporz'
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parties in Austria. Nowhere outside the Anglo-Saxon world have two
~\ aci The Social
groups dominated a political system so completely. °
Partnership system and the tradition of common approach to Foreign
Policy depends on the continued domination of such thinking. This
gives rise to an insoluble if nonetheless real doubt; how stable is
Austrian neutrality if the domestic political economic situation
becomes uncertain? There are historical reasons why this question
gives rise to more 'Angst' in the Austrian situation than elsewhere.
Final Comments
Neutrality has undergone the same political change as the
environment in which it is intended to be relevant. We shall now
examine the new model which has emerged. A purely legal doctrine of
neutrality forces all political events into an artificial no-mans
land. The determination to remain consistent within tne law may be
understandable but it has led to rationalisations which are at times
scarcely credible.
Soviet criticisms of Austrian behaviour are dismissed on the grounds
that they wish to make Austria ultimately pro-Soviet. Yet the same
commentators argue tnat there is no contradiction between being
neutral and western. This is clearly a matter of political
persuasion.
It is dishonest to argue that economic dependency does not threaten
neutrality. Dependency on West Germany has never been greater, but
the political effects are limited because of historical barriers to
anything which might smack of 'Anschluss'. Swiss economic and
political dependence on France in 1813 was the reason given by the
allies as to why her declaration of neutrality was not credible. In
terms of official statements, neutrality and dependency are unlinked
as they are not covered in International Law. Clearly the political
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facts remain. Neutrality has a longterm existence only if tnere is no
major opposition either domestic or foreign. Thus Austria has adopted
a policy of independence based on and given credibility by her
permanent military non-alignment.
Because there is at present widespread acceptance of neutrality,
does not imply that in the event of a serious international crisis or
of progression to a working system of international collective
security that it should continue to be viewed so positively. In fact
historical experience suggests precisely the opposite. The acceptance
of neutrality is not a matter of a common agreement on the validity
of International Law in wartime (see Benelux, Denmark, Norway) but
rather of the political climate of the times. Neutrality in the
modern context must thus be aimed at preventing all war and this not
primarily because of Soviet pressure but because classical neutrality
in wartime can only be applied where territorial boundaries can be
defined and defended. Modern War technology has meant that
neutrality must be directed to prevention rather than sideline
sitting. There are of course limits to the capabilities of small
States, but the nature of neutrality and the finality of modern
technology as it affects both large and small puts them in a unique
position which must be utilised.
128
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES -CHAPTER TWO
1. Rotter M., 'Die dauernde Neutralitaet', Duncker u. Humblot,
Berlin 1981 pl7-18
2. cf Bonjour E., 'Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitaet',
Hebbling/Lichtenhahn Basel 1965, 1970
3. cf. Luif Paul, 'Neutralitaet-Neutralismus-Blockfreiheit' Eu Rund
1982 p269-70
4. Strupp K., 'Neutralisation' Berlin 1932 pl2
5. Rotter op.cit. p54-6
6. Strupp op.cit. p64
7. see Verdross A., 'The permanent neutrality of Austria' Vienna
1977
8. Koeck F., 'A permanently Neutral State in the Security Council'
Cornell Journal of International Law' 1973 pl39
9. in Verdoss A., 'Austria's permanent neutrality and tne United
Nations Organisation', American Journal of International Law(AJIL)
1956 p64
10. Wrignt Q., 'The present status of Neutrality' AJIL 1940 p415
11. Swiss Agreement with the League of Nations 1921*.
12. Walters F.P., 'A History of the League of Nations', RIIA/OUP 1952
13. Wright Q., 'The Lend-Lease Bill and International Law' AJIL
1941 p305-313
14. Ogley R., 'The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the twentieth
century' Routledge and K. Paul, London, pl65
15. Ogley op.cit. pl48
16. Howard C., 'Switzerland' in Toynbee A./Toynbee V,M., 'Survey of
International Affairs 1939-46; the War and the Neutrals' RIIA/OUP
1956
17. cf 'Focus on Switzerland' Vol 2. 'Historical Evolution', Swiss
Office for development of Trade, Lausanne 1975 or Bonjour op.cit.
18. cf Luif op.cit. p271
19. Rotter op.cit. pl02 or Bonjour op.cit.
20. Black/Knorr/Falk/Young ed., 'Neutralization and World Politics'
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1968
pl02
21. Klaus J., speech to Council of Foreign Relations, New York 8/4/68
BP ID
22. Zemanek K. in Neuhold H./Thalberg H. ed., 'The european neutrals
129
in international affairs' Braumuller/AIIA Laxenberg 1983 p63
23. Black et.al. op. cit. p66
24. Spannocchi E., OZA 1967 p268
25. Frei D., 'Kriegsverhuetung durch Neutralitaet' in Beitraege zur
Konfliktforschung'(Zuerich) 1981/4 p37-55
26. Haegloff H.G., 'A test of Neutrality in Sweden in the second World
War' International Affairs April 1960
27. Ogley op.cit. pl7-18
29. Interview with Erwin Lane, Vienna 1984
30. Vital D., 'The Inequality of States, London 1967 pl02
31. Frei D., 'Ideologische Dimensionen der Neutra 1 itaet' OZA 1968
p213
32. Andics H., 'Der Staat, den keiner wollte' Goldmann Verlag,
Vienna, 1978
33. Verosta S., 'Gedanken nach 25 Jahren; der oesterreichische
Staatsvertrag vom 15en Mai 1955 und die immerwaehrende Neutral itaet
Oesterreicns' Eu Rund 1980/2 p91-92
34. Verosta op.cit. pl01-2
35. Dusek/Pelinka A/Weinzier1 E., 'Zeitgeschicnte in Aufriss' TV-
Verlagsunion GesmbH, Vienna 1981
36. Verosta S., 'Oesterreicns Weg zur dauernden Neutral itaet' Eu Rund
1975/2 p20-l
37. Harvey 0., 'The diplomatic diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-40
Collins London 1970 pll0
38. Adenauer K, Bundestag 21/6/55, 'Dokumente zur Duetschlandpolitik'
Vol 1 1955 p93
39. Austrian Bishops 27/3/38 in Grayson C.T. Jr., 'Austria's
International position 1938-53, Librairie E.Droz, Geneva 1953 p25
40. Grayson op.cit. p26
41. Benedikt H.ed., 'Gescnichte der Republik Oesterreich', Oldenbourg
Verlag, Munich 1977
42. Wemzierl U., 'Zur Nationalen Frage - Literatur und politk im
oesterreichischen Exil' in Lutz H./Rumpler H., 'Oesterreich und die
deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', Oldenbourg Verlag,
Munich 1982
43. Stadler K.R., 'Austria', Benn, London 1971 pl93
44. Kreissler F., 'Der Oesterreicher und seine Nation', Boehlau
Verlag, Graz-Vienna 1984 pl89
130
45. Botz G., 'Von der Ersten zur Zweitan Republik; Kontinuitaet und
Diskontinuitaet' in Botz G./Stadler K./Weidenholzer J. ed.,
'Perspektiven und Tendenzen dsr Sozialpolitik' Europaverlag, Vienna-
Munich-Salzburg 1984 d42
46. Kreissler op.cit. p675
47. Verosta S., 'Die geschichtliche kontinuitaet des oesterreichischen
Staates' in Benedikt op.cit. p604-5
48. Department of State, Washington D.C., Bulletin IX 1943 p310
49. see Grayson op.cit. p54-61
50. Barker E., 'Austria 1918-72' Macmillan, London 1973 pl37
51. Fellner F., 'Die Historographie zur Oesterreichisch-Deutschen
Problematik als Spiegel der Nationalpolitischen Diskussion' in
Lutz/Rumpler ed. op.cit. p34
52. Fellner op.cit. p36
53. see Barker op.cit. chl7, Benedick op.cit. p480, 284
Verosta(OZA 1975) op.cit. p21-2, Grayson op.cit. p65-80
54. Neck R., 'Innenpolitik' in Weinzierl/Skalnik ed., 'Die Zweite
Republik', Styria Verlag, Graz-Vienna-Cologne p60
55. Stourzh G., 'Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945-55', Styria
Verlag Graz-Vienna Cologne 1980
56. Renner K., 'Oesterreich, St Germain und der kommende Friede' Wien
4/46 in Czasky E.M., 'Oesterreichs Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralitaet'
OeGA 1980
57. Raab H., 'Die Integrale Neutralitaet der Schweiz-das anzustebende
Vorbild eines freien Oesterreichs'(1945) in Mock A/Steiner L/Khol A.
ed., 'Neue Fakten zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralitaet' Politische
Akademie der OeVP, 1983 p239
58. Renner K., 'Die ideologische Ausrichtung der Politik Oesterreichs'
WZ 19/1/47 also Csasky op.cit.
59. Kasamas A., 'Progrartrn Oesterreich. Die Ziele und Grundsaetze der
oesterreichische Volkspartei' Vienna 1949 pl06
60. Verosta 1975 op.cit. pl09-15
61. UN General Assembly 1952 in Csasky op.cit.
62. see Verosta 1975 op.cit. pll2
63. Verosta in Eu Rund 1975 op.cit. p28-9
64. State Department Publication no. 5399 Washington D.C. 1954
65. Dulles 13/2/54 in Mayrzedt H/Hummer H., '20 Janre oesterreichische
europa- und neutralitaetspolitik' Vol 1 OeGA/Braumuller 1976
66. Bollmus R., 'Zur oesterreichischen Konzeption fuer einen
131
Staatsvertrag' in Mock/Steiner/Khol op.cit. pl20
67. Moscow Memorandum in Siegler H., 'Oesterreichs Souveraenitaet,
Neutralitaet und Prosperitaet' Vienna, 1967 p283
68. See also Mayrzedt/Hummer op.cit. pll
69. see Ermacora F., '20 Jahre oesterreichische Neutralitaet' Vienna
1975 p70-l
70. 'Conception officielle Suisse de la neutralite' in Scnweizerisches
Jahrbuch fuer Internationales Recht (SJIR) 1957, Vol XIV, pl95
71. Mayrzedt/Hummer op.cit. pl2
72. Ginther K., 'Oesterreicns imnerwaehrende Neutralitaet' Verlag fuer
Geschichte und Politik Vienna, 1975 pl4
73. Ginther K., 'Neutralitaetsrecht und Neutralitaetspolitik',
Springer Verlag, Vienna-Berlin 1975 p33
74. Bericht des Bundesrates and der Bundesversammlung ueber die
Richtlinien der Regierungspolitik in der Legislaturperiode 1971-75,
Seperatdruck 11245 der eidgenossichen Drucksachen und Materlalzent.
75. Ginther (Springer) op.cit. p25
76. Gintner (VPG) op.cit. pl5
77. Bindschedler R.L., 'Neutralitaetspolitik und Sicherheitspolitik'
in OZA 1976 p339
78. Ibid. p334
79. see Durdendefskii NY Times 1955 No 22. 'Swiss Neutrality' p28-30
or Volgen v., '150 Years of Swiss Neutrality' Int Affairs (Moscow)
1965/11 p50-52
80. see Bindschedler-Robert D. 'Voelkerrecht und Neutralitaet in
sowjetischer Sicht' OZA 1965/3 pl44-163
81. see Snurshalov v., 'Der rechtliche Innalt des Prinzips 'pacta sunt
servanda'' Gegenwartsprobleme des Voelkerrechts, Berlin 1962 pl36-7
82. Vigor P.H., 'The Soviet view of War, Peace and Neutrality' London
1975 pl78-185
83. Bindscnedler-Robert op.cit. pl56
84. Black et al op.cit. p45-47
85. Schmid, 26/2/58 in 'Dok. zur Deutschlandpolitik' 1958 p592
86. Neues Deutschland 1/8/57
87. Thalberg H., 'The european Neutrals and regional stability' in
Neuhold/Thalberg op.cit.
88. Ermacora 1975 op.cit. p76
132
89. Beloff M. Eu Rund 1980/2 pl34
90. Die Furche 1960/29 pi
91. Ginther(Springer) op.cit. pl06-7, 134-7, 143-6
92. Oehlinger T.,in Oehlinger/Mayrzedt/Kucera ed. 'Institutionelle
Aspekte der oesterreichischen Integrationspolitik' Vienna 1976 p48
93. Andren N./Belfrage F., 'The Neutrality of Sweden' in Birnbaun K./
Neunold H. ed. 'Neutrality and Non-alignment in Europe' Braumuller/
AllA Laxenbyrg 1982 pill
94. Andren N., 'Sweden; Defence and disarmament' in Neuhold/Thalberg
op.cit. p40-l
95. Ulden, Die Furche 1963/2 p7
96. Vital D. 1967 op.cit. p66
97. Andren op.cit. p45
98. Hakovirta H., 'The Soviet Union and the varieties of Neutrality in
Europe' in World Politics 1983/July p363-585
99. Hakovirta H., 'An interpretation of Finland's contribution to
European Peace and Security' in Neunold/Thalberg op.cit. p30/31
100. Vayrynen R./Pajunen A., 'The Neutrality of Finland' in
Birnbaum/Neunold op.cit.
101. Alhorn B.O. 'Finnlands Neutralitaetspolitik in den 80er Jahren',
1982 pt3
102. Kekkonen, UPI interview, 5/5/63 in Vital D. 'Survival of Small
States' London 1971, pl09
103. Bock F. in Bauer R.,' Ibe Austrian Solution' International
Conflict and Cooperation' University of Virginia press,
Charlottesville Va., 1980
104. Neuhold in Bauer op.cit. pl67
105. Kruzel J.J., 'Neutrality in World Politics' (Research Project) in
Neuhold/Thalberg op.cit. p81/2
106. Heer F., 'Was heisst schon Neutral', Die Furcne 1959/51-2 p5
107. Schulmeister 0., 'Oesterrechisches Wunder - 2e Teil' Eu Rund
1980/2 p52
108. Girard R., 'violence and the Sacred', John Hopkins Univ. Press,
Baltimore and London 1973
109. Zemanek K., 'Austria's policy of Neutrality' in Neuhold/Thalberg
op.cit. pi7
110. Hartlmayer F., 'The European doctrine of Neutrality', Korea and
WOrld Affairs, 1982/2 p340
133
111. Toncic-Sorinj, OZA 1967 p424
112. Toncic-Sorinj, 'Neutralitaet; Eusropaeische Aufgabe', Die Furcne
1967/29 p4
113. Bonjour E., 'Oesterreichiscne und scnweizerische Neutralitaet in
Vergleich' in Schweizer Monatshefte, 1980/10 p829-839
114. Ginther(Springer) op.cit. p79
115. Mock A., 'Die Internationale Bedeutung des Staatsvertrages' Eu
Rund 1980/2 p48
116. Moser A.B.J., 'Oesterreichs und Schwedens Neutralitaet im
Vergleich', Zeitgeschichte, 1978-9, p259
117. Die Presse 7-8/12/72 pi
118. Regierungserklaerung 1975 Sten Prot dNR *.
119. Morgenthau H., 'Politics among Nations', New York 1970 p85-95
120. see Kunz J., 'Austria's permanent Neutrality' AJIL 1956 p420-
26ff or Berger P., 'Das oesterreichische Neutralitaetsproblem' in
Der Donauraum, 1956/1 p2-10
121. Kunz op.cit. p422
122. Ermacora F., 'Oesterreichs Staatsvertrag und Neutralitaet',
Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt a.M./Berlin 1957, pl07-lll
123. Ermacora F., 'Oesterreichische Verfassungslehre', Vienna 1970
p98-108ff also by Ermacora 1975 op.cit. p68-71
124. Ermacora 1970 op.cit. pl03
125. eg Nenning G. 'Oesterreich sieht sich keinerlei
voelkerrechtlichen Bindungen gegenueber' 1959
126. Hagen J.J., 'Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und die
Neutralitaet Oesterreichs' in OeVDJ 1976/April p6
127. Verdross op.cit. p30
see also Verosta S., 'Neutralitaet; ein Grundriss', Vienna 1967
128. Ginther K., 'Neutralitaetspolitik und Neutralitaetsgesetz' JBl
5/6/65 p302-12
129. Unterberger A., 'Mytnologisierung der oesterreichischen
Aussenpolitik' Eu. Rund 1981/1
130. Zemanek K., 'Zeitgemaesse Neutralitaet' in OZA 1976 p355-367
131. see Waldheim K., 'Perspektiven der oesterreichischen
Aussenpolitik', OZA 1968 p368, Kreisky B., 'Politik braucht
Visionen, Oldenbourg 1982 p64, Bock F., 'Sicherheit und
Zusammenarbeit' in Die Furche 1976/31 p3
132. Oehlinger op.cit. p28-9
134
133. Shepherd G; 'Oesterreichische Odysee', Quintus Verlag Vienna
1958 p294
134. in Black et al. op.cit. p xii-xiii
135. Neuhold H/Loibl W., 'The permanent Neutrality of Austria in
Birnbaum/Neunold op.cit. p49
136. Note that Ogley calls Austria 'fully neutralised' and non-free
will op.cit. p5
137. see Laqueur W., 'Das traurige Europa; Neutralitaet, Entspannung,
Anpassung' Eu Rund 1980/2 pll9-131
138. Kekkonen op.cit.
139. NZZ 21/11/56
140. eg Czernitz AZ 1/5/55, Ermacora op.cit. Karasek F., OZA 1967
pl30 etc.
141. Eger R., 'Krisen an Oesterreichs Grenzen, Herold Druck und
Verlags Ges.mbH, Vienna 1978 p65
142. in Grubhofer F., 'Neutralitaet und Staatsscnutzgesetz', Die
Furche 1957/51 p4
143. Karasek F., 'Oesterreich und Europa', Die Furcne 1964/50 p4
144. Frei D., OZA 1967 op.cit. p208
145. Stourzh G in Schou/Brundtland op.cit. p96
146. Pelinka A., 'Struktur und Funktion der politischen Parteien' in




Austria and West European Integration
"Basic laws change when they have
been in force only a few years, law
has its periods, the entry of saturn
into the house of the lion marks the
origin of a given crime... larceny,
incest, infanticide, parricide,
everything has at some time been
accounted a virtuous action."
B.Pascal 'Pensees' No 60
The fundamental dilemma which Austria has faced since the
foundation of the Second Republic stems directly from the ambiguity of
Austria's position both during and after four-power occupation. This
problem was made permanent by the direct involvement of the Soviet
Union both in the signing of the State Treaty and as we have seen in
tne coming into being of neutrality. It can be summed up as the
problem of westernism.
Since the earliest period, Austria's negotiators were well aware
that the greatest danger to a reestablished Austria came from the
Soviet Union. It was to meet the minimum requirements of tne USSR
that the agreed formula of permanent neutrality was adopted. By this
stage, Austria had already received large amounts of aid from the
European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) and was a full member of
tne OEEC. This had anchored the economy firmly into the western camp
and the decline of the KPOe as a political force ensured that there
was no substantial domestic opposition to this. In joining the
Council of Europe in 1956 as a full member, Austria's commitment to
active integration with the West seemed assured.
By 1957 the Common Market had emerged and Austria was not to be a
member, largely due to considerations arising out of her neutral
status. This problem was to be the overriding concern of Austrian
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Governments for the next fifteen years. In 1972 agreement was finally
reached allowing relations to find a new if unstable equilibrium. The
development of a distinctive 'Austrian' model of neutrality was aided
in part by the experiences and pressures in this debate and the
positions adopted both domestically and internationally. This is in
itself a fairly mundane conclusion. Its importance lies not directly
in the debate but rather in the underlying dilemma so clearly exposed
in neutrality on the Iron Curtain. The truth is that there is a cost
in Neutrality related directly to the ideological divisions of Europe.
This political stalemate demands that all decisions are taken with
this context in mind.
The Austrian economy after World War II
Originally the dominant power among the allies in Austria was the
Soviet Union. The four power occupation and Austria's united front
under Karl Renner quickly ensured that Soviet hegemony was
neutralised. The US Secretary of State, Stettinus described the goals
of policy towards Austria;
"Depending upon the contribution of the Austrians themselves to
their own liberation and reconstruction, the Government of the United
States intends, in collaboration witn our allies, to create conditions
in which the Austrians can achieve their political and economic
welfare in harmony with their neighbouring states"^
The assumption by the United States was that the Austrian
provisional government would be a puppet administration on the lines
of the provisional governments of the rest of Europe. Austria
remained in the western camp in part through tne fact that the USA,
alone among the victorious powers was able to relieve the economic
problems including near-starvation conditions whicn resulted after
1945.2 was j-j-jjg ability made concrete in 1947 by the enactment of
the E.R.P. which ensured tnat Austria looked to the west economical ly.
The purpose and methods of the E.R.P. will only be briefly
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discussed here; suffice to say that its ultimate effect was the
consolidation of the spheres of influence agreed at Yalta and the
emergence of two confrontational power blocs whose existence was to
dominate European politics for the foreseeable future.
In Austria the KPOe organised demonstrations against government
policies in Spring 1947 which led to increasing pressure particularly
within the OeVP for a more cautious approach to the Soviet Union. It
was the SPOe which was most bluntly pro-American seeking in their
domestic competition with the KPOe to identify clear differences in
policy. They specifically opposed any arrangement with the USSR.
This was at the cost of division within its own ranks but it was
thanks to the support of the SPOe
" that Austrian workers accepted the burdens of the American
reconstruction concept.
Participation in the OEEC nad dramatic effects on the Austrian
economy. By 1949, GNP had increased above its pre-war levels. The
growth of the early 1950s kept pace with the economic miracle taking
place in West Germany. Between 1948 and 1951, industrial production
trebled and productivity doubled, while (DP grew by 50%.4 The result
was an orientation towards western markets and confirmation that the
pre-Hitler concentration of Austrian trade on Eastern and Central
Europe had been replaced by a new concentration on the rapidly
expanding western showcase economy in West Germany.
In the period from 1952 until 1958 the West German Economy grew by
48% wnile GNP in Austria leapt 45%. All other European States lagged
behind.^ As a result, by 1958 the first full year of the Common
Market's existence, 49.6% of Austria's exports and 54.4% of imports
were with 'The Six' now grouped together in the new Market and the
vast bulk of this trade was with West Germany. During the period of
Anschluss the economy had undergone rapid development especially in
the area around Linz (Steel, Armaments, Chemicals). This new
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industrial development had been orientated towards the needs of the
Third Reich of which Austria was an integral part after 1938. The
parallel experiences and developments in Austria and West Germany
under the ERP merely reconfirmed the close interrelationship.
The ERP became a concrete body following a conference of
representatives of 16 European States and the USA in 1947 at which a
new "Committee for European Economic Cooperation' was set up. In
April 1948 this became a fully-fledged organisation with Austria as a
founder member. The Plan operated through the mechanism of
"counterpart funds' whereby goods were donated by US industry
suffering from overcapacity and used in Europe to create reserves.
These were paid into special national accounts to tie used as an
investment fund by national governments in co-operation with the ERP
administration.
"Hereby the Marshall Plan solved the greatest and most difficult
problem of the Austrian economy - the balance of payments."^
Austria was a major beneficiary of Marshall Aid - between July
1948 and 1949 it accounted for 14% of Austrian National income a
higner proportion than in any other recipient State.^ As we have
noted, Austria's growth rates for the 1950s outpaced those of all
other European countries except West Germany (Austria - 6% p.a., West
Germany - 7.1%, Sweden - 3.2%, U.K. -2.2%).8
The formation of the E.E.C.
By 1957, Austria had one of Europe's fastest growing economies.
That growth had been largely export-led. Between 1952 and 1958
exports had increased in value by 81.3%. Nearly all of this increase
was in exports to the countries now grouped together in the Common
Market. These States had been anxious to set up a more thorough-going
union in Western Europe. It is clear that Austrian politicians had
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not grasped the dimensions of tne problem now posed and were ill-
prepared for the controversies which emerged.
The problem was that in the view of Austrian politicians Neutrality
merely entailed a distance from military commitments and allowed fully
Western social structure, while the Soviet Union was clearly anxious
to limit the degree to which Austria was identified with 'the West'.
Neutrality was only newly established by 1957 and tne EEC debate wnich
continued throughout the 1960s was essential in establishing the
limits to political activity under the new circumstances. It appears
that in 1955 considerations of European integration were of no real
concern to any of the parties. Austria was faced with tne fact that
her economy was largely orientated to the demands of Western Europe.
In the more basic commodity areas Austria actually had a trade surplus
in dealings with the EEC.
Following the collapse of the British-inspired 'Maudling Talks' in
Paris, the Benelux countries, France, West Germany and Italy
negotiated a new treaty of co-operation signed in Rome in 1957. This
group, widely known as 'The Six' consisted of the most powerful
trading economies of Western Europe with the exception of the United
Kingdom. The creation of the Common Market was thus a direct
challenge for those remaining outside its confines.
The Austrian economy was, as we have seen, heavily dependent on
markets in 'the Six'. More pointedly, Austria had virtually no
tradition of trading with the other countries remaining. Despite
tnis, Austria joined these States in the formation of a much looser
federation to be known as EFTA or 'The Seven'. Only 10% of her
exports and 11.2% of her imports came from these countries. In same
areas virtually all trade was with countries now in the Common Market
- e.g. live Cattle -96%, fuel - 92.6% and timber - 91%. Geographical
and historical factors made Italian and German markets much more
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accessable to Austrian exports and the opportunities for trade with
her only EFTA neighbour, Switzerland, had never been fully developed.
Unlike the Scandinavian countries the Austrian economy was not geared
to trade with the UK. A mere 2.7% of her exports went to Britain.10
More fundamentally, Austria's position was made worse by the structure
of her production and trade. Austria had a relatively low capital
intensity in her exports making it more difficult to overcome the
trade discrimination now imposed by 'the Six' than, say, Switzerland
with her strong capital base.
In the early stages the problems were presented in dramatic terms
by those who favoured close ties with the EEC; Landeshauptmann
(Provincial Governor) Krainer of Styria warned most threateningly;
"Austria must not starve because of neutrality"
Austria joined the new EFTA organisation only after considerable
internal debate. The pro-EEC Trade Minister Bock chose to emphasise
the passages of the Treaty of Stockholm which underlined that the goal
of the organisation was further and more widely cast integration.
There was nevertheless opposition to the signing of the EFTA Treaty
especially from the opposition FPOe, who resented both the economic
separation from large markets (Liberal wing) and the separate
development from West Germany which this treaty seemed to imply
(National wing). They described the new organisation as 'stillborn'
(Gredler) and openly opposed any membership. In its place, Gredler
suggested a bilateral treaty of association with "the Six". Mannert
put the FPOe's position quite clearly;
"Whoever wants a united Europe must accept the possibility of
Supranational Institutions.
The stridency and urgency with which the FPOe advocated membersnip
of the EEC reminded some observers of the pre-War campaigns for
Anschluss arguing as they did that an Austria beyond this organisation
was not viable in economic terms.
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"There remains evidence that FPOe speakers at best ignored, but
sometimes went so far as to ridicule the idea of 'Austrian'
nationality while continuing to harp on the German cultural heritage
of the Austrian people. Consequently there were suspicions that FPOe
leaders meant 'grossdeutsch' wnen they used the term 'Europe'"13
We will examine the major divisions in the Austrian political
establishment over this issue below.
Despite these objections, Austria signed the Treaty of Stockholm as
a founder member of EFTA. This Agreement set up a much looser co¬
operative trade structure than that envisaged by the Treaty of Rome.
Article 42 of the EFTA Charter expressly accepts the possibility that
members may wish to leave the organisation;
"Every member State can withdraw from this agreement on condition
that it send a written notice of termination twelve montns in advance
to the Government of Sweden, who will inform the other member States."
The organisation is not intended to move towards any kind of
political unification. It has a purely trade function.
"EFTA can never be an end in itself for Austria. Wnoever tries to
represent the Treaty of Stockholm in this way ... would interpret it
incorrectly. EFTA, in which we now work in all good faith, is not the
ultimate goal which is to be found in an all-European solution."^
As we shall see, the SPOe was often characterised as being the
chief support for EFTA in Austria and the debate was sometimes
portrayed as a choice between 'Red EFTA' and 'Bourgeois EEC', mucn to
the irritation of those politicians who liked to be both such as Bruno
Kreisky. In the final analysis EFTA proved fairly uncontroversial
largely because the Soviet Union chose to concentrate its attacks on
what it saw as tne greatest threat - the EEC. EFTA in fact had
several advantages for Austria. It brought the possibility of
expansion into previously unexplored markets. Additionally, in
contrast to trade with the EEC, 87% of Austria's exports to EFTA
countries in 1958 were finished manufactures."^ As we shall see, EFTA
was an unexpected success in commercial terms, somewhat dampening the
urgency of the debate in the initial period. Indeed Fritz Molden
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publisher of the leading Vienna conservative newspaper 'Die Presse'
wrote that the EEC question was;
a fundamental question of life and death for this
country..which could have the direst consequences for our
fatherland."16
Rather than go through a blow by blow account of the debate in the
1960s which has been we11-documented elsewhere, (eg. Mayrzedt/
Binswanger, Mayrzedt/Rome, Government Documents etc.) I will now
concentrate on the positions adopted by the main participants in the
debate, both domestic and international. While external actors
maintained largely unchanging positions the domestic debate falls into
three distinct phases; 1958-63 when Austria negotiated in the shadow
of Britain together with Sweden and Switzerland, 1963-67 when
following the failure of UK membership talks Austria, alone among tne
neutrals, decided to 'go it alone' in negotiations with 'the Six' and
1967-72 when Austria resumed contacts with the other interested




In this section I wish to concentrate on the attitudes adopted by
the EEC both as an individual institution and through the attitudes of
tne larger States. The Benelux countries were supportive in line with
their general policy of support for the fullest degree of integration
possible, but this very consistency meant tnat their views were seldom
decisive, although under a unanimity system the potential for small
states is theoretically overproportional.
It should be emphasised from the outset that the EEC never
developed a clear policy on the nature of 'association' for neutral
States. The assumption on the part of the neutrals that the term by
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necessity meant some system of trade preference was not necessarily
shared by the EEC. By early 1959 the EEC was speaking of
'multilateral association' to the 'free European Market'. Although
the Council of Ministers was keen to extend the Community's scope the
EEC Commission was always notably more cautious.
In February 1959, a Commision memorandum to the Council warned that
the liberalisation could not take place at the expense of the fruits
already achieved. From the beginning, the Commission did not define
the end results they sought to reach. The idea that each case had to
be considered separately was a constant feature of EEC attitudes.
There was a distinct impression in Brussels that the neutrals wanted
all of the benefits without any of the costs especially those
involving restrictions on sovereignity.
V /v /
In May 1962, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak warned that from his
perspective it appeared that those countries which had originally
doubted the ability of the Common Market to function successfully were
now knocking on the door in order to reduce economic worries without
any willingness to accept restrictions.^ Additionally, the EEC
differentiated starkly between the applications of the various
neutrals. Austria had a 'legitimate' political excuse for her
neutrality in that it was a precondition of her reestablishment and
played a role for Western Europe in neutralising a part of the iron
Curtain. Sweden also played a security role in safeguarding the
relative independence of Finland. The EEC was sharply critical of
Switzerland however;
"No political justification can be found for Swiss Neutrality and
it cannot justify any claim for preferential association"^
Once again we see that outside nations continue to look for a
political 'function' of neutrality without which its grounds are
considered weak. The legal foundation of tne status is of interest
primarily to the neutrals themselves.
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It could be argued that law does not refer to economic conditions
but this does not hold where the same state chooses to make than a
barrier to full membership and at the same tine seeks preferential
membership. In Austria's case the EEC tended to a 'bourgeis sympathy'
regarding the status as an unfortunate but necessary by-product of the
Cold War which the EEC must treat with sympathy if it was not to
isolate Austria. What emerges here is another clear example of the
role of both internal and external actors in the actual scope of a
neutral country's activity. In this case the EEC's attitude was
crucial not least in allowing the neutrals to maintain the myth that
policy was entirely a product of the neutral itself. I am not saying
that the EEC shaped Austrian policy but merely pointing out that the
negotiations were a dialogue in which both co-operated and that any
attempt to portray them as the work of a single group is unhelpful.
In the Macmillan report on the extension of the Community,
Professor Hallstein argued that Swiss neutrality was obsolete because
the EEC sought to abolish the conflicts which had given rise to Swiss
neutrality in 1815. As it was now impossible to talk seriously of
winning a global war, neutrality was irrelevant for security policy.
Nevertheless the Macmillan report was more cautious in its final
conclusions arguing negatively that not to accept neutrality within
21
the EEC might create neutrals totally unattached to either side.
In tne view of non-neutral states there is a clear assumption that
the entire debate is open to the realm of political negotiation.
Nownere is the legal status considered. It is assumed that neutrality
must be a mutual concern. If politics leads law for the bloc on which
the current neutrals most rely (the West), it is likely that
political considerations will dominate for a less friendly group also,
and legal protestations about the nature of neutrality will be
disregarded (eg. Switzerland in 1813).
145
An even more influential report was presented to the European
Parliament in January 1962 by its chairman Birkelbach. Its conclusion
was that Association was to be viewed positively though there was
little attempt to define what this might mean. In reality the
neutrals operated knowing only that association meant anything between
1% and 99% of full membership. The importance of the Birkelbach
Report lay in the fact that it opened up the possibility of a real
institutional relationship with the neutrals.
In 1963 the French veto on further discussion with the UK led to a
crisis for the neutrals as well. Both Sweden and Switzerland withdrew
their applications. Despite domestic contoversy the majority in the
Austrian Government decided to press on with Austria's negotiations
with the EEC, arguing that Austria's close trading links made her
situation more urgent.
The negotiations with Austria alone covered a variety of areas
which might be considered under Association. These did not begin in
earnest until Spring of 1965. Soon the term 'Association' had been
replaced by talk of a 'special treaty of an economic nature'. This
reflects the increasing international pressure from the Eastern bloc.
It was now accepted in EEC circles that Austria was a special case,
but it was not long before various member States began objecting to
various areas of the discussions. The position of West Germany is
interesting in this respect. All the reports of the time show that
the West Germans were broadly in support of efforts to integrate
Austria into the Community and were prepared to negotiate a treaty
which would take account of Austria's difficulties vis a vis the
Soviet Union. This is confirmed by the chief Austrian negotiator of
this period Trade Minister Fritz Bock.
"The Germans always supported us....Erhard said to me 'Do what you
want we support everything.'23
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The problem arose because of Soviet propaganda which emphasised
that it viewed any agreement by Austria with the EEC as a breach of
the 1Ansch1ussverbot' contained in Article 4 of the State Treaty.
Sensitivity to this issue in both Bonn and Vienna led to the West
Germans adopting a quiet role in the negotiations although they stood
to benefit most from any agreement. At party level the close party
links led spokesmen for various West German parties to voice tneir
position on the issue (e.g. Mende, leader of the FDP at the Party
Congress in Munich 1963). The second problem was West Germany's own
support for the political goals of the Treaty of Rome;
"It was the unanimous opinion of the EEC officials that an economic
community could not function without a political superstructure. It
was always the Germans who said 'out of tne economic Community we must
make a political one', and with that was created a real barrier to
Austrian participation that remains today."22
Italy played a very curious role in the negotiations. In May 1964,
the Italian Government issued a memorandum on the thane of
association. This concentrated on an interpretation of the political
goals of the Community (Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome). According
to this, it appeared that several countries did not possess the
requisite qualities to become associates. The Italians pointed out
that the treaty required that association could only be seen as a step
on the road to full membership and tnus the association of states
whose international status prevented them from taking up this
memDership made tnem ineligible also for association togetner with
countries who rejected Liberal Democracy.
Given the state of affairs between Austria and the EEC and the
difficulties posed by Austria's relations with the Soviet Union this
was clearly a statement directed at Austria. A charitable
interpretation might call it 'unhelpful' although it raised a number
of issues. Austrian sources of course denied that it was directed in
any way against them.26 The OeVP newspaper 'Volksblatt' reported that
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the Austrian ambassador had received assurances from the Italian
Government that Italy had no objections to an arrangement between
Austria and the EEC.27 Kreisky himself commented;
"The Austrian Government's view is that South Tirol is a political
problem while integration is an economic problem. The Italian
Government is of the same opinion"^
This is clearly a misrepresentation of the actual situation. The
Italians were prepared to allow this division of spheres to become
extremely blurred. Bilateral relations between the two countries were
at a very low ebb throughout the 1960s dominated by the claims of
Soutn Tyrol. The fact that the Italian Government were prepared to use
any levers available to oppose Austria's involvement in support of the
South Tyroleans underlines the importance they attached to the issue.
The same process of longstanding political enmity was apparent in the
role played by the Republic of Ireland during the Falklands Crisis.
against
The determination of the Italians to retaliate towards Austria in
all spheres culminated in the exercise of the veto on the continuation
of further negotiations in Summer 1967. The reason given was
Austria's refusal to take effective action against terrorists
operating on Italian territory but based in Austria. The French in
particular were relieved by the Italian veto and certainly raised no
objection to its somewhat unusual roots. Clear divisions between
politics and economics are again a product only of the imagination.
Bock himself is of the opinion that had an agreement been within reach
tne Italians could not have vetoed on these grounds.^
Once more the interrelationship of the political, economic and
legal must be set against Liberal attempts to separate tnem. We might
add that the Austrians had stopped making the assertion that
Association could be seen as a step on the road to full membership in
1965. It was widely portrayed as an impossibility under neutrality
and not the result of Soviet pressure. Yet as we shall see by the
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1980s the 'capital interest' was encouraging exactly this course of
action. The legal problem had been satisfactorily rationalised out of
existence but more importantly the depth of Soviet opposition to the
EEC seemed to have been reduced. Any impression that the negotiations
with the EEC would lead to full membership would, in 1965, nave led to
domestic and international uproar. The permanence of the problems
posed by permanent neutrality would appear open to 'revision' if not
'reversal'.
All commentators agree that the French had already decided that the
negotiations could go no further due to the opposition of the Soviet
Union. The Italians merely preempted them. This was in spite of
the fact that according to Bock, the French played a cooperative role
at diplomatic level in Brussels. It became clear, however that the
French shared Russian concerns about Anschluss. As one commentator
put it;
"As Europe's statesman with the strongest sense of history, he [de
Gaulle] often describes Austria's independence as a condition of
Franco-German friendship in diplomatic discussions..."^
De Gaulle was quick to recognise the strategic and political
implications of Austria's neutrality. Given his own commitment to an
independent 'force de frappe' for France he was also anxious to
maintain healthy and independent relations with the Kremlin. The
close association of Austria might also increase the influence of
'Deutschtum' at the expense of French-led 'Francophonie'. In June
1965, Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus undertook a visit to Paris as
head of a trade delegation. The main purpose of the visit, howaver,
was to try to persuade de Gaulle of the need for an agreement. The
outcome was a quiet if forceful rebuff. In de Gaulle's 'Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals' Austria had to concentate on her role in
Southeastern and Central Europe;
"Vous etes Danubiens!""^
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Ludwig Steiner, now OeVP Foreign Policy spokesman confirmed this in
an interview;
"I was a fellow traveller with the Chancellor with de Gaulle..where
we tried to get understanding for the Austrian position. De Gaulle
said 'The most important thing is your Neutrality. That is the
essential element for a peaceful development in Central Europe. We
will try and create a possibility to overcome all these economic
problems.'
The implication for Austria was clear. The time was not yet ripe
for French approval of her integration efforts. French objections
would thus have put an end to Austrian efforts just as they did twice
to the efforts of the UK, had the Italians not intervened before them.
In addition the degree to which the future adherence of tne Austrian
economy to the West was linked with neutrality contradicted Austrian
insistence that the economy was separate from Neutral considerations.
b. USSR and Al 1 ies
By far the most vociferous opponent of an Austrian agreement with
the EEC was the USSR. Without reference to her position the central
dilemma facing Austria throughout the debate would not emerge. It is
nevertheless conmonplace among Austrian politicians and diplomats to
contend that Austria was at no time forced to bow to external
pressure. Certainly, Austrian officials went to great lengths to
ensure that every shift in policy had a domestic justification but it
is the position of the USSR which ultimately makes the entire problem
comprehensible.
The 15-year struggle was to find an agreement which was somehow
mutually acceptable to the USSR, Austria and the EEC. Within this
triangular relationsnip (and tne considerations of France vis a vis
the Soviet Union complete the triangle) the parameters of Austrian
policy had to be defined. The Austrians further developed their
remarkable ability to turn an unpalatable series of pressures into a
smooth and mutually acceptable agreement. It must be added that in
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the 1970s this has been more readily achieved on the international
front than at home. The Austrians certainly played an active rather
than a passive role in the shaping of the final agreement but the
virtually unanimous assurances by Austrian politicians that the goals
were achieved entirely through their own efforts remains a romantic
half truth.
It is perhaps useful to divide the questions about the activities
of the Soviet Union into two: firstly, on what grounds did the USSR
attack the EEC and secondly in what ways was pressure applied to
Austria to adopt a particular policy?
When the Common Market came into being,the USSR responded with the
publication of the '17 Theses' revised and reissued in 1959. This
forms the first attempt at a Soviet analysis of integration in the
West. The basis of the new Union in the West was dismissed;
"Under the guise of 'uniting Europe', the imperialist
'Integrationists' have caused a division of Europe whereby groups of
States have resulted which oppose one another economically,
politically and militarily and an aggressive military bloc with a
series of Western European States was created which was directed
against the Soviet Union and the European People's Republics."^
The fundamentally anti-Soviet nature of the EEC is established in
thesis 4 and analysed as a Western reaction to the rapid growth in
power of the Socialist States. Soviet fears of a revitalised Germany
are also immediately apparent. In thesis 5 the Common Market is
characterised as a vehicle for West German Capital expansion to be
achieved by the subjugation of the economic power of all the smaller
States. The '17 Theses' remain sceptical of the ability of the EEC to
survive its internal contradictions;
"The Rome Treaties do not alter the economic or political base of
those states which have signed them; they also do not change the deeply
contradictory economic and political positions very typical of
capitalism. Therefore a real economic union of the peoples and states
is not possible.'^
Despite tnis, the theses do recognise that some form of monopoly
capitalist form of cartel is a feasible development and are far too
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cautious to actually predict the collapse of capitalism.34
Nevertheless, thesis 12 outlines how West German capital will come to
dominate the Community leading to renewed Franco/German rivalry and
the isolation of West Germany from the remaining members.
The main thrust of Soviet propaganda was thus establisned from an
early point; the EEC would be an expensive failure, designed to
benefit West German monopoly capital. Its fundamental purpose was the
continuation of aggressive Cold War politics. As time progressed and
tiie EEC failed to live up to Soviet predictions of a speedy demise
this position became increasingly untenable, especially as the
Community seemed to be having an expansionary effect on trade. Binns
traces the sudden increase in Soviet writings about the EEC in 1962 to
the economic successes of tne Market and its popularity with other
non-Member States. This success had to be set against corresponding
strains within Comecon;
"Some demonstration was required that the fundamental Soviet
analysis of irtperialism still held good."^^
The result was the far more detailed publication known as the '32
Theses' which contained little new on the origin or purpose of the EEC
but a marked emphasis on the politically aggressive nature of tne
organisation. In an article in 'Pravda' in 1962 Khruschev was
reported as rating the survival chances of the Common market as low,
suggesting;
"This tree will wither without producing good roots"
Still the spectre of a rampant West Germany dominated the
propaganda field;
"The greatest danger facing the peoples of Europe is German
militarism, which plays an increasingly pivotal role in the EEC
countries' preparation for war."-^
Furthermore, under the guise of European integration and the defence
of the West this lobby was taking over not only the scientific and
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technical technology developed in other countries but also tne arras
industry. According to the USSR, West Germans were trying to gain a
leading role in the new Community especially in those parts with a
direct or indirect role in the Arms race, e.g. Euratom, ESRA etc..
All this emotive anti-German propaganda was now applied in further
propaganda directed towards Austria. Indeed the 32 theses directly
address the problems facing tne Neutrals;
"The partners in EFTA, left alone by the UK are now under increasing
pressure from the larger EEC powers. Any entry into the Common Market
by the smaller European countries would represent significant damage
to their national, economic, and political interests."-^
According to propaganda, the neutrals were being drawn into an
unmistakeably aggressive military-industrial complex. Association was
rejected as an attempt by pro-German factions within the neutrals to
achieve membership via a diversionary tactic, covering up tne true
military and strategic significance of the Community. This thrust of
Soviet propaganda was to be repeated many times in the course of tne
1960s. Soviet protests that the EEC was US dominated may indeed have
a ring of truth in certain areas but when set against Soviet practice
in Eastern Europe they have a somewhat hollow ring. The critique
cannot however simply be rejected. As usual many of the observations
emanating from Moscow at times exposed truths which Western analysts
were unwilling to concede. At the same time the Soviet Union's own
practices made it difficult to cast the Kremlin in the role of White
Knight sent to save the power of small States!
The most famous and clearest statement of Soviet views of Austrian
policy came during Khruschev's visit to Austria in the Summer of 1960.
Although the Soviet press had been warning for some time against
groups in Austria which sought to reach an accommodation with the EEC
the finality of the Soviet position was finally put beyond doubt by
Khruschev himself. In 1957 a Soviet commentator had written;
"The large capital-dependent Austrian newspapers represent the
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interests of foreign circles with vehemence and carry out propaganda
for entry into the Free Trade Zone."-^
Khruschev in 1960 underlined this rejection by emphasising first and
foremost that in Soviet eyes the status of permanent neutrality was
not compatible witn membership of, or association with the EEC. He
characterised Austria's neutrality as the act of defence which had
enabled the Austrians to resist the aggressive overtures to the West;
"Plans arose to drag Austria into such an organisation as the
Common Market, whose six members all belong to NATO and where West
Germany plays a leading role. As is well known, certain circles in
West Germany see the Common Market as an appendage of NATO with the
consequences which would result from that. They do not bother to hide
tne fact that the Union has a political character. We tnerefore tnink
that the Austrian Government...showed appreciation for the national
interests of Austria when they recognised that an Anschluss with tne
Common Market would limit economic independence and be a real danger
to Austrian Neutrality."-^
There then followed a barrage of propaganda in tne press and in
academic journals;
"The political obligations of the Common Market... do not transcend
those envisaged by the North Atlantic Trety. But for the 3 European
countries that have proclaimed neutrality to be their policy... the
situation is quite different, for had they joined the Common Market
they would have had to retreat from this policy."^
A detailed analysis of all the Soviet contributions seems
unnecessary if only because most of the articles merely reinforced
points made at an early stage. It would be fair to point out however
tnat there were two points at which the Soviet Union felt that it had
found irrefutable arguments; first the illegality of membership of the
EEC under neutrality and secondly the predominant role of West Germany
in the EEC. Using Article 4 of the State Treaty the Russians argued
that any association of Austria with the community amounted to 'Cold
Anschluss' with Germany;
"Austria's neutrality is founded on international agreements
concluded after the war and guaranteeing this neutrality. Moreover,
Article 4 of the State Treaty signed by Austria and the four great
powers lays down that Austria 'shall not enter into political or
economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever' and the Federal
Republic of Germany is certainly playing first fiddle in the EEC."^
Thus as the Soviet Ambassador to Vienna, Avilov made clear to
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Chancellor Gorbach;
"An entry of Austria into the EEC in one form or another would be
in direct breach of both Neutrality and the State Treaty."^
Quoting West German sources, the Soviets also pointed out that the
West German government itself far from hiding the political ambitions
of the EEC, encouraged then. Bock reports;
"Herr Mikoyan said to me when I was in Moscow 'That is a political
Community; you yourself heard what the German Chancellor and Foreign
Minister .. said.'"23
In order to substantiate their political position, the Russians
also argued that EEC membership would be detrimental to Austria's
economy, in the Austrian press Dimitriev and Sabelnikov pointed out
that Austrian growth between 1958 and 1963 had kept pace with the EEC
and in 1964 had actually exceeded tne EEC average. The virtues of
maintaining ties with the 'traditional partners' in the East were also
emphasised.^ Another Russian writer, Ostrogorsky, pointed out that
the EEC was prone to internal divisions over production and its
distribution.^^ Perhaps tne strongest warning of all came in an
article in Pravda written by Grigoriev in which he warned;
"Politics is indivisible from economics.1
The difficulty of squaring this reality with old nineteenth century
Liberal concepts of separate spheres are part of the Austrian dilemma.
At root one of the major parties to her neutrality, the USSR has
forced Austria to recognise that there is an ideological element to
the neutral status appropriate on the Iron Curtain if only because the
two warring parties make such a distinction. It is clear that Austria
has to find a status that reflects the realities of the tensions in
which she must prove her neutrality. For it to be credible Austria
must ensure that her pro-Western bourgeois base does not force her to
be aligned de facto with the West. If Grigoriev's position were to be
officially admitted then economics would become a natural sphere in
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which to apply neutrality. It is impossible in the interdependence of
today's world to deny that the separation of one from another is not
an illusion. What has developed in reality is a pragmatic compromise
- the 1972 Agreements allowed Austria to confirm her status as a
Western State, without involving her in wrangling in Brussels the
result of which might be that she was just another distinctly Western
European State. This would seem also to be acceptable within the
triangular relationship which we outlined above. During the period
the Soviet Union grew to live with, if not to like the EEC as a
political reality and in the absence of any effective sanctions
between diplomacy and war, the eventual form of the Agreement
reflected the limits as well as the effect of pressure.
Perhaps the most threatening aspect of Khruschev's visit was his
'promise' to 'defend' Austria's neutrality. The Austrian Government
was quick to reject this as an official role as unnecessary and
undesired. The threat had nevertheless been made.
On his official visit in 1966, Podgorny reaffirmed Soviet
opposition;
"We say in all sincerity as friends of the Austrian people that
membership of the Common Market in whatever shape or form could lead
to a situation where this country could be tied not only through
economic but also by political considerations. This could lead to a
distancing from the State Treaty and tne proven path of Austrian
neutrality. To whose benefit would that be? The answer is obvious;
certainly not the Austrian people."^
This attitude was repeated and underlined during visits to Moscow
by Klaus (March 1967), Waldheim (March 1968) and Kirschl'aeger (Jan.
1971). It was accompanied by echoes in all of the Eastern Bloc States
especially in East Germany.^ All commentators emphasised the danger
of expanding markets for West German capital in the Austrian economy.
Ultimately, it was clear to the majority in Austria that a direct
confrontation with the Soviet Union over an issue which had aroused so
much anger would be extremely damaging and could only be a very
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pyrrhic victory. The credibility of Austria as a viable neutral State
was on the line. As such the dichotomy of Westernism and Neutrality
was brought into the open. There can be no doubt that neutrality was
the factor which has kept Austria out of the EEC and more especially
the objections of the USSR. In no other issue since the State Treaty
has the Soviet Union been so emphatic that its continued support for
Austrian neutrality was dependent on a particular political decision.
The dilemma had a number of interesting results. Politicians in
favour of membership of the Community had either to admit that this
had proved impossible because of Soviet interference, unpalatable to
most who were anxious to underscore Austria's freewill in every
political decision, or to argue that under neutrality law membership
was unfortunately impossible, thus shielding Austria from the problem
of Russian interference but risking making non-membership a permanent
feature, in the 1960s tne fear of admitting Soviet pressure was
predominant and most politicians ultimately argued that Austria had
never sought full membership. As we shall see, by the 1980s a right
wing group within the OeVP became openly unhappy with any attempt to
imply that Austria was permanently barred from tne Community and
argued that it was not a legal matter. The politics of supposedly
neutral legal reasoning are once again only too obvious.
In 1972 as we shall see the Austrians signed agreements with the
EEC which avoided any confrontation but achieved much of what the
Kreisky group had sougnt. This pointed to the only real policy option
open to small States which do not depend on outside powers. The
parameters of this decision were no longer set beyond Austria's
borders but an attempt was made to estimate risks and attempt a more
active approach. This trend to action rather than mere reaction was
of course easier for a social democratic government which saw its
goals in a slightly different light from both the two external groups
157
than for a government whose aims were ultimately identical with one
side and opposed to the views and aims of the other.
c. Other opinions
In order to complete a survey of groups involved in Austria's
negotiations with the EEC, I now wish to briefly look at positions
held by other actors who took up less high-profile roles - namely the
(JSA and the non-Six European countries mainly grouped around EFTA.
For the USA, both the EEC and Austria's association with it involved a
number of problems. On one level, the USA had always encouraged moves
towards West European integration on the basis that it provided a
steady bulwark against Russian expansion. Accordingly, the USA was
opposed to any 'dilution' of the EEC by the neutrals and there was a
feeling in some quarters that the neutral States..
"wanted it both ways, demanding the commercial benefits of tne
community without assuming its burdens."^
Nevertheless as in the case of the EEC itself, tnis applied more to
the cases of Sweden and Switzerland than to Austria. Indeed the very
fact of Soviet objection seems to have made Austria's case more
attractive for the Americans. A further interesting point of note was
tne accusation levelled against Switzerland by the same author of an
overzealous definition of neutrality once more bringing to light the
fact that from an outsiders point of view neutrality has to be
politically not legally 'justified'.
The otner strand in US thinking arose because of the threat which a
successful EEC might eventually pose to the US economy. As on the
worldwide level the cooperation of the EEC only took place within an
overall framework of competition;
"It is clear that Capital Integration on a continental level
succeeds while intercontinental imperialist competition is increased
likewise.
In Austria, the overriding impression was one of her irrelevance
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to the USA. The New York Times found that Austrians felt themselves
"negligible and expendable"^-'-
The position of the EFTA countries was also largely quietly
expressed. Of the original seven members, five had entered into
negotiations with the EEC in 1960 and tnere was widespread acceptance
of Austria's position in the period of her individual negotiation
1963-67. As has been pointed out the diplomatic independence of the
EFTA states is safeguarded in the Stockholm treaty.
The debate within Austria.
I now wish to turn to the debate on the EEC as it was conducted
within Austria. As pointed out, there were three fairly distinct
phases of negotiation and three particularily important questions
raised by the Soviet Union; how far was EEC membership desireable?
How far did the plans contradict neutrality? In what sense was the
State Treaty breached by entering into a Customs Agreement which
involved West Germany?
The issue aroused passions in the political and business
establishment but not in the wider populace who remained more
concerned with the continuation of expansion which had taken place
since 1945.
"In the face of widespread puolic indifference to the issue of
Austria's relations to European integration process, the intensity of
the conflict among Austria's political elite is striking. This was
[until 1972] the only serious issue in postwar Austria which led to an
ideologically significant divergence between the political elites of
the OeVP and the SPOe."-^
Even this division was not clearcut. The domestic political norms
established in 1945 were going through a period of adaptation. At the
beginning of the debate, the 'Proporz' system was in operation whereby
both parties divided cabinet posts and many employment opportunities
between themselves on the basis of election results. After SPOe gains
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in the 1959 elections, Bruno Kreisky became the Foreign Minister in an
expanded role. The other leading actor in this period was the OeVP
Trade Minister Fritz Bock who was the most prominent advocate of a
close association with the EEC. After a shift in political power in
1963 and later one-party government between 1966 and 1970, his views
became very influential. It was pressure from this faction which
ensured that Austria 'went it alone' in 1963. As Kir^chlaeger reports
a reorganisation of responsibilities within the government meant that
the leading role in negotiations was transferred from the 'red'
Foreign Ministry to the control of the 'Integration Minister'. Bock
himself says;
"From 1956 I systaxiatical ly had one area competence after the other
brought back from the Foreign Ministry. The first step was that both
Ministries were made responsible. The last step was made in 1964
when the entire foreign trade realm came under the Trade Ministry much
to Kreisky's annoyance..
It would nevertneless be misleading to restrict our analysis of the
divisions over EEC membership to a strictly party split. Although
tne KPOe and the FPOe were respectively consistent opponents and
advocates of the EEC, the larger parties were divided within
themselves.
The pro-EEC group within the OeVP centred, unsurprisingly, on the
economic or business wing of the party. The core of their argument
was summed up by Bock as early as 1957 when he maintained;
"Austria has an interest that her exports to the Common Market are
not minimised but on the contrary strengthened, as a matter of life
and death."^4
It was the conviction that an association was fundamental to the
survival of the Austrian economy which provided the thrust of this
group's argument. It was of course in their direct interests to ensure
access at favourable rates to the expanding markets of Europe. The
portrayal of their individual interests as the determinant national
interest was of course then essential.
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As we have established, Austria of all the States left out of the
Common Market relied most heavily on the EEC as a trading partner. The
fear of return to the dire economic straits of the 1920s and '30s and
even more starkly to the starvation of 1945 have always had a strong
appeal in postwar Austria. Thus the arguments of the Bock group
supported by the Wirtschaftskammer (Chamber of Trade) and its Research
Institute (Wifo) were couched in terms of warnings of the effects of
exclusion. In 1959, Wifo reported that Austrian trade faced severe
consequences if there was no breakthrough in negotiations with the
EEC.^ EFTA could only partially substitute for the lost
opportunities in 'the Six'. The essence of the Bock argument was that
international law did not restrict the economic policy of a neutral
State. The Swiss conception outlined in 1954 seemed to support this
assertion except in the case of Customs Unions which might involve
future political or economic obligations. Bock argued;
"If one invented it [economic neutrality] it would be the end of
our economic prosperity. The strict maintenance of our legal and
military neutrality which is recognised by the entire Austrian poeople
as tne real basis of our sovereignity has nothing to do with those
decisions about the European integration question which are matters of
life and death for our economy."-^5
I shall return in more detail to the tneoretical questions raised
but beforehand it is worthwhile establishing the views of other groups
especially those developed in the SPOe. Within its ranks at least two
distinct positions can be observed; one centred on the Party leader
Bruno Pittermann who was to become the Boo-man of the Bock faction and
the other around the Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky supported by the
,<C\
able deputy Karl Czern/tz.
In June 1959, Pittermann broke the public front of consensus on
the need for an agreement with the EEC when he attacked it as a
'bourgeois bloc'. He accused the Austrian business establisnment of
trying to manoeuvre Austria into membership. Thus the argument
presented in East/West terms was in fact an illusion to prevent the
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real nature of the EEC becoming exposed. For Pittermann the Common
Market was a cover for the emergence of a new form of cartel
capitalism whose only interest was to ensure sympathetic government
policies.57 He reinforced this attack at the SPOe party conference in
November, introducing a new emotional element;
"We can see in the 'oh so strongly recommended' Anschluss with the
EEC, at the price of part of our economic independence, not only a
danger to our neutrality but the repetition of the Anschluss this time
not to a State but to a Group of States."5^
By introducing the 'Anschluss' from a domestic platform he gave
support to the view maintained by the USSR. Although proponents of
the EEC rejected this connection out of hand it could no longer be
dismissed as 'mere' Soviet propaganda if expounded by the second
highest ranking politician in the country. Pittermann found support
within the SPOe. As the tnen Secretary of the Arbeiterkammer (Chamber
of Labour) Edouard Maerz pointed out, the constellation of class
forces within the EEC was far from favourable to organised labour or
socialists. He showed that the theory that EEC membership was a
matter of life or death was a gross exaggeration and argued tnat
dependence on EEC markets was already too great to be satisfactory.50
Pittermann now suggested that economic goals had to be viewed witnin
the framework of neutrality in order to procure food supplies and raw
materials in wartime.
"In order to support neutrality, I would accept tnat Austria's
economic situation might worsen comparative to the rest of Europe."5-'-
In all of this discussion, Pittermann held a minority viewpoint
even within the SPOe. Nevertheless its influence was considerable
particularly in view of the importance of the decisions which had to
be made and also within the Austrian postwar tradition of consensus.
By publicly expressing his opposition to EEC membership the focus of
the debate took on a wider dimension. Perhaps the most important
single influence of this faction was in pointing out that Austria had
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no need to single itself out from other States in Europe in her
dependence on trade with the EEC. As Pittermann showed, the EEC had
an annual trade surplus of AS 7.5bn in 1961 so that it was ridiculous
for Austria to emphasise her own dependency in exclusion;
" We do not come to the negotiating table of the EEC in the role of
a beggar but as a good and punctual paying client, who takes more from
the EEC area than it supplies."62
The other major strand within the SPOe was represented by the
reformist wing identified initially with Kreisky and Czernrtz but also
with Kirschlaeger. There was a convergence of views with certain
elements within the OeVP not particularity identified with business
represented in government by Toncic and Waldheim.
This group differentiated itself from Pittermann in their
insistence that some kind of agreement was necessary. Czernitz
insisted on this from an early stage.^ Kreisky too spoke of the
danger that sovereignty might be reduced as much by iirpoverisnment as
by membership of the community.Czernitz originally rejected any
connection between neutrality and the economic sphere;
"it would have been better if nobody had started to talk about
neutrality in these economic discussions"^3
He claimed that neutrality was limited to the wartime military
sphere but changed tack and argued for joint membersnip of the EEC and
EFTA. He became the champion of the cause of EFTA and of the creation
of a wider trade zone involving 17 countries.^ Kreisky also adopted
a markedly cautious approach to the EEC and preferred to point out
the success of EFTA in widening opportunities for trade. It was more
important in his eyes to overcome the problem of tariff
discrimination than to seek actual membership. He emphasised that he
recognised the role which the German question had played in Soviet eyes
in 1955. The pre-eminence of West Germany in the Community thus was a
legitimate concern. In this Kreisky was categorical;
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"Not only the State Treaty prohibits Anschluss with the EEC; the
Moscow memorandum does so also."^
This disagreement about the applicability of neutrality and the
clauses of the State Treaty to the EEC debate shows the degree to
degree of political unanimity in Austria. It is clearly insufficient
to accept the view of various legal scholars who argue that there is
an abstract universal principle in operation when the decision makers
are likely to choose any of a number of options. All the
positions when in fact any glance at the content and outcome of the
debate leads inevitably to the conclusion that the collective decision
was not predetermined. There were those who argued in absolute terms
that the EEC debate had nothing to do with neutrality, while on the
other hand otners emphasised that it was the essential task for
negotiators to safeguard^ threatened neutrality. Some argued that
EFTA and the EEC were mutually exclusive choices (Bock) others
(Czernitz) that they did not have to be so. On the right wing there
was a desperate attempt to show that Anschluss and the EEC were
unrelated while the SPOe leaders stated categorically that there was a
major problem. The only regular consistency is that everybody can
justify a political goal by referring to the universal application or
otherwise of 'superior' law. The problem is that nobody could agree
which laws applied where and when. In one sense this is a political
problem of Literal justification which is so universal in politics as
to be an assumption. Yet in the Austrian case it takes on greater
significance if only because everybody asserts that their case finds
its validity not because it is politically or economically desir^able
from a particular world view but because it is 'tne law'. In the
utter confusion engendered by the EEC question we see the shortcomings
of tne legalistic approach. All that remains is political division by
which a coherent notion of practiced neutrality is dependent on a
contributions are phrased in terms of obligatory
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a new language. The various ad hoc factions which emerged all
developed internally consistent legal arguments; When after 1967 the
Kreisky/Waldheim group anerged as the dominant view a clearer picture
began to develop.
SPOe dominance of Austrian political institutions in the 1970s and
80s ensured that this view is still current. The final agreements
were signed simultaneously with agreements between the EEC and
Switzerland and Sweden. This provided the extra protection from
ch
Soviet interference whicn Kreisky and Kirschlaeger had been anxious to
A
maintain in 1963. At that time the electoral swing towards the OeVP
had led Chancellor Klaus to award chief responsibility for
negotiations to Bock.
It should be stressed that Kreisky was in favour of an agreement
with the EEC but was anxious to maintain the credibility of neutrality
in the face of such outright opposition from the Kremlin. The legal
and foreign policy difficulties were apparent.^0 In the period of
negotiation Kreisky encouraged a restructuring of the economy to make
it more able to withstand competition from the EEC. This was seen as
best achieved within the framework of EFTA wnich provided an
unexpectedly successful boost in the development both of new markets
and of new areas of production.
It would perhaps be worth outlining some of the changes in Austria's
negotiating stance over the period. At the outset, the pessimistic
outlook predominated. Austria was held to be doomed to remain in the
relative 'poverty' of the inter war years if she did not take part in
the integration process. There was talk of the 'maximale loesung'
(the closest possible arrangement).
"Austria appeared ready [in 1961] to accept in principle all the
areas of the Treaty of Rome as far as she saw no direct contradiction
with the principles of permanent neutrality, similar to Sweden but
unlike Switzerland... Thus a fairly general alignment of economic
policy was envisaged."^
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Yet this nervousness on economic grounds was grossly exaggerated.
During the period of negotiation (1958-72) the percentage of Austrian
exports destined for the Six fell from 49.7% in 1958 to 40.1% (average
1967-71).67 This was made UP of a 6% fal1 in trade with Italy and 3%
in the proportion of trade going to West Germany. Imports remained
stable (56% 1967-71) .^7 At the same time exports to EFTA countries
rose from 11.9% to 18.6%. This was in the framework of a volume of
trade which rose by 87% between 1959 and 1967 though trade with the
EFTA States increased some 248%.^^ Even more significantly the
i rioteriais
structure of trade changed. Whereas 1958-61 raw manufactures made up
23.3% of imports and 21.8% of exports this had been reduced to 17.5%
and 13% respectively by 1971.^7 The importance of manufactures rose
correspondingly from 46.1% of exports in 1958 to 59.2% by 1972.^7
Austria's trade with EFTA countries grew at a faster rate than that of
either Switzerland or Sweden (EFTA average 106%).^7
While the change in structure and destination of trade and its
relevance to the decreasing sense of panic in the tone of approaches
to the EEC during the 1960s is important, it is also worth noting that
the level of trade with the EEC remained twice that of trade witn EFTA
states. Mayrzedt also points out that the adaptation of the Austrian
economy still left it structurally weaker in capitalist market terms
than the economies of Switzerland and Sweden.
By 1966 even the staunchly pro-Market Industrialists Federation
accepted that the effect of EEC tariffs was at most 4% which could be
offset by 2% growth elsewhere. The importance of EFTA in the 1960s
was to prevent the Austrians being left isolated at the time of EEC
consolidation. The argument that an Austria outside the EEC would
face permanent stagnation saddled with old-fashioned and inappropriate
industry must be set against the problem advanced by some socialists
that EEC capital would swamp Austria reducing her to the status of a
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colony in the event of membership. When Klaus spoke to the German
news magazine 'Der Spiegel' in 1967 following Podgorny's visit during
which the Russian reemphasised Soviet opposition to EEC membership for
Austria he said;
"If needs be poor - but neutral."71
Yet the real economic condition of the country in no way merited
this dramatic portrayal of the choices facing Austria. As Knapp
observed;
"How poor or rich we will be depends 5-10% on the EEC agreement and
at least 90% on ourselves... Let us negotiate further in Brussels,
Paris and perhaps most importantly in Moscow,- but let us prepare
ourselves in the meantime for the possibility that we will not come to
an 'arrangement'. Above all let us finally put an end to the attempt
to try to convince ourselves that Austria's prosperity is dependent on
the EEC. Certainly it would be easier with the EEC; but it will also
be possible without if only we desire it (almost) as much."7^
There were two other areas which arose during the EEC debate wnich
merit our attention; the question of the applicability of neutrality
to the economic sphere and the intrusion of German history into the
affair through the ghost of the 'Anschluss'.
We have already seen how early commentators declared that
neutrality had a purely military function and had no place in the
discussion of economic matters emerging from the EEC debate (see
Czernitz). According to this view as long as the EEC was prepared to
negotiate clauses to adequately protect neutrality in wartime there
was no direct conflict. This argument was based in the attempt in
1955 to follow a neutrality like that of pre War Switzerland. In this
view;
"Economic neutrality exists only in so far as the permanently
neutral country may not conclude any tariff or customs union with any
other country because it would thereby relinquish its independence in
a political respect as well to greater or lesser extent... Otherwise,
economic neutrality does not exist."7^
Yet this very definition is flawed in at least two respects.
Firstly it admits that there are economic areas where there are
political consequences so direct that they cannot be separated into a
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different sphere. The political decision to draw the line at tariff
and customs unions emerges as purely arbitrary and as appropriate to
the minimum condition acceptable for neutrality to be credible in the
nineteenth century. It cannot be raised into a pure principle for all
time without deliberately misunderstanding its purpose. It is fully
consistent that the twentieth century might have thrown up new
economic relationships which have direct political consequences but
which are unmentioned in a Swiss definition which did not consider
them. One such new area of economic and political relationsnip mignt
be the EEC.
This is our second point. It was given backing even by western
jurists when they concluded that the Treaty of Rome did indeed contain
clauses of a political nature which seemed to preclude neutral
membership;
"While a State whicn only decides on neutrality after tne outbreak
of war can carry out an active economic policy in peacetime, a
permanently neutral state is obliged in peacetime to enter no such
economic ties which would make it impossible to fulfill its
obligations. A permanently neutral State can thus enter no inter
state organisation like the EEC, since this aims at a confluence of
the different national economies of the signatory States and this
gives its central organs resposibility to aim at a unitary economic
policy witn compulsory effect for member states."^
The neutral had thus to ensure that in wartime it could withdraw
itself from any pact. The same problem had been seen by Zemanek^
when he argued that Article 225 of the Treaty of Rome restricts the
scope of the neutral to act in wartime by allowing the Commission to
ask the Court to determine what corresponds to a legitimate security
interest. Unlike EFTA, the EEC aims directly at full political
integration. This fact alone would appear to end all hopes of neutral
membership. The Treaty of Rome also foresaw majority voting which
created the additional barrier that the neutral might find itself
isolated and outvoted on issues considered of vital importance by the
country itself. Switzerland had negotiated a separate agreement with
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tne League of Nations involving much less restrictive conditions and
had found them impossible to maintain. The fact that unanimity voting
has emerged has led many in Austria to argue that this objection is no
longer valid. (This may now have been proved a false argument since
the Single European Act, now held up in the Irish Courts). Where
there is a political gap the letter of the law tends to be quietly
forgotten....
For a long time there was no 'Austrian Policy' on the EEC but
rather a chaotic fragmentation of opinion loosely based on party
affiliations. The proporz system of permanent coalition came under
severe strain finally breaking up when the OeVP won an overall
majority in 1966. Those close to the Foreign Ministry remained
anxious to maintain Austria's relations with all countries. Yet as
late as 1960 then Chancellor Raab had stated;
"Austrian neutrality would not prohibit membership of the EEC but
the Austrian policy of neutrality must also take into account the
possibility of various eventualities and must be ready and prepared to
face each of these."^
We shall see that this view is still held by the Bock-Khol wing of
the OeVP who essentially allege that Austria has tied herself with
bonds which are of her own invention. Throughout the 1960s the legal
wrangling persisted. In 1963 Peter Berger wrote that the majority
vote rule in the EEC meant that supranational ity was emerging
precluding the membership of Neutrals.At the so-called 'Salzburg
Expert Deliberations' Ermacora argued tnat tne only obligation was to
ensure that Austria could leave in the event of war and dismissed any
notion of economic neutrality. Opposing this view, Zemanek argued
that economic obligations did exist and referred to the coincidence of
the economic and political spheres apparent in Articles 223 and 225 of
the Treaty of Rome.
The degree of political disagreement can be gauged by tne fact tnat
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at the same conference, Bock maintained that there was a choice
between the EEC and Comecon which had to be decided in favour of the
former while the SPOe leader Pittermann maintained that the existence
79
of neutrality meant that membership could never come into question.
We are unsurprisingly left to conclude that each politician seeking
a particular political end can be seen arguing that their individual
position had full legal justification. The EEC focussed the attention
of all those involved in the need for the permanent legal
rationalisation for political ventures. The centrality of the EEC to
the Western System in Europe made it also an object of East/West
debate and sharpened the political and economic contradictions inherent
in Austria's position.
Austria was also vulnerable over the Anschluss. Article 4 of the
State Treaty was the prohibition of any unity whatsoever with Germany
known as the Anschlussverbot. It states;
"The allies and associated powers declare that a political or
economic union in whatsoever form between Austria and Germany.."
.. is prohibited. Further the Article underlines Austria's
responsibility for vigilance in this matter;
"In order to avoid any such union, Austria will make no form of
agreement with Germany nor enter any form of dealings or take any
measures which would be orientated directly or indirectly to support a
political or economic union with Germany or to constrain her
indivisibility or her political or economic independence."^
As we have seen, even Kreisky recognised the role of Anschluss in
Soviet thinking. Nearly all Austrian jurists except for those
identified with the far left of the SPOe or KPOe have striven to
reject any identification of the named enemy -Germany- with the EEC.
Bock dismisses any attempt at parallels on the basis that Germany as
such no longer exists and argues tnat the Anschlussverbot applies only
to united Germany.
"The term 'Anschluss' implies a prior existence of a 'German
Reich'. This German Reich no longer exists. There are two German
States. Anyway, and this is generally accepted, we refuse to say
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that trie intensification of economic relations has a political
character. On the purely economic level, Austria can have a Great
Power policy as can the Germans. They have nothing to do with one
another."23
Yet this can be countered on two levels first by arguing that in
West German law Germany remains a single State divided artificially to
the point that East Germany is an honorary member of the EEC for
trading purposes (in terms of the second protocal to the Treaty of
Rome) and also by arguing that the Anschlussverbot was quite clearly
decided to prevent an Austrian Anschluss with West Germany in 1955.
Nevertheless Ermacora (1975) insists that the EEC and West Germany
cannot be said to constitute the same unit. The argument that any
unity with the EEC would open the floodgates to West German investment
so as to reduce Austria to the status of a colony is thus in this view
invalid.
"The main reason being that even witnout EEC membership, German
investment in Austria cannot be stopped within the social market
economic order except by means of a law which would cut out the
citizens of one country in a discriminatory manner."^-'-
Many otner writers have pointed out that within the EEC Germany is
only one among equals (pars inter pares) and that this is true in all
international organisations.^^ When argued in legal terms this
argument can seem to remove any contradictions, except if one argues
that the Anschlussverbot prohibits Austria and Germany from ever
joining the same organisation. It cannot be argued that the result is
politically clear cut. The political, historical and economic
dilemmas of Austria's neutrality all come together here. It is these
rather tnan a series of legal doctrines which separate it for example
from Irish neutrality.
In 1972 Ireland joined the EEC as a full member without reference
to her neutrality. On a visit to Dublin in October 1971, the French
foreign minister declared that tne EEC left the sovereignty of
the member states unaffected and thus left neutrality intact. He
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pointed out that all 6 of tne EEC States were of the view that Ireland
could enter the EEC without effect on her neutrality.83 0ne rnig1:lt
argue that the only fair response would be to extend this logic to the
case of all neutral states. This is nevertheless a political
nonsense. To be sure this reflects as much upon the peculiarities
attaching to Irish neutrality as to those concerning the Austrian case
yet there are profound implications. Some legal theorists might argue
that Ireland may decide not to join on the basis of neutrality policy
but tnat they have established at least that it is part of free
political decision rather than legal dictate. Yet this is an
inadequate explanation. A political decision of the wrong type would
undermine the whole of Austrian neutrality (based as it is on the
systatiic division of post war Europe) in a way which it does not
affect the Irish (whose neutrality is fundamentally a method of
reserving the right to follow a different policy from that of the
United Kingdom). It is this decision which maintains the credibility
of the entire legal structure which can only exist if it maintains the
trust of those who would have to respect its neutrality. Security,
independence, sovereignty and all the goals of neutrality are likely
to be far more threatened by a false political decision than can be
helped by feebly arguing tnat legal neutrality has been maintained.
The Soviet Union could merely decide that neutrality was over and that
Austria had become another nostile State. In this event Austrian
protests that neutrality had been followed to the letter would become
irrelevant. In the end, the usefulness of any legal structure depends
on the assent of all of those affected. In terms of neutrality this
means understanding the spirit of the laws as much as the letter.
This brings us back into the sphere of the political.
More alert elements and the less desperately pro-Western groups
in Austria have long recognised that neutrality in post war Europe
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must be relev^nt to the Cold War without allowing the neutral State to
become a mere passive pawn. It remains true that neutrality was a
mechanism agreed by the outside powers as a method to avoid Austria
being integrated into either alliance bloc. Forty years of Cold War
have shown that though the alliances themselves are in theory
protective against the threat of war they too have their primary
relevance in peacetime given the holocaust which would occur in Europe
were the arsenals of both sides to let loose. They have thus found a
role relevance in the half-peace of the Cold War. The same is thus
obviously true of a neutrality born of these roots; it must be
primarily relevant to its context.
In the attempt to avoid total domination, being small can at times
be a positive advantage; a small 'maverick' State is more likely to be
tolerated than a 'large' one. On his State visit to Austria Khruscnev
promised that the USSR
'would not stand idly by in the event of an infringement of
Austrian neutrality."®^
This led to a sober if shocked response in Austria wnich snowed
that the Austrians were not unaware of their situation;
"We have awoken from a dream. From the dream tnat Austrian
neutrality is a well made bed on whose petal-white pillow of innocence
we could quietly slumber.1
The Austro-West German relationship is a particularity delicate
question. The existence of considerable trade dependence on any one
State is always a hazard in terms of State independence particularity
in wartime. When one state is neutral and the other part of the
central unsolved problem of post war Europe other states are likely to
be suspicious of anything which raninds them of a recurring crisis. A
relationship of dependence under these circumstances is obviously
particularity delicate. Bruno Kreisky, the only living Austrian
political signatory of the Moscow Memorandum has long emphasised tnis.
In his view the Austrian agreement was seen in Moscow as part of the
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German settlement. This, coupled with the fact that Western Austria
and Bavaria remain culturally closer than the same parts of Austria
and Vienna make all relations between Austria and West Germany highly
suspect especially where West Germany is dominant. Thus where Austria
and West Germany are merely two members among many there is little
objection. On this basis joint membership of OECD, UNO or EBU is
acceptable as it does not threaten the balance of power in Europe.
Any situation where it appeared that West Germany might extend her
political sphere of influence into Austria does then become a threat
to States outside. West German influence within the EEC would appear
to be in this latter category, especially given the predominance of
West Germany as a trading partner for Austria. This position was
recognised by Kurt Skalnik in 1966;
"After the Podgorny visit an equilateral triangle has emerged. Its
three sides are called EEC, Austria and Russia. Our country has
become a confrontation point between East and West once again. Its
freedom, independence, and neutrality are factors of the European
security system, even if some people haven't recognised tne fact. The
hour of Austrian diplomacy has come. It is the task of the latterday
grandchildren of Metternich to find the formula for a treaty with the
EEC which brings the interests of Austria into harmony with those of
Brussels but also with those of the USSR."^
The agreements of 1972 seem to have achieved this task at least for
the 1970s. Austria's success in her policies across the Iron Curtain
coupled with consistently outstanding economic performance would
suggest that neutrality in small countries is far from creating tne
isolated backwaters which right wing commentators proclaim. The
success of Austria indeed suggests that the contradictions inherent in
the Western/Neutral status can be manipulated to the country's
advantage. The economic performance of Switzerland, Sweden and
Austria suggest that, if anything, neutrality brings considerable
economic benefits.
Neutrality in Austria was conditional on the maintenance of a
discrete but observable diplomatic distance from West Germany and the
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development of separate histories. As long as Germany remains the
European flashpoint of East/West relations this will continue to be a
precondition of Austrian political credibility. As long as the legacy
of World War 2 remains a political factor in Europe this will be
essential to Austrian security. This lesson above all was underlined
in the 1960s by the EEC debate. More positively the same experience
and subsequent economic performance squashed the myth that Austria was
not viable in economic terms.
The agreements with the EEC, 1972.
The actual accords signed with the EEC in 1972 were greeted by some
(eg SPOe) as the achievement of the desired basis for future
development of relations and by others (OeVP, FPOe, business
federations) as a disappointing lowest common denominator representing
the minimalist position. Although the principle of negotiating with
the neutral States had been restated in 1967 it was not until The
Hague summit of the leaders of 'the Six' tnat a green light for
negotiations was actually given. These would take place as soon as
negotiations with tnose States seeking actual mambersnip nad begun.^
cW
In November 1970, Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger gave an indication
A
of the direction of negotiations through a 'Declaration of
Principles'. In this, renewed emphasis was laid on the need to secure
Austria's neutrality. This was portrayed as a general European
interest ensuring a continued degree of stability in central Europe
and Austria underlined the degree of importance she attached to it.
Austria admitted a direct economic interest in a treaty but the
declaration pointed out that interest was very much a two-sided affair
in that Austria ran a permanent trade deficit with the EEC. In 1969
Austria's trade deficit with the community was 60% of her exports to
'the Six', a deficit which was not made up by surpluses elsewhere.
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Austria's period of slower growth in the 1960s was blamed on the lack
ch
of an adequate agreement with the EEC. Kirschlaeger thus described
A
the goal of the negotiations to be the abolition of all discriminatory
07
duties and tariffs which were obstacles to trade.
Some more critical observers (eg Mayrzedt) complained that
throughout, the EEC adopted a superior attitude towards the neutrals.
The tendency witnin the EEC and in those countries seeking membership
was to refer to the Community as 'Europe'. Mayrzedt pointed out that
EFTA was also Europe and was as a unit the most important single
external customer for EEC goods. The Commission was guilty in his
eyes of an outmoded concept of integration, despite the fact that an
agreement would be in the interests of both parties. The Commission
appeared unable to view the neutrals as having any contribution to
make to the European integration process. This was justified on the
basis of the supposed goal of the EEC ie political integration over
and above economic cooperation in which the neutrals by virtue of
their status could not take part. Mayrzedt observed that precisely in
those areas which seemed prime candidates for policy integration eg
agriculture, foreign policy the nation States had jealously guarded
their independence;
"In the present situation of European Integration all the
industrialised states of Western Europe could take part with equal
rights. This assumes however that the criteria for participation in a
future integration are not used as criteria for participation in
present integration, as the EEC Commission followed by the Council of
Ministers does... As long as the neutrality of the neutral State is in
the European interest it cannot be demanded tnat tney give their
neutrality up in their integration policies."^
Yet this is a very dangerous argument. First it is clearly untrue
that the future goals of an organisation can be merely disregarded
because of a present impasse which makes those goals impossible or
improbable in the long run. On this basis it could be argued for
example that NATO is not a war alliance because it has not fought a
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war in thirty years and Austria should join it to ease the transfer of
technology! Secondly this Austrian commentator in objecting that
neutrality must be safeguarded as long as it is in the interests of
outside powers so to do at the same time allows the possible
conclusion that were the outside states to decide that neutrality was
not in their interests they could legitimately decide to disregard it.
If this is allowed tnen neutrality is openly admitted to depend on the
perception of it as valuable in outside countries. No neutral country
has officially allowed any third party the 'right' of interpretation.
Even here we see the dilemma for neutrals; they must constantly
strive to portray neutrality in the 'correct' light. Failure to do so
. c.h
might undermine the whole basis of Austria's policies. Kirschlaeger
speaks of the anger he at times felt at the manner in which tne EEC
OQ
handled the question of relations to Austria. For our purposes
here, it is more important to note that the actual agreements reached
cH
bore the stamp of the ideas represented by Kreisky and Kirschlaeger in
A
cH
the 1960s. Kirschlaeger put it so;
"I merely want to show... how in my eyes Foreign Minister Bruno
Kreisky fully recognised the economic significance of European
integration and simultaneously accepted the political necessities by
which participation in this integration could only take place if it
could be brought into harmony with Austria's permanent neutrality and
State Treaty."^^
The Agreements eventually came into being in July 1972. The
agreement did not extend to agriculture but involved a five step
reduction in tariffs to be completed by July 1977. Alone among the
neutrals, tariffs on Austrian/EEC trade sank 30% with immediate effect
• exAin January 1973. This extended to all manufacturing goods and
industrial products. Austria was to remain a member of EFTA and
tariff free trade was to continue between EFTA members. More
sensitive products were subject to a slightly slower tariff reduction
(eg paper and paper products were to be duty free by Jan. 1984, and
pulp, ferro-alloys and aluminium by Jan. 1980). The institutional and
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political aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy prevented total
agreement on agricultural products. Instead there was a mutual
commitment to harmonisation of policy and a number of concessions on
individual products. The countries also signed an extremely complex
agreement on 'country of origin' rules to offset any 'trade diverting
effects' of the treaties. Preference is granted if the good in
question originates completely in either EEC or Austria, if processing
in either leads to a change in tariff class or if it cones under the
terms of two lists which impose special conditions regarding
processing and origin. Both sides agreed to give 12 months notice of
any measures which might be applied because of balance of payments
difficulties or of any notice of withdrawal from the agreement, in
order to implement and develop the agreement (tne so-called 'Evolution
Clause') a 'Joint Committee' was set up whose decisions were to be
90
unanimous. Officially 2 such bodies were created to deal separately
with Austrian relations with the EEC and ECSC in turn (there are also
separate treaties) but de facto the committees usually sit as one.
The Committee meets at the request of either partner but at least once
yearly. As a rule the Committee makes its decisions in the form of
'recommendations' although it does have the power to make 'decisions',
binding on both partners. Here the requirement of unanimity is of
particular importance. The Committee itself thus functions as a semi-
supranational organisation.
Political reaction in Austria to the agreements was mixed.
Kirschlaeger and the SPOe judged them the most suitable agreements
available, in that they guaranteed political freedom, the right to
make economic policy to other countries, an equal position on the
Joint Committee, neutrality in wartime and the right to withdraw from
the agreement. This was in addition to satisfactory economic
arrangements.
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"It was the task of foreign policy in the negotiations., to find on
the one hand the widest possible agreement on the economy and on the
other hand an agreement which was compatible with the status of
permanent neutrality, the obligations arising from treaties entered
into and the political task which is Austria's."91
The opposition parties while greeting any agreement as an advance
were critical of the limitations of the treaty. OeVP leader
Schleinzer pointed out that an agreement had always been the goal of
EFTA and of Austrian policy under the OeVP. Nevertheless;
"The discrepancy between the goals of the negotiators and the
results actually achieved is very obvious. We are convinced that the
Government could have signed a better treaty if they had first
undertaken more intensive contacts at governmental level at the
appropriate moment and secondly if they had not weakened their
negotiating position by over-optimistic declarations and thirdly if
they had not given up their negotiating positions so early."^2
The FPOe, long advocates of EEC membership were also dissatisfied
with the scope of the agreement. Individual commentators from both
parties were often even more critical. Andreas Khol spoke of the
agreements as a 'mini-solution' meeting only the bare minimum
objectives set in 1958.^ Peter Katzenstein described the treaties as
'scaled-down'^ while Waldemar Hummer saw them only as the 'lowest
common denominator'.^
All this illustrates the extent to which an economic functionalist
model of the implications of agreement with the EEC had been accepted
by 1972. Yet the implications are much wider. Integration in Western
Europe cannot be separated into 'economic' and 'political' categories.
Social engineering on this scale cannot be separated from its societal
or political function as Anton Pelinka was quick to point out. It
is quite clear that those most enthusiatic about the EEC did not make
this separation and were quite prepared to place economic efficiency
above tne concept of independent democratic legitimation in their
calculations. The Liberal separation of politics and economics is
simply untenable in this context. The political function of the EEC
as both consciously and consistently capitalist and at the same time
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non-Soviet (ie deliberately reactive to the existence and policies of
the USSR) integration is central to its conception and evaluation.
"Through the artificial division of nonpolitical from political
areas the essentially political character of European integration is
underplayed. The decision for integration per se is a political one
(ie involving a choice) and not one deducible from the notion of
'Sachzwang' [a no-choice decision determined by a previous larger
choice]. Also underplayed is the fact that the decision for
integration within a particular order of society is also a political
one, ie it is one chosen from a number of alternatives. There is
deliberate underemphasis on the fact that the decision for integration
in close co-operation with NATO is really only political ie it follows
specific interests. European integration is social-technical in
nature at a superficial level but is primarily a political marker.
Behind the technocrats clearly stand uncnanged political
preferences.
All this would appear to me to be obvious but it needs categorical
restatement in this form if only as a counterstatement to the numbing
effect of the political diatribe. Seldom in the literature is the
scope of the agreements conceded. Where it does emerge it is in the
form of a stark choice between integration with the east or the west.
It is certain that the EEC has been most strongly promoted by those
favouring capitalist efficiency as the prime goal of a society and the
ease with which this functional notion of the EEC has won acceptance
has hidden the political implications at its core.
The development of western integration seems to confirm some of the
predictions of systems analysis in that capital concentration seems to
be preferred to the survival of independent democratic forms. As we
have seen, the Kreisky government's agreements were intended to
achieve that integration without losing the generally positive
attitude of tne USSR to Austrian neutrality. But we should be under
no illusions as to the seriousness of the EEC debate; the limits on
Austria's freedom of manouevre which emerged through the attitude of
the USSR and the remaining political ambitions of the EEC destroyed
the purely functional view that the political goals of the Community
were inapplicable or obsolete. The 'politics' were established within
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the balance of social forces created and reformed by integration. The
debate became political despite Austria's attempts to prove the
opposite. Agendas and their nature are always determined by both
parties to a discussion.
We return once again to the implications of neutrality within a
divided Europe. It is only the 'polities' which gives neutrality any
meaning. The limits imposed by Liberal Neutrality Law about the
economic sphere are clearly inappropriate to twentieth century
conditions. To be fully integrated into the anti-Soviet bloc of
Western Europe would reduce neutrality to a technicality, even where
the national governments retain certain functions. The fundamental
dilemma that Austria stands between West and East and must play a
neutral role and be western simultaneously emerges with great clarity
through this debate. It is also obvious that the line of least
resistance is to try to reduce the EEC to an organisation witn a
purely technical function. The results of 1972 disappointed the
right, but they established a new equilibrium appropriate to the
ch
detente era. Even in 1985 Kirschlaeger maintained the success of the
agreements;
"We achieved everytning which we wanted. We began a consultative
phase with the legal advisors of Sweden, Austria and Switzerland., and
without attention to any outside state we agreed that we must maintain
our treaty-making power... The EEC originally did not want to leave
the idea of a Customs Union. At tne end the EEC was prepared to
accept a Free Trade Zone solution which is the ideal solution from the
point of view of neutrality.^
All of this shows the degree to which it was arguments about
Neutrality, proposed by the Soviet Union which provided the stumbling
block to membership. The USSR was officially notified of the treaties
in an Austrian Aide-memoire (20.9.72)^ in which the USSR was assured
of Austria's determination to maintain neutrality, unaffected as it
was (!) by the agreements. Austria also agreed to intensify Austro-
Soviet trade co-operation and to negotiations. As a result the USSR
180
dropped the propaganda campaign waged for 15 years and there has been
little further comment.
Nevertheless it is a highly unstable equilibrium. Integration in
Europe has continued at a faltering pace and the agreements of 1972
look increasingly insecure. The fundamental 'Janus head' dilemma
remains.
The Integration debate in Austria since 1972
The arguments about integration since 1972 have taken place mostly
at the level of academic discussions or in the pages of the press. The
argument has been removed from the parliamentary sphere. This is not
to say that there are no political groupings who campaign for a
strengthened Austrian participation in the integration process, but
the issue was no longer a primary concern of day to day political
debate. In the main this can be attributed to the long period of
Kreisky dominance in Austrian politics under whom there was general
satisfaction with the extent of the agreements. Where Government
officials have commented, tney express continued pride in the success
of the treaties (eg Kirsbhlaeger to me) and most particularly of the
A
success of the 'evolution clause'.
More importantly the Austrian domestic economy flourished as never
before throughout the 1970s. According to OECD statistics (Jan. 1980)
the Austrian economy grew faster than any other OECD national economy
with the exception of oil rich Canada and Japan in terms of growth in
domestic demand. GNP growth was outpaced only by that of Japan and
Norway. In addition, inflation (annual average) was lower only in
West Germany and Switzerland.^® Analysis of growth in trade volume
1971-79 is also provided by the OECD (Jan. 1981). Trade showed an
annual increase of 2.2% in all markets during the period. Trade with
the EEC Six grew fastest (eg Italy av. +2.5%, France av. +6.2%, West
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Germany av. +5.2%) and slowed somewhat with remaining EFTA partners
(Sweden Av. -0.4%, Switzerland Av. -2%) and with former partners who
had joined the EEC (Denmark av. +0.1%, UK av. -5.1%) .101 Tj-,e
preeminence of Wiast Germany in Austrian trade was thus largely
reinforced. Given the steady performance of the West German economy
throughout the 1970s this is hardly surprising but it leaves Austria
vulnerable to outside attack over the issue of dependence.
It is interesting to note that the chief realm for debate has moved
from the circles of lawyers so dominant in tne 1960s to economists.
The agreements of 1972 are generally seen by them as partial and temporary
witn little long term potential. Positions on the question of the
compatibility of neutrality with membership of the EEC have also
changed. There are increasing numbers on the political and economic
right who now argue that membership is compatible with the obligations
of neutrality. They argue that security policy is not contained in
the EEC treaty and that some form of qualifying pre-conditions in a
future treaty could be established to create circumstances in which
the possible conflict of interest could be avoided. This would have
to be precise in nature so as to avoid reinterpretation by an
international court. This is nevertheless far from a cast iron
guarantee tnat the dilemma would be solved. When confronted by the
actual implications of the agreement signed by herself with the League
of Nations regarding sanctions, Switzerland merely made steps to
withdraw from the agreement. It has also been possible to argue that
UN collective security policy is compatible with neutrality where the
political will has existed. Any agreement between the Austrians and
the EEC would no doubt be vulnerable to the same rationalising
contortions as treaties signed to date!
According to those in favour of membership, Articles 223 and 224 of
the Treaty of Rome allow the national security interests of any state
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to be placed above all other interests. Neutrality being merely a
military matter in this view it can be seen as part of these vital
interests. It must be assumed by an observer that in joining the EEC
however, the threat to Austria's security does not come from the EEC
itself and hence that neutrality as security policy has only one
identifiable enemy - the Soviet Union. This is a considerably altered
outlook from the traditional myth that neutrality is addressed to all
1 (AO
states. z Esterbauer also writes;
"With a precondition for neutrality based on security and war
policy and as a militarily neutral zone, a neutral state could be a
member of the EEC- even of an economic policy union. It is in the
interests of the neutrals... to be integrated with a seat and voice in
the creation of the Community opinion in the political system with
which she is most strongly integrated, namely Western Europe and not
merely to face already reached decisions whicn they must accept; in
this way she could bring in considerations of neutrality much more
satisfactorily than through a passive attitude."^-'-
This is an attitude repeated by the man most closely associated
with the business view of the EEC in the 1960s, Fritz Bock, who
portrayed the present situation as involving passive acceptance of all
Cortmunity policy, with the only choice as 'Friss Vogel oder stirb'
(Eat little bird or die).
"In my opinion the Neutrality policy consideration has actually
been reversed if one believes that it is even relevant. I must
recognise that this is international law as it stands vis a vis
supranational organisations. If it is so, then I can only say that
Neutrality is much less endangered if I can work on those decisions
essential to Neutrality myself. Then I could as far as possible
contribute my own thoughts to the process, whereas now this is not at
all possible."23
Yet if this is true neutrality has little relevance for
contemporary Europe. It should be pointed out that both Kirschlaeger
and indeed OeVP leader Alois Mock were opposed to this analysis;
"We were from the beginning on different sides... Now as then I do
not share the opinion of Herr Bock that we would have a greater
influence as members. As small states we would not have this ability
but we would get all tne disadvantages which membership would bring
with it. That was the reason why Switzerland...did not join but came
to the same conclusion as ourselves In 1973, I pointed out that
through these Agreements we had closed a divide which would otherwise
have been very wide.... I do not believe that economic isolation will
occur for in reality the economic development of the EEC has not been
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very different from our own."93
EEC membership is nevertheless advocated by an important group
within the OeVP around the leader of its political thinktank, Andreas
Khol.
We will examine this position shortly but first we might
legitimately pose the question as to what neutrality is defended by
membership of the EEC? Is this not equivalent to fighting war so that
war does not occur? It is apparent that the definitions of legal
neutrality adopted by the political right have become absurd and
devoid of real meaning. The political role of the EEC as an anti- or
at least self-consciously non-Soviet group is always underplayed
simply because this aspect is not deducible from the text of the Rome
Treaty and because of the direct political advantage to be gained by
ignoring this fact. It is quite clear that an attempt by a neutral to
join the EEC would undermine the wnole basis on which neutrality's
credibility is founded. At its most technocratic this position is
outlined by Rotter when he points out that neutrality would require a
treaty involving delineations and exceptions of such complexity that;
"..in the final analysis would make participation in the
integration of the Community either entirely impossible or at least
create a special category of integration within the Community- ie a
Community within a Community."-'-^
As ne points out central direction of the Community's economy would
mean that the Neutral would have to steer its entire economic capacity
to one warring party in a future East/West war. The question thus
arises as to whether the celebrated pragmatic principle of 'courante
normale' still appears neutral if it involves 100% supply of only one
party to a conflict?
"All in all, a neutral would tie forced to put his entire economy in
the service of the wars of the EEC States."!^
Andreas Khol maintains that the institutional division between NATO
and the EEC prove that it has no long term political integration
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programme;
"The times when the EEC wanted to develop into a Federation are
over. The EEC is, sui generis, an organisation which allows the
greatest degree of autonomy... All attempts to give the EEC a 'NATO*
or security component have collapsed for ever.. There is no
institutional connection between NATO and the EEC and there is no
security cooperation.. Ten years ago this was not so apparent. Then
the EEC was the same as the WEU."105
This is of course the opposite argument to that used in Spain in
the recent NATO referendum by those supporting NATO. Then, the
intimate connection between democracy and the Western Alliance was
constantly underlined. We must thus conclude that the entire purpose
of establishment or other rationalisations of neutrality are to
corroborate attempts by certain sections of society to allow Austria
to enter the EEC one of whose attractions is the very anti-Communism
whose existence is never admitted. Thus 'Anschluss to the West'-*-^® is
ensured. In fact, Khol almost admits as much;
"There is a political argument [for eventual membership]. We do not
want to find ourselves marginalised by the rapidly emerging fact tnat
'Free Europe' is becoming the same as 'European Community', left with
very few other States as 'Buffers' between East and West.""'"^^
At its most honest the wheel turns full circle and the
effective argument becomes that neutrality is not a goal in itself but
must serve deeper purposes. Of course this could be and one day may
be used to justify everything.-*-^ with this candid argument it is
maintained that EEC membership with conditions is consistent with a
restrictive interpretation of neutrality.
When the left argues that the deeper goals of peace and security
would be served by total disarmament the argument is dismissed as
legally impossible. On the other hand the contradictions of the UN
Charter and neutrality can be reconciled to serve 'deeper' ends. All
this merely serves to reinforce the totally flexible use of aspects of
neutrality law. Indeed it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
where sufficient numbers at home and abroad accept a rationalisation
the new interpretation is presented as obvious and applicable since
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tirre immemorial. The dominance of the legal establishment in Austria
and the party system ensuring acceptance of anything agreed by the two
proporz parties make it very difficult to find an alternative
viewpoint in Austria.-^
Qshlinger's point that a 'pure' neutrality theory is no longer
appropriate seems worthy of comment. Every sovereignty is restricted
and subject to relationships of interdependence. It must be admitted
that with the development of the Capitalist World System neutrality is
seriously threatened. The very historical circumstances whicn
reorientated Austria's economy towards West Germany have ensured that
the West Germans are careful to be seen as non-manipulative in their
dealings with Austria. Autarchy is not a serious alternative to
trading within the present system. Yet an alliance with a
centralising Customs Union (EEC) poses an immense threat to the
as<^TT\me.fcrAca)
neutrals. As Galtung has pointed out, asaymotrical economic relations
under capitalism must lead to increasing linkage with the strong
partner.The political circumstances of Western Europe ensure that
this problem remains for Austria. A choice exists and the fact that
EEC integration is incomplete means that the problem will not
disappear.
Were the EEC to emerge as a truly supranational organisation,
neutrality could find no place within it. Membership of the UN is
only possible for permanent neutrals because of the effectively
permanent division which has developed between the Superpowers which
has meant that all sides have been prepared to discard legal niceties
in preference of political pragmatism. At the same time the Charter
remains as a statement of intent or ideal which neither side would
discard in favour of a more accurate legal description of present
political conditions. In other words both neutrality and UN
supranationality have been compromised by mutual assent.
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The political context of the EEC is different however. Were Austria
to become an integrated part of one side of the same Cold War divide
which has forced the UN to adapt, her neutrality becomes a farce in
Cold War Europe. Political credibility is the precondition for any
legal directive. The question of whether a particular position can or
cannot be reconciled or ex post facto rationalised becomes irrelevant
if the political preconditions for neutrality have eroded.
Let us now examine the position of Dr. Andreas Khol who has been
the most vociferous advocate of eventual EEC membership in the 1980s.
These views are shared by the economic Liberals in the OeVP and
generally accompany support for increased military service,
privatisation and conservative social values.109 Khol argues that a
new European policy is now essential after tne failures of the Kreisky
era when policy was
"conceived according to personal preferences, prejudices and other
emotions and not according to the true interests of our country."10^
As a result, Austria has in this view failed to take advantage of the
opportunities opened up by the EEC Markets, unlike the Swiss. This
may of course reflect a personal preference for the economic outlook
of the Right wing Swiss to the pragmatic centrism of Kreisky. Khol
further argues however that the legal arguments of the 1960s no longer
apply. The national veto has replaced majority voting thus allowing
for Austrian national interest, confederation appears less and less
likely while non-Community members still participate in some notable
projects eg EUREKA and COST. In addition the West European Union is
no longer identical with the EEC, while neutral Ireland is a full
member. According to Khol, the EEC and Austria must find an agreement
which does not disturb the delicate power balance which is in the
interests of all States. In addition to the political reason outlined
above, Khol gives three main reasons why Austria cannot afford to
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remain outside the development of the EEC; technology, agricultural
development and the international division of labour.-^ this
is presented as politically neutral and purely a matter of 'function'.
In this light Khol proposes a three step plan for policy towards
the EEC;
i. immediately increased cooperation in the fields of agriculture,
country of origin rules, science and technology and transport leading
to a gradual international!sation and
ii. Association. No official treaty for neutrality would be necessary.
As we have seen however it is only possible for the EEC as a stage
prior to full membership. It thus involves observer status at the
European Parliament, full integration into the EMS and an autonomous
gesture by Austria of bringing her policies on competition,
environmental protection and internal market into harmony with the
EEC. The question of wartime sovereignty or of the total Western
orientation does not arise for Khol because neutrality is merely
military. Austria would take part in all areas of European political
co-operation except security. The final goal would be
iii. Membership of an organisation which Khol models on the Holy Roman
Empire ie free movement of goods in a loose political unit.
Seldom has the sacrifice of political sovereignity for economic
efficiency been more bluntly stated. It is nevertheless one of the
most coherent plans put forward since 1972. It remains vulnerable on
many fronts. It makes no reference to external political conditions
eg the Cold War. Furthermore, in arguing that the EEC is not a mere
puppet of NATO it concentrates (conveniently) only on the superficial.
In the recent Spanish NATO referendum, political conditions in Spain
ensured that the two were portrayed as intimately linked. It is true
that NATO per se and the EEC are not identical. Yet within the
umbrella of 'the West' they are both clearly lined up as two aspects
188
of the anti-Soviet polity. Because the EEC is not directly military
does not mean it is not part of the Cold War. The axis of the EEC
remains Bonn-Paris with extensions to London and Rome and these
primary governmental links are clearly central to the West European
Security system.
The division between the 'economic' and the 'political' cannot be
made successfully. The fact that neutrality law does not deal with
capitalist concentration nor with the crtetion of supranational
organisations is a direct result of its origins in the nineteenth
century. To argue that this fact precludes the extension of the
<9a nCje^OUS
spirit of neutrality into these areas is ridiculous unless neutrality
is to appear as a mere anachronism of historic interest. Khol has
almost gone as far as to reject neutrality in favour of being western.
Of course in legal terms a neutral facade can be maintained but the
political relevance in peacetime but most particularly in wartime has
disappeared. The argument of the Allies in 1813 tnat Switzerland
could not be considered neutral because of her close integration with
Napoleon's France becomes appropriate once more but magnified by the
level of integration of the EEC. In domestic terms, Khol's position is
not unchallenged. Even such unradical characters as Kirschlaeger,
Pahr, Busek"--'-®, Steiner and even Mock remain opposed. Pahr put it
thus in 1985;
"Austria cannot be a member of the European Community. Today there
is no doubt about that. This question was decided as early as the end
of the sixties. This is clear. Austria cannot be a full member of
the EEC because that would mean a very substantial restriction of
Austrian independence and this in its turn would be contrary to
Neutrality."-^-'-
In another interview, OeVP Foreign policy spokesman Steiner said;
"The close relationship has been created in practice... We were
always for the closest possible connection as long as it is
justifiable by international law... Many people say today 'Formally
the Rome Treaties should lead to a Supranational Organisation. They
are not being followed, therefore it doesn't matter for a Neutral;we
can join because the Rome Treaties are dead.' However, it remains
true that in joining, there is a natural assumption that the Rome
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Treaties have been accepted otherwise we would have to make conditions
which the EEC would not accept."2-^
The political interpretations which decide the actual content of
'law' have seldom been so clearly demonstrated. It can no longer be
legitimately maintained, that Austrian Neutrality is not being
reshaped by the political context.
Concluding Remarks
In 1980, Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr expressed Austrian
frustration with the EEC and highlighted the dangers inherent in small
country relationships with larger powers.
"More and more a trend has been recently recognised in the EEC
towards failing to take note of the special relationship existing
between members of the EFTA System and the Community. This refusal by
the Community increasingly tends to put Austria and the other EFTA
countries on a par with third parties. Austria emphatically objects
to this attempted equation with countries enjoying preferential
treatment... No account is taken of Austria's massive and close
interdependence with the Community... Austria welcomes Europe's
progressive integration and it wishes irrespective of all difficulties
and preserving its permanently neutral status to continue in a
pragmatic manner to participate therein. The same principles and
arguments which render full Austrian membership of the EEC impossible
naturally determine the special character of our relationship with
the EEC.!-12
The dilerrma is here exposed quite clearly. The credibility of
neutrality depends on this choice not becoming too stark.
We can of course restrict our sympathy in this situation to an
acknowledgement of its existence. It is quite clear that non-
membership of the EEC has not in any way crippled the economy, indeed
Austria has performed exceptionally well. Neutrality has proved far
from a handicap in the search for successful economic development; the
economies of Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and later Finland are
regularly quoted as model successes. Against this background there
are considerable grounds for scepticism as to the depth of the
Austrian plight. Stories of hardship and disadvantage are ultimately
treasured on a relative scale!
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This is not to deny the existence of a long term problem but to
remark how successfully Austria has manipulated theoretically
difficult circumstances. Dependence on the European powerhouse
economy of West Germany has not so far been a critical issue. This
has enabled the Austrians to dismiss Soviet jibes about a 'Cold
Anschluss' as mere propaganda of no consequence. More astute
politicians have recognised tnat this dismissal must remain credible.
The issue is never raised by Austrians without outside prompting.
Internal propaganda unity among Austrian parties also contributes to
the perpetuation of the myths of State. This unanimity does not
suffice however to make the real substance of the problem disappear.
Any attempt to join the EEC would no doubt have to develop its own
virtually unanimous interpretation, but the substantial damage to the
credibility of neutrality cannot be denied. Once again we have this
perpetual Austrian problem of the difference between superficial
appearance and actual fact.
As we have seen, Neutrality can only be understood within the
context of forces between which one is neutral. In general terms the
EEC debate made those outside forces the EEC and the USSR. Neutrality
as a credible status will continue to exist as long as this triangular
relationsnip exerts power. If Austria is seen to ally herself to one
side so as to make out of this triangle a dividing line then
neutrality becomes a concept of a legal text book. The danger
obviously exists that the neutral will be faced with the sterile
alternatives of complete identity with one side or complete
neutralisation leading to political incapacity. The only way out of
this dilemma is to take sovereignty seriously and ensure a credible
neutrality. This requires a dynamic and pragmatic policy which
constantly challenges trapping relations and does not allow the
emergence of accepted 'dominating outside powers'. To some extent
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Austria has been successful in this. Nevertheless there may be
choices between economic efficiency and political sovereignty to be
made.
The ability of small States to snift the focus of discussion may
well be greater than that of larger States. A larger State eg Germany
in a similar triangular relationship would incite much more defensive
responses from the outside players than does Austria. The dilemma of
Western versus Neutral is at the core of the 1955 settlement and its
existence tends to suggest that Austrian neutrality is a provisional
equilibrium, fundamentally tied to the political circumstances of
post-Yalta Europe. As of now this equilibrium, unstable as it is, has
appeared preferable to the implications of making a stark choice.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Austria and her neighbours
"In every man's memory there are things he
won't reveal to others, except perhaps his
friends. And there are things he won't
reveal even to friends, only, perhaps to
himself, and then, too, in secret. And
finally there are things he is afraid to
reveal even to himself, and every decent
man has quite an accumulation of them. In
fact the more decent the man, the more of
them he has."
F. Dostoevsky, 'Notes from Underground' NY
1974, p44-5
Austria shares boundaries with seven States (considered as six for
the purposes of this chapter - Switzerland and Liechtenstein being
considered as one). Witnin Europe, only West Germany has more diverse
neighbours (nine). Around half the boundaries are with clearly
capitalist economic and social systems and the other half with
countries claiming a 'socialist' form of government.
This division is in itself oversimplistic; Yugoslav foreign policy
has made her by far the most independent of the socialist states in
Europe, and was instrumental in the creation of the non-aligned
movement. This marks her out as different from those countries who
are members ofthe Warsaw Pact. Austria also divides NATO-Centra1 from
NATO-South. At her furthermost western end, neutral Switzerland, is
the only one of Austria's neighbours which is not a full member of the
UN. This variety provides us with a considerable opportunity to
observe a multifarious foreign policy in miniature.
Austria's geopolitical position is central to her neutrality. In
any war situation a land or air-based attack is likely to come from
these local quarters. It is also at these close quarters that we
mignt expect any "restrictions" imposed by the adoption of neutrality
to be most obviously exposed. Any tension between immediate "national
interest" as defined by Government policy and the status of neutrality
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is likely to surface.
Local relationships also predate Austria's neutral status. This
allows us to highlight some of the crucial ambiguities in Austrian
politics stemming from earlier conflicts. How adequately clarified is
the historical legacy with West Germany and with former monarchy
territories? Is there any threat that Austria's local relations could
lead to war scenarios which threaten neutrality, or otherwise
expressed, have the needs of neutrality induced a different approach
to regional questions?
Any picture of Austria's geopolitical position would be incomplete
without reference to the historical links with present-day neighbours.
Prior to World War I the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy encompassed
all of present-day Czechoslovakia and Hungary, most of northern
Yugoslavia and large areas of Northern Italy. Historical connections
are thus close within the region. This former 'Danubian' orientation
has been seen by many as a possible alternative to German centricity:
anti-German politicians as late as de Gaulle ("Vous etes Danubiens")
have been concerned to highlight this aspect of Austrian history.
Since World War I, and for German-speakers in the monarchy long
before this, Austria has tended to look to Germany on a cultural,
economic and even political level, culminating of course in the
'Anschluss' of 1938-45, wnich was to determine much of Austria's
political identity in the post-war world. As we shall see, Austro-
German relations cannot be understood without reference to this
period. The division of Europe into two blocs and the power of the
West German economy have ensured a continuing ambiguity in their
relationship.
Seen from Vienna, Switzerland is the most distant of all of
Austria's neighbours. Close links only exist between the Swiss and
Austria's westernmost province Vorarlberg, which led to an attempt by
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Vorarlberg to gain entry into the Swiss Confederation in 1919.
Even from this very brief outline, Austria's complex and
longstanding interconnection with her neighbours emerges. This
historical tradition is seldom matched elsewhere in Europe. An
understanding of its scope is essential if we are to grasp the
underlying reasons for Austria's postwar dilemmas.
I will now look at the development of relations with each of the
individual neighbouring states. It would be impossible to examine
every event in detail and in each case I will concentrate on specific
central issues which highlight key problems.
"We want to achieve a maximum in stability, which did not exist for
centuries for this part of Europe ... By the term 'Stability' we want
to express that it is our goal to get on top of our problem in such a
way that we are not dependent on the Great powers and do not have to
fear any intervention from them."^
1. Austria and West Germany
We noted in a previous chapter that tne importance of the
'Austrian' dimension of the German question has been constantly raised
by the Soviet Union in its dealings with Austria. This was
particularly so during the time of negotiations on an agreement with
th EEC and as we have seen is officially dismissed either as spurious
Soviet propaganda or patent nonsense. And yet the problem does not
simply disappear. As we shall see when we examine two recent affairs
(Reder, Waldheim) the process of coming to terms with the past is
still incomplete.
Almost without exception, Austrian and German politicians assert
that relations between the countries are near-perfect. Within the
realm of everyday affairs, this appears plausible, and the development
of bilateral ties since 1955 has been remarkably smooth. But to deny
the historical, cultural and economic context within which this takes
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place is misleading and potentially dangerous, as illustrated by the
domestic and foreign policy crisis caused by the Reder Affair of 1985.
During a particularly low period in Austro-West German relations in
1955, German frustration with the special treatment given to Austria
spilled over into official statements, eg by Adenauer;
"Nowhere was Hitler so enthusiatically received as in Vienna!"
It is this which we must keep in mind when examining official
statements on Austro-German relations. The present degree of
enthusiasm for the level of Austro-German interrelationship is an
inaccurate guide. In any time of crisis Austrian identity with West
Germany remains an extremely potent weapon, and could serve as an easy
justification for any breach of neutrality. It is with this in mind
that the more pious statements have to be put in context.
In Foreign Policy Reports of the Austrian Government Austria's
relations with West Germany are described as 'particularly close', on
the basis of cultural exchange, meetings between Ministers on
economic, traffic and environmental questions and cross-border co¬
operation. The implications of the economic dependence, the cultural
concentration (especially in Western Austria) on West Germany and the
very direct sister-party relations crossing the borders are left
tactfully unstated.3
Historical fears lead the Austrians and Germans to constantly
understate the nature of their contact. It is ultimately misleading
to treat West Germany as 'just another neighbour'. De Gaulle's advice
that Austria should turn eastward has meaning only with reference to a
desire on his part to maximise the distance between Austria and
Germany. The interlinking of the two in foreign minds was expressed
by the Polish academic Smogozewski when he said;
"The loss of a quarter of her territory, as well as 5.5m people,
the departure of 14.2m Germans from eastern and southeastern European
countries onto the west side of the Oder-Neisse-Czech Wdod, the
independence and neutrality of Austria guaranteed by an international
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treaty and finally the division of tne Reich into 2 States is the
price which the German Volk paid for letting a Paranoid come to
power, greeting his early successes with enthusiasm and tolerating his
crimes.
Any realistic assessment of Austro-German relations must take this
into account. In German cultural mythology, 'Austrian' is the
counterpoint to 'Prussian';
"Statemindedness in Prussians; love of nature and homeland in
Austrians; virtue and efficiency on the one hand, piety and humanity on
tne other.
This long cultural tradition, and continual involvement of
Austrians and Germans in each others affairs makes separate identity
unconvincing. Habsourg dominance of the Holy Roman Empire was only
finally broken in the 19th century. The alliance of the powers in
WOrld War I and the often-expressed wish for Anschluss in the inter-
war period all confirm the relationship. Post-war attempts to create
distance may be genuine, but they are fragile and have roots in a very
contrary tradition. The result is that much Austrian propaganda
appears to be an exercise in self-deception. Austria has had more
problems than Germany in this regard. We will thus look at examples
in recent Austrian politics which highlight the uncertainty of
Austria's cultural orientation towards Germany and 'Germandom'. Until
the 1980s these realities remained largely suspicions. The Waldneim
and Reder-Frischenschlager Affairs have changed this.
Still, it would be inaccurate to imply that no change has taken
place;
"No German in possession of his five senses would even dream of
'bringing in' those German-speaking European countries or parts of
countries which lay outside the Reich boundaries of 1937 ..."
This fact can be contrasted with statements made after World War I.
The post-war settlement has completely shifted West German attention
from Pan-German unity to 'Inner-German' questions. As the American
journalist Lippmann stated;
"The western allies are absolutely and unanimously agreed on their
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insistence on the separation of Austria ... When we speak of
reunification we mean the reunification of East and West Germany with
a reunified Berlin as its capital."7
It should be pointed out that the efforts to separate Austrian and
German histories have been encouraged at every step by the wartime
allies. The quiet rewriting of history corresponded to Allied wishes
to avoid any future repetition of the Anschluss and a strengthened
Germany. The burial of Austria's past has not taken place without the
complicity of both Germanys and the four powers. Austria's political
independence has never been a question in the Federal Republic.
Official visitors in both directions have been anxious at all times to
O
emphasise 'good neignbourly' relations in place of common heritage.
West German conceptions of 'Germany' have been limited to the 1848
'Kleindeutsch' notion and her policies directed towards other
problems.
The very fact of a divided Prussian heartland probably enabled the
development of an Austro-German relationship based on two states
after 1945. Yet the happily expounded view that after 1945 the
'collective consciousness' of 1365 - 1945 had vanished, being replaced
by a vague notion of German-Austrian cultural togetherness^ is
ultimately not credible, partly due to the unseemly and unsatisfactory
haste by which the process is assumed to have taken place.
This failure to come to terms with the collective experience of at
least 1938 - 45, has returned to naunt the domestic and foreign
profile of the Second Republic.
After tne end of World War II, Austria quickly established a
unified political identity. By 1946 Austria was allowed to re¬
establish relations with UN member states under the terms of the
second 'Kontrollabkommen'. The establishment of direct contact to
'enemy' states was nevertheless refused. Even at this stage the
extreme, indeed unique, ambiguity of Austria's position is visible.
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According to the accepted legal documents Austria was Hitler's first
victim in expansionism. Yet in no other of Hitler's conquests did the
victims react with such enthusiasm to their victimisation, and in none
of the other conquered territories (bar the Sudetenland) was loyalty
to the German ideal strong enough to risk compulsory conscription into
the armies of the German Reich. It is worth noting that even as a
'victor power' Austria did not insist on a place in the negotiations
on a peace Treaty with Germany.
Most commentators confirm tnat by May 1945 there was little active
support for old 'Grossdeutsch' ideas. Given the economic collapse and
defeat, this is hardly a surprising conclusion. Given the likely
international reaction to a pro-German stance in 1945 one is tempted
to draw parallels with Peter's denial of Christ.
The myth of a suddenly discovered 'Austrian' identity took root.
Nevertheless, opinion polls throughout the second republic indicate
that only by the late 1970s did an overwhelming majority recognise
Austria as either a nation or becoming a nation. What is true is that
a large proportion of the political establishment of the post-war era
did experience the cost of opposition to Nazism, and were themselves
untainted by association. The universalisation of this experience
into the official version of Austria's war leaves too many major
questions unanswered. We will return to this in our analysis of the
Reder and Waldheim affairs.
The earliest real contacts with the Western zones of Germany took
place with the formation of the OEEC in 1948 to oversee the Marshall
Aid Programme (ERP). Earlier, representatives of Socialist parties as
well as Christian Democrats had established informal contact through
the Second International and NEI respectively. At this stage the
Federal Republic was not officially established. The first interstate
contact took place within tne framework of the GATT meeting at Torquay
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in 1950/1.
Only in May 1953 did Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber and State
Secretary Kreisky undertake direct contact with the West German
government in a visit to Bonn described as an exchange of opinion in
Austro-German relations. The setting up of an Austrian Embassy in
Bonn still required Allied (specifically Soviet) approval, again
underlining the unclarity of Austria's position as a sovereign power.
As a result the 'Trade Mission of the FRG' was set up in Vienna and an
Austrian Political Mission was set up in Bonn.
At this stage, the two most vexed questions were those of German
Property and the Citizenship question. The State Treaty of 1955
imposed a prohibition on the return of German property
(Rueckgabeverbot) (Article 22) which resulted in the withdrawal of the
Trade Mission from Vienna, and protests to the three Western Allies.
Austria now claimed reparations from Germany (State Treaty:Article 23,
para.3) pointing out that Austria had not claimed reparation for the
invasion of the country.
The Trade Mission was withdrawn on the day after the State Treaty
was signed. Adenauer's remarks on the enthusiasm of Austrians for
Hitler merely widened the rift. Only some months later did relations
improve, when German Foreign Minister Brentano visited Vienna. It was
agreed to set up a 'Gemischte Katmission' to look into the problem.
Two years later, on the occasion of Adenauer's visit to Vienna (17th
June 1957) a "Treaty to regulate Relations in the sphere of Property
Law" was signed which cleared up most of the outstanding
disagreements. The final solution to tne problem - the question of
damages for those Germans who had been tortured or suffered under the
Nazis, and compensation for those Germans who had been driven from
their homes and those who had moved into Austria (over 240,000) - was
only achieved in June 1961 with the "Treaty on Finance and
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Compensation" signed at Bad Kreuznach, by which legal ingenuity was
applied to reinterpret the strictness of the State Treaty to the
benefit of West German property owners while West Germany agreed to
"pay out a contribution in reparation for those who had been driven
from their homes".10 German anger was assuaged and the fear that
Germany could reclaim assets now central to Austrian economic
stability was past.
Througnout this initial post-State Treaty period, tne international
implications of the Treaty were directed at West Germany. The Soviet
decision to separate Austria from Germany and permit a State Treaty
was interpreted as an attempt to influence West Germany away from
Adenauer's chosen pro-NATO, pro-Western course,
"as if the Soviets were trying to demonstrate what a good bargain
Bonn could have had for the asking".11
On his 1957 visit to Vienna, Adenauer was asked whether neutrality
on the Austrian model would be acceptable for a reunified Germany.
His answer was unequivocal;
"I would see such a solution as unacceptable ... The population of
West Germany is now 50 million inhabitants. She has considerable
economic potential as you know. The possession of this potential by
Russia would contain the danger that the potential of Russia would be
equal to that of the US."12
The assumption in the 1980s that potentials are indeed equal and
that this equality alone allows neutrality for Austria sits
interestingly in this light. The refusal of the West to accept the
similarities between Austria and Germany was unanimous and vocal.12
Golo Mann put it at its most clear;
"This way would mean doing without all the great and well meant
successes of Adenauer's policies; instead of them, a neutral (much
poorer, restricted and more lonely) West Germany would have been the
basis of a 'later to be achieved' neutral 'Entire Germany'. Such a
Germany would be in danger for all time, even after it had been
achieved.nl4
After 1961, Austria was no longer used as a possible model for
Germany as it was seen as an unserious political suggestion, as were
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serious political attempts at reuniting Germany.
In 1962, President Lubke (FRG) visited Vienna and the official
joint communique declared that there were "no outstanding problems"
between the two countries. Nevertheless the economic relations
between the countries were to give rise to wider international
problems during the 1960s. As we have seen in our chapter on the EEC,
the Soviet Bloc used the intensity of Austro-German econoxmic
relationships to considerable effect in their propaganda in the 1960s.
Direct comment on this relationship, pictured as the invasion of
Austria by West German capital was begun by a joint communique of the
KPOe and the ruling East German SED in 1957;
"Both parties are well aware that the revitalised German militarism
is a serious threat to the neutrality and independence of Austria, and
further to the existence of the country ... Both parties declare that
the agreement reached between the Governments of West Germany and
Austria over the return of so-called one-time German Property to West
Germany only aids the monopoly-capitalists and militarists in West
Germany and hence injures the interests of the Austrian and German
peoples.
Certainly the statistical relationship tends to support the notion
that West German influence in Austria is potentially enormous. Trade
has dominated public discussion on Austro-German relations since the
1950s: 40% of all of Austria's imports and approximately 25% of her
exports come from trade witn West Germany.-'-® These proportions have
been largely impervious to changes in trade patterns with other
countries. Austria is also a relatively trade-dependent state.
Visible exports account for over 22% of GNP (cf. Belgium 53.6%, Sweden
28.7%, FRG 23.1%, UK 20.8%, France 17.1%, Japan 12.4%).17 In
addition, Austria's dependence on West Germany in particular can be
hignlignted by tabling the level of growth generated in Austria by a
1% growth in partner countries. The importance of the West German
economy for Austria is obvious.
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Simultaneous growth of 1% in the economies of Austria's seven next
most important partners would produce an effect equivalent to that of
a 1% growth in tne West German economy alone. Austria's freedom of
movement vis a vis West Germany is clearly open to question.
West Germany, then, is clearly not 'just another good neignbour'.
Culturally, historically and economically, her role is more important
in Austrian affairs than is widely conceded in official circles. The
fact that Austria nas remained outside the EEC and the encumbent
restrictions on residence and employment wnicn this distance has
entailed has ensured a difference in policy and approach which has
tended to reinforce Austria's profile as an independent state. This
belies the argument that neutrality is unaffected by an approach to
the EEC.
The Austrian economy is dependent on West Germany in three furtner
spheres; investment, tourism and currency. By 1969, over one quarter
of all direct foreign investment in Austria came from West Germany.
At that time 22% of the Austrian economy was owned by foreign
companies.-^ By 1985 this figure had risen to 30%, particularly in
the areas of insurance (73%) and internal trading (57%). Indeed only
the electricity supply industry and the banking sector remain almost
completely in domestic hands. The German share of direct investment
from abroad was 29.7% of the total by 1978, or over AS9.2 billion (cf.
Swiss-based MNC investment 17.3%, USA 12.6%, Switzerland 10.2%,
Benelux 8.7%, UK 6.6%)Tne total West German investment in tne
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Austrian economy is now thought to have been over AS20 billion since
1952, currently employing over 100,000.
German money is now central to the finance of major industrial
areas such as electronics (Siemens), vehicles (Steyr BMW), textiles
and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand Austria is only tenth
favourite destination for West German foreign investment.
"With the reduction of tariff restrictions up to 1978 and failures
in Eastern European trade, German interest in investment in her
southern neignbour reduced noticeably".^
It is of course hardly surprising that direct investment by a
neighbouring economy which is in itself the strongest influence in the
entire West European economy should take a major role. The problem
remains that Austria's political position vis a vis West Germany and
her independence of action is guaranteed more by historical
circumstances tnan by economic relationships or International Law. In
the event of UN economic sanctions on West Germany, Austria would be
seriously threatened.
Over five million German tourists are the major factor in
providing Austria with an invisible earnings surplus which goes some
way towards closing Austria's large trade deficit, wnile the Austrian
Schilling is tied to the value of the West German Mark, and hence to
the European Monetary System.
The intrusion of West German capital into the internal economy
would seem to suggest support for systems analysts who argue that the
international interests of capital are ultimately decisive. This
threat to the State is consistently and deliberately underplayed by
the political establishment. It can however be pointed out that,
while the capital interest is clearly wholly present, this does not
necessarily preclude a domestic 'national' element, especially in an
economy in which the state sector is unusually large, such as Austria
and in which the financial strings remain in domestic hands. Suffice
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to say that the Austrians have been happy to accept the influence of
the German Mark if not of the German government.
The economic interrelationship is a serious diplomatic problem.
All Austrian establishment figures are quick to deny any idea of 'Cold
Anschluss' and unwilling to name a degree of interdependence after
ch
which talk of independence becomes spurious. Kirschlaeger put it
A
thus;
"Certainly there is a limit [to the acceptable level of economic
integration with West Germany], which cannot however be described in
figures, but results from the entirety of tne political situation..
Close economic co-operation is not the same as dependence... With less
trade dependence between the wars we had a considerably higher rate of
dependence on the German Reich."^
"The Federal Republic is certainly Austria's most important trading
partner by a long stretch... This is determined by tradition, the
shared language and doubtless it has been helped even further by the
creation of the Common Market. I do not see any contradiction between
this and the Anschlussverbot in the State Treaty. I also do not think
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that it is a restriction of Neutrality."
"We must make sure in relations with all states, including Germany,
that through the intensity of our relationship our sovereignity is not
limited.. This has in no way been reached. We always try to come away
from our economic dependence on Germany... but we are in no way
dependent on Germany"'"
In border areas the intensity of the relationship is even greater.
Most of Austria's exports are sold in Bavaria, and those from the
Western Bundeslander also in Baden-Wurttenberg. Large parts of Tirol,
Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and Upper Austria are completely dependent on
markets, employment and investment in Southern Germany. The creation
of the ARGEAlp in which Bavaria, Tirol and Vorarlberg amongst others
take part has institutionalised this relationsnip at regional level.
Both Austria and the 'Land' Bavaria lobbied unsuccessfully for the
completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, of wnich they hoped to be
the major beneficiaries.
One problem in Austro-German relations was ended in 1975 with
the signing of a consular treaty with East Germany. West Germany
opposed the international recognition of a particular 'East' German
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citizenship. This had been a basic danand of the East Berlin regime
since 1954, but had been rejected by West Germany on the basis of the
Basic Law which sought reunification. In 1974/5 the West German
government made direct representations to the Austrian government
leading to protests from the East. Austria asked that Bonn should
"not interfere in Austrian domestic affairs". Following a visit by
Hans-Dietrich Genscner to Vienna in February, it was agreed that East
German citizens on Austrian soil would be free to choose between East
or West German embassies. By March, a treaty had been signed witn
Berlin. The novel arrangement has since been followed by the UK.
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Kirschlaeger sees tnis as a furtner example of Austria's independenceA
from West Germany.^
In general, relations with East Germany have been calm except for
attacks during the EEC debate and close relations between the SED and
KPOe. Recently, trade between tne two countries has increased,
especially in the sphere of heavy industry (as in, for example, the
construction of a vast new steel complex in Eisenhuttenstadt by the
VOEST-Alpine Concern)
On a sub-state level, political parties in Austria have strong
attachments to their counterparts in West Germany, a contact which is
not duplicated to the same extent in relations with other countries.
Personal links between Kreisky, Brandt and Schmidt were a considerable
factor in tne Socialist International. The SPOe makes much of its
greater domestic strength relative to the SPD. Developments within
both parties have been remarkably parallel. The SPOe reforms of 1957
preceded the West German reforms passed at Bad Godesberg by two years.
The SPD's accession to power in 1969 was followed by SPOe victory in
1970. When in 1983 the SPD suffered a major electoral defeat, the
SPOe too lost its overall majority. German politicians are regular
speakers at SPOe party and election meetings, both local and national.
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The OeVP, thougn for historical reasons anxious to avoid any direct
church affiliation through the label Christian Democratic, has close
parallels with the CDU/CSU. The Catholic Daft may tie said to be
stronger in the OeVP (especially in Vienna) than in the CDU. Austrian
secular liberalism is shared between the OeVP and the FPOe. Both CDU
and OeVP have been keen to develop international contacts. The OeVP,
somewhat alarmed at the prospect of being excluded from meetings of
EEC Christian Democratic parties, was instrumental in the creation of
the European Democratic Union and later tne International Democratic
Union. Indeed Alois Mock, the OeVP leader, is chairman of both.
International support came most strongly from tne CDU/CSU. These
links have given Mock higher international profile to counterbalance
the international presence of Kreisky and the domestic attention given
to it. Again, the link with West German politicians is central, and
leading figures such as Kohl, Strauss and Carstens make appearances at
major Austrian 'society' events like the Opera Ball.
The most openly pro-German party in the Austrian polity is,
however, the FPOe, a party with few, if any, parallels abroad. In
part the party understands itself as a continuation of the third
traditional group in Austrian politics, German Nationalism. The FPOe
stems from the so-called VdU (League of Independents), set up after
the re-enfranchisement of the 600,000 ex-members of the NSDAP. It was
encouraged by elements within the SPOe who saw its emergence as a
possible bourgeois competitor to the OeVP. These ex-national
socialists banded together with a group of economic Liberals such as
Kraus, Neuwirtn and Reimann.
"The unifying factor of all those interests represented in the VdU
was the removal of the NS-Laws."25
The party programme of 1949 explicitly supported a German
'Volkstum' and spoke out for the creation of a unified Europe on the
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basis of peoples' sovereignty, allowing German National supporters of
the party to resurrect in veiled form the dream of the 'Grossdeutschen
Reich'.25 initial successes of the VdU at elections could not
hide the basic division in direction between the 'liberal' wing and
the 'national' wing. The ambiguity of the FPOe's position towards
German nationalism, Nazism and anti-semitism has remained. The VdU
party programme of 1954 (Ausseer Programm) states as follows;
"The VdU follows a 'national' politics, ie. it stands for the
maintenance and strengthening of the German Volk in the Austrian area
and hence for its spiritual and material wellbeing. It thus sees the
Germanic task of Austria as follows ... (1) in the maintenance of the
sense of belonging of all Germans; (2) In the creation of a sincere
friendly co-operation with Germany ... (3) In the protection of the
threatened Germans of the Frontiers".2"''
This last point will be seen to be significant when we look at
Austria's relations with Yugoslavia and Italy. In 1956 the VdU broke
up under the stress and was replaced by the FPOe led by former Nazi
Minister Anton Reinthaller. The 1957 programme of the party re-
emphasised the FPOe view that Austria was a state but not a nation,
rather a part of the German nation.
On Reinthaller's death, Friedrich Peter, a former Waffen SS
Obersturmbahnfuhrer later accused of taking part in transportation and
murder of Jews, became leader. This fact strengthened the tendency in
the FPOe which saw the Nazi occupation of Austria in a positive light
(and defended participation in the Reich armies). 2S
"The Defamation of the resistance and praise for loyal 'fulfilment
of duty' freed those concerned from any acts of regret, the carrying
out of which was more the exception than the rule in Reconstruction
Austria."-^"
Officially, of course the FPOe has a total commitment to the
Austrian State. It nevertheless continues to manipulate the notion of
the 'German Cultural Community' to political effect. We will see this
in particular reference to Carinthia. Peter himself points out that
Energy dependence on the Soviet Union is of a hign level and that
emphasis of German dependence is unfounded.
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"Which Grossdeutsches Reich do you want? The eastern or the
O/Tf
western? The historical preconditions do not exist.
Despite attempts by the FPOe leadership to emphasise the 'Liberal'
aspects of the party the Reder affair was to re-expose aspects of this
latent German Nationalism. There were continued attempts to build
links with the FDP in West Germany, and FDP politicians have been
involved in the FPOe's more Liberal moments. Nevertheless the
parallels between the FDP and FPOe are remote. Under Scheel and
Genscher the FDP came to represent a strictly Liberal viewpoint.
During the 1970s it understood itself mainly as a left-liberal
grouping in the British tradition, althougn since 1980 tne 'economic
liberal' right has re-established itself. The FDP is certainly no
longer associated with Nazism in any particular sense.
Events in Carinthia (where 70% of local FPOe members are active in
the KHD, the mouthpiece of strident German nationalism) and the vote
against the 'International Convention for the removal of racial
discrimination' in the Nationalrat all consign the FPOe to the ranks
of the nationalist right. Indeed, membership of the youth wing of the
FPOe is restricted to youth witn German mother tongue.-^ Ungens
comment that the FPOe stands in the way of a truly liberal Party^ is
difficult to dispute.
The official representation of Austro-German relationships is
beyond doubt only a very partial one. It addresses direct
governmental contacts and inter-party relationships alone and fails to
grapple with the essential historical problem. As a result it gives a
misleading picture of the whole nature of the problem. It is
certainly true that there is NO institutional or popular movanent for
any Unity with Germany which could smack of the prewar situation.
This is reflected in the various opinion polls recorded by Kreissler
whicn seen to suggest a gradual increase in confidence. Nevertheless
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this may still contain an element of the 'taboo', and it remains true
that the very question would appear inappropriate elsewhere. This
leads in its own turn however to an inability to face up to the nature
of the legacy as it does exist. Any remnants of the past relationship
are merely denied or ignored in the hope that they simply disappear.
Having a popular and well known Jewish Chancellor certainly aided this
process. Nevertheless, in 1985 and 1986 two major 'crises' occurred
which have illustrated the latent instability which has now twice
plunged the political and national image into (terminal) crisis both
at home and abroad: the Reder-Frischenschlager Affair and the Waldheim
Case.
(a)Reder-Frischenscnlager Affair 1985.
The case involved an SS officer, Walter Reder, who had been
convicted of war crimes in Italy after World War II, most particularly
o
for the massacres in the central Italian village of Marzabott^ in June
1944, where civilians were killed by SS soldiers in an act of cold¬
blooded revenge, reported back by Reder as a success to his superiors.
A military court in Bologna sentenced him to life-long imprisonment
"for continual violent crime together with murder against private
Italian citizens" in 1951, and to a further 30 years for arson and
destruction. Although the supreme military court in Rome was of the
opinion that 'war criminals' had no right to be treated as prisoners
of war, Reder was held as a PoW at Gaeta near Naples. Austrian
attempts on his behalf began as early as one year after his
imprisonment when then Foreign Minister Karl Gruber intervened,
followed by other figures (including Vienna Cardinal Koenig).
"On tne advice of his lawyers Reder asked the relatives of the
victims of Marzabotta for forgiveness in writing. They voted among
themselves; only one 80-year-old woman was prepared to forgive him."^
In December 1984, one month before his release, only four out of
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260 voting members voted for his release.
His final release was agreed in a meeting between Chancellor
Sinowatz and Bettino Craxi on the latter's visit to Vienna in 1984.
The agreement was that Reder should be returned to Austria and taken
quietly and without public knowledge back into Austrian life. He was
to be met by an official of the Ministry of the Interior or Defence,
at an airport where reporting would be minimised.^ On 24th January,
the plane landed at Graz-Thalerhof military airfield, and Reder was
greeted not only by an official but by the Minister of Defence
himself, Friedelm Frischenschlager (FPOe).
The two travelled together by Bundesneer helicopter as a result of
which the Defence Minister was absent from a parliamentary Question
Time. Matters reached a head when Frischensch lager was asked
whether he considered Reder to be a prisoner of war or a war criminal,
to which he answered "He nas the status of a prisoner of war. He is
therefore a prisoner of war for me."
The resultant uproar led to an unprecedented internal political
crisis in which the SPOe/FPOe coalition only survived after Chancellor
Sinowatz made it a test of SPOe loyalty to him. Frischenschlager
refused to resign, and his decision was applauded by his own party
colleagues. The lasting domestic and international implications
of the crisis which developed did so because of the way in which
Austria and more particularly certain sections of Austrian society
reacted to the Affair.
The leading mass-circulation 'Kronen-Zeitung' published a jubilant
editorial entitled 'Finally Free' by Victor Reimann, suspected himself
of anti-Semitism. Frischenschlager was reported as having greeted
Reder, "Gruess Gott, Herr Reder, I'm very happy for you"-^, and the
same evening he happily told journalists that "in the fortieth year of
the Republic, the last war participant has finally returned to
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Austiriri "*5^JD As the crisis gathered momentum the overwhelming
criticism was broken by FPOe voices supporting the action; leading
among tnese was the young and ambitious leader of tne regionally
powerful Carinthian FPOe joerg Haider, who described the conduct of
the Defence Minister as "exemplary". Others, such as Gerulf Stix
declared that they would have acted similarly.
Opinion polls showed that despite OeVP pressure, crisis in the SPOe
and widespread establishment condemnation, only 26% were in favour of
Frischenschlager's resignation while 45% declared themselves against.
Only among the under-25s was there a majority in favour of his
removal.
Most poignantly, the meeting took place as the World Jewish
Congress was meeting in Vienna for the first time since the War, and
on the fortieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.
Chancellor Sinowatz, aware no doubt of the reputation Austrian anti-
semitism has historically earned, apologised to tne Congress and spoke
of a 'political error'. The writer Elie Wiesel replied;
"Only a political error, Herr Bundeskanzler? Is it not also an
ethical error, even an aesthetic error? There is a lack of
sensitivity here"1^
The president of the conference Bronfman spoke of his "horror at the
hero's welcome for a war criminal". Widespread foreign comment was
unanimous. The 'Times' wrote;
"There are some mistakes which cannot be made good by apologies ...
Herr Frischenschlager makes things even worse when he says that his
meeting with Reder was of a purely personal nature. This says much
about Frischensch lager's personality."4^
The 'Neue Zuercher Zeitung' called the coalition patch up "as
expected, an Austrian end"41, while 'Die Welt' spoke of the Ghost of
an evil past being let out of the bottle. In Italy, Liberal Party
President Bozzi called Frischensch lager's attitude "impossible ... we
couldn't believe our eyes and ears", wnile 'Le Monde' made perhaps the
most biting critique when it wrote "Anti-semitism and pangermanism are
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still present in all levels of Austrian consciousness.'^
The final twist to this tortured affair was still to come. All
observers of Austrian politics declared themselves surprised and
shocked that the central 'devil' in the affair should be
Frischenschlager, long thought of as the leading liberal progressive
in the FPOe, groomed to lead the party from the ghetto of German
national dreams. Helmut Zilk said
"I am amazed that it is Friedhelm Frischensch lager who acts in this
way, for until now I'd held him to be a reasonable young liberal, who
didn't think any differently about the crime of the War than I do."
Amongst the leading figures in the FPOe, Frischenschlager was
prepared to make the greatest efforts to repair the damage. Initially
this came in an admission of a political error. In a series of
interviews, he underlined his view that Nazism had been a particularly
nasty dictatorship and distanced himself from war crimes.
Frischensch lager was fighting his own past. As student leader of the
FPOe's 'RFS' he had demonstrated against those demanding the dismissal
of a professor on the grounds of extreme anti-semitism. He was also
associated with the Turnerbund, a 'germanic' sports organisation
associated with FPOe national circles. In 1984, the Turnerbund
journal published a map of the 'German Volk and Cultural Community',
showing 1939 borders of the Reich including those areas now without
German populations in Poland and Czechoslovakia.^
"In general Frischenschlager's biography offers enough clues for a
recognition that 'bringing home' the ex-Nazi Reder arises completely
out of his unconscious 'assumptions'. Reder belongs to this inner
world of Frischenschlager, all Reders belong to the 'extended family'
who 'merely' fulfilled their duty as war participants."^
In the Waldheim case we shall see that 'duty' is a normal and
legitimate excuse for fighting for Nazi forces during World War II.
There is a communication gap between an English-speaking understanding
of the justification of wartime activity and the views of a generation
of Austrians.
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In an interview with Israel's mass circulation 'Jedioth Aronotn',
Frischenschlager was quoted as apologising to the Israeli people in an
article headlined "I apologise and regret my meeting with the Nazi
criminal."45 The result of this was a complete turnaround. His
former supporters in the FPOe attacked him with venom. The leaders of
the FPOe in Tirol, Salzburg, Upper Austria and Styria joined Joerg
Haider in condemning his apology. Salzburg's Wiesner commented
"For me Reder is certainly the last returning citizen. Haider is
certainly right. Reder is in my eyes a soldier who carried out his
orders and was fairly much the only one who had to pay."45
Styria's Turek declared that
"Uninterrupted further apologies are not to my mind necessary.
Frischensch lager gave the Chancellor a declaration once, and it should
have ended there."
Even more strongly he described Reder:
"For me Reder is an upstanding person, because he suffered a tragic
fate, and instead of the army went to prison. He always acted with
the Waffen-SS as a correct soldier."45
The most outspoken critic was Carinthia's Joerg Haider who
attacked the Minister for 'totally unnecessary' apologies. Reder was
for him in no way a war criminal:
"I can't accept that leading representatives of the Republic of
Austria have intervened on behalf of a criminal."4?
Asked about the Nazis, Haider refused to give a figure for those
killed in concentration camps (eg."Which NS criminals and crimes occur
to you?" "I don't think about that". "Why?" "Because I have no
reason to consider the horrible events of that time.")
"It disturbed me that Frischenschlager turned around after a week
from something which he had originally correctly formulated. Suddenly
Frischenschlager called Reder a 'war criminal' to the surprise of us
all."4?
Haider's position was backed by neo-Nazi Norbert Burger and the
far-rightist Otto Scrinzi.
Haider may represent only a small section of the Austrian
electorate, but his local appeal in Carinthia is strong (see section
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on Yugoslavia). But the Reder-Frischenschlager affair was in truth a
national crisis. The latent truth of Austrian involvement at all
levels of the Reich was once again exposed - 'A country suddenly
overwhelmed by images of its past.'43 The unwillingness of a section
of the population to let go of the idea that SS-officers were 'only
soldiers', or express regret for the war, together with the fact that
this group's party was now in government left Austria internationally
exposed. Many showed themselves very unwilling to accept the
seriousness of the issue. The tendency was to hope that the affair
would merely pass, and the world would return to a view of Austria as
the 'Island of the Blessed', nopefully without damage to the tourist
trade. Unfortunately this reaction merely serves to ensure that
accusations of guilt now have a double validity. What might be 'the
past' now haunts 'the present'.
"The West Germans and now the Austrians have shown a strange
inability to understand the importance which the year 1945 has for the
surviving victims of Nazism. How else can one explain the case of the
Austrian Defence Minister ... It is certainly not enough to ascribe
the unbelievable stupidity of the Minister to a usual lack of
experience ... "49
The Austrians have never accepted any reponsibility for the war;
indeed, it was considered a great success of the treaty negotiations
that a 'guilt' clause was removed. The legal fact that the 'Republic
of Austria' did not declare war with Germany cannot and does not
obscure the fact that tne vast majority of Austrians complied witn
German demands accepting them as those of their own government. The
British government found it impossible to extend wartime conscription
to cover Northern Ireland. The Germans faced no such trouble in
Austria.
It can of course be pointed out that the victor powers compl led -tri, Ur-
indeed encouraged Austria's attempts to distance herself from Germany.
There is considerable hypocrisy in foreign outrage. Yet as long as
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Austria has not accepted the truth of the coalition with Nazism, there
will continue to be a discrepancy between the 'official version' and
exposures of a different reality. The continual refusal to confront
this reality merely ensures the longevity of the crisis and its
effects become all the more devastating. Instead of escaping 'pariah'
status, which seems to have been the chief object of this consistent
lying, the perpetual return of the past is confirmed. It appears that
Nazism in Austria cannot merely be confined to the history books.
In 1986, Austria's leading international diplomat was found lying
in order to hide the facts that might damage him, in the hope that he
would not find out. Waldheim is perhaps a paradigm for a whole
political culture.
(b) The Waldheim Case:
The affair around Kurt Waldheim arose during his candidacy for the
Austrian presidency in 1986, and centred around revelations that he
had been a ranking German officer during World War II. In his memoirs
'In the Eye of the Storm' he maintained that he had been discharged
from the Eastern Front in 1941, and spent the rest of the war at home
researching his doctoral thesis. In fact he had been in the Balkans
as an officer of the Wehrmacht. The question arose as to whether he
had known about the transportation of 50,000 Jews form Salonika in
1943.
Waldheim continued to maintain his own innocence, 'proving' that he
was on leave at the time. Yet the credibility of a claim that a
German officer of such high rank had not known about an action of this
scale was severely in doubt. The extreme crudity of Waldheim's
original lie cast doubt on the credibility of his candidacy. The
result was an outbreak of xenophobic anger unseen for some time in
Austria and a landslide victory.
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The most virulent attacks on Waldheim came from Yugoslavia and more
potently from the World Jewish Congress, based in the USA. Austria's
tradition of anti-semitism was again brought sharply into focus. Much
of what Kreisky's success as an Austrian Jew had achieved was heavily
undermined. The leading Austrian psychologist Erwin Ringel, long an
observer of the cultural characteristics of 'Austrians', and himself
chairman of the campaign for Waldheim's SPOe opponent expressed the
fear that the real issue of the campaign might become the voters'
attitude to the World Jewisn Congress.
The slogans used to promote Waldheim's cause were changed from 'The
Austrian whom the world trusts' to 'We Austrians will vote for whom we
want'. The appeal to crude jingoistic sentiment was made without
embarrassment. Elements of the establishment (for example in profil,
Salzburger Nachrichten) expressed the view that Waldheim was no longer
a suitable candidate, but this had little effect. Once again the
facade of a happy 'island of the blessed' dropped to expose a
frighteningly threatened culture, which did not have any intention of
accepting any lectures on historical morality. Waldheim himself
exposed his own anger in flashes in interviews with journalists.
Observers expressed worries that a defeat might lead to a
rekindling of virulent anti-Jewish sentiment in.portions of the
Austrian population. On the other hand, Austria's international
standing after Waldheim's victory was in doubt.
In many ways Waldheim's sad and pathetic wrigglings were a parallel
of a national reality. The crudity of the lie was striking, and yet
it appeared that he had almost convinced himself of its truth. The
Austrians too, had almost convinced themselves that the war in Austria
had taken place in Germany. The fact that Austria's loyalty to the
Fuehrer was never seriously in question has never been honestly
accepted. The legalist arguments on the legal status of Austria
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during the war seemed to have been transferred as accepted historical
fact. Thus Austria was 'a victim', part of the opposition to Hitler.
Appealing though such a view is, and not entirely without basis it
is unfortunately totally misleading. It is the story both Austrians
and the powers abroad wanted to tell, much as Waldheim's own
invention. Confronted with contrary evidence, Waldheim proclaimed
that to have told the truth would have been 'boring'! A propaganda
leaflet designed for schools in 1985 to explain post-war Austria
described the Anschluss as follows;
"Many politicians abroad, who were also guilty in the events,
accused Austria over her resistance-less capitulation after the war.
They forgot that they themselves needed 5 years to defeat Hitler's
Germany. They expected the impossible from Austria, to which they
gave no hope of help or support. One part of the Bundesheer was even
ready to fight, but didn't, so that no German blood would be split ...
In fact, nothing happened from abroad.
In the same document the entire emphasis is on the 'rigged'
referendum, the 'Allies' inconsistent policy on Austria' and on the
terrible difficulties of opposition.
This is not to say that opposition did not exist. The reality is,
however, that vastly more Austrians fought for Hitler than against,
which is not true of the Dutch, Danes, Czechs, Poles or any other
occupied nation. Unfortunately, the success of Austria's diplomats
(removal of war-guilt from the State Treaty), the determination of
Austria's proporz-parties to retain a unanimous front on the nature of
tne Anscnluss and the remarkable skill of lawyers to prove tnat black
is white have been allowed to obscure this truth. A case such as
Waldheim exposes the wounds not of one man but of an entire generation
and their children.
Only this explains the extremity of the feeling of threat in an
entire nation. Unfortunately the election of Waldheim merely confirms
the suspicion of critics that Nazism is not regretted in Austria.
Austria has never officially expressed regret for a war in which she
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was a 'victim'. A case such as Waldheim exposed the wounds long
present, in a concrete form.
Austro-West German intimacy is a victim of this same process.
Austrian dependence on West German economic success obviously
threatens her freedom of political action. Yet all the Austrian
politicians interviewed dismissed this as Soviet propaganda. None of
them were prepared to define a point at which concentration on a
single country might start to limit Austrian independence. With
reference to a fear that historical problems of a specific kind might
be used to disadvantage Austria this becomes comprehensible. Yet
denial of problems by politicians does not mean that they do not
exist.
Galtung and the structuralists^2 have shown how 'asymmetric'
economic relationships tend to lead to growing dependence in other
spheres. In the Austro-German case this has implications for their
bilateral relationship and more widely for the entire post-war
settlement, of which the neutrality of Austria is a central part. For
fear of international reaction the domination by West Germany in trade
relations and the cultural unity are underplayed, and the 'legal' fact
that neutrality law does not mention economic relations is held to
prove that no political or legal questions remain.
The degree to which Austria is sensitive to West German opinion was
underlined when 'Der Spiegel' named Austria a 'Scandal Republic".^
Austrian outrage was intense with counter blasts from politicians,
newspapers and 'profil' ('Spiegel' equivalent in Austria).^ On the
other side, the bitterness in the West German press during the
Waldheim and Reder affairs shows the depth of resentment in West
Germany that Austria had escaped blame for her participation in
Hitler's war effort. Austria's most loyal ally in all of this was tne
West German government whose own disinterest in Austria allowed the
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Austrian myth some appearance of validity. Certainly West German
interest has turned elsewhere. The notion of 'Cold Anschluss' while
not presently credible, is based on a factual association which
severely compromises Austria's ability to be 'neutral' in wartime vis
a vis Germany, and which Austria has been unwilling to seriously
tackle. It remains the real obstacle to international acceptance of
Austrian membership of the EEC.
Austria's inability to face her past and the unwillingness of the
outside powers to undermine this tendency leave considerable scope for
conspiracy theory. Only the 'moralistic' and 'vengeful' lobby in the
World Jewish Congress catalysed around the candidacy of Waldheim
refused to oe silent, thus opening the entire issue to the glare of
public attention once more. There does indeed seem to be a coalescing
of interests between the Austrian establishment anxious to escape the
burden of guilt associated with World War II and West Germany's
experience as 'pariah' and the interest of the outside power elites
anxious to encourage any story which emphasises Austria's independence
from Germany. The emergence of Haider as leader of the FPOe, may
indicate a time bomb which may yet explode in the face of the postwar
establishment both in Austria and abroad.
2. Austria and Italy
Austria's post-war relationship to Italy has been dominated by the
problem of South Tyrol or Alto-Adige, and the question of rights for
the German-speaking group in the region. The Austrians were active
after the war in seeking to regain South Tyrol. The Allies made plain
their opposition to any territorial changes in this region, despite
Austria's claim to be a victim of Axis aggression, and directed the
foreign ministers of both countries to talks in Paris. The resulting
Gruber-de Gasperi agreement, signed on 5th September 1946, was
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intended to remove the problem of South Tyrol from the international
agenda. In fact the issue remained unresolved much longer.
Italy has been Austria's second most important trading partner
since 1945, and relations between the two states have naturally
extended to a much wider range of issues. But the fact that Bettino
Craxi's visit to Vienna in 1985 was the first by an Italian Prime
Minister to Vienna since 1919 indicates the degree to which the
problems of the Adige valley permeated other areas of the bilateral
relationship.
On the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at the end of
WOrld War I, the 'remaining' German-speaking rump of the empire came
to a grudging recognition that the Slav peoples of the empire sought
sovereign states. The award of the southern part of Tyrol, including
Tyrol Castle, to the Italians was very unpopular in Austria especially
because of the existence of a sizeable German-speaking majority. The
Allies decided to maintain their wartime agreement with the Italians
whereby
"they had not only promised the South Tyrol to Italy but also the
Istria peninsula and a large slice of the Dalmatian coast ... It was
tnus that Italy entered the war."-^
The result was to extend Italy's frontier up to the Brenner Pass
which she saw as her 'natural' defence. Italian apologists for
Italy's position claimed that;
"Due to its geographic position, the Alto-Adige area has been
subjected over the centuries to constant Germanic pressure aimed at
acquiring possession of this Alpine region primarily for the military
...access to the south. Only in the 14th century was the House of
Habsburg able to penetrate the region that had always been part of tne
life and political events of the Italian peninsula."5^
Further;
"It nad long been a well-known fact, at least in Vienna and Paris,
that from a political standpoint, Italy identified her natural
frontier to be the Alpine Watershed at tne Brenner Pass."-^
Claiming the military need for defence and the integrity of the
entire valley of the Adige including Trento, the Italians out-lobbied
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the diplomatically weak Austrians.
Nevertheless, the overwhelmingly German-speaking population were a
threat to the stability of the agreement. As a result, after 1922
there was a deliberate and systematic policy of Italianisation,
directed mainly at the main population centres.
"By 1939 it was estimated that 95% of all government positions were
taken by Italians, although at this time the German-speakers made up
75% of the population".
The rise of Hitler in Germany worsened the situation for the
German-speakers. During the attempted Nazi coup in Austria (1934)
Mussolini underlined the seriousness he attached to his Brenner
frontier by moving troops to guard the border. Italianisation of
names and the use of the Italian language in all official transactions
was by now normal practice.
The creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1937 seemed to seal the
fate of South Tyrol. Hitler agreed that the Alto-Adige was a
permanent part of Italy, and all those who were unable to accept tnis
as satisfactory were advised to resettle in Germany including the
newly 'reintegrated* Austria. Due to the intervention of full-scale
war, these agreements were never fully implemented. An
estimated 86% of all German speakers seem likely to have opted for
resettlement rather than accept the Italianised Alto-Adige. One thing
is certain that the South Tyroleans were completely alienated by the
Italian State.
Following Axis defeat in 1945, the South Tyroleans and the
Austrians quickly began to lobby their case on the region. Following
a mass-petition amongst the South Tyroleans to the (North) Tyrol
Provincial Government in Innsbruck, and then Vienna, the Provisional
Government asked the Foreign Ministers of tne Great Powers meeting in
London to consider a referendum on nationality in South Tyrol (5th
September 1945) as part of the peace treaty to be signed with Italy.
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This activity was unusual in a period where the Austrian Government
preferred to adopt a low international profile. Meanwhile, under
Anglo-American pressure, Italy introduced German as a second language
and rejected all Austrian advances. The issue was a purely 'internal
affair'. The Austrians responded with a memorandum to all UN members
(April 1946) and the Foreign Ministers of Italy and Austria were
directed to talks in Paris though no border alterations were
envisaged.-^ The resulting agreement became an appendix to the Allied
Peace Treaty with Italy in February 1947.
Despite the maintenance of Italian sovereignty, the agreements
reached were a considerable advance for the South Tyrolers on the pre¬
war situation. The Axis agreements were null and void;
"the new agreement secured for the South Tyroleans the rignt to be
German once more, by envisaging German-speaking schools, equality of
the German and Italian languages in public offices and the tight to
're-Germanise' personal names which had been 'Italianised'."^
Austrian diplomacy, in 1946 very much a developing creature, put in
extreme effort for the German-speakers of the Alto-Adige. It was the
one issue which commanded Foreign Minister Gruber's attention beyond
direct negotiations with the four powers. The first result was the
Autonomy Statute passed by the Italian Parliament in 1948. This was
cleverly devised to protect the cultural and economic interests of
Italians in this area. South Tyrol (redefined as the province of
Bolzano) was united with the larger, majority-Italian, province of
Trento in the lower part of the valley of tne Adige to form the
autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige with a built-in Italian
majority. This was despite the large number of re-enfranchised South
Tyroleans who had opted to leave the area under the Axis Pacts. The
Italians argued, much to Tyrolean and Austrian annoyance, that the
valley was in fact one indivisible unit.
Few significant powers were transferred to the Provincial level.
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In addition, the new Italy developed not as a federal but as a
powerfully centralised state which left even less power in the hands
of German speakers. The result was considerable and growing
dissatisfaction among the German-speakers and their 'ladinish'
speaking allies. Gradual Italianisation of the urban areas continued
while the countryside and small settlements remained German. The
cleft was becoming socially ingrained.
"By 1961, their <German> numbers had dropped again to 232,171 (62%)
while Italian-speakers had increased to 128,271 (34%): in that ye^r
79% (109,000) of the Italian speakers were living in the princip?®
centres of Bolzano and Merano where only 23% (61,340) of the German-
speakers lived; by 1971, 77% of the inhabitants of Bolzano were
Italian-speaking and 55% of Merano's."^1
By the mid-1950s it was clear that the 1946 agreement had failed to
meet the demands and expectations of the South Tyroleans. On 8th
October 1956, the Austrian government lodged a complaint that the
Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement was not being implemented satisfactorily.
In 1957, the militants met under the new slogan 'Los von Trient' (Away
from Trento), entailing a demand to raise the Province of Bolzano to
the level of a separate region. They made concrete proposals for a
new Autonomy Statute which were presented to the Italian government by
members of South Tyrol's German-speaking representatives the SVP
(Sudtiroler Volkspartei) in 1958.
Despite this pressure, tne Italian government continued to regard
the issue as purely domestic and refused to enter into discussions
with Austria on the issue. The new Austrian Foreign Minister, Bruno
Kreisky, as a member of the SPOe, was expected to take a more moderate
approacn.
"Supposedly Kreisky saw the problem more as an economic and social
issue. In addition, in Austria the socialists had occasionally been
suspected of supporting a final acceptance of the loss of South
Tyrol."62
The opposite appears to nave been true. Kreisky was under pressure
to show this to be a false assumption, and his Ministry was staffed by
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personnel strongly loyal to the cause of South Tyrol.
"In effect the socialist Foreign Minister could be relied upon to
adhere to a policy worthy of the right wing of the People's Party."63
Kreisky's most dramatic decision was to bring the whole issue
before the General Assembly of the UN. The 1960 General Assembly
passed a resolution calling on both countries to resume negotiations
(a victory for Austria) on differences arising out of the South Tyrol
problem. In case of a failure to reach agreement the issue should be
brought to the International court of Justice in the Hague.
Opinions vary on the success of the UN venture. Max Beer, the
German observer, felt that other small states had been sympatnetic to
Austria but NATO states had been displeased. The Vienna-published 'Die
Presse' pointed out that Canada, Portugal and Turkey as NATO countries
had supported Austria6^, but the general attitude of the West was not
one of enthusiasm. The American writer Schlesinger felt that
Austria's prestige had actually been damaged. in January 1961,
events took a dramatic new turn;
"Matters exploded ... in January 1961, as the infamous 'Aluminium
Duce' exploded into the air; the statue in Waidbruck which had always
been perceived by the South Tyroleans as a modern version of Gessler's
Hat."66
This was merely the most dramatic step in a campaign of terror
which was to become part of political life in the 1960s. On 'Herz
Jesu Nacnt' (lltn/12th June 1960) there were no fewer than 47
explosions in the province killing several people and causing
considerable damage. International support cooled, as those
associated with the bombing appeared to be allied to far-right groups.
The FPOe in 1957 had declared;
"To fight for a Volk-community containing all Germans with the
resultant rights and duties, means to continue to fight in Austria's
struggle against the attempt to undermine the spiritual base of the
rights of South Tyrolean Germans."6^
As Schlesinger points out;
"it was not mere Tyrolean militancy but the notion that pan-
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Germanism seemed to be raising its head, which concerned even some of
the more moderate and understanding circles in Italy and elsewhere."^
Slogans sucn as 'Freedom for African Hottentots, subjugation for
Tyroleans' used by some sections alienated Afro-Asian support at the
UN and underlined the racist overtones discernible in the more
militant Tyrolean propaganda. The bombing also had little support
from non-Tyrolean Austria.
Meanwhile negotiations between Austria and Italy continued very
slowly. In 1962, the SVP declared itself willing to give up its
demands for a separate region if provincial powers were strengthened
decisively. This did not help the strained relations between Rome and
Vienna. The Italian government introduced visa requirements for
Austrian tourists. The Chamber of Deputies in Rome also looked into
statutory action which would strip South Tyroleans who had opted for
Germany in 1939 but returned in 1948 of their Italian citizenship.
The issue received wide publicity and was a considerable embarassment
to Adenauer in West Germany.
In 1964, Kreisky proposed an international guarantee for Soutn
Tyrol; this was clearly unacceptable to the Italians who had argued
all along that all the obligations contained in the Gruber-de Gasperi
agreement had been fulfilled and the suggestion was duly dismissed.
Nevertheless the existence of any governmental exchanges on the issue
seemed positive.
However, the Italians were determined to punish Austria over South
Tyrol in other areas. There was a definite 'frisson' in Italian
support for Austrian agreement with the EEC. In May 1964, an Italian
government memorandum maintained that association with the EEC was
only possible as a prelude to membership. This was widely interpreted
as an anti-Austrian salvo, although (as we have seen in the chapter on
the EEC) this was denied in Rome. In 1967, the Italian veto of
Austrian attempts to achieve a treaty with the EEC was a response to
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Austria's attitude to South Tyrol.
Italy took considerable exception to events in Austria in 1967. In
June a Linz court acquitted a group of self-confessed terrorists
headed by the extreme right-winger Norbert Burger. This was widely
interpreted as support for their activities. Later in the month,
Austrian television presented a programme which to Italian minds
justified terrorism. The death of four Italian soldiers in a
terrorist attack further alienated Italian opinion. The Italian view
was now that Austria was not prepared to take adequate measures
against terrorism. Speaking in the Italian Parliament, Prime Minister
Aldo Moro announced;
"Italy's agreement to Austria's possible association with the
Common Market is dependent on the demonstrable capacity of the
Austrian Government to combat terrorism with appropriate preventative
and punitive measures".
He demanded concrete action from Austria against terrorism.
Austrian dismay at the Italian veto was tempered somewhat by a
general pessimism about Austria's negotiations with the EEC which had
previously centred on the French attitude. There was nevertheless
considerable resentment that the issue was seen to have international
repercussions for Austria. Austria dismissed Italy's action as
spiteful and unrelated, but this fails to understand the depth of
resentment in Italy over the bombing campaigns. Parallels with the
importance of Northern Ireland or Gibraltar to the entirety of the
UK's relations with Ireland and Spain respectively are not
inappropriate.
The accession of Kurt Waldheim to the Foreign Ministry in Vienna in
1968 and a new Italian government signalled a new determination to
reach agreement. A new agreement was signed between the governments
in Copenhagen while a series of meetings in Paris and New York paved
the way to a new package of measures. At Geneva in early 1969 it was
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agreed to propose a timetable of measures for tbe region. Following
final negotiations with the SVP a new 'package' was agreed. Both
sides accepted elements of compromise from their initial demands. The
Italian government agreed to a series of additions to the 1948
legislation, greatly strengthening the position of the Germano-
speakers. Austria for her part abandoned her insistence on stronger
international guarantees for the region. Waldheim explains his
success in 1969 as follows;
"There was one reason why the Agreement did not materialise under
Kreisky, because Kreisky requested a special International Court
Arbitration for differences arising out of such an agreement. The
Italians rejected this... Things developed further so that when I
became Foreign Minister... we felt that if the Italian side accepted
the operational character they would have made concessions. If you
ask me why it worked, well I hope this is the best solution we could
have ever achieved. I do not believe we could have got more out of
the Italians. Certainly it was clear that it was impossible to get
South Tyrol back, which would have been the best and most logical
solution. We tried this at first under Foreign Minister Gruber after
the Second World War... but it just didn't work... Kreisky had already
recognised this and did a lot in preparing the ground for a later
settlement. The treaty signed in Copenhagen... to get away from
terrorists wno were very strongon both sides [??]... annoyed both
Austrian and Italian radicals."'1
At a tense meeting of delegates, a narrow majority (52.8%-46.6%) of
the SVP agreed to support the leadership under Magnago and accept the
package. Although the region of Trentino/Alto-Adige was to remain
intact, the Province of Bolzano gained several new powers. Attached
to the package was a calendar of operations whereby all the provisions
of the new agreement would be implemented within four years.
The deal involved new rules on the teaching of German at all levels
of education, the free use of German in public administration and the
development of the German (and Ladinisn) cultures.72 Under the
agreement, chief responsibility for mining, fishing, farming,
services, transport, and local culture was transferred to the
province. Agreements to bring television in German to South Tyrol
were to be made with RAI (the Italian state television service). The
building of schools and kindergartens became the primary
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responsibility of the province, while every child was taught Italian
or German as a second language from primary level. The eventual
construction of a university was also promised. The ability to speak
both languages in all public offices and courts was guaranteed as well
as bilingual road signs and signs on public buildings throughout the
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province.
The two Foreign Ministers cleared up the remaining obstacles at a
meeting in Copenhagen on 30th November 1969. On Decanber 15th
Chancellor Klaus guaranteed that the Austrian government would not
raise the South Tyrol question at an international forum for the
period of lmplanentation. Despite SVP acceptance, or perhaps because
of it, the SPOe opposed the agreement in the Nationalrat. After the
SPOe's accession to power in 1970, the policy of reconciliation with
Italy was nevertheless maintained;
"if for no other reason, this was necessary for Austria's fresn
approach to the Common Market."^
In November 1971 President Jonas paid a state visit to Rome, the
first since 1875. Significantly, the event's success was marked by a
declaration by Italy's foreign minister of support for Austria in ner
negotiations with the EEC, which was duly given.
Since 1970, the South Tyrol question has not intruded into Austro-
Italian relations with the same intensity. Yet certain features
suggest that there remains an unsolved element in South Tyrol and that
the issue may yet be fertile ground on which the seeds of discontent
can grow.
The principle of 'proporz' between the ethnic groups in South Tyrol
applied to 29,000 jobs, or 20% of the total employment in the province
of Bolzano.^ Previous to the agreement most of these jobs (eg.
teaching, administration) had been held by Italian-speakers.
According to the timetable 'proporz' snould be achieved in employment
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by the year 2002. Yet the existing proportions were vastly
imbalanced.
"It never occurred to anyone to ask what would happen if the South
Tyrolese ... failed to take advantage of their success. But this is
what happened."76
As Alcock points out, years of discrimination had led to a complete
absence of public service tradition among German-speakers. The result
was a crisis in the railways and postal services. Large-scale
vacancies in South Tyrol were set against a background of rising
unemployment in the rest of Italy, but the proporz regulations
prevented the jobs being filled by Italians.
The confusion surrounding language identity was further complicated
by a compulsory declaration of language group. Failure to make such a
declaration would now lead to loss of rights. Yet increasing inter¬
marriage meant major problems regarding registration. When a New
Left party opposed the rule and refused to declare themselves as
either German or Italian (declaring themselves to be both) they were
disqualified, in effect the package had institutionalised the
separate identity of the communities.
The South Tyrol economy expanded considerably. The rise in value
of the D-Mark and Austrian schilling against the lira made South Tyrol
an increasingly popular tourist destination (overnight stays doubled
between 1971 and 1980).77 Bolzano became Italy's most expensive city.
The tourist industry created joos, creating more labour shortages in
the proporz-affected areas.
"The one thing completely unacceptable for the South Tyroleans was
that any labour shortages should be made up by Italians from
elsewhere, who mignt stay."^
The result was a restrictive deflation policy set against low
growth and unemployment in the rest of Italy. The hardest-hit section
were the Italian speakers. Tourism developed largely in the German-
speaking areas, and Italians stood to lose most through the proporz
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legislation. The EEC's agricultural boom also benefitted German
speakers. Evidence from demographic trends now suggests that the
overall Italian-speaking proportion of Soutn Tyrol's population was on
the decrease. During the European elections of 1979 the 'Europa-Union
Tirol' with strong backing from Otto Habsburg and pro-Western elements
in Tyrol (eg Esterbauer) put forward a platform similar to that
advocated by sections of the FPOe which saw a united Western Europe as
the most effective means of ensuring the Unity of Tyrol and of the
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'Peoples' of Europe, most specifically, the German 'Volk'.
The local elections in the Province of Bolzano in March 1985
confirmed the increasingly embittered stance of Italian speakers. The
neo-fascist MSI received over 20% of the vote. The celebrations to
mark the 175tn year of a Tyrolean mountain rebellion against Napoleon
in September 1984 was used by Tyrolean chauvinists as an excuse to
reinvigorate claims for unityFollowing a controversy when the
Italian Foreign Minister warned that pan-germanism would never be
allowed, he claimed that his cortments were directed against events in
O]
South Tyrol. Austria reacted calmly to this, seeing it more as an
excuse than a real claim, but the 1985 local elections showed that
anti-German feeling in South Tyrol remains.
Austrian politicians continued to raise the issue in the UN. In
1981, Pahr outlined Austrian frustration with the Italians;
"In our relations with Italy., the problem of South Tyrol is of
particular importance. .. Last year I informed the Assembly of the
impatience of the South Tyrolean people and the increased concern of
the Austrian Government about this delay. I regret that .. the
situation has not improved since and that no substantial progress has
been achieved."82
He laid particular emphasis on the guarantees affecting the use of
German in court and administrative sectors. In 1984, Minister Gratz
reported;
"Because of the General Assembly resolution in 1960 and 1961, there
was a new agreement in 1969 over the restructuring of South Tyrolean
autonomy. Fifteen years later, there are still several conditions
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unresolved... This situation has strengthened worries among the people
of South Tyrol "88
In general, however, Vienna seems anxious to work past the problems
of Tyrol. In 1972 the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpenlander (ARGE Alp) was
established with the membership of local and regional government units
in Austria (Tyrol, Vorarlberg), Germany (Bavaria), Switzerland
(Graubunden) and Italy (Trentino, South Tyrol, Lombardy). All
conxnentators agree that its establishment has contributed considerably
04
to smoothing Austro-Italian relations. Italy and Austria also
joined with Yugoslavia in the settling up of ARGE Adria in 1975,
linking for the first time with a non-capitalist economy. These are
both based on notions of areas of 'natural' co-operation. Austria has
developed a remarkable capacity to seek practical agreements in the
face of underlying dispute. This can only succeed in the long run if
the issue is not merely ignored and considered 'solved'. There have
been clashes at local level, despite goodwill.
"There was a sharp clash between Edouard Wallnofer, the Provincial
Governor of Tyrol, and Dr Pahr, the Austrian Foreign Minister, in the
summer of 1976. The federal authorites objected that ... ARGE Alp
acted unconstitutionally in presenting a transfrontier development
plan directly to national governments; this was alleged to be an
intrusion into the sphere of foreign policy constitutionally reserved
to the Federation".
Other politicians still maintain South Tyrol as an example of a
breach of Human Rights (eg Ermacora). Steiner for his part sees it as
an agreement for the higher good;
"In nationalist tnought of the nineteenth and early twentietn
centuries, these areas are irreconcilable... The Provincial Governor
of Tyrol spoke of 'tne Unjust border at Brenner' in tne Andreas Hofer
Anniversary[1985]. Only, one can say that one feels something as
unjust- one cannot say it is just - but one accepts it in order to
serve a higher end - namely peace8®
At national level however a functional approach has predominated
(despite the Reder affair). The building of the Europa bridge in
Austria completed the motorway link between Milan and Munich, making
it one of the busiest stretches of motorway in Europe. The
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restrictions imposed by the Swiss for heavy traffic have make it
effectively the only motorway road link joining these two points of
the EEC. Austria's position as a transit country has led to serious
tension with the EEC, and growing pressure from campaigners concerned
about the environment, led Austria to suggest that much of this
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traffic should be transferred to the railways.
In February 1984, Craxi made his historic visit to Vienna, during
which South Tyrol was not discussed. In September of the following
year Chancellor Sinowatz returned the visit. This visit was widely
acclaimed in Austria and Italy as highly profitable, despite continued
difficulties over South Tyrol. Bolzano (German) radio said
"There may have been seven agreements signed, border difficulties
eased, transport improvements discussed, improved use of the harbour
at Trieste and many other no doubt useful things brought to the table:
South Tyrol remains the core of Austro-Italian relations, even if tnis
OO
does not suit some Italian newspapers."00
Yet in Austria a change in attitude was visible. Despite continued
awareness of South Tyrol, the core was already at work to distance
itself from the frontier group. Thus the Oberoesterreichische
Nachrichten in Linz wrote that
"Italian-Austrian relations are too important to be seen merely out
of South Tyrol eyes. The EEC now comes more and more into the picture
- for Vienna, Brussels is important."®^
Austrian-Italian trade now amounts to over £2.5bn^, with Italy in
considerable surplus (1983). Both countries have a clear interest in
playing down differences over South Tyrol, pangermanism and 'Reder'.
Nevertheless, the internal power of (North) Tyrol in Austria ensures
that Vienna and Rome will not be able to avoid the South Tyrol issue
without the complicity of the Tyroleans; this was temporarily aided
by the package agreement and institutions such as ARGE Alp. The
suspicions that the issue is not entirely solved remain, but South




As in the case of Italy, when Austria achieves a working
relationship with Yugoslavia it is in spite of a local dispute. The
long-standing barrier to harmony is the position of the Slavic
minority in Austria and in particular of the Slovene ethnic group in
Carinthia.
Following the break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the newly
formed State of Yugoslavia invaded territory north of the Karawanken
Alps and occupied southern Carinthia. Despite very bitter resistence,
the Yugoslavs reached the regional capital, Klagenfurt. Austria
protested to the Peace conference in Paris and in June 1919, the
negotiators agreed to a referendum in the controversial areas. The
referendum resulted in a 59.04% majority voting to remain in Austria
in the so-called Zone A, where the 1910 census had reported thst
Slovenes made up 68% of the population. In the areas of highest
concentration of Slovenes however, to the south of the River Drau,
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tnere was a very slight majority in favour of unity with Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless;
"A regional analysis shows that many Slovenes... had voted for tne
retention of their homeland by Carinthia.
It appears that many hoped for a generous Austrian minorities
policy and this had indeed been promised. Much of the clergy had been
active in their support of the Austrian cause and much of the credit
for the result goes to their influence. The result was the creation
of a small Slovene-speaking minority in Austria and an even smaller
German-speaking minority in Slovenia. The community of Slovenes in
Carinthia identified themselves as clearly separate, but they were
themselves relatively isolated from the Slovene heartland and had
always had considerable contact with the German-speaking community
around them. They spoke a unique dialect of Slovene influenced by
German.
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During the First Republic, although Carinthia remained one of the
poorest parts of a struggling country, the Slovenes enjoyed the
protection of the Catholic Church. They seem to have suffered no more
than their German-speaking neighbours, although as recent Yugoslav
propaganda points out, the Vienna Government took not a single measure
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for their protection.
The rampant anti-Slav propaganda of the Nazis took a deep root in
Carinthia however. When the Germans declared War on Yugoslavia in
1941, the Carinthian Slovenes were extremely vulnerable;
"the last foreign-policy considerations about the Carinthian
question disappeared."^
The Germans began a policy of driving Slovene families from the land
(about 300 in total) and many were incarcerated in Nazi camps. This
led to the organisation of the only resistance movement of any size on
the actual territory of the Reich itself. Many Carinthian Slovenes
joined up with Tito's Partisans on the other side of the Karawanken.
The bitterness of the war in Yugoslavia was virtually unparalleled.
Indeed, tne Slovenes suffered proportionally more than any other group
except the Jews.
"The memory of World War II horror likewise explains tne still
partially effective tone of Yugoslavia's reaction to Carinthian German
Nationalism(... something which many Austrians still cannot
comprehend.)95
After the defeat of the Nazis, units of partisans from Yugoslavia;
"fought side by side with Qarinthian partisans to free Carinthian
areas inhabited by Slovenes."
as Yugoslav propaganda puts it, or alternatively;
"The end of World War II witnessed encroacnments onto German-
speaking population and still more far-reaching claims to Carinthian
territory"^'
as Austrian versions maintain. The British occupation troops insisted
on the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces to the pre-1938 boundaries.
Certainly it was widely felt that Yugoslavian territorial claims were
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exaggerated, although not unexpected.
These collective experiences in the period 1919-1945 are held to be
the cause of the very deeply felt fears or 'Urangst' of both groups in
southern Carinthia, which contribute to the intractibility of the
problem for outsiders and insiders alike;
"It is hard to deny that a kind of collective psychosis exists."98
Both communities now see the prospect of extinction at the hands of
a perceived aggressive enemy as real.
Initial Yugoslav territorial claims were modified as it became
clear that no outside power would support their cause. Nevertheless,
when the State Treaty was signed in 1955, Article 7 specifically dealt
with the rights of minorities in Austria, giving the Slovene and Croat
groups
"the right to their own organisations and meetings, press in tneir
own language" as well as "elementary instruction in the Slovene or
Croat language and to a proportional number of their own secondary
schools."99
The Slovene and Croat languages were to be given official status
where there were;
"Slovene, Croat or mixed populations... In such districts
topographical terminology and inscriptions shall be in the Slovene or
Croat language as well as German."9^"
A further condition is also added outlawing anti-Slovene
organisations. The Treaty provided for a comprenensive protection for
the Austrian minorities, guaranteed by Yugoslavia as a signatory.
It should be pointed out that the proportion of the total
Carinthian population calling itself 'Slovene' had alredy fallen to
22,367 or 4.7% by 1955. Obviously this too gives a distorted picture
in that the concentration of Slovenes into one part of southern
Carinthia is here statistically submerged. Nevertheless it is
significant that the Austrians were prepared to concede comprehensive
rights to groups much less statistically numerous than their
opponents. By the 1970s they had fallen back on statistical arguments
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to justify their failure to implement the full force of the State
Treaty, even though the proportion of Slovenes in'Carinthia still
stood at 3.4%. It is easy to conclude that there was a degree of
political opportunism.
The opportunity to enact the spirit of the treaty into concrete
form in 1955 was not taken up. In 1945, compulsory bilingual
instruction had been introduced in Carinthia. The Nationalrat
introduced a new School Act in 1959. By this Act, parents could
withdraw their children from instruction in Slovene and leading local
figures (eg Provincial Governor Wedenig) urged the 'speediest
possible reaction'"*"1^ to the demands of German-speaking parents. As a
'counter-measure' a full-scale Gymnasium for Slovene speakers was
established in Klagenfurt, an institution which was to become a major
centre for the development of a Slovene intelligentsia. The Act was a
response to a well organised campaign by the strongly Germanic
'Kaerntner Heimat Dienst' (KHD) who with the eventual backing of
Wedenig organised a successful petition. Following an emotive debate
in which loyalty and disloyalty to the 'tribe' were seen to be in
question, over 80% of parents petitioned to have their children
released from bilingual education. The School Act in parliament was
an attempt from Federal level to mediate in this conflict. The result
was that the Slovene language was no longer a compulsory subject in
Carinthian schools.
"Slovene was not even put on the same level as English.
As Haas and Stuhlpfarrer observe it showed how low the political
priority of community relations came on the Carinthian Agenda.^''"
Non-Carinthian Austrians in general failed to grasp either the
detail or the emotion of the Carinthian problem. Former Foreign
Minister Erich Bielka regretted the fact that the measures agreed in
the State Treaty were not enacted
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"with the backing wind of the overwhelming enthusiasm of the entire
Austrian nation over the return of national freedom"102
Yet the nature of the dispute and its intensity suggested that this
would indeed be a major problem were it not for the relative numerical
insignificance of the minority. The intensity of the dispute at local
level and the indifference at the wider level suggest a frontier
dispute in which the frontier protagonists have been cut adrift from
the 'parent' communities with only sporadic interest in the issue at
national level when Yugoslavia threatens to draw wider implications
from the dispute.
In general, the 1960s were a quiet period in Carinthia. Austria
was anxious not to stir up problems with Yugoslavia at the same time
as negotiating with Italy over the problems of tne South Tiro leans.
Nevertheless, a joint Yugoslav-Austrian Commission was set up to look
into the possibility if developing relations into other spheres.
Yugoslavia had strongly opposed the School Act of 1959 and the Legal
Language Act of the same year. She objected that the creation of one
Gymnasium in Klagenfurt did not represent the fulfilment of the
conditions of the State Treaty. The Court Language Act had limited
the use of Slovene to three small administrative areas (Bezirk) where
the Slovene population was more concentrated. Both the Acts were
interpreted as anti-Slovene and anti-State Treaty in character.
Despite this and the failure of a mixed Austrian Federal
Government/Slovene set up to deal with the problems faced by the
minority, relations between Vienna and Belgrade at bilateral level
improved. In 1960, Kreisky visited Belgrade followed by a return
visit by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. The talks concentrated on
wider bilateral issues - economics, border traffic, establishment of
consular offices etc. A statement was issued expressing a desire to
work around the Carinthian question, in the hope that;
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"contacts between representatives of the minority and Austrian
officials would make it possible to find a solution acceptable to all
sides."103
In 1965, the Provincial Governors of Carinthia and Styria
accompanied Chancellor Klaus and Kreisky on a visit to Belgrade which
was mutually acknowledged as constructive, resulting in the abolition
of visa requirements on travel between Austria and Yugoslavia (the
first such agreement with a Communist country). Tito made his first
official visit to Austria in 1967;
"both sides expressed satisfaction over the further progress being
made in regard to the realisation of the rights of the Slovene and
Croat minorities in Austria, who, as the last few years prove, now
play a binding role between the two neighbours to an ever greater
degree. "■'■
As with South Tyrol in the 1970s, the issue had seemed to become
one of the past. The Austrian habit of sweeping issues under the
carpet seemed to nave worked in this case . No further measures were
taken in Carinthia, and the exigencies of the State Treaty were
quietly forgotten. No large-scale protests were organised by eitner
the Slovenes or the German Nationalists. Yugoslavia concentrated on
building wider contacts with the Austrian Federal Government. A
symbol of this was the new border bridge opened by the leaders of both
countries in 1969. The Governments acted in concert in a combined
approach to the UN's European economic Commission to underline the
importance both sides attached to the Oder-Danube and Rhine-Main-
Danube Canal projects.
Despite this, conditions in Carinthia remained unresolved. The
five State visits betwen 1960 and 1968 did little other than register
the existence of a problem. Chancellor Klaus was himself a Carinthian
of reasonably pro-Slovene sentiment and the Provincial Governor Sima
(SPOe) followed the generally conciliatory course of his predecessor
Wedenig. Writing in 1971 the conservative Catholic, Theodor Veiter,
internationally renowned specialist in minority affairs wrote however
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that Austria had failed to implement the majority of the clauses of
Article 7 of the State Treaty.105 veiter- himsel£ a with a
self-proclaimed allegiance to a romantic notion of a German 'Volk'
emerged as one of the champions of the Slovene cause in Austria. He
himself had written that the Slovenes were better off under the
Habsburg empire.
Troubles in Carinthia took root once more in late 1969 and early
1970 as preparations got underway for celebrations of the 50th
anniversary of the referendum. Yet no Slovenes took part in these
preparations;
"Reputedly, the governor was unable to arrange for a Slovene
contribution because the German-nationalists threatened to boycott the
observances. How great the chances of Slovenes being able to sit on
the same tribunal were... is of course difficult to say. Be that as
it may, not a single one of the high Viennese dignatories could steel
himself to express regret at the absence of Slovene
representatives."
At the same time, the KHD published a special edition of their
vitriolic propaganda vehicle 'Ruf der Heimat' (Call of the Homeland)
announcing in effect a new offensive that would last "until one of the
two peoples no longer exists."-^
In response, a few young Slovene militants erected makeshift
bilingual signs. Sima and Kreisky decided that action on signs must
now be taken, it seats to have been seen as a final attatpt to pacify
Slovenes without disturbing the fragile calm. The bill for
presentation to the Nationalrat was put together by SPOe functionaries
without reference to the opposition. A new Department of Slovene
Affairs was set up by the Carinthian Government.
In July 1972 the Nationalrat passed the Act which triggered the
outbreak of violence; the 'Ortstafelgesetz (Place Name Description
Act) (BGBl 270/1972) with the votes of the SPOe against those of the
combined opposition. As a result 205 place names (out of a total of
2875 in the Province of Carinthia ie 8.5%) were to be bilingual. They
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were spread throughout 36 parishes (Gemeinde) where the 1961 census
had shown a population of at least 20% Slovene speakers. The signs
were not truly 'topographical' in that they referred only to districts
and did not extend to all areas where some Slovene was spoken.
The resulting outbreak of German-nationalist resentment heralded
one of the most regrettable stories in postwar Austrian
politics. The Government began mounting the new signs at a rather
unfortunate moment; two weeks before the anniversary of the 1920
referendum. In the middle of the night, when a mere 36 signs had been
erected, bands of extreme German nationalists pulled them down. The
leading far-right apologist in the FPOe, Otto Scrinzi, described the
action as;
"proof of the correctness of the FPOes objections to the Act.""^
On the 10th October, Governor Sima was showered with rotten
vegetables by a crowd"^, while on a later visit, Chancellor Kreisky
was subjected to insults from an angry crowd ('Jewish Swine' etc.).
In an immediate reaction, Kreisky rejected any talk of a 'head count'
to determine minorities, pointing out that the only demands for such a
measure came from those on the far right. Yugoslavia immediately
registered her own 'serious concern' at events to Vienna.
Many observers felt that the lenient attitude of the police and
courts to the activities of the German Nationalists amounted to
cowardice and lack of resolve on the part of the Austrian State
however.
"For all police measures, the Austrian authorities did not prevent
pogroms against bilingual inscriptions. There were even cases of
similar actions being led by responsible officials, and on published
photographs there was also a policeman applauding chauvinist vandals
pulling down an inscription.
The most significant result in Carintnia was the 'palace revolt'
within the Provincial SPOe. Governor Sima's policy of generosity to
the Slovenes was attacked by a group around Leopold Wagner. Communal
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elections in Spring 1973 snowed SPOe losses. It was clear that more
votes were being lost than gained in the attempt to implement the
State Treaty. At the end of September 1973, Sima was told to resign
as Governor by the provincial SPOe. The press followed;
"If Governor Sima finally follows the policies of the SPOe... the
next step should soon be due; Wagner should be Governor."H3
In Carinthia the problem was not so much the legislation of rights
enshrined in the State Treaty. The Croatian minority in Burgenland
had also seen little action to bring the State Treaty into action, yet
there was little pressure for change and no organised discontent;
"As Ljubljana nationalities theoretician Drago Druskovic has shown
in detail, success does not so much depend upon the literal fulfilment
of the law as on the spirit of tne clauses to protect minorities."H4
It is precisely this spirit which has been missing since 1972.
Bilateral relations between Vienna and Belgrade deteriorated
sharply. On November 6th 1972, Belgrade sent a note to Vienna
expressing 'deep concern' and pointing out 'Austria's very precise
responsibility'-'--'-^ to act in Carinthia; they also demanded action
against the now strident KHD, threatening to bring the entire matter
to international attention. Austria, in a pattern of exchanges which
was to repeat itself, rejected all of Yugoslavia's charges and reacted
in a notably defensive tone.
A Commission of Study was appointed in 1972 to look into the whole
question of bilingual signs. This was a clear attempt to buy time;
Vienna had little clear idea of a programme for the Carinthian
nationalities. Slovenes themselves had considerable faith in
Kreisky's support for their position. Yet Kreisky had also atibarked
on a policy to reintegrate the German-nationalist orientated FPOe into
the mainstream of Austrian politics. The Germanic element in
Carinthia was a considerable stronghold of both FPOe and SPOe. From
the standpoint of party headquarters in Vienna tne need to remain on
intimate terms with the KHD may not have been obvious but locally it
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was recognised that there were members of all parties in the KHD's
structures. In the end, the Federal party and hence Government became
the victim of these pressures.
Yugoslavia prepared to carry out her threat to bring the issue to
international attention.-'--'-^ 1974, she raised the issue at the UN
Committee on the elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In a
report to the Committee, the Austrians maintained that this was not an
ethnic or racial issue. CERD's own report (A/9618) was more critical,
demanding action against KHD activities, the ending of numerical
criteria for the implementation of Article 7 and an extension of the
legal provision for Slovenes. A further UN report, however, painted
Austria in very flattering terms. Ermacora maintained that Austria
had fulfilled all obligations under the State Treaty.
Meanwhile, the Government's Commission continued its work. The
KHD's demand that any changes in law should be preceded by a group
census or 'headcount' to determine the size of any minority was
granted by both FPOe and SPOe, despite the bitter exchange of notes
in 1974. In 1975, the Commission reported, outraging both Belgrade
and the minority.
The final package in 1976, was the result of negotiations between
the political parties in Vienna rather than the outside interests.
The new 'Ethnic Groups Act' passed into law, under which a 'Minorities
count' was to be organised throughout Austria. The Act made provision
for special assistance and the placing of bilingual signs wnere more
than a quarter of the population spoke Slovene. Advisors on Minority
Affairs were appointed within the Federal Chancellor's office. The
Act was passed unanimously and met with widespread apathy outside
Carinthia. The exception was the outrage of the liberal intellectuals
from all parties, whose views were widely reflected in the press.
Anton Pelinka, the leading Austrian political observer wrote;
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"The obligations [of the State Treaty] towards the powerful
outsiders were punctually and exactly fulfilled. Only in those
commitments towards the powerless are we still in debt."n7
'Profil' editor Lingens wrote;
"Above all, there is no doubt that Austria is on the way to a
continuation of the breach of the conditions of the State Treaty in
the case of tne Slovenes."118
Veiter and others recorded their disgust also. International press
I 1 Q
comment was widely hostile to Austria. Yugoslavia dismissed the
Act, insisting that statistical ennumeration of minorities could not
solve the problem;
"Central to the Yugoslav view is the fact that in the Republic of
Slovenia, the linguistic minorities - Croats (31,000), Serbs (13,500),
and Italians (3,000) - enjoy fundamental rights under the constitution
and have flourished far more than the Slovenes of lower Carinthia."120
The KHD, in tandem with all of the major political parties, set
about organising a huge anti-Slovene campaign for the count. The
propaganda can only be described as incitement to racial hatred. The
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Slovenes were dismissed as the 'most privileged minority in Europe'
and the old 'primordial fears' were played upon, with Slovenes
described as 'nationalist communists'. Publications used emotional
emblems, such as traditionally dressed Women and Chidren with the
slogan 'The Border country pleads with you -'Don't leave us in the
lurch!'121
The Census itself was a fiasco. Most Slovenes boycotted the event
or were involved in deliberate sabotage. Outside Carinthia, only 27%
bothered to register a vote. In Vienna a solidarity campaign by youth
and left wing groups, resulted in a higher number of Slovene speakers
being registered in Vienna than in Carinthia.
The Government was left with a considerably worsened situation.
They could not act as had been promised on tne basis of the count
playing into the hands of the KHD. As a result, the Government issued
a decree establishing 8 'Gemeinde' and 2 'Bezirk' where bilingual
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signs could be erected (BGBl 38/1977). Two further decrees announced
that 91 areas were to have bilingual topographical signs (BGBl
306/1977, BGBl 308/1977), a considerable reduction from Sima's 205 in
1972, a number already considered too low by Slovenes. The means by
which the areas were determined were never made clear. The FPOe took
out advertisements in all the pro-German press. Boasting of the stark
reduction in concessions to the Slovenes the title ran 'Did the FPOe
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not do all that is humanly possible for Carinthia?'
For many observers, the unhappy parallels with South Tyrol were
clear, and there was a marked sense of shame in editorial comments
outside Carinthia;
"The whole thing., is a multidimensional disgrace. It is a
disgrace for the SPOe; this party, once dedicated to internationalism
betrayed that tradition in Carinthia; by connecting tolerance to the
actual total of those to be tolerated, by portraying itself as a
German Nationalist party. When Bruno Kreisky became Chancellor in
1970, he attempted to solve the Slovene issue with the principles of
tolerance. In 1972 in Klagenfurt he was attacked by extremists.
Kreisky turned around and made right wing politics."-^
In terms of Austria's relations with Yugoslavia, tne 1977 decrees
allowed the issue to be removed from the immediate centre stage, and
public (non-Carinthian) attention switched to otner issues. Yet the
situation in Carinthia, like that in South Tyrol is more of a problem
on which a lid nas been temporarily placed than a now-irrelevant
anachronism. It remains a threat to bilateral relations to be revived
when tension mounts or excuses are sought. The Yugoslavs have been
prepared to revive the issues to divert attention from both external
and internal attacks on the Federal Government.
In 1982, ten years after the attack on the bilingual signs, an
event which had passed into folklore as the 'Ortstafelsturm', tne
Catholic journal, 'Die Furche' reported;
"The Carinthian Slovenes are bitter that in carrying out the
conditions of the State treaty, their views were not taken into
account. Since the Ethnic Minorities Act, the parties represented in
the Carinthian Landtag constantly repeat that as far as minority
rights are concerned, the State Treaty has been fulfilled... It is a
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matter of some concern that they pay hardly any attention to the
reemergence of the problems of the Nationalities."124
The question did indeed come to life again in 1983-5 over the issue
of schools. With KHD encouragement, the FPOe raised the old question
of bilingual education. Since 1945, all primary schools in the mixed
language area had been bilingual. Arguing on the basis of parental
choice, the FPOe demanded that those who so desired should have the
right to have their children educated in German alone. The KHD
organised a petition of voters throughout Carinthia. A successful
petition of over 20,000 signatures was delivered to the Provincial
Government. Under the leadership of Joerg Haider (see Reder Affair),
the FPOe increased its share of the vote in provincial elections to
over 11%, by far its best performance in any area of Austria, largely
on the basis of this campaign. The manipulation of the ethnic issue
in this manner shows the extent to which tne German Nationalist
element is feared in local politics. The speed with which the SPOe
sought to establish its credentials by passing a new Schools Act in
1985 confirmed this as fact. Haas concludes that the German
Nationalists will stop at nothing short of genocide;
"If the German Nationalists had their way, Carinthia's
nationalities struggle would end with the disappearance of the
Slovenes."125
A letter in the local press expressed this precisely;
"Those who do not like it in Austria, those who are constantly
dissatisfied and constantly have something to niggle about should
emigrate to our neighbour south of the Loibl Pass - and immediately.
Nobody will stop them! But why do these complainers not do this after
aii?"125
The FPOe itself is completely unrepentant over its attitude on this
issue. According to Haider the two groups have no problem with one
another;
"The Slovene 'Volksgruppe' certainly does not feel under pressure.
Their political leadership is worried that the ethnic question will
come to a peaceful end because everybody is content and that tney will
no longer have a political sphere of action. This is the real
background that I see, as somebody who travels around the province. I
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have numerous friends in the Slovene Volksgruppe who confirm this
impression."126
As a result the FPOe is happy to use the slogan of a 'parent's
right to choose' in Southern Carinthia above the social need for a new
concept. In this view the State Treaty has not merely oeen fulfilled,
it has been exaggerated. Indeed in Haider's view the discrimination
in Carinthia is against the German majority. As Haider says;
"We are used to living with the fact that the further one lives
from Carinthia the more impractically the issue is dealt
with. Often only emotional outbursts come from elsewhere and it is
evident that everything functions without any problau and that the
minority is advantaged in several areas. As for the 1972 problem, You
must study the history of Carinthia carefully in order that you do not
become a victim of disinformation which unfortunately is repeated in
many foreign publications... The history of the events in the early
seventies is that the Place Name Tables were attacked not by the
majority community but from the minority community. They also started
grafitti and letter-writing campaigns, from which the problem can be
traced. This was of course regrettable, that it came to such
emotions, however it was right that we solved it with the
internationally verified census... from which certain areas were
proven never to have been settled by the Slovenes."126
All of this is heavily reminiscent of the historical selectivity
practiced in other areas of ethnic conflict, in which the dominant
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group choose to speak for the satisfaction of the minority. Hearing
Haider, it is surprising that anybody ever thought that there was a
problem! Of course the parties outside Carinthia proved unable to act
radically in the 1970s. This is true of all groups, but even the
Viennese leadership of the FPOe is unsure as to its position on
Carinthia;
"The position of the Slovene Volksgruppe is entirely different from
that of the South Tyroleans in my opinion. They have a much better
position with regard to their rights than is suggested from time to
time by the Slovenes. There are educational establishments in
Carinthia which are internationally recognised.. What the Carinthian
FPOe does with regard to changing an already existant situation is
first and foremost a Carinthian problem and not a problem of the
Republic of Austria as a whole... In Carinthia the clocks always
strike differently than in Vienna'"29
I have concentrated on the acute problems of the Carinthian
Slovenes. The numerically larger group of Croat speakers in
Burgenland have not played a parallel role. This can in part be
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accounted for by their total dislocation and detachment from the
Croats in Croatia and to their corresponding integration in
Burgenland. The Burgenland was at one time part of Hungary in which
the Germans too had a minority role and this may account for the
harmony. The Croats of Burgenland have not been vocal in support of
the Slovene cause and are used in Yugoslav propaganda rather then in
substantive policy.
Slovene affairs have tended to overshadow Austro-Yugoslav affairs.
Nevertheless the Governments at Federal level have both been anxious
to extend relations in other spheres. In international terms,
Yugoslavia's non-alignment makes her a less controversial partner for
Austria than aligned neighbours in international forums. This was
particularily true at CSCE, where both worked together as part of the
resultant ad hoc 'N + N"(Neutral and Non-aligned) group.
As Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Petric pointed out;
"Our relations to Austria are developing satisfactorily because
both sides wish to develop them further."-*-^
The Austrians too have been anxious to concentrate on other issues.
A Foreign Ministry spokesman put it thus;
"In relations between Austria and Yugoslavia the Slovene Minority
question plays no further role. I think that the solution which we
found is satisfactory for the Yugoslavian side."^'^
Former Foreign Minister Lane puts it thus;
"The inter State relationship stands without doubt above that of
the understandable attempts by Yugoslavia to support the Slovenes in
Carinthia, who are fighting for their cultural existence. Yugoslavia
knows that it is dependent on the stability of the entire region, at
least as dependent as we are. Therefore they will not actively take
part in crises in this geographical area which could bring the house
of peace tumbling down, because they know that tne roof would collapse
on than first... The relationship between Yugoslavia and Austria has
certainly contributed to the fact that there has been no war in this
region for 40 years. The maintenance of this is vital for everybody
in this zone, no matter what societal form exists. This is much more
important than anything else."-^
This was of particular importance to the thousands of gastarbeiter
frctn Yugoslavia employed in Austria. By the mid-1960s, Austria's
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labour supply was no longer sufficient to fill the numbers of jobs
being created, particularity in the unskilled and semi-skilled
sectors. The high wages of Austria, enticed recruits from South East
Europe. In Austria, 90% of gastarbeiter came from Yugoslavia,
representing 8.7% of the workforce by 1973.130 visnna and the Western
Provinces were the centres for immigration. Like West Germany and
Switzerland, Austria saw this as an elastic supply of labour necessary
to maintain growth. She attempted a so-called 'Rotation policy'
'..which aimed at an administratively controlled limitation of the
length of stay in the host country."131
As elsewhere, this extremely functionalist policy led to
considerable social stress; newcomers were usually housed in the
poorest conditions and there was no provision for special facilities.
The result was permanent ghettoisation and linguistic and cultural
isolation. As Max Frisch remarked of Gastarbeiter in general -they
sought labour and got human beings. The ghettos confirmed the
hostility in the resident Community. An IFES poll in 1972 snowed that
90% 'disliked' Gastarbeiter, and 57% wanted no contact. Only 25%
accepted Gastarbeiter's right to a minimum wage.^^
The Austrians remained hostile, although immigrant numbers were far
below the totals in Switzerland. There, a series of directly anti-
immigrant proposals were passed by referenda. Swiss national
unemployment rates of less than 1% throughout the recession was
largely a result of refusals to prolong Work Permits for Gastarbeiter.
The benefits for the Austrian economy during the boom were enormous.
As the oil crisis hit, the trade unions pressed for more restrictive
legislation. The result was tne 'Employment of Foreign Workers
Act'(1975) under which foreign workers were given a function of merely
balancing Austria's fluctuations.-*-^ Nevertheless, in 1977 tnere were
still 196,800 gastarbeiter in Austria-*--^ although the workforce was
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reduced by 17% between 1980 and 1983 to the lowest level since
-ir.™ 135 The result is nevertheless a longterm direct interest in19 /0.
Austrian economic affairs in Yugoslavia with the subsequent
implications for Foreign Policy.
At a more local level, Slovenia, Carinthia and Styria joined with
the Italian Province of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia in November 1977 to
create ArgeOst (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost). Despite strains over the
Slovene minority, this institution tries to address possible areas of
cooperation;
"The frame of themes to be dealt with is very wide, stretching from
questions of transalpine connections through Electricity supply,
forestry and tourism to current questions of environmental protection,
planning, development and the maintenance of the cultural and
recreational environment.
In 1977, Austria and Yugoslavia signed a treaty to build a
Karawanken Road tunnel between Carinthia and Slovenia. Even this was
attacked in 1985 by Haider and the FPOe.
Overall, Austro-Yugoslav relations have followed a similar path to
Austro-italian problems. The contacts between the neighbouring States
have been overwhelmed by the problems at the frontier. Yet in
relations at a bilateral level the Austrians have been remarkably
successful in the sphere of concrete agreements. The agreements on
visa restrictions, the Karawanken tunnel, economic and trade matters
and cooperation through ArgeOst emphasise the Austrian ability to
utilise the conflicting pressures on the Yugoslav Federal Government
and ensure that the Slovene problem does not restrict agreements in
other areas. Nevertheless, the local problem cannot yet be considered
a thing of the past and threatens to invade national relationships if
unchecked. The experience of the 1970s and the bitterness aroused in
Belgrade, Ljubljana and Klagenfurt seem to prove this beyond doubt.
It is of course in Vienna's interest to portray events as fully
problem free and to skirt the issue. Nevertheless, the local
255
determination of the KHD and their allies in the FPOe at least, would
seem to ensure that the Slovenes will be attacked until some sort of
'final solution has been achieved'. In typically Austrian fashion,
the scope of the problem is seldom admitted if only in the hope that
it mignt disappear.
Austria and Hungary
The relationship between Austria and Hungary is a long standing
one. The Habsburg territories were divided into 2 essentially
autonomous parts, united only by the monarchy itself and foreign
policy. Outside the German-speaking group, the Magyars occupied the
position of greatest privilege within the dual State. In 1918, as the
ampire collapsed, trade and economic integration between the two areas
was considerable. Years of separation, World War II, and the
imposition of the Iron Curtain restrictions have reduced the degree of
contact at a personal level, such that Hungary remains a less
important trading partner than Switzerland with which Austria and
Vienna in particular have no historic link.
Yet the Austro-Hungarian rapprochement is one of the most hopeful
creations of the detente era, comparing remarkably with the
relationships which have developed in other parts of the East/West
frontier. It is a relationship which has continued to prosper in a
climate which can only be considered hostile to such developments. It
is all the more noteworthy given the crisis which engulfed Hungary in
1956 and is still the greatest threat which Austria has had to face.
The Hungarian revolt was always liable to present difficulties
for Austria. The State Treaty in Austria and neutrality resulted in
the rapid withdrawal of occupying forces from Austrian territory a
fact which did not go unnoticed in Budapest. The brewing crisis in
Hungary exploded just 18 months after the agreement on a new treaty
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for Austria. The Austrian role was in part as model in the policies
of Nagy, in part as a reception camp for fleeing Hungarians and in
part stategic, as Hungary's only non-communist neighbour.
Although many reports by Nagy and his friends tend to emit the
fact, there is no doubt that events in 1955 in Austria were very
influential as a model for the future development of Hungary. Nagy
himself went as far as to suggest a neutral Hungary on the model of
Austria. This was always a less likely parallel than it appears
given the degree to which Hungary had come under Soviet and more
directly Communist control since 1945. At Yalta, Hungary had fallen
into the Russian sphere of influence, while Austria had been subject
to division into four Zones of occupation. As a result, Hungary was
fully integrated into the Eastern Bloc, whereas Austria gradually
manouevred herself beyond Soviet control.
Nagy insisted on Hungary's right as a sovereign state to determine
her own path, preferring co-operation with neighbouring small states
to Russian over lordship. Yet in stating such a policy openly, he
threatened to undermine not only the power-political ambitions of
the USSR but the internal stability of other Eastern Bloc regimes.
The neutrality of Hungary would mean the loss to the USSR of an
allied territory. The same was not true in Austria by 1955.
The Austrian reaction to the invasion of Hungary was swift and
outspoken. Unlike tne NATO countries, Austria issued a direct appeal
to the Soviet Union to withdraw a few days after the attack;
"The Austrian Government follows with painful sympathy the bloody
events with such high losses which have now lasted 5 days in Hungary.
It requests the Government of tne USSR to help ensure tnat the
military fighting be ended and the bloodshed stop."137
The relatively harsh statement from Vienna may reflect a
confidence, following 10 years of direct negotiation with the Soviet
Union, but more realistically it also reflects the real danger felt in
Austria about the proximity of the events. The threat to Austria came
not merely from the USSR but through her status as Hungary's non-
communist neighbour. Any Western aid for Hungary could only have been
deployed through Austria. As one American diplomat observes;
"Our planes could not fly over Coirmunist controlled East Germany,
Czecnoslovakia or Yugoslavia, so we could approach only through
Austria and Austria declared in no uncertain terms that it would
resist any form of overflights."138
Any attempt to breach Austrian sovereignity would have meant the
end of detente's most prominent fruit, Austrian neutrality. The
Austrian Government thus took measures not only on her borders with
Hungary. Controls at crossing points into West Germany were tightened
while the unguarded stretches between the border outposts were also
subject to intensified control.
Of course the most serious threat came from events in Hungary. The
Soviet authorities showed a determination to respect Austrian
boundaries despite pressure from Czechoslovakia and East Germany to
reoccupy the former Russian Zone of eastern and northern Austria. The
most serious incident took place at Recnnitz in Burgenland in November
1956 when 2 Soviet soldiers pursued refugees onto Austrian territory.
After a fignt with local farmers, they were arrested by Austrian
patrols. One tried to escape and was shot dead. In the aftermath,
Austria expressed regret at the killing, but delivered a strong
protest to Moscow at the violation of Austrian territory. Two days
later, the USSR expressed regret at this
". .unpremeditated violation of frontiers"-*"^
... claiming that the two had merely been lost.
Austria's most remarkable achievement was as a receiver of
refugees. The response from the populace was enormous and immediate.
On 30th of October (7 days after the invasion) 'Wiener Zeitung'
reported that Red Cross collection points were proving too small, the
Co-operative movement 'Konsum' had donated AS700,000 and set up a
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collection service point, the Trade Union Federation had donated vast
sums of money, medicine and petrol, as had the Catholic Church and the
political parties.140
The stream of refugees increased by the day. By 21st November,
38,520-'-4-'-a had arrived. Four days later the total was
rising to 95,700141c within two days. By 2nd December, 103,000l41d
had arrived. The Austrians made urgent appeals for other Western
countries to nelp. By Spring 1957 over 170,000"*"^ refugees had
arrived in Austria.
By mid January 1957, 167,780 private donations had been received
amounting to AS20m. In the month of November 1956, the Austrian
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Government spent AS31m rising to over AS80m by December. One
official estimate in May 1957 put the total number of refugees in
Austria at 34,000, while 135,000 had gone to other countries.144
This influx amounted to the greatest nutiber ever to arrive in such
a short tine in any European State this century. We shall deal with
other examples of refugee policy in a future chapter.
Internally, there was virtually unanimous support for Nagy and his
supporters. The OeVP initially wished this group luck through its
Press Service-^-' but as defeat became inevitable, they toned down
their statement. Although they maintained unity with the rebels they
restated that nobody wanted a restoration of the reactionary prewar
Hungarian Government.-*-^ Tfte sPOe followed a similar pattern, with
Interior Minister Helmer the most outspoken supporter of the Hungarian
cause.14^ Yet by a later stage, even Helmer was criticising the
reporting of events by the Austrian Press and appealed that newspapers
restrict their coverage to official news.
"One can only make guesses at the grounds for this suddenly
cautious approach of the Austrian Government. Perhaps the Government
feared a Soviet protest about one sided positions, pernaps they had
come to the conclusion that responsible action for a neutral State
demanded a certain degree of restraint despite a general position in
favour of a purely military interpretation of Neutrality."148
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Certainly after November 1956, the Eastern Bloc Press began a vocal
campaign against Austria's press and its apparently 'unneutral' stance
throughout the crisis. 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia' (3/11/56) both cited
the newspaper of the Moscow-loyal KPOe and accused Austria of allowing
supporters of Hungary's pre-Nazi leader, Admiral Horthy, to be
transported into Hungary across Austrian territory. Austria was
accused of supporting weapons aid for the rebels. Soviet officials
claimed to have found weapons in parcels marked as Red Cross parcels.
It seems as though a system of justification was being built up for a
domestic audience.
The internal result in Austria was increased pressure for a self-
censoring press. One of the OeVP Cabinet Ministers, Grubhofer, called
for a law to restrict the freedom of the press in times of tnreat of
war. The elation of the early success of the rebels (including a
banner on the main Vienna/Budapest road proclaiming 'we thank the
Austrian people') gave way to sober considerations. The KPOe was
completely isolated within Austria as the only party to openly support
the invasion. When a KPOe deputy tried to address the Nationalrat,
all non-communist deputies left the Chamber in protest. The KPOe
itself was internally split over the issue, some leaving the party.
The party has never succeeded in having deputies returned to the
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Nationalrat since.
The crisis in Hungary also had wider implications. Austria voted in
favour of the American motion condemning the USSR at the UN,
emphasising the degree to which Austria attached herself to the West.
In the USA, it was made clear that any attack on Austria would be a
major threat to peace.
"Austria has scrupulously observed the military neutrality laid
down |n0the Treaty[????]; but there is no doubt where its sympathieslie."
Allowing for the factual inaccuracies, this illustrates the degree
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to which Austrians considered the Hungarians as engaged in a struggle
for 'freedom'. Austria on the other hand represented the goal which
the Hungarians sought. 151 Lomax reports that the camps in Austria
were fertile recruiting grounds for Radio Free Europe, the American
propaganda station, and for Gehlen's West German Intelligence. Yet
although this impression has remained, there was a notable tendancy
for the 'Western' element to disappear in the later stages of the
conflict once it became clear that the rebels' cause was doomed. The
reaction to the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 suggests that the
Austrians learnt that they must be more cautious in their
pronouncements in future.
In a wider sense, the 1956 experience established Austria as the
most reliable refuge in postwar Europe for fleeing east Europeans.
Austria has since been a leading advocate of all measures to humanise
border crossings. (Hungary has removed minefields and automatic
weapons along her frontier witn Austria.)
For bilateral relations between Vienna and Budapest, the 1956 crisis
was a catastrophe. The new regime in Budapest under Kadar represented
a considerable evil to most Austrians. In a radio broadcast, Kadar
accused the Austrians of aiding and harbouring counter¬
revolutionaries. Hungary's later reticence may well have been
connected with the still-live issue of refugees. In January 1957, the
Hungarian Government was allowed to produce a questionaire for all
refugees in Austria and this was circulated under the auspices of the
UNHCR, the Red Cross and the Austrian Government. The result was the
return of some 3,000 refugees to Hungary (Hungary claimed 17,000) and
a claim to the UN by Hungary that Austria was hampering the return of
refugees, a claim refuted by Vienna.152
By February 1957, Austria had banned all sporting and cultural
contacts. Hungary attacked Austria's reaction as 'hysterical' and
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'incompatible with neutrality', reiterating her complaints of anti-
Kadar complicity. In late February, the Austrian mission in Budapest
was cordoned off and all personnel and visitors were personally
checked by the guards. Around 100 Hungarian vistors to the embassy
were arrested, followed by Austrian protests at this 'provocative
measure'. The mission continued to issue visas. The Hungarians
eventually lifted the cordon on the Austrians, but relations nad
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reached a postwar nadir remaining poor until the 1960s.
By contrast, Austro-Soviet relations did not deteriorate furtner.
In April 1957, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan visited
Vienna, the first such visit to a non-Soviet bloc European State after
the invasion, symbolising a return on the Soviet side to coexistence
policy and a restatement of Soviet commitment to a neutral Austria.
It also symbolised the role which neutral Austria could play in
overcoming diplomatic 'frisson' between the blocs. As Kreisky said;
"The Hungarian question did not play a special role in these
discussions although Mikoyan emphasised the interest of the USSR tnat
States bordering Austria have good and normal relations with Austria.
On the Austrian side it was not forgotten to point out that 2 parties
are needed for good and normal diplomatic relations."154
In late 1957, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made a stopover in
Vienna on his return from New York and after discussions with Figl,
both sides let it be known that they were willing to negotiate
improvements in relations.Despite this, a series of attempted
escapes and border incidents severely delayed normalisation. Even by
1968, Austrian imports from Hungary were less than those from either
Czechoslovakia or Poland.
The thaw in relations began in 1964, when Kreisky as Foreign
Minister made an official visit to Budapest. By then the two States
had come to a new agreement over reparations for Austrian property in
Hungary and over co-operation on the investigation of border
incedents. Kreisky's visit was the first such visit by a Minister in
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a non-Communist country to make contact with Budapest after 1956.
During a later visit to Vienna by Fock, the leader of the SPOe, Vice-
Chancel lor Pittermann spoke of Hungary as the 'neighbour's flower
garden'. Austrians considered these visits a considerable success;
"a new phase in Austro-Hungarian relations."157
The new emphasis was very much on the need to recognise that two
different and competing systems were in operation. Any new era in
relations would thus not take place;
".. because we have softened ideologically or are prepared bit by
bit to sacrifice our principles because of our policy of trying to
make relations with communist countries but, on the contrary, because
we are convinced of our ideas and our picture of society."158
This was to be the type of peaceful Coexistence which Kreisky was
to advocate for two decades. When the Hungarian Foreign Minister
visited Vienna, a number of treaties were signed on Passport control,
customs regulations, technical agreements and individual legal
matters. In September 1965, the Hungarians announced that the
minefields on the Austrian border would be replaced with spotlighting
techniques. In 1966, the Visa requirement was lifted for one day to
1
allow Austrian tourists to visit Odenburg.
By May 1967, when Chancellor Klaus travelled to Budapest, relations
between the two countries had clearly entered a new phase and both
were anxious to maintain the cordiality. Klaus was at pains to
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emphasise the 'two peoples, one river' connection.
The first exchange of visits by Heads of State took place in 1970
and 1971, unaffected by events in Czechoslovakia and very much in the
spirit of the detente which was by now an international fashion, at
both superpower and at inner-German level. Trade, tourism, industrial
co-operation and financial contacts were considerably improved. By
now, Hungary had set in train an economic reform process which was to
make her the most liberal of the Soviet satellites with considerable
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flexibility built in to the economy.
ch
In 1973, when Bruno Kreisky and Foreign Minister Kirsschlaeger led
A
a visit to Budapest and relations were described as;
"a classic example for coexistence in Central Europe."160
On a personal level, the inability of Kreisky to meet Kadar was
nevertheless considered a personal snub by some observers. It was
interpreted in some quarters as a backhanded compliment to Kreisky's
understanding of communist practice in eastern Europe;
"Austria's Socialists, who understand the practices of their
communist neighbours much better than OeVP politicians, are for this
reason more feared as mistrusting partners by the Hungarians.
Kreisky, who considers the bread of a communist to be the main course
at an executioners dinner for popular front-blinded Socialists (a
reference to the obliteration of Social democracy in eastern Europe
between 1945 and 1949) is considered a 'particularly difficult case'
(Press officer Lorincz, Hungarian Foreign Ministry)."160
Nevertheless, Kreisky used the visit to call for a small States
Peace Zone.
Austrian unease about human rights in Hungary has now virtually
disappeared. In 1979, Hungary and Austria agreed to the removal of
visa restrictions on travel by Austrian citizens to Hungary. Currency
restrictions were also relaxed and investment by westerners
(especially West Germans and Austrians) in Hungary expanded
considerably. In 1981, Kreisky's official visit to Budapest was
described by one accompanying journalist as a 'family meeting'.He
reported a Hungarian commentator as saying;
"In the first place come our relations to the Soviet Union. Then
comes Austria and after that there is a large gap."-LO'i
In tne 1980s, the stability of this relationship has been unique in
East/West experience. The Hungarians made their first governmental
investment in the West when a new hotel in Vienna was financed by the
Magyar National Bank. The Austrians had also invested in Hungary,
lending millions to finance a new conference centre in Budapest. In
1982, there were 200,000 Hungarian visitors to Austria indicating the
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considerable degree of openness of the old monarchical boundaries.
Figures for 1983 showed a 30% increase. A jointly owned
Austro/Hungarian travel company was set up in Budapest.163
Neutral Austria is regularity praised in the Hungarian press.
According to some commentators;
'Bruno Kreisky achieved immense popularity in Hungary and the
relationship was referred to as 'the new KuK' [a joke on the local
name for the Habsburg monarchy, now referring to 'Kreisky und
Kadar'.]"164
The non-military aspects of relations were emphasised, ie Austria's
neutrality vis a vis NATO is given less prominence than the cultural,
economic and Foreign Policy benefits.
The relationship at bilateral level was close enough that
deteriorations in the international climate left Austria and Hungary
unaffected. The Austrian Government's official Foreign Policy Report
in 1983 pointed out that;
"Despite the increased East/West confrontation, relations between
Austria and Hungary were not restricted. They were in fact developed
further."165
Chancellor Sinowatz broke tradition by making his first foreign
trip as Chancelloir to Budapest rather than Bern.
By the 1980s cooperation was close and cordial;
"These relations, characterised by a policy of open borders and
frequent informal contact between the leaders of both countries bear
close resemblence to the association that linked Austria and Hungary
during a common past."-^
Both have a vital function for each other. Success in Austria's
relations with Hungary provide a concrete example of commitment to
detente, and an example of the effectiveness of neutrality in central
Europe. A comparison with other East/West frontiers shows that
Austro/Hungarian rapprochement is unique in the European experience.
The openness of the relationship contrasts sharply with the conflict
between Hungary and her fellow Warsaw Pact member neighbour, Rumania.
Remarkably, this has continued unaffected by the new phase of the Cold
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War. Hungary has also become an important economic partner for
Austria.
For Hungary, her unique contact with the Vienna regime provides an
acceptable 'window on the West' and a contact across the Iron Curtain
which might not exist with a NATO neighbour. Economically, the
benefits of this calm environment have been considerable. Cheaper
Hungarian goods and prices have led to a revitalisation of local
economies near the frontier; Hungarian border posts are often
overwhelmed with Austrian consumers on Austrian Public Holidays and at
Christmas.
Shawcross puts it thus;
"Under a bourgeois democracy, its [Hungary's] sibling, Austria, has
suffered none of the horrors that Hungary has had to endure... The
Austrian experience is immensely important to both Hungarians and
Czechs. It is according to the successes of the Kaerntnerstrasse
[Vienna's Main Street] and the standard of living in Graz that they
measure their own countries achievements... Despite all that they have
undergone, many Hungarians still think in much the same way as their
Austrian neighbours."167
Certainly tnere is evidence that political fashions cross borders.
Following demonstrations in Lower Austria against the building of a
planned Hydroelectric Dam at Hainburg, Austria in 1984/5, there were
local protests in Hungary against plans for a similar project on a
Hungarian part of the Danube, the first of tneir sort since 1956.
Austro-Hungarian relations stand as the major contribution of
Austrian Foreign Policy since 1955 to stability and detente in Europe.
Its significance should not be underestimated. The result, as Neuhold
points out, is that;
"The central Danubian basin, for centuries a breeding ground of
discord and war - both world wars started in and around Austria - has
become one of the most peaceful regions in Europe.
Austria and Czechoslovakia
Apart from a brief period in which there was a cordial relationship
in the 1960s there have been continued tensions, caused in part by
266
Austrian dissatisfaction with aspects of Czech policy and the nature
of the regime itself. This made it a difficult relationship adding to
a historical legacy of rivalry and antagonism. Witnin the monarchy,
the Czechs had become by 1918 an important and vocal 'Volksgruppe' who
contributed significantly to the cultural and economic life of the
entire State. Indeed, after the end of World War I and the setting up
of a new government in Prague, over 100,000 people of Czech origin
still remained in Vienna, making it the world's second largest Czech
city. This influence on names and culture can be seen today. Bohemia
was the centre of the monarchy's industry, and Czech/German contact
provided much of the cultural impetus in the Vienna of 1900.
While Austro-Hungarian rapprochement has been a significant feature
of the post World war II era, the same cannot be said for Vienna's
relations with Prague, despite the fact that the cultural and personal
links between the Germans and Czechs is historically closer.
After World war II, the new provisional government's representative
made his first contact abroad when Gruber drove to Prague. According
to Shawcross;
"In 1968 the Czechs were infuriated that the Austrians had a higher
standard of living; in 1914 it had been higher in Prague.
For many Czechs, as we noted in the case of Hungary, Austria remains
the example of what is possible for small States. This admiration has
never extended to the Czecnoslovakian Government.
Initially after the signing of tne State treaty, relations were
made difficult by a failure to agree to reparations for Austrian
property in Czechoslovakia. At the end of World War II, the Czechs,
amongst the most intense opponents of the Nazis drove out the large
German speaking minority who were widely blamed for their
collaboration with Hitler. These Sudeten Germans flooded into West
Germany and Austria and their position threatened to disturb attempts
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to create neighbourly relations.
The sums at stake in the reparations dispute were considerably
larger then amounts in other countries. Around 40,000 Austrians were
directly affected by the Czech nationalisation of German property and
the Austrian Government was insistent that normalisation of relations
could only take place after agreement on this question. Because of a
consistent failure to agree, a tresty was not signed for 20 years.
In 1958, Chancellor Raab suggested a personal meeting with his
Czech counterpart. Yet relations deteriorated over the decision of
the Austrian Government to allow a meeting of former Sudetenland
refugees in 1959. This was a militantly anti-Czech organisation. The
hostility between them and the Czech Government was immense, but the
Austrians were unwilling to prohibit the meeting. On 22nd May, 1959
the Czech Government sent the Austrians an angry note;
"The fact that the Austrian Government has actively supported this
performance, snows that Austrian officials identify with this
revanchist propaganda, in total contradiction of Austria's neutrality
and the obligations undertaken in the State Treaty. The
Czechoslovakian government has further drawn attention to the fact
that they consider the holding of the so called 'Sudeten German
Congress' in Austria as an unfriendly act towards Czechoslovakia"-'-^
The Czechs made it known tnat the independence of Austria was
largely a part of the problem of Germany after World War Their
security more than that of any other single nation seemed dependent on
the condition prohibiting Anschluss. Throughout the EEC debate,
Czechoslovakia was a regular and vociferous supporter of the Soviet
view that any Austro-EEC association moved Anschluss closer and as
1 79such was a breach of the State Treaty and neutrality law.
The Sudeten German meeting delayed Austro-Czech negotiations by an
entire year, more than the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Only
in June 1960 did a delegation of Czech civil servants visit Vienna,
although this too was of little avail. Nevertheless, there were
visits by Government members to trade fairs in Vienna (March 1963) and
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Brno(1965) and there was some increase in trade volume between the
parsers 173 Economic relations between the countries also improved
and the visa requirements for travel were also reduced.
Following the 7-day war in Israel, Czechoslovakia broke off
diplomatic relations with the Israelis anc^ asked Austria to continue to
represent her interests in Tel Aviv. This Austria has continued to
do. Nevertheless, despite diplomatic cooperation, a border incident
in August 1967 marred any real improvement. Czech Guards shot a
fleeing East German, killing him after he had already reacned Austrian
territory and leaving bullet marks on the Customs House at Gmuend.-'-7^
Even the breakneck pace of reform within the Czech Communist Party
in 1967 and 1968 had only an indirect effect on bilateral relations.
The same cannot be said of the crisis of August when Warsaw Pact
troops invaded Czechoslovakia. On the morning of the 21st August, the
Austrian Chancellor Klaus issued a statement announcing the recall of
the cabinet and the imposition of a state of readiness. The statement
on the evening of the same day on Austrian television is remarkably
cautious when compared to statements at the outset of the Hungarian
crisis in 1956;
"We do not want to and cannot interfere in the internal affairs of
other States, this all the more because we must reject any such
attempt at interference in our own internal affairs."-'-73
This is despite the fact that Austrian defence entirely depends on
other people not calling an invasion of Austria from outside an
'internal affair'. The concentration by Klaus on the technicalities
of the invasion and his failure to officially express sympathy with
the Czechs or to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops, led to
widespread and loudly expressed criticism of his stance within
Austria, especially from Kreisky and the SPOe. The most notable
feature of the Aust ia- eaction was nervousness;
"The insecurity and latent nervousness of the Austrian Government
showed through in the repetitions of declarations that there was no
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danger to Austria because of her neutrality. This insecurity and tne
more than cautious judgement of the moral side of the Soviet
aggression can be seen not only from the systematic infringement of
airspace by the Soviet Airforce and the conceited handling of
Austrian protests by the Soviet Foreign Ministry; they may also be to
do with the lack of official American assurances that an infringement
of Austrian sovereignty would be unacceptable."176
There were indeed numerous infringements of Austrian airspace by
Russian pilots on 21st, 22nd and 25th August. The Russians seemed
most interested in the airports at Vienna(Schwechat) and
Linz(Hoersching) and seemed to be on almost permanent control of their
"j 77
former Zone of occupation. The Austrian Government protested
through their ambassador in Moscow, but as Waldheim reported to the
Nationalrat, the ambassador was kept waiting for 3 days before being
able to deliver the note. This incident brought home the degree to
which the Soviet Union felt itself answerable to Austria for breaches
of Neutral territory. This is not to exaggerate the threat which
Russian troops posed to Austria but to point out the impotence of
defence in the event of Soviet plans to the contrary.
The domestic reaction to the crisis in Austria was muted. According
to Eger, the official Information Service was anxious;
"to avoid any impression which could be interpreted on the Soviet
side as interference.
and instead of criticism of the USSR, the government;
"tried to work on the media to try and achieve a reductionin the
stridency of the tone in repoting of events in Czechoslovakia.:17^®
The Austrian mass media began by adopting an anti-Soviet tone
although this modified in the light of continuing discussion about the
nature of a responsible press in such circumstances.
The political parties found no such 1956 style unity. The OeVP
spoke of sympathy with the Czechs but concentrated on the Government's
emphasis on neutrality and national security.179 The SPOe made a much
stronger statement calling the invasion;
'... a strike against emergent democratisation in our neighbour.
The SPOe expresses its full sympathy with the suffering people of
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Czechoslovakia rooted in a commitment to neutrality."130
On 26th August, five days into the crisis, the SPOe leader accused
the OeVP of being 'appeasers' and accused them of failing to
appreciate the brutality of the Soviet actional The OeVP appeared
distinctly stung by the accusations. The State Secretary for
Information, Karl Pisa, said;
"The Austrian people will not understand, when attempts are made to
make party-political capital from the tragic events on the other side
of our borders. They will, however, welcome it if all parties take up
a statesmanlike approach in these times."-'-^
Klaus himself called Kreisky's attacks the biggest disappointment
of his whole career. Kreisky also attacked UN General Secretary U
Thant for cancelling a planned visit to Prague, which he said would
have given the UN a presence in the Czech capital.
Almost more significantly, the previously Moscow-loyal KPOe broke
ranks and condemned the invasion;
"In all alliance with the Soviet Union, the CPSU and the other
socialist countries and their communist oarties, the central committee
of the KPOe objects to the invasion."
Although Austria remained the chief destination for refugees, there
was no immediate flood as in 1956. In the immediate aftermath there
were a mere 1355 applications for asylum. Although there was a large
rise in the totals in the years following the crisis, the pressure on
the Austrian system did not reach the same proportions as in 1956 or
indeed in 1981.
Austro-Soviet relations were not seriously damaged in the long
term, as in 1956. Nationalrat President Maleta visited the USSR in
March 1969, the first Western politician to do so after the 1968 crisis
and announced intensified economic relations and no major
difficulties.-^ During the period of the invasion, the Soviet press
had again attacked the Austrian press for a non-neutral attitude, but
these had not been taken seriously in Austria and they had not reached
the extent of 1956.
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Neutrality was now clearly understood as involving more obligations
than the mere avoidance of war. As Waldheim pointed out, neutral
States must begin their policies in peacetime, and this involved the
maintenance of good relations with neighbours and active participation
World events.185 TtuS is some distance from the definition of
neutrality offered by Raab in 1956.
On a bilateral level, relations between Vienna and Prague were now
virtually non-existent. Only in 1971 did relations begin to improve
again. Yet a series of border incidents involving escapees in May
1972, July 1972 and September 1973^®® set relations further back. In
the July and September incidents, 4 Austrians were killed after
accidentally infringing Czech airspace. The Prague Government also
refused to accept any Austrian protests on the matter and only in
December of 1973 did the two governments agree on a procedure for
border incidents, in early March 1974 tnere was a further
infringement of the border, this time by Czech officials entering
Austrian territory.
The reparations negotiations between tne two States were constantly
interrupted by these incidents. By the end of 1974 the new treaty was
ready, however the incidents on the border had postponed any real thaw
in the temperature. Even in the 1970s when much of Austria's
diplomatic effort was directed at a policy of detente and peaceful
coexistence, there remained severe problems in the immediate
environment. Finally in late 1974, the longest running single issue,
reparations, was brought to an end, and almost 20 years after the
State Treaty a new agreement was reached. At the signing, the Czech
Foreign Minister said;
"We are glad that we have agreed on this issue and both Austria and
the CSSR are sure that the agreed treaty is above all a means towards
the full developnent of good-neighbourly relations.""'"^
The visits at high level which followed the agreement were the
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first such exchanges since World War II. In February 1976, Kreisky
visited Prague and it was officially agreed that relations should be
normalised. A joint Commission was set up to examine the possibility
of cooperation. Kreisky declared;
"We should utilise this situation to provide an example of
cooperation... all of a sudden there is such a wide range of possibile
areas of joint endeavour that can be prepared."-'-^
Yet it remained at heart an unsatisfactory relationship, always
threatened by the basically uncooperative attitude of the Czechs and
the reaction of the Austrian public to events in Czechoslovakia. The
Charter 77 movement received widespread publicity in Austria, and many
of those exiled as a result of their support for the Charter found a
home in exile in Vienna. Kreisky himself made much of his support for
the group and condemned the reaction of the Czech Government. A
further problem arose in the 1980s over Church/State relations in
Czechoslovakia. Fearing a revival of Catholic activism, the State
placed the Prague Cardinal under nouse arrest and began a strict anti-
ecclesiastical policy. The policy was largely a failure, illustrated
by the large crowds at tne celebrations of the jubilee of the Czech
Saint, Methodus. Austrian church leaders pressed their government
hard to support their own campaign against the Czech policy. The
Pope's visit to Vienna in 1983 was seen in part as being directed
against Czechoslovakia.
Despite a swap of presidential visits in 1979 and 1982, relations
can still only be described as at best 'correct'. In November 1984,
there was yet another border incident when Czech guards shot dead a
fleeing man who had already reached Austrian soil. Austrian
newspapers reacted angrily and the frontier was decribed as the
'Border of Death'. Czech cultural events were cancelled in Vienna,
and there was widespread outrage at Czech assertions that Parliament
was being manipulated by certain forces.^2
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The first contacts at international level were made by the KPOe,
whose leadere Muhri made contact with the Czech Politburo member Vasil
Bilak.193 At Government level the 'normal' unsteady equilibrium was
reestablished.
On the local level, the Czech border is the most potent example of
an Iron Curtain in Austria. Unlike border regions with virtually all
of Austria's neighbours, those near Czechoslovakia have suffered from
1 94
longterm disinvestment and depopulation. ^ There is virtually no local
traffic, and Northern Lower Austria has suffered the steepest
1 QC
population decline of any region in Austria. J This can be traced by
the failure to develop cordiality and openness at State level.
Austrians must still apply for Visas for travel to Czechoslovakia, a
requirement now removed at all other frontiers. The Austrian
Government has faced severe problems in invigorating the local
economies along the border and it remains a natter of profound regret.
It is also in marked contrast to the close historical connections
which existed between communities, such as Brno and Bratislava with
Vienna and Ceske Budejovice (Budweis) with Linz.
In part, Austria's relations to Czechoslovakia must be set in
another context. Although they may appear poor in comparison with
relations with Budapest, Czech relationships to all western countries
have remained strained since 1968. It seems unlikely that there will
be any major improvement until there is a change in attitude in Prague
and Moscow. These are after all foreign relations and in a
relationsnip there must oe two partners. Relationships with
neighbouring states have the extra dimension that they have effects
not only on the governmental level but on the local and hence the
personal level also. Relationships cannot be considered truly stable
until the personal aspect of contact and freedom of movement is
satisfied.
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Austria's neutrality has certainly helped to reduce the military
antagonism and cooperation has been possible in some areas
(electricity supply, Danube Convention). There have also been major
battles over issues such as atomic power and pollution. The Czech
experience is nevertheless a reminder that even States who make
detente and peaceful coexistence the central plank of their foreign
policy are not assured of the willingness of others to seek detente
with them.
Austria and Switzerland.
Mucn of what is written on Austria's relationship with her western
neighbour is of the nature of comparative studies or have concentrated
on developments and divergences in neutrality policy. We have already
dealt in some detail with the models of neutrality and will examine
further aspects below (UN membership, military policy). The joint
approaches to the EEC have also been dealt with elsewhere and hence I
wish here only to identify bilateral aspects of the relationship which
are not covered by the various other areas.
Economically, Switzerland has developed much closer ties with
Austria since the war, especially through neutrality and EFTA.
Nevertneless Austria and Switzerland have never been close
international partners except in the Western province of vorarlberg.
This was in part due to terrain and also due to the fact that Habsburg
ambitions were directed to German and Slavic lands. On a simple
geograpnical basis, Vienna is further from the Swiss border than from
any other frontier. In modern times, the Swiss frontier has been the
securest of Austria's borders in military terms.
Swiss investment in Austria has been considerable since World War
11-*-96 gj-jci Switzerland further acts acts as a base for investment for
multinationals in Europe.
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Chancellor Raab made his first visit abroad after the establishment
, , _ , . . . „ .. t , 197 It became almostof the Second Republic to Switzerland.-1^'
traditional that the first foreign visit of every new Chancellor is to
Switzerland. This is of course linked to the desire in Austria to
establish the centrality of neutrality on the Swiss model to Aust 'an
thinking. Both countries have sought to avoid any impression of a
quasi-alliance, and are anxious not to be seen as interfering in tne
determination of neutrality policy. As we have seen the result has
been two divergent models. Thus Austria comes under the Swiss maxim;
198
"The Swiss worldview is not to view the world"
This has not stopped several senior Austrian politicians openly
admiring the capitalist political model that has developed in the West
(eg Toncic-Sorinj, Mock)-^ and suggesting that Switzerland should be
the political model for Austrian neutrality as well as the legal
predecessor.
One major hiccup in Austro-Swiss relations came after the Kreisky
government's decision to implement a reduced version of its election
pledges on the Bundesneer and military service;
"Doubt about the effectiveness and credibility of Austrian defence
preparedness was raised by Helmut Schmidt (but also by his Swiss
colleague Rudolf Gnaegi) at the beginning of the 1970s at the time of
cuts in military spending in Austria."^
Fears about the development of a military vacuum emerging in
Austria will be examined at a later stage, suffice to say that there
has been little public comment on this (matter from Switzerland since
then.
Establishment writers in botn Switzerland and Austria have been at
pains to underline the basic similarity between the two countries in
order to make legal and political capital as we have seen. In 1986, a
series in the Austrian news magazine 'Profii'201 pointed out some of
the advances in relations. While relations are effectively free of
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major division they are not truly intimate. This is in part due to a
reluctance on the part of the Swiss to develop close relations, but
more significantly to the historical need in Austria to concentrate on
the Superpowers and Germany. Nevertheless, Austria is always content
to be a partner of Switzerland at international level. At CSCE , both
cooperated within the 'N + N' group. In 1984 a new consular treaty
came into force wnereby each country represented tne other in areas
where only one of the two countries had diplomatic missions.
Vorarlberg has strong local connections with Switzerland including
shared cultural and linguistic traditions. In 1919, there were
attempts to join the Swiss Confederation but tnese foundered on the
rock of Swiss, Allied and Austrian objection. There are strong
provincial connections with the neighbouring Swiss canton of St.
Gallen and there is considerable employment commuting, mostly from
Austria into higher-waged Switzerland.
Conclusions
We are thus left to draw somewhat surprising conclusions. In many
ways, Austria has been most successful in managing her relations with
her potentially more difficult partners in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Here there has been a clear discontinuity of relationship since world
War II and previous problems (eg dating from the monarcny) have been
obviously superceded, in both cases Austria has been replaced as an
'identified threat' by another power or group. In the case of the
populace of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union is now
the clear occupier, while in terms of the regime NATO as a military
unit is now a much greater worry than Austria. While Austrian and
Hungarian historians meet to revise official histories of the Habsburg
monarchy and agree that the empire can no longer be simply described
as 'a prison for free peoples', relations at a bilateral level are a
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remarkable example of detente, unique in the postwar experience. The
continued success of this relationship is perhaps the most hopeful
sign for detente in Europe now remaining. Relations with
Czechoslovakia are, as we have seen , difficult on a practical level.
Yet within this framework, Austria has successfully managed to prevent
any escalation of military tension without retreating into an
apolitical or apathetic position. In this sense, Austria has refused
to become dominated by the Iron Curtain although taking note of its
existence. As Kreisky pointed out, Austrian awareness of Czech
issues is still a very important factor for dissidents.
Relations with Austria's western neighbours are on the other hand
quite the reverse. On a superficial level, and in official
communiques, they are without problem. Certainly there are not the
systemic divisions apparent in relations with the Eastern Bloc. Yet
here we must make a clear distinction between official government
statements and the latent (cultural) undertones. As we have seen,
relations with Belgrade and Rome function satisfactorily only as long
as the frontier ethnic disputes which continue to exist are ignored or
pushed aside. If they become issues affecting the political core,
which they have done in the past and threaten to do in the future,
bilateral official relationships may become more difficult. Austria
has been remarkably successful at steering practical arrangements
around emotional problems eg Karawanken tunnel, ArgeAlp, ArgeOst etc.
Nevertheless, where human issues, deeply felt, come into play the
structure looks remarkably fragile. In the case of these relationships
it can be truly said 'Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait
point'. The EEC developments have given Vienna a direct interest in
developing wider contacts. If either of these reasons should change,
there is little to suggest that cultural problems have been
satisfactorily addressed and that the problems will not reemerge.
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Typically, this danger is not recognised or admitted - a phenomenon
common to many aspects of Austria's post-1955 balance. In part this
can be attributed to a fear that recognition may encourage the
instability.
Relations with West Germany remain highly problematic. The
problems of economic over-reliance are nowhere admitted, nor are the
political or even military implications addressed. The attacks by the
West German press on recent Austrian practice (eg Der Spiegel, Die
Zeit etc) suggest an underlying resentment in West German circles at
Austrian ability to redirect all of Europes accusing fingers away from
herself. The degree to which West German attacks must be repelled
from the highest level, suggests a highly unstable equilibrium. Most
worryingly, any suggestion to Austrian politicians that instability is
integral to Austria's postwar settlement or that there is a political
danger in Austria's economic overreliance on the West German
economy are rejected as nonsense, and there is an attempt to underline
successes. The impression is left that while relations witn Hungary
and, to the extent that they exist with Czechoslovakia, are based on
solid foundations, those with West Germany are based on sand.
I am not here suggesting that Austria has not contributed to a
remarkably stable equilibrium in Central Europe. What is more
striking, however, is that the mainstay of this equilibrium - perfect
relations with the West - is fundamentally unstable. The Reder and
Waldheim affairs and the Austrian, West German and wider international
rections certainly suggest that the official version of Austria's
position may be seeking to divert attention from the underlying
problems.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Austria and the East/West problem
Fortunately for M. de Renal's
reputation as an administrator, a
huge supporting wall was urgently
needed for a public promenade... This
disadvantage, which affected
everyone, placed M. de Renal in the
happy necessity of winning immortal
fame for his administration..
Stendhal, 'Le Rouge et le Noir', Ch 2
On 15th May 1985, the Foreign Ministers of the four States which
had signed the State Treaty gathered in Vienna to commemorate the 30tn
anniversary of the agreement. They hailed Austria as a model success
in international relations and the celebration itself was followed by
a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and USA to try to
reduce tension in the 1980s.
Newspaper columnists throughout the world joined in the
congratulations;
"Austria is one of the great economic and political successes of
the postwar period...it serves as an example of how East and West can
live together"-'-
'Tne Tines' headed its editorial 'Thanks to Khruschev - and NATO.'^
Amongst all this self-congratulation on behalf of the Austrians and
their partners, it was clear tnat while Austria's economic success was
important the most important role of Austria was in the East/West
division which has existed in Europe effectively since the end of
World War 2. Britain's Foreign Secretary said that Austria..
"served as a model of what we now should be trying to achieve in
East/West relations."3
In this chapter we will be concerned to look at Austria from the
perspective of the East-West divide which gave Austrian neutrality
its birth. We will consider the perspectives on Austria's role and
function which have been derived from experience of this quasi-
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conflict, although to understand the domestic controversies which have
arisen we must consider detente in the context of Austria's
increasingly global interests. For this reason, we will concentrate
here on the importance of detente for Austria and a more detailed
analysis of specific policy issues, leaving an assessment of internal
division over the content of policy until the next chapter.
From the perspective of strategic power politics Austria's 'role'
or 'function' is defined as part of detente. Indeed one could be
forgiven for believing that it is the sole object of Austria's
existence if one read literature published in the signatory States.
While objecting to this facile circumscription of Austrian Foreign
Affairs, it must be admitted that the overriding problem of the Iron
Curtain has preoccupied the thinking of Austrian politicians. It is
within the context of the East/West conflict that Austria's permanent
neutrality can be most easily understood, both through its roots as a
function of the 1955 Treaty and in the threat to world Peace which the
East/West divide provides.
In the EEC debate, we saw the unstable triangular relationship
between the USSR the EEC and Austria which was fundamental to an
understanding of the 1972 agreements. On the problem of peace, the
triangular construction is again informative.
"Austria's neutrality is above all military. It looks westward in
every other respect although for geographical as well as historical
and political reasons it maintains exceptionally good relations with
its East European neighbours. When detente was the order of the day
this posed no problem as Austria could claim to play an active role in
encouraging better East/West relations. The end of detente has caused
friction with the US over technology transfer to the eastern bloc and
brought strong denunciation from the Soviet Union and its allies about
plans to modernise Austria's tiny air force and defences."^
We have already seen that the success of Austrian policy depends on
tne fundamental Western/neutral dichotomy remaining an 'efficient
secret'. Austria has, on a local level, been able to achieve
stability more easily in her role as East/West bridge tnan in her
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historically complex and domestically controversial relations with
other neighbours. We will now look at how the wider dimensions of
East/West relations and the threat of World War have influenced both
Austria's foreign policy in specific interests and enforced a new
approach to neutrality.
Oenlinger in the 1970s offered a view of neutrality; he began by
asserting that it takes its point of reference from war. It is then
arranged in layers around this possible breach of normal conditions;
precautions in a case of conflict, precautions against secondary pre-
conflict effects which in turn flows easily into the sphere of
politics under neutrality whose maxims are only indirectly determined
by 'war'. Thus politics effects the entire gamut of civilian and
military affairs.
While this definition already represents a development away from
the pure classical model, it remains unsatisfactory as a description of
reality. In looking at post-nuclear Europe, we must accept tnat 'war' has
become divided into two parts; military clashes and permanent military
hostility. This second area has in fact dominated European strategic
thinking for forty years under the name of the 'Cold War' and it is a
reality which is nere as easily classified as war than as peace. Its
weapons are political and human and it has gone through periods of
greater and lesser tension. Austria's own existence is thanks to one
of the periods of lesser tension. Into this real conflict neutrality
in Austria was born and within these parameters rather than the
traditional Liberal norms Austrian neutrality has a role. It is this
permanent conflict as much as outright war which has become a 'core'
concern of policy makers, joining rather than ousting 'war' in its old
form as the reference point for neutrality. It is the reality of this
which has forced Austria into new radical departures from traditional
concepts of neutrality. The two European military-economic groupings
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between which Austria has to find a suitable role are now dominated by-
Cold War as much as by actual military war. The existence of weapons
of ultimate destruction has led to the substitution of this form of
hostility for the old forms, and the NATO and Warsaw Pact structures
are geared to both Cold and Traditional types of war. Politics is now
clearly as relevant to the maintenance of peace as legal norms
established in a less uncertain age or indeed of military capacity.
It is no longer a mere 'outer layer' but a direct consequence of the
new circumstances.
It might be objected that Cold War is still preferable to actual
war and is substantially different from classical notions, indeed one
might argue that it is the only alternative. I can only respond that
modern 'war' which Cold War replaces is also so substantially
different in scope and implications from tnat envisaged in the Hague
Conventions that it is not a relevant base on which States can base
their existence or policies. The survival of communities has never
before faced such a threat from manmade sources. In other words,
technological development has meant that if a European war takes
place, neutrality would quickly become an irrelevance and its
avoidance is not a matter of status within or without military
alliances. Neutrality in the context of the Cold War has considerable
scope and indeed in the Austrian case speaks directly to the conflict.
Other less devastating wars might also allow one to speak of
neutrality although this is likely merely to place the permanently
neutral states alongside many aligned States. Nevertheless with this
in mind we can speak of wartime neutrality in a traditional sense but
only in conjunction with a recognition of its relegation. The reality
of 30 years of Austrian neutrality is that it has been most relevant
and potent in a cross Iron Curtain context. Hence the divides of
Swiss terminology between 'neutrality' and 'foreign' policy become
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more blurred.
The State Treaty as part of the detente process
The agreement between the four powers of the victorious wartime
alliance over Austria was one of the most notable achievements of
detente since 1945. The sudden relaxation of Soviet attitudes was
seized upon by alert Austrian politicians and diplomats so that by May
1955 a State Treaty could be signed in an atmosphere of mutual
congratulation. The withdrawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops is the
only such negotiated withdrawal since World War II and as such must
rank as the most far-reaching territorial agreement of the Cold War.
Politicians in many countries were to use the Austrian settlement as
an example of what might be possible in Europe. Gaitskell felt that
it disproved the cynics who claimed;
"..that the Russians are never prepared to make agreements. This
is quite obviously untrue - they signed an agreement over Austria."^
We shall not deal here with tne intended or unintended signals
which the State Treaty gave to West Germany. Suffice to say that
there have been no similar withdrawals from allied or occupied
countries by either military bloc since the treaty.
It has been a concern of Austrian apologists to try and define a
'role' for the new neutral Austria in Europe. As Kirschlaeger, then
Aw
Foreign Minister, conmented;
"Whoever has no function in the community of States has a
permanently endangered existence, as historical experience shows,
declarations and even treaties offer less protection for the existence
of a State and its independence than the usefulness of the tasks which
a State has to fulfil"'
For many, the problem has been to reconcile the possibilities
offered by Austria's unique position in central Europe with the
limitations imposed by her small size. The leading OeVP foreign
policy spokesman, Franz Karasek, spoke for many when he said;
"Since 1968 the Austrian feels himself too small all of a sudden,
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too unimportant, too irrelevant... Yet humanity has become a great
'community of destiny' in the light of the bomb. As a result, there
is a responsibility for the running of events which no people in the
world can withdraw from."^
In the period of the Hungarian crisis and later in the Czech and
Polish crises, Austria's role as a receiver of refugees was more
concrete. At the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,
the Neutrals and Non-aligned countries were to be among the most
active and throughout the period of detente Austria's function as a
middle territory was relatively obvious and widely acclaimed.
Waldheim commented on this as Foreign Minister when he said;
"The art of our diplomacy must consist in reforming the condition
of the balance of power by using all the means available to legally
secure the existence of Austria.^
This might be best achieved by using Austria's neutral status as a
negotiating location between East and West or by seeking political
goals wnich recognise tne real problems. Politicians seek to minimise
the ability of smaller actors than themselves to interrupt their own
plans. Under the SPOe there was an attanpt to manipulate this into a
creative tension between Austria's opportunities and her limitations.
As Kreisky pointed out in Moscow;
"I do not wish on any account to exaggerate the importance of small
neutral States, but I think that they fulfil a useful task alone
through the fact that they provide a territorial precondition for the
meeting of antagonists. A second not unimportant precondition of
detente is created through Austria's policy of normalisation with her
Eastern Bloc neighbours."-^
This illustrates the degree to whicn in the hands of a skilled
communicator the achievements of a small country could be magnified
against a background painted as fraught with difficulties. Kreisky
was keen not to commit Austria to any role such as intermediary in
Great Power disputes, maintaining tnat in the long run this can only
be successful if carried out by the powers themselves. Nevertheless
Austria's geographical position alone gives Austria a considerable
forum for activity. Together with United Nations activism and refugee
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policy, Austria's regional detente policy has been the most powerful
contribution to the reduction of tension. As Kreisky pointed out;
"They [small States] are involved everywhere... Yet it is in fact
the sign of European detente that no small State in Europe is involved
in the conflict of the larger ones."11
The four signatory powers have taken little direct interest in the
domestic affairs of the State and indeed this has led some to complain
of total disinterest especially in the West. In foreign policy terms
the Eastern Bloc has been more concerned. The Runanian Foreign
Minister, Manescu, spoke for many when he gave this official
evaluation of Austria's role;
"We consider Austria's neutrality a positive factor in the
relations between the States of Central and South East Europe and in
the international situation as a whole."-^
The USSR was anxious to point to the example of Austria for much of
the period after 1955. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in
Geneva in 1959 Gromyko said of the State Treaty;
"This act had the result of a considerable improvement of the
political climate in Europe, as everyone remembers and is an example
of how large the unused possibilities and reserves are.""^
Other international figures such as West Germany's Helmut Schmidt
spoke of Austria's influence being much greater than her physical or
economic size and of the importance of the city of Vienna for the
improvement of East/West contact.^
More cynical commentators on Soviet policy have been quick to
debunk all talk of a real role for neutral States, maintaining that
there is an 'essential assymetry' in East and West European designs on
neutrals which..
"leaves no room for a convergence of policies of reconciliation.
Active mediation by the European Neutrals as a consequence is a role
witnout attainable purpose beyond that of providing assistance to gain
time in efforts to prevent war. Detente in this relationsnip has
unfortunately been little more than a common denominator for
fundamentally different policies."-^
Yet this is a very «h;ub6 und easy over-simplification does not take
account of the progress made at local level, the very fact of the
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military distance between the opposing forces created by the existence
of Austrian neutrality and the equally (if not more) limited
contribution of comparably sized States within the Alliance structure.
If nothing else the neutrals unlike the Allied States are able to
break ranks with the superpowers much more easily. In times of
tension these factors can all make a contribution. The degree to
which Austria and Hungary have maintained and developed their
bilateral relations has teen very important for the continuation of
military and political stability in South and Central Europe. By not
being a contributor to East/West polarisation, Austria has made
possible a neutralised zone in Cental Europe. Neutrals like all small
States may be unable to impose their views but they may be
considerably freer to propose or mediate than small States in tne
blocs and seam able to use their position to propose and mediate ideas
which might otnerwise be rejected.
The overlap between neutrality and foreign policy in Austria has
grown since the State Treaty. The necessity for this activisation of
neutrality stems in part from radical changes in the wider environment
and particularity in the nature and range of War. Austria has also
contributed herself to this process with a clear desire on the part of
the political establishment to avoid a repetition of the international
neglect whicn hastened the Anschluss in 1938. Kreisky commented;
"After the signing of the State Treaty, as Austria had committed
herself to perpetual neutrality, it was our concern not to use this
neutrality as an excuse for a policy of isolation...but we gave our
Foreign Policy a global aspect and therefore by definition an active
character.
Active Neutrality, pioneered in one sense by Sweden under the title
NOT alignment, has become the most obvious distinction between Swiss
and Austrian practice. The emergence of two separate models became
most obvious after 1967 and the failure of the EEC negotiations in
Brussels when Waldheim emphasised that Austria needed to be active in
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all the forums of world politics.-,q The concentration of the early
1970s on CSCE matched that of other countries bound as they were to
particular allies. Yet Austria's geopolitical position necessitated a
much longer term commitment to some form of detente than that of other
countries. Austria's assumption is that East/West tension is the
obstcxlfl-
major factor in pan-European relations and the main object to Austria's
expansion of trade and economy. Austria thus works towards detente
"..not on account of ideological indifference but because we are
convinced that there is no sensible alternative. We do not understand
it as a policy of appeasement but of a continual struggle to find a
modus vivendi."^
Neutrality has provided the means for Austria to minimise this
instability. The assumption that the East/West dimension is the only
one of importance nas now come under attack from those demanding a
global approach eg former Foreign Minister, Erwin Lane;
"One can no longer speak of a 'bipolar' world... The relationships
are much more complex.
Thus the ability to work simultaneously on several levels has
become much more important. Within this scenario Austria has
considerably more scope than is widely assured;
"The Austrian is not all that certain that he is at home in the big
wide world... Every second self-description begins with the
qualification that we are above all a small country with naturally
limited perspective and ability to act. Within this is a bit of tne
coquette. This coquetterie is expressed by the saying 'dont make
yourself so small, you're not that important."'^
The result is an inability to find a balance between under¬
estimation and overinflation of one's own position. Luckily on a more
concrete level there exists considerable past evidence of areas where
Austria has acted with considerable effect. The incentive of a
disturbing historical legacy is to take a defined and active role in a
more positive context, and this the Cold War scenario has provided for
Austria. The added incentive that the search for peace can be painted
in glowing moral terms goes some way to explaining the image of the
296
'Island of the Blessed' juxtaposed against the image of a nation
unable to come to terms with its previous history.
Refugee Policy
Since the Second World War, Austria has served as a destination for
refugees particularily from the Eastern Bloc. In the earliest
postwar period there were large numbers of German-speaking refugees
driven from their homes or seeking to flee from Russian occupation.
Although tne majority made their way to the emergent West Germany,
several hundred thousand remained in Austria. In the debate on the
Neutrality Act in the Nationalrat Chancellor Raab made it clear that
it was Austria's intention to maintain her liberal policy on political
asylum as a part of ner neutral status;
"The right of asylum will remain in Austria in all its fullness, as
is right in a free and democratic nation."
As we have already seen, Austria's policy was put to the test as
early as 1956 when the populace and government reacted immediately to
the wave of Hungarian refugees. Austria committed herself to a
comprehensive policy of aid for political refugees in cooperation with
the UN agency responsible UNREF.24 Nevertheless, problems existed in
the sneer weight of numbers arriving. As time progressed the numbers
of long term inhabitants in refugee camps also rose while there were
several major health problems. In addition there were large numbers
of old, sick and difficult cases adding to the already high costs of
the operation. As we have seen, the UN voted thanks to Austria for
her role as a refugee reception country.
e>
The 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia also led to a rise in the number
of those seeking asylum, though the numbers and speed of the crisis
were more restricted. Throughout the early 1970s the number of people
seeking asylum declined to an annual level of below 2,000 per annum.
This included the first large intake of refugees from the developing
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world when 1,550 Ugandan Asians arrived in 1972. Two years later, 200
Chileans sought refuge from the Pinochet regime, a figure which had
risen to 700 by 1981. In 1975, the first Far Eastern refugees arrived
(200).25 Yet the concentration has tended to be on Austria's role as
receiver for refugees from Eastern Europe, for whom Austria is the
preferred destination. Sometimes they arrive as tourists over the so-
called Green Border between Austria and Yugoslavia.
The deterioration of international relations has a direct if
imprecise effect on the numbers of refugees leaving Eastern Europe.
From 1976 when there were approximately 2,000 applications for
political asylum, the numbers rose sharply so that by 1979 the numbers
stood at 6,000.2^ ^ we see^ tj-,e polish crisis of 1980-1 pushed
the totals much higher, and in 1981 there were some 35,000
applications. After the imposition of travel restictions under
martial law the numbers dropped sharply and have stabilised at 5-6,000
97
annually.
By July 1981 there were 200 people per day arriving at Traiskirchen
Refugee Camp. The camp, built for 1,500 people, already housed 2,500.
The result was a further overstretching of the Austrian Governments,
already relatively established refugee system.28 rphere was
considerable anger at the failure of Western countries to match their
political rhetoric with positive action and accept refugees
themselves. By November 1981 of 27,000 Poles newly arrived, only
6,000 had found permanent homes. The Austrians estimated that over
AS1,000m was spent by the Austrian Government on aid for polish
refugees. By late November there was rising pressure in Austria for
the introduction of compulsory entry visas for Poles.29 The
imposition of martial law and the subsequent sharp reduction in the
numbers of Poles arriving relieved the situation somewhat, and there
was a slow movement of refugees to other destinations especially in
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North America and Australasia.
The question of further iirmigration remains controversial. If a
refugee is not granted permanent residence in Austria, he/she may seek
to emigrate. Receiver countries for immigranmts have now been largely
reduced to Australia, Canada and USA. West European and Scandinavian
countries are only prepared to act during extraordinary influxes. If
a refugee fails to find a destination, he/she is confined to the
official camps without real employment. It appears that destination
countries are more willing to help where refugees are clearly victims
of East/West politics. Economic value (eg youth, profession etc.) is
also treated generously. Where the refugee comes from a country not
considered to be part of this crisis especially if there is suspicion
that they are trying to manipulate 'Gastarbeiter' status, eg
Yugoslavs, he or she may even fail to be given an interview.
Refugees who do receive direct recognition in Austria are then
granted full status including residence permits, access to social
security benefits and work permits. Under these cirumstances, the
state of the economic cycle may well determine the generosity of tne
policy despite the Geneva Convention. Nevertheless Austria has an
active record in this area of humanitarian aid. This has created
difficulties when the policy involves refugees from or for the Middle
East (see the Mar^chegg incident 1973).
Refugee Policy has cost an estimated AS6.5bn since 1945.^1 In that
period Austria has been a stopping point for some 1,750,000 refugees
at some point in their flight.^ Austria's neutral status has no
doubt increased the ease by which Austria can carry out this policy.
As Erhard Busek points out, this is one area in which a human aspect
of the Cold War can be dealt with by a neutral where the intervention
of an allied country would be less effective. Austria has herself
accepted a considerable number of refugees as permanent residents,
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such that one in every 246 residents had been a refugee in 1985 (cf.
Switzerland 1:150, UK 1:390, Sweden 1:416, West Germany 1:617).32 It:
should be pointed out however that only 5% of all refugees are in
Europe although Austria has taken a considerable share of this number.
Within the context of East/West, relations, this has been an
important contribution. Austria's neutrality ensures that it does not
become an immediate political football of a crass East/West type.
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
Austria as a smaller State and, as we have seen, as a State within
the German 'Rechtsstaat' tradition, tends to support efforts to
legally enshrine her national security.
"Austria proclaims her allegiance to the fundamental principles of
our western tradition in her international relations, to loyalty to
treaties (pacta sunt servanda) to repect for accepted obligations and
to the principle of 'Right before might'."33
This tradition and the geopolitics of the Iron Curtain made Austria
an enthusiastic supporter of detente as it developed through the 1960s
and 1970s. The highpoint of this movement was beyond doubt the
signing of an international agreement on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975.
The suggestion for such a conference came initially from the Soviet
Union, shortly after the fall from power of Khruschev (Report of the
Central Committee of the CPSU, March 1966). For many in the West this
was part of Soviet policy to reinforce and stabilise the political
divisions in Europe which had existed de facto since the end of World
War II. Additionally the USSR wanted to bring the East Germans into
the sphere of international negotiation as a fully recognised partner.
The early attempts at freezing the West out of Berlin had failed and
the propaganda round of the 1950s had failed to persuade Adenauer or
the West German electorate against membership of NATO.
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"The postwar 'possession ' of the Soviet Empire in the Wast was
thus still in doubt in legal terns, while support for the
reunification stance in West Germany remained an axiom of every NATO
meeting. In the face of these facts, Kj^ugche^Is successors were
obviously intent on achieving new ways eeegnftrnn by the international
community for the status quo in Eastern arid Central Europe."^
The situation in Vietnam together with deteriorating Sino-Soviet
relations also encouraged the USSR to seek this 'Ausgleich' in the
European situation. They thus sought to emphasise the doctrine of
peaceful coexistence and to intensify economic exchange between the
blocs, while remaining anxious to encourage scientific and tecnnical
exchange (more likely in an atmosphere of detente than one of
confrontation).
From a Soviet point of view, the Czechoslovakian crisis appeared as
a problem internal to her sphere of influence, now propounded in
intellectual circles as the so-called 'Brezhnev doctrine'. The
political repercussions of the Czech invasion were remarkably limited
and the USSR found increasingly positive response to its proposals.
In Austria the OeVP as governing party accepted the idea of a
security conference in principle as early as 1969. It was the SPOe
government of Bruno Kreisky however which was to be most closely
associated with Austria's contribution. Enthusiasm for CSCE was
tempered by a fear of Soviet intentions.
"Enthusiasm for CSCE as a real instrument for the improvement of
individual security and extension of freedom of action in foreign
policy was not equal everywhere appearing greatest in governments made
up of left-wing parties."-"
Nevertheless, even in traditionally cautious Switzerland, agreement
on participation was reached. Another neutral, Finland, had by now
undertaken the role of organiser and had issued the first official
invitations for the setting up of a conference. This was indicative
of the degree of involvement and the role of honest brokers which tne
neutral States were to maintain throughout the negotiations.
The Austrian Government for its part took up tne issue of the
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conference with considerable cross party agreement, and the first
official statement was made in July 1970 when the Government issued
its 'Memorandum to all European Governments, USA and Canada';
"The Republic of Austria as a permanently neutral State between the
great military blocs, has a natural interest in all genuine efforts
towards detente. The suggestion of calling a conference which would
deal with questions of Security and Co-operation in Europe was
therefore favourably viewed from the beginning."^
In the memorandum, the Austrians focussed on the stategic elements
contained in the proposals underlining their policy of two-sided
reduction of military potential;
"Because of her own longterm geographical and military position and
because of the military realities in Europe, Austria believes that
longterm progress can only be expected if the Conference whicn deals
with Security in Europe also leads to consultation on and the solution
of the central security question, ie a mutual and equal reduction in
military power."36
Austria offered to join Finland in providing facilities for
preparatory discussions at 'expert' level.
As early as 1971, Kreisky introduced the proposal that any
conference on European Security must deal with the crisis in the
Middle East;
"I believe - though I am well aware that many people on many sides
will react with annoyance to this reflection - that a Security
Conference will not earn this name if there is not a place on its
agenda for the problem which poses a direct threat to the peace and
security of Europe at the present moment - the. nearby war in the
Middle East."-^
In making this assertion he was also developing his own personal
conviction into a national policy, a confusion which was to mark
Kreisky's association with the Middle East. In this instance, he was
loyally supported by Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirschlaeger. Despite
A
the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in 1973, it did not prove possible
to persuade sufficient numbers in the CSCE to support him. On the
grounds that the issue was not sufficiently European, it did not
appear as an official part of the Conference. The USSR and USA
appeared anxious not to threaten their hoped-for status quo
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arrangement in Europe and Israel reacted angrily to Kreisky's
suggestion. Subsequent events tend to support Kreisky's assertion
that the Middle East remains a source of instability threatening
Europe. Nevertheless, his insistence that the problem appear on the
agenda of CSCE required considerable diplomatic effort on the part of
the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
"The timin<^_of the Kreisky suggestion (Council of Europe, Feb.
1972) left Kirschlaeger in a deeply embarrassing situation. The
Foreign Minister - at the same time involved in difficult negotiations
with Gromyko and Kosygin in Moscow- knew what the Chancellor intended
to say in Strasbourg but ^ould not communicate the text of Kreisky's
speech to the unprepared and surprised Russians. The atmosphere at
the discussions became rimarkably more unfriendly."-^
By February 1973, the Austrians had reduced their demands to a
request for a discussion on a European contribution to peace in the
Middle East.
Nevertheless, despite this lack of success the Austrians co¬
operated with other neutral and non-aligned countries in proposing and
negotiating other areas of the treaty. Both geographical position and
neutrality ensured that Austria would take an active role in the
content of the agreement especially in the area of security. Despite
the fact that no united front between the neutrals was ever negotiated
a high level of informal co-operation and consultation emerged.
Switzerland proposed a system of compulsory arbitration in all
conflicts in Europe. This was in line with the juridical tradition of
obV'gpttex-vj
Swiss neutrality. The proposal expressly suggested an obligitory court
which would be empowered to adjudicate the justice of the claims of
the various States.^ The Austrians were supportive of this proposal
though they suggested a slightly more flexible mechanism.^0 As might
have been expected the larger states were very unenthusiatic about the
idea, underlining the fruitlessness of an idea of abstract legality as
a principle of international relations. Such an objection has never
before stopped the Swiss jurists from trying.
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Nevertheless, Switzerland played an important role in the final
agreement when she was made responsible for its structure and the
'Basket' system which finally resulted. The neutrals began to develop
a collective identity as the negotiations continued. Austria openly
called for human rights principles to be part of the agreement as..
"one of the principles which will guide the mutual relations of
the particpants. ^
Austria put emphasis on the need to ease travel restrictions and
create easier movement of newspapers and information. The neutrals
also jointly proposed (and saw accepted) a resolution which provided
for a 30 day notification of all military manoeuvres including those
at sea and in the air.^ By tne time of the signing of the Final Act,
the so called 'N + N' group had made a substantial contribution to the
text of the agreement.
For Austria CSCE was of more than passing significance.
ch
Kirschlaeger summed up its importance as follows;
A
"For a small State with these special considerations, the securing
of peace through foreign policy has become a very essential part of
our international relations. ^
Tnis can be seen as a tacit admission that the Cold War had
introduced a political elauent into neutrality which was as essential
as the military or legal sections of the status and indeed was the
basis on which the legal and military aspects were revitalised. CSCE
provided an opportunity to enter into dialogue with all States in
Europe and North America and attempt to broaden its scope so as not
merely to confirm a 'Great Power'; status quo but also to reassert an
independent element. Here, as we shall see neutrality proved a
considerable advantage.
Clearly Yugoslavia, Finland and Austria have a common political
need to encourage a relaxation of East/West tension given their
geographical location. The neutrals did not form a group so as to act
out a role as the 'Good Samaritans' of Europe. This is particularily
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apparent in the field of Basket 1 (Security). At the conference,
Austria co-ordinated the editorship of all agreements regarding 'human
contacts' and 'military aspects of security', Switzerland undertook
similar functions on 'information' and Sweden for 'education and
learning'. Interestingly, divisions between States on textual matters
were not always on the basis of East/West dichotomy but sometimes
between the Great Powers and the N + N States (together with a
collection of other small countries). This tends to support the
thesis that at such tines the concept of 'small States' with small
State behaviour has some validity.
In an analysis of the text of Basket 1, Hopmann found that the N +
N Group proposed seme 33.7% of the final wording. Of this, Yugoslavia
was the most active (59.9% of this proportion) followed by Sweden,
Austria, Switzerland and Finland often acting in concert. Yugoslavia
was the single largest contributor to the final text of Basket 1. The
neutrals were able to propose compromise texts where East and West
were divided. The USSR suggested exchanges of military observers
under mutually acceptable conditions^, the UK preferring some more
rigorous arrangement. In the end a joint N + N proposal was accepted
whereby the wording was altered to-read
"at each State's own discretion as a sign of goodwill and with due
regard for reciprocity."4^
The neutrals also contributed to otner areas of the treaty.
Austria proposed a common energy and raw materials fund and wider co¬
operation on third world issues. In the Human Rights section, she
48also proposed an Initiative for better dissemination.
At the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki, Kreisky again returned
to the theme of the Middle East, and underlined the need to extend the
implications of CSCE to a wider global context. In many ways it was
the symbolism of the actual signing of a postwar East/West agreement
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which was most important. The fragility of its actual contents was
/»L
already apparent. Kirschlaeger wrote that it was a mistake to believe
A
that a fundamental change had taken place;
"Viewed realistically, Helsinki seems to me to be a programme of
work that in some parts between some States was already fulfilled at
the time of signing, for example in the case of Austria's relations
with her neighbours., and in other parts or between other States it
still has to be created with great patience and effort."^
So it was to prove, and the post-1976 period has been one of
virtually uninterrupted deterioration in East/West relations. As we
have observed elsewhere Austria's 'local' politics remain an
exception. Austria took a cautious approach to President Carter's
amphasis on 'Human Rights' and preferred a policy of stealth;
"We cannot remain silent about the basis of our ideological
position... However, we must avoid any superfluous overemotional
outburst in order not to give those who already see some of the
clauses of the final act as a burden any excuse to question the
continuation of this development."^
On the whole, this deterioration was already very apparent by the
time of the Belgrade follow-up conference in 1978. The issue of
violations of some of the aspects of the Human Rights clauses in
Basket 3 had already become a matter of great controversy. Between
Belgrade and the mid-1980s a series of major crises returned the
situation to complete confrontation. We shall deal with these events
in detail below. Suffice to say that at a CSCE follow-up meeting in
1980, Austria's Foreign Minister, Willibald Pahr, was left pointing to
local achievements as evidence of real progress. Nevertheless the
commitment of Austria to this severely weakened process remained by
necessity total;
"The basis of communication which was created by CSCE and its
follow-ups must be maintained. Only on this basis of a permanent
dialogue can we come any nearer to the goals of detente. If this
meeting is a failure then we will all be losers."51
At Madrid in 1984, Austria remained an active participant proposing
in the context of Development Policy a 'Unitary Raw Materials Fund'.
Under Basket 3, Austria also took part in a joint initiative with
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Spain and Switzerland for better dissemination of information.
Nevertheless in many ways the problems had not changed. As had been
the case for the initial agreement, the N + N countries found
themselves able to propose considerable amounts, yet faced the veto of
one or both of the Superpowers. In many ways the other important role
lay in the psychological and strategic importance of dividing the
blocs physically, in many international negotiations, neutral
countries could act as host (eg CD, CSCE, SALT II, INF, START in
Geneva; MBFR, SALT I in Vienna, SALT I and CSCE in Helsinki, CBSBMD in
Stockholm and the presence of UN Centres in Geneva and Vienna.)
Austria's commitment to the process was never in question. The
theme of detente ran through the entire security and foreign policy of
the country under Kreisky. After 1972, integration with the EEC was
no longer an issue of public debate. The problems of South Tyrol had
also been removed from centre stage. As a result the effects of
East/West tension already central to Austrian political experience
since the war took on a new primacy. The result of all these cnanges
was a considerable strain on the now traditional bipartisan approach
to Foreign Policy. We will examine this in more detail below. First
we must examine the issues which changed the political climate in
Europe after Helsinki.
Afghanistan and the Olympic Boycott
The Afghanistan invasion in December 1979 precipitated a major
deterioration in East/West relations. Initially the Austrian
Government tried to remain outside the resulting round of Cold War
moves, although critical of the USSR. In the lignt of later criticism
that Austria was 'soft' on the USSR for opportunistic reasons it is
interesting to note how Austria's ambassador to the UN, Klestil,
defended;
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" Austria emphasised in its declaration that it could not remain
silent at the infringement of these principles... and that it must
therefore be demanded that tne troops be immediately withdrawn.
Austria had simultaneously declared that it would support the relevant
resolution, the first country to do so."52
Nevertheless Austria's failure to demand a recall of the Security
Council following the invasion was widely criticised.
"In March 1938, Mexico was the only country on earth that protested
against the occupation of Austria. In 1980 there were 43 States which
demanded a recall of the UN Security Council. Austria was not one of
these 43."
The domestic controversy took on international dimensions when at a
meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers in Rome, the British Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington suggested the "neutralisation of Afghanistan
on the Austrian mode."-^
There was an outraged reaction in the Viennese press. The
Austrians protested that comparison with Austria was invalid as such a
Carrington solution would involve the imposition of a plan from
outside whereas the Austrian model had been a voluntary political
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choice. The degree to which domestic and international sources
disagree on this interpretation is startling to say the least and of
considerable importance for the future security of a neutral State.
Kreisky himself reacted angrily;
"It does not seem to me to be a very appropriate comparison to
make. First and foremost because Austria was occupied by four Great
Powers 25 years ago which all had to withdraw simultaneously.
Afghanistan is only occupied by one power, its large neighbour,
however. That would imply more thoughts about a 'Finnish' solution.
However even this idea would be neither realistic nor appropriate."^
Kreisky then proposed a solution which shows a remarkable adnerence
to 'Great Power' mentality, suggesting the withdrawal of troops and
the establishment of a government loyal to the USSR.57 It is
interesting to speculate whether such Austrians as Kreisky also feel
that Germany could have legitimately demanded that Austria have a
satellite status in 1938.
Kreisky also sought to be highly critical of the USSR calling tne
308
invasion a major error of calculation^ ^ ^ , . , , . 1Out it contributed heavily to
the deterioration of Austria's relations with the USA. Kreisky
himself felt that the initial mistake had been made in response to the
revival of Muslim fundamentalism in Iran after the fall of the Shah.
He rejected any suggestion that the invasion of Afghanistan was part
CQ
of a wider-conceived plan of Soviet expansionism.-^ Had such a view
received widespread support Kreisky's policy of detente might have
come under increasing pressure at home also. Austro-US relations had
already been strained by a public row over sanctions against Iran.
The Austrians had objected to the US government's request for
sanctions being sent to them on the same basis as it had been
addressed to NATO allies. The underlying insecurity of Austrian
neutrality could seldom have been more openly exposed. At a point of
tension for tne USA, Austria was immediately included among the
'friendly nations'. Austria could not politically afford to accept
this title in the given context yet could not oppose the USA too
openly. The notion that neutrality in crises is entirely self-
determined remains a political nonsense.
The US suggestion that the Olympic Games in Moscow snould be
boycotted was also unpopular. Officially the government tried to
sidestep this stark choice between the Superpowers by leaving tne
decision to the National Olympic Committee. Yet in Austria this
attempt to pass the buck of political decision-making into the realm
of sport was rather unconvincing given the extent to which all major
sports organisations in Austria are dominated by the political parties
themselves. As Neuhold points out;
"The question of whether Austria got away with her legalistic
approach in the eyes of the States participating in the boycott,
especially in view of the fact that the Austrian Olympic Committee is
headed by leading Austrian politicians is still valid."^
With the backing of public opinion, Austria decided to take part in
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the Games. Only after balance appeared to return tnrough the Olympic
Boycott of 1984 was the uneasy feeling erased.
Poland and Eastern Bloc Debt
When the US Senate failed to ratify the SALT II Treaty signed in
Vienna by Carter and Brezhnev there was a further deterioration in
Austro-US relations. The vote signalled a rightward drift in US
politics confirmed by the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980.
The imposition of Martial Law in Poland by General Jaruzelski
precipitated an even more severe crisis for detente and indirectly for
Austria's relations with the United States. The attempt by the USA to
impose trade sanctions on Poland and the efforts to persuade West
European States to do likewise bxposed the financial insecurity of
Austrian relations with the Eastern Bloc and led to direct conflicts
of interest and policy with tne Reagan administration.
Austria had long supported the development of economic contacts
with the Eastern Bloc and for obvious reasons. As early as 1965,
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Kreisky made speeches in favour of increasing credits to the East.
As the oil crisis set in in Western economies and East European
economies also fell into recession, Kreisky continued to reject
suggestions that the rising level of debt to Eastern Europe posed a
significant problem for Austria's still-prosperous economy;
"The question is asked whether the debt is dangerous. I say
clearly that I do not consider it to be at all dangerous. The net
debt of all Comecon countries was approximately 3.5% of Gross National
Product in 1975... The level of debt does not appear to me to be in
any way alarming.""^
This can be seen as the response of a politician aware of the
importance of financial confidence in capitalist transactions. In
part, it must be considered an inaccurate assessment of the depth of
the East European depression. Particularily in Poland there was an
alarming acceleration in the level of debt.
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By April 1981, the Industrialists Organisation issued a special
statement in which they warned that the country was threatened by its
excessive dependence on Polish coal and the extent of the credits now
extended. Austria ranked fifth in terms of credit and first in per-
capita loans.63
The Polish crisis had already been a distinct possibility since the
founding of the Solidarity Trade Union and its rapid spread to all
sections of Polish industry and agriculture. During the growth of
Solidarity, Poland's indebtedness accelerated rapidly, indebtedness
to Austria alone rose from AS52bn in 1980 to AS60bn by June 1981. By
April 1981, Kreisky was warning the Socialist International meeting in
Amsterdam that should the Russians be forced to choose between
maintaining Poland as a Communist State and detente, they would choose^
the former.^ Speaking in Sofia, Bulgaria in May ne warned that while
the Government may need to be reestablished, the continuation of
detente depended on no intervention from outside sources;
"Every action of this type must lead inevitably to an end to the
detente process and for a long time to come."613
The danger of the process in Poland was already clear. Also in May
1981 Kreisky warned of the dire consquences of a mishandling of the
Polish crisis;
"Imagine for one moment, Poland suffered a fate similar to Hungary
or Czechoslovakia. How would those who in their parliaments speak so
strongly for disarmament come across? They would be shouted down, as
if they were preparing their own people for a similar fate as the
Poles. An arms race with no holds barred would be the result and all
hope of arms limitation, of substantive negotiations on these
questions would be ruined. All these observations must be put to the
Soviet Union."66
The vast increase in the number of people applying for political
asylum in Austria throughout 1981 underlined the extent of the crisis.
As we nave seen it led to considerable domestic controversy and
recriminations. In December 1981, the Austrians suspended their
agreement with Poland whereby Poles could enter Austria without a
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visa. In part the Government justified this action by claiming that a
high percentage of those applying for visas were not in any political
danger. Unlike the Hungarian and Czech refugees these people were
escaping a situation that had not yet reached military crisis. It was
estimated that there were 50,000 refugees in Austria at this time.
The costs threatened to reach over £25m in food and acconrnodation
alone. Austrian anger at Western response was heightened by a sense
that policy in Western capitals amounted to a dangerous attempt to
isolate Poland through an ill-conceived attempt at sanctions and a
simultaneous indifference to the wave of refugees flooding into
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Austria. The pressure for trade measures increased. Kreisky began
a vociferous campaign against this policy, convinced that a pragmatic
approach was essential. Any direct intervention would inevitably risk
all out war.^
Austria's trade exposure also put additional pressure on Government
policy. Austria ranked fifth among Poland's creditors, at £lbn by
January 1982. About 80% of the lending was covered by official export
guarantees, which provided some safety but left a large amount of
exposed dabt as well as considerable liabilities should Poland have
opted for bankruptcy instead of renegotiation of her debt. The fact
that a default in Poland mignt have a domino effect on other exposed
countries in Eastern Europe further threatened Austria's position and
that of other Western nations likewise exposed.^ By the end of 1981,
Comecon net debt to Austria had reached $lbn, an increase in over 25%
in one year. Although Austria accounted for only 5% of the West's
total exports to Eastern Europe, her share of bank loans was over
os. 70O o •
Anger with US policy became more apparent throughout 1982. He
openly attacked supposed American sympathy for polish Trade Unions,
71
given their own attitude to strikes and Trade Unions under Reagan.
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He suggested a humanitarian approach together with the Roman Catholic
Church, which he saw as the only organisation capable of administering
such a project. It may be worth noting at this point, the extent of
domestic political interest in the Polish crisis which emerged over
this period. Clearly concern over the flood of refugees created
considerable pressure, but the direct economic interest of Austrian
banking and trading interests was matched with a humanitarian concern
in other circles. This was marked both in the Catholic Church and in
the Trade Unions. As Kreisky remarked Poland appeared to be a country
of extraordinary symbolic importance for European peace.
"There are countries which have a vital significance for this
continent. Poland is undoubtedly one of these countries."^
The Austrian press devoted large amounts of space to developments
in Poland, (eg Profil devoted an entire edition entitled 'Requiem for
Poland').
Nevertheless, Kreisky insisted that Polish policy must not be aimed
at bankrupting the economy. He travelled to Washington and Moscow to
emphasise this point. He suggested that the countries involved in
CSCE should draw up a long-term aid package for Poland.^ All of this
was important to preserve the impression that alternative policies to
Reagan did exist although it was never likely that they would be
enacted. Kreisky's desperation is evident from some of his speeches
at the time;
"If Poland were to declare itself bankrupt... the consequences
would be disastrous not only for Austria but for the whole of Wbstern
Europe and it would be the result of United States outrageous policy
towards the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries."^
In the final analysis, the threat of economic disaster in the event
of Polish default must have played the major role in Austrian
reflections on the situation.^ Thus commentators have often not
given full attention to the implications for neutrality of the Polish
crisis. The attacks on the USA were unprecedented in Austria at
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least since World War II and completed Austria's shift from 1950's
policy. Then the USA had been the great defender of Western Europe,
but in the 1980s Austrian Government Policy reflected the ambiguity
towards the USA widespread in Western Europe.
For this reason there was considerable domestic unrest at Kreisky's
policies. The rift which had been developing in Foreign Policy
throughout the 1960s and 70s was widened. The OeVP was now openly
critical of what they saw as a dangerous arrogance on the part of
Kreisky, whose personal dominance of foreign policy was portrayed as
complete.
Relations with the Superpowers
Throughout the period of Austria's occupation between 1945 and
1955, the US was seen in much the same positive light as was normal in
countries in tne Western Alliance; ie as a guarantor of democratic
freedoms against the totalitarian threat posed by the Soviet Union.
As a recipient of massive amounts of US aid through the European
Recovery Programme (ERP) Austria had some reason to be grateful to US
Policy. On withdrawal the USA left equipment for the use of the
fledgeling Bundesheer and the counterpart funds raised from US capital
were released for tne disposition of tne Austrian government. Further
loans were granted and property formerly frozen was released. As we
have seen, the US was unhappy about a German settlement in Europe
which encouraged neutralistic tendencies, nevertheless in the light of
the strategic possibilities available, Dulles signed the State Treaty
in 1955.
The Hungarian crisis provided a possibility for tension between the
two States. In fact, Austria emerged from the crisis with the
reputation of her neutrality strengthened in the West, where the
strength of Austrian pronouncements on events in Hungary was seen as
proof of her determination not to be drawn into an ideologically
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neutral stance.
The single most damaging incident occurred in 1958. American
transport planes were on their way from West Germany to supply troops
in the Lebanon. The planes including an entire division of US troops,
overflew Austrian territory on their way to the Mediterranean. It was
reported that the USSR offered to make jet fighters with crews and air
defence troops available to Austria. The Austrian Government's
protests to the US Government were swift and outraged.
"The Federal Chancellory-Foreign affairs has expressly brought the
attention of the Embassy of the United States to the fact that an
overflight of Austrian sovereign territory by foreign military
aircraft without express permission is an infringement of Austrian
The US government assured the Austrians that their sovereignty
would be respected in the future and apologised officially for the
incident. Trust had nevertheless been breached. On return from the
Lebanon, Austria was again overflown, but this time with the
permission of the Vienna authorities. The Austrians remained
extremely irritated that their air vulnerability had been so crassly
exposed, at a time of only limited world tension and that that
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exposure had been at the hands of the Western Power.
The US Government has been accused of ignoring the neutrals ,
particularily those in central Europe. They ware distinctly cool on
attempts to widen the EEC to include neutrals, but the development of
detente as a political trend in US policy brought about a period of
neglect. The lack of interest in neutrality except where interests
are directly affected is notorious. It is worth noting that at the UN
in the period 1960-63, Austria's voting record was 100% in agreement
with the West in votes of East/Wast significance (cf Ireland - 81%,
Sweden -78%, Finland - 59%).^ As we will see later this underwent
considerable change during the next 20 years.
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In public statements, Kreisky generally supported the overall
principles of US detente policy within the sphere of the maintenance
of a form of power balance. From the late 1970s onwards, and
especially after NATO's 'double decision' of 1979, the climate of
growing irritatation with the US was more than shared by Kreisky.
Successive crises over Afghanistan and Poland led his government into
direct and public conflict with the Americans. On his resignation,
the first Foreign Minister of the new Sinowatz Government, Erwin Lane,
was generally perceived as continuing this anti-American bias. Recent
events did not improve the climate for his supposedly more pro-US
successor Gratz who saw further crises over Libya, Reder and Waldheim.
Anti-americanism in Austria thus paralleled developments in other
countries, particularily West Germany. In the 1960s and early 1970s,
Austrian politicians were keen however to minimise their differences
and emphasise the common cultural and political (and financial?)
commitment to the Western system. Speaking in Kansas City
in 1963, Kreisky outlined his view of the US;
"America today is for us in Europe the power which carries the
greatest political and moral responsibility for tne fate of tne
world."79
A close associate of Kreisky's commented;
"Despite all the reservations, America remains a bulwark of freedom
and democracy; ideals which Austria is committed to from her deepest
roots and neutrality changes none of this.®®
In the 1970s, the progress of events leading up to the CSCE Final
Act was remarkably smooth. As we shall see later, Kreisky was a
dedicated and active supporter of 'detente as containment' as opposed
to seeing detente as appeasement. This accorded well with US policy
under Nixon and Ford. Their pragmatic approach to diplomacy was
Kissinges-
personified in Kissenger who enjoyed a cordial working relationship
with Kreisky. Both men shared a taste for a diplomacy sometimes
higher in media value than in actual content. At Helsinki, Kreisky
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paid tribute to Ford's contribution to the success of the process.
"The meeting was only made possible because the President of the
USA, Gerald Ford, despite all the ups and downs had consistently
followed a policy of detente between the Great Powers."
Kreisky was insistent on tne need for a balance of forces, again
according well with Kissenger's thinking.
"Detente requires a balance of power and also a balance of armed
potential... As much as I wish to understand and value the motives of
a consistent pacifism... I can nevertheless see little chance for
o 9
such an ideology in today's world."0^
Kreisky's later disillusionment was tnus not so much with the US
but a political disagreement about the nature of Realpolitik. This
later shift in policy, however, allowed him to regain the respect of
the strong internationalist/pacifist tradition in the SPOe with the
growing anti-Altericanism of some of its wings. His concrete policies
and statements suggest that this was a convenient side-effect and that
he retained a political realist worldview.
As we have seen, the SPOe government opposed trade as a weapon of
political warfare against Eastern Europe. Austria remained extremely
wary of any measures wnich might expose her trade dilemmas. Austrian
opposition to trade sanctions does however date far before the Polisn
crisis. During the 1970s when grain embargoes against the USSR were
being discussed Kreisky remarked;
"The most dangerous development would be to make political capital
out of the needs of ordinary people... To refuse wheat supplies to the
Soviet Union would only have raised the anger of the Russian masses.
People would have said; there are your Western capitalists for you -
tney want to let us starve, even when we pay for their wheat.
Therefore I was always in favour of delivering grain."^
Afghanistan and Poland added major strain to an already disturbed
relationship. The election of Ronald Reagan, the continuation of a
trend towards direct confrontation with the USSR and the subsequent
demise of the spirit of the Helsinki agreement posed considerable
problems for a country situated at the point of contact between the
two blocs. The self-confidence of the Austrians by the 1980s in the
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viability of tbeir status was confirmed in the vocal nature of the
opposition to these changes in US policy. When parallels between
Austria and Afghanistan were folloved by an aggressive attitude to the
situation in Poland there was increasing irritation.
Speaking to the Party Conference of the SPOe in Graz in 1981,
Kreisky expressed his frustration;
"It is obviously the will of the American people that they are to
be governed so. As democrats we have to accept this. However, over
there one will also have to accept that within the democracies of the
world there are also different political philosophies."^
By the end of 1982 the overriding impression was of rapidly
deteriorating relations. This led to a major outbreak of criticism
from the right about Austria's increasing distance from the Western
Superpower.
As a result, on the 14th of December 1982, the Federal Government
adopted a 'USA Konzept' in an attempt to reassess and improve Austro-
US relations for the period 1983-6. Officially the reason disclosed
OC
was the 35th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. in reality its
political significance lay in its attempt to improve Austria's image
in US public awareness. The need for such a policy was officially
justified in terms of the special structure of the USA which required
a special and specific response;
"An intensification of Austro-US exchange visits at governmental
level is sought in order that through this intensification Austria's
attitude to bilateral and international economic questions can be made
clear."^6
Austria's tourist and cultural presence in the USA was to be
strengthened. The increasing reliance on North American sources for
high technology products was also recognised, and a new post of
Scientific Attache was established at the Austrian embassy in
Washington. This in its turn was the result of increasing strain
between the USA and Western Europe over trade, which increasingly
concentrated on the transfer of high technology products.
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The embargo on the transfer of technology to tne Eastern Bloc
strengthened in the light of the Polish crisis had already led to
major division over the co-operation of West European countries in the
construction of the building of pipelines to supply Western Europe
with energy from Siberia. Despite assurances during Kreisky's visit
to Washington in January 1983 that the technology question was now
'mutually satisfactory'8^ this was clearly not the case. The
carefully arranged trip after which Austro-US relations were described
07
as 'completely smooth, perfect friendship' had more to do with
General Elections in Austria than with the underlying reality. In
truth, relations after the Polish crisis had never been more strained.
Kreisky's somewhat cynical aside that with Reagan he had "found no new
common factors - except that we are both old"8^ would seem to give a
more accurate assessment of the wider bilateral state of affairs. On
his retirement, Kreisky described US policy under Reagan thus;
"The western world is over-involved in places where a non¬
intervention policy would be better. As well as over-engagement there
is also one-sidedness; we cannot speak for Trade Union freedom in
Poland and look on in Chile where there is also a Christian Trade
Union. All this weakens the West; it ruins its credibility. It is
all the result of an overideologising of US politics, as was never
before the case. It was not like that under Dulles or Eisenhower or
Truman."88
Former Foreign Minister Pahr rejects all OeVP claims that through
an arrogant neglect of Austria's longterm Western friend Kreisky had
distorted Austrian Foreign Policy;
"In every country there is the possibility for every responsible
official to express his opinion. But there was never a discrepancy
with Kreisky. The line was always clear"
As we have mentioned, Foreign Minister Lane was anxious to extend
the political norizons of Austrian foreign policy beyond the sterility
of Cold War bipolarity, and this is said to have contributed to his
replacement by Leopold Gratz. Further crises have prevented any real
improvements however.
One further issue should be mentioned; technology transfer. The US
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threatened to remove toost favoured nation' status from Austria and
suspend technological exports to Austria unless a mechanism was found
to plug supposed leaks whereby US technology of use to the Soviet
Union was being transfered through Vienna. The result was agreement
to change trade regulations;
" 'The proposals are for an adapted foreign trade law... intended
to close technology export holes to the east and avoid possible
sanctions. For 'sensitive items' export licences could be made
compulsory... The future supply of individual countries with US high
technology products will depend on the quality of controls in these
countries' declared the US Embassy officer for trade... 'A
satisfactory control for Austria might be a prohibition on the re¬
export of US technology.' Austria however wants to find her own
solution.. In any case, a sharpening of the East/West conflict must
not take place on Austria's back."^
A law was passed in November 1984 with the consent of all parties
in the Nationalrat after secret negotiations. The result was a much
stricter control of imports and exports of nign technology products,
by allowing for a system whereby imports can receive a classification
against re-export at tne request of the exporting country with
penalties of up to 2 years imprisonment on violation. The
difficulties for Austria can be seen in the comments of Foreign
Minister Gratz about the new Act;
"he emphasised that Austria had taken the 'minimum possible '
measures, which in his opinion did not contain any admission that the
situation had not been acceptable previously. Expressly the Minister
underlined that these decisions were Austrian and that no negotiation
had taken place with any American agency."^
The problem for an analyst of the situation is that all Austrian
politicians continue to argue that legal form is the same as political
actuality ; i.e. that because the Americans ware not consulted
officially they thus had no influence on the law. This can only be
seen as a further example of political salesmanship.
Despite this, Austria was placed together with all the neutral
States on the so-called 'Grey list' of 'potential technology
offenders', as a result of which stricter rules on technology export
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from the USA applied. This was in spite of official expression of
92
satisfaction at the measures by Washington.
This dilemma illustrates the problem that Austria faces if detente
becomes not identical with but an alternative to Western policy.
Technology transfer provides a useful example of the dilemmas which
might be intensified if the economic pressure were to come from the
EEC or more specifically from West Germany. The myth perpetuated
understandably in Austria and Switzerland that economic dependence has
no effect on internal or external policy is neatly exposed by this
episode. Indeed it provides a useful example of how the continuation J
of the Cold War requires a response from neutrality although the
outbreak of fullscale war would expose the problem yet more starkly.
As Vice Chancellor and Trade Minister Steger said, tne tecnnology
transfer issue was directly related to detente - Austria did not want
to lose credibility in Eastern eyes yet not to act would anger the
USA. Gratz" insistence that the new regulations were a purely
Austrian affair can only be understood as a fairly unconvincing if
predictable attempt to deny that Austria had acted as a Western
poodle. It is equally sure that the USSR was fully aware of the
dilemma and at times of relative calm might choose not to comment on
such a matter. Nevertheless, the potential for claims against Austria
in times of crisis is gigantic. The crumbling of the Austrian facade
of pure legal neutrality happened once more at the hands of tne West.
In considering Austria's relations with the Soviet Union, I should
like to point out that the detailed debate over EEC membership and tne
crises of 1956 and 1968 have been dealt with elsewhere. The
theoretical challenges posed by the doctrine of peaceful coexistence
and the Soviet attitude to bourgeois international law have also been
examined. Nevertheless it is worthwhile investigating bilateral
affairs and more importantly the conduct of the detente policy with
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the superpower normally thought to pose the greatest threat to
Austrian neutrality.
According to Felix Ermacora in 1975;
"the 20 years of neutrality policy have clearly shown that equally
in legal and political spneres, Austria has a specific neutrality
partner in contrast to Sweden and Switzerland (though not Finland) and
that is the USSR."93
This arises because of the constant need to assure the Soviet
Union that Austria views her permanent neutrality as being as
important as her attachment to the West. We have already noted that
the threat of a reintegration into Germany has been a constant Soviet
tneme. Kreisky, himself present at the negotiations with the Russians
in 1955, saw this very clearly;
"On the Soviet side, Germany is not seen as divided into three,
but, I think, in four; the Federal Republic, GDR, Germany east of the
Oder-Neisse line and Austria. One fears, from the Soviet side that
were a united Germany of 70m re-established, it would strive to create
a land of 80m - which would only be possible through a reintegration
of Austria."^
For this reason Austria is forced to constantly reanswer the
political challenges of the Soviet Union. This fear of an enlarged
Germany is also common in France; L'anschluss, c'est la guerre'
remains an unspoken assumption of French policy. France acted as an
important western monitor of Austrian behaviour for the USSR. When
Khruschev appeared to compare Adenauer to Hitler while on a visit to
Vienna there was further embarrassment in Vienna. (Khruschev ranarked
that while the outer similarity on photographs was not great, the
policies were the same.) 95
Throughout the difficult days of 1956 and 1968 Austria sought to
maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. During the
1960s the constant pressure on Austria from Moscow was largely
responsible for the restrictive nature of Austria's final agreements
with the EEC in 1972. This dialogue over the EEC was replaced by the
issues of detente in the early 1970s. Despite a growing anti-
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Americanism there was little sense of close co-operation with the
Russians. The USSR remained the real bogey in all Austrian policy.
The relief expressed in 1961 after Khruschev's visit is still valid
today;
"As the Turboflot aircraft took off from Schwechat to take the
Soviet Prime Minister eastward once more, a great weight was lifted
from the hearts not only of the police, not only of the government but
of the entire Austrian people."y5
Seven years later the editor of the same publication wrote of
Podgorny's visit;
"Whoever believed that a State Treaty type miracle would happen in
relation to Russian opposition to Austria's EEC plans, may finally
have come down from the clouds."
It is a necessity for post-1955 Austria to address tne problem of
ideological divide and neutrality within such a structure before the
onset of actual war. This has been the most important reason why
Austria has supported the development of detente and has entered into
dialogue with the USSR over the meaning of peaceful coexistence.
We must now turn to the issues raised by these policies. Their
roots lie in the optimism so current in the 1960s. An example of this
can be found in Kreisky's speech in 1963 in which the normal realism
of his comments gave way to a vision which reads in the more sober
1980s like a flignt of Utopian fantasy;
"The greatness of our times lies in the fact that at this very
moment in the middle of Europe, we are experiencing such a process of
the disappearance of hatred. In front of our eyes hatred, suspicion
and contempt is disappearing between Germans and French people and
between other peoples. But we are also experiencing something every
day which was clearly not visible to the great psychoanalysts at the
tine of their work, namely how in our free community througn the co¬
operation of all the formative powers in our society - education,
psychology, politics and journalism - respecting freedom of tne
individual and with daily interchange, people are being educated into
ever more positive ways of behaviour."
It was with this kind of optimistic outlook that the policy of
detente was approached. When speaking to an audience in Yale,
Connecticut Kreisky was able to argue plausibly;
"Khruschev's so-called peace policy was not a propaganda manoeuvre
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but corresponded to the actual needs and wishes of the Soviets."99a
Nevertheless he warned even then that a detente policy did not mean
that communism would simply disappear;
"There will be communism in Europe at least for the foreseeable
future, even if it is in a different form. Anyone who believes that
one can buy these countries from the communist camp through various
economic relief measures is making a mistake."99b
In 1968, Kreisky was more subdued less than a month after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops;
"One can indeed follow a policy of normalisation with communist
States only by strictly respecting the limits of what is possible, and
one cannot follow a policy based on self-delusion or
fraternisation... The communist States also expect no political
reconciliation from us..."-'-®^
As he pointed out;
"These events [ Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1970 ]
show in a very crass way, that the fascinating, idea of convergence as
it is represented by influential academics and politicians is refuted
by events in the final analysis."!^
Kreisky saw detente as a policy of containment ratner than
appeasement and accepted the challenges of peaceful coexistence. Here
we will be concerned merely to outline what the policy of peaceful
coexistence has meant for Austria. In 1968, Kreisky put his
position thus;
"The ending of the Cold War in Europe seems to be expressed in the
the realisation of the principle of peaceful coexistence - despite the
proliferation of irrelevant or misleading phrases around this. It
represents the maximum that is achievable in our times. For this
reason I see the Austrian State Treaty as a visible expression of this
coexistence.
In 1975 at Helsinki, Kreisky put the position in a more comparative
perspective;
"It is noteworthy that it is now often made clear that Coexistence
... cannot be valid for the realm of ideology. I welcome this
clarification because from the side of the democratic states as well,
we are firmly resolved to bring about the breakthrough of the
philosophy of democracy, and we are also convinced that democracy is
such a creative governmental form that within its structures and by
strictly observing it's principles, great social reforms have taken
place and will take place in the future."-*-^
It seems apparent that the confusion arises in part through shared
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terminology. At its most literal, Austria has adopted a policy aimed
at the survival of a small State, and as such peaceful coexistence is
a statement of a necessary precondition. As Oehlinger points out, the
understanding of neutrality as being in the service of peace has now
become a central maxim. This can only be understood within the
context of the Cold War in the shadow of weapons of total destruction.
Nevertheless there is a clear difference in the understanding of what
constitutes a peace-loving nation to that specified by Marxist-
Leninist propaganda;
"Although this concept of peace is open, it is not immune to other
ideological views. This, however, is a general sign of liberal
democratic concepts of law. The ideological openness of this concept
of neutrality results in norms not for opinions themselves but for
methods of allowing conflicts of opinion."
The Austrian Social Democrats reject war as a method and thus need
international contact, but they do so in a clear spirit of
competition. The fundamental dilemma, so oft repeated, is here
perhaps more apparent than elsewhere. The role Austria is to play in
any conflict during peaceful coexistence is clearly ideologically one¬
sided. As long as peaceful coexistence remains intact, this may be an
acceptable role to play. Were a deterioration to occur, such that war
might once more appear to be a real possibility, the credibility of
neutrality will depend on the USSR's view of this past. The USSR must
be prepared to accept the bourgeois definition of neutrality whereby
Austria cannot be asked to undertake an ideologically neutral stance,
and must thus make a concrete separation in policy towards Austria's
100% alliance with the West in one period (Cold War) and her
equidistance in another (Full War). The Austrians have thus sought to
play a very dangerous double game, seeking to limit the competition ,
but nevertneless seeking to profit by it. The decision under Kreisky's
leadership to gamble on a policy of war avoidance (positive peace) and
avoid the conflict which would expose Austria's vulnerability is
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balanced against the consistent allegience of the Austrians to all
other forms of competition except military. It is not a policy without
risks.
The success or otherwise of the strategy may lie in its not being
discovered as a strategy. Foreign Policy towards the USSR involves a
fundamental credibility gap and hence a permanent crisis for Austria.
Although Finnish experience may have tantalising parallels in this
respect, the constellation of interested parties surrounding the two
States is slightly different. After the failure of two KPOe led
General Strikes, and the continuing strength of the Vienna Government,
it was clear that Austria was not going to be a Soviet satellite.
Neutrality was conceeded fundamentally as a mechanism to achieve
national unity and a degree of sovereignity. Finland has had to
struggle to establish her place in the West against a much less
certain background. Swiss and Swedish models remain historically
entrenched enough that they can resist outside attempts to 'define'
what constitutes a suitable policy. Finland, as we have seen
understands clearly that there are ideological constraints to her
policies in the international arena. Austria attempts to maintain a
Swiss-style model out is aware that the situation is dependent on tne
present equilibrium not being superceded by Soviet domination. To
tnis end, the policy of peaceful coexistence becomes obvously
attractive.
Two pan-continenta1 issues; Energy, Rhine/Main/Danube Canal
The problem of technology transfer and its specific reference to the
Siberian Gas Pipeline, leads us on to a slightly more detailed
examination of Austria's Energy Policy which has left her
exceptionally dependent on the Eastern Bloc for her energy supplies.
In terms of power yield, 51.6% of Austria's imported energy came from
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Comecon countries (cf 22% from OECD countries).105 mU.This exposure was
most acute in the areas of natural Gas, where Comecon accounted for
98.6% of imports and of coal, where Comecon provided 70%. In the
field of crude oil and allied products, the Comecon share showed a
sharp rise 1982-3 from 27.2% to 33.4%, although this was mostly caused
by a fall in supplies from OPEC countries.
As energy became a more crucial issue in the 1970s, Austria faced a
serious problem. As her own reserves were dwindling, she faced the
prospect of increasing dependence on either OPEC or the USSR. At
present we will concentrate only on the development of relations with
the Eastern Bloc within the context of Cold War and detente.
Austria was the first non-Comecon country in Europe to sign a
Natural Gas Supply Treaty with the USSR in 1968. The outstanding
features of this agreement such as the trade and credit conditions
were later used in treaties between the USSR and West Germany, France,
Italy and Finland. The 1968 agreement lasts for 23 years. The USSR
now supplies Italy, France and Yugoslavia from tne same border
delivery point on the Austro-Czech frontier. The pipeline to Italy
and Yugoslavia was opened in 1974, that to France and West Germany in
1979. Nevertheless, the exposure to international crises in energy
policy was underlined when a consortium of West European countries
signed a supply agreement with the USSR and Iran, whereby Iran
supplied southern USSR with supplies and the USSR diverted equal
amounts to Czechoslovakia, Austria, France and West Germany.-^
By 1973, the exposure of the Western economies to OPEC and hence
predominantly Middle Eastern pressure, led to a severe crisis in energy
politics. Most Western economies searched desperately for alternative
sources of supply. While large finds emerged in the North Sea and
the Americas, Western Europe was left with a considerable shortfall.
The natural gas arrangements between USSR and Western Europe and the
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existence of crude oil agreements with France, Holland, Belgium,
Sweden and Italy allowed Kreisky to argue that energy could be seen as
a symbol of a new pan-European integration and a part of detente.;
"I wish merely to point out that a pan-European Energy Policy would
easily fit into conceptions of global detente."107
Was Austria merely making a virtue out of dire necessity? Since
the 1950s, Austria had seen her net import dependency grow from 20.5%
in 1955 to 70% by 1980.108 Although this left her less dependent than
some otner OECD countries (Japan, Switzerland) the speed of increase
in Austria's level of dependence was a severe economic and political
headache. In 1977, Science and Technology Minister Firnberg returned
from Iran with the announcement that supplies were secure and that
Iran had agreed to accept Austria's atomic waste from the proposed new
Nuclear Power Station at Zwentendorf. The double irony of this was
apparent by 1979 wnen the Iranian revolution finally destroyed the
government's calculations which had alredy been upset when, against
most expectations, a national referendum had rejected the nuclear
power programme in November 1978.^08
The government's assurances of a steady supply from the East as an
alternative were greeted with considerable scepticism. In Poland at
the end of November 1979, Kreisky dismissed domestic fears of growing
dependence on the Eastern bloc;
"I must say, that in the light of the unstable situation in Iran
and the Middle East, this form of dependence is to be accepted more
readily than dependence on Iran or on other States.""'""'"0
He therefore appealed for an East/West Energy Union and maintained
his support for the Siberian Pipeline project dispite the Polish
crisis and American protests.
The political implications for Austria are enormous, as we have
seen over technology and now over energy. It is clear that dependency
characterised as a purely one way process is also misleading, in that
Soviet dependence on revenues from exported energy grows in proportion
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to spending undertaken on the basis of calculations of income. The
hard currency generated through energy sales is essential for the
economies of the Eastern bloc. Nevertheless, the integrative forces
of the economy provide a severe challenge to neutrality, especially in
the event of the crisis in which it is designed to operate. Austria
has been active in the international electricity market, encouraging
East/West co-operation and exchange. In part, this may be
"an effort to become an important transit point for power exchanges
between East and West."
Austria is integrated into the West European Electricity Supply
network(UCPTE) and also into the South East European System(SUDEL).
It also acts as a switching station between both systems and between
the two and COMECON, through power lines with Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. A Transit agreement signed in 1968 allows Czecn
] n
electricity exports to Switzerland.
Austria has built a new switching station at Duernrohr to
improve the interchange facilities between Austria and Comecon, the
first of its size.114 In total, Austria's exports of electrical power
exceed her imports, but this covers deficits in electricity trade with
Czechoslovakia and large surpluses in trade with West Germany. In
addition, imports are greater in winter, meeting shortfalls in
hydroelectric output.11-'
We now turn briefly to a topic which was very much an Austrian
priority but which has so far failed to materialise - the proposed
linkage of Europe's two most significant waterways - the Rhine and the
Danube. As early as 1961, Kreisky was encouraging such a
development and foresaw its results as almost revolutionary for
Austria.11*' This theme was constantly reiterated by both Kreisky and
Waldheim and formed one of the methods by which Austria sougnt a form
of economic integration more suitable to her inter bloc status.
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By 1974, in a climate of detente, Austria appeared to have
convinced others of the need for such a connection. The Austrians
had reckoned without the triple oppostion of increasing unwillingness
to embark on such gigantic capital investment projects during
recession in the West, the increased US pressure to restrict East/West
trade and thirdly the growth of the environmentalist lobby, who
objected to the destruction of parts of Bavaria. Despite the support
of the Land Government in Bavaria ( Bavaria also stood to gain
economically from the project) spending plans were rejected by the
West German Government in 1982 with 36km uncompleted. West German
Minister Hauff called the project;
117
"the most stupid since the tower of Babel."
Into this modern Babel, the Austrians had poured investment
especially into new harbour facilities in Linz, Enns, Krems and
Vienna. Industrial planning had also calculated on the Canal.
Although Kreisky assured his 1970s audience that the project would be
completed by the 1980s, the link will not be completed until 2020, and
even this is far from certain.
These two examples serve to illustrate the difficulties involved
for Austria in developing practical policies in Cold War
circumstances. They are unable in the short term to force any policy
changes either in West Germany or beyond. Nevertheless, they also
underline the degree of importance Austria attaches to a climate of
coexistence. We should, however, not underestimate the minefield
which becomes so apparent if we look at neutrality in the light of
competing dependencies in the fields of technology and energy.
Nevertheless within this very constellation of conflicting pressures
the opportunities for activity of a small State appear. For either
side to push too hard would have consequences for their own longterm
stategies. Also short term difficulties met with creative proposals
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from tne neutral may secure the neutral credibility in the medium and
long term. The logjam at bilateral superpower level may reduce the
possible number of sources for suggestions at breaking the stalemate
to countries which maintain relations across the military frontier.
The fact that at CSCE small countries proposed while large countries
disposed should not be understood only in terms of the limitations of
small power abilities but also in terms of the degree of flexibility
and creativity it exposes. Sweden had a considerable role in setting
up the 1983 meetings on disarmament at Stockholm where US Secretary of
State Schultz and his Russian counterpart Gromyko were able to meet.
The Austrian's insistence on alternatives to US trade policy in the
1980s may frighten some of the most pro-Western elements in the
Austrian polity, however they may also encourage other West European
countries, more formally attached to USA to develop alternative
strategies.
Nonetheless, the difficulties and frustrations remain. The energy
problem outlines the degree to which economic problems and desires
cloud political or juridical certainties, while the Canal project
shows the degree to which Austria is dependent on external powers and
decisions.
Final Remarks
Detente is not really a matter of choice as such in Austrian
Foreign Policy. The foundation of a State in postwar Austria was
only possible in tne light of a thaw in the Cold War and its survival
remains linked to the continuation of at least 'non-war' coexistence.
Austria has thus adopted a positive approacn to East/West relations
even in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the detente policy followed by
Kreisky's governments and more especially the criticism of US Foreign
Policy in the 1980s threatened to shatter the domestic unanimity
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traditional in foreign affairs. The increasing controversy of the
late-Kreisky and early-Sinowatz years has abated somewhat despite the
political dynamite of the Reder and Waldheim scandals. Much of the
proporz-provincialism swept away under Kreisky has returned and has
invaded the sphere of foreign policy also. We can only discuss the
debates on the nature of detente policy with reference to the
increased globalism of Austrian policy. This we will do in the next
chapter. The true importance of detente is that it is fundamentally
linked with the purpose and origins of neutrality. The success of
this status still depends on the success of a coexistence policy.
Although many observers talk of a death of detente, it will continue
to remain essential for small States to follow a policy of co¬
operation whatever euphemism is chosen for the policy.
The reality is that Austrian neutrality is a product not of full
War but of Cold War and this has altered the nature of that neutrality
just as the bomb has altered the nature of war. A break in the Cold
War to physical war would bring this neutrality in its train as just
another victim. Hence the role of foreign policy has grown at the
expense of a purely military approach. This too has been attacked as
appeasement towards the USSR, but there is little evidence of this in
reality. To understand the need for coexistence is not the same as
embracing the principles of Marxism/Leninism.
It snould be pointed out that the implications of much of Austria's
policy are that should detente be succeeded by a mutually compatible
Europe, Austria would then be able to integrate into trade
organisations unfettered by the protests of either superpower. The
further latent implication of this is that neutrality would lose its
meaning ie neutrality as an institution is entirely a function of the
Cold War in Austria's case. There is no history of full wartime
survival as in Sweden or Switzerland with which to root neutrality in
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the collective experiential consciousness. Should Cold War become
full war, it means annihilation. Should it improve neutrality loses
its function. Neutrality in its modern form must refer to the Cold
War; ie it must address questions of Foreign Policy, ideological
questions, economic integration and can no longer take its basis from
the dictates of 1815 Law.
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Austria and the Global System
"Why snould I war without the walls of
Troy,
That find such cruel battle here within?"
W. Shakespeare, "Troilus and Cressida"
Actl Scl
Even when compared to other European states, Austria's connection
with events beyond her continent has been underdeveloped. In part,
this can be attributed to the historical legacy of the previous
century. While the rising and dominant powers gradually acquired
overseas possessions in their imperial conquests, the Austrio-
Hungarian Empire was concerned more to maintain its own unity tnan to
expand in the "new" continents. As a result the international
connections of Great Britain, France, and even of Germany never
developed in Austria. The inter-war Austrian republic was itself too
small and unstable to participate in the extension of international
interests. Austria remained essentially removed from the processes of
globalisation.
Geographically, Austria's most immediate contacts were, of course,
European. The lack of a sea boundary ensured that the trading pattern
wnich emerged in Western Europe would not be natural for her land¬
locked situation. The emergence of extra-European issues is thus an
important new chapter in Austrian foreign relations.
It would be unrealistic to deal with the development of Austrian
global policy without examining the importance of tne United Nations.
This is true of most of the so-called "Small States", both in terms of
the role they can play in such a diverse organization and also in the
weight which a smaller country attaches to more formal forums in which
they have a defined role. For Austria, an extra dimension was
present; namely, the significance attached to her acceptance into the
339
international community after 1945. For seventeen years Austria was
the sole German-speaking country in full membership of the UN, further
strengthening her separate development from West Germany, and
establishing an independent image.
We will also examine the development of Austrian links with the
poorer countries of the world. This has been more significant in the
1970s, though the question of development aid remains somewhat
controversial. Some of the political implications of this have been
very obvious in the establishment of relations with the countries of
the non-aligned movement. The theoretical debate over the
relationship between permanent neutrality and non-alignment will be
examined here.
Finally, we will look at Austrian involvement in the questions of
the Middle East. This has been highly original and at times equally
controversial. The personal involvement of Bruno Kreisky will emerge
as central.
Austria and the United Nations
For Austria as we have remarked, membership in tne United Nations was
an issue of considerable symbolic importance. In 1947, an application
from stil1-occupied Austria for membership was surprisingly vetoed by
the Soviet Union. The first bitter phase of the Cold War had begun,
and the Russians were more interested in consolidating their role in
the part of Europe which had become their sphere of influence after
Yalta. Within this scheme, the future of Austria was by no means
certain. Austrian politicians such as Karl Renner were anxious to
reanchor Austria into world affairs in order to quickly reestablish
the State as independent of the occupying powers but also to underline
Austria's independence from Germany. The UN obviously provided the
most hopeful option for Austria. All these strands are apparent in
Renner's words in April 1946.
340
"Austria lies at the point of intersection between all tne
Continent's interests and there can barely therefore be imagined a
polity tnat would be as keenly interested in peace as Austria. But by
reason of this position Austria cannot either turn or politically tie
herself to the east, west, south or north without unsettling the
equilibrium of those interests and even helping to invoke a repetition
of 1916 and 1939. Austria is in the serious yet encouraging situation
of not being at liberty to choose any other partner other than the
UN. "1
One government memorandum in November 1945 suggested Schoenbrunn
Palace in Vienna as a possible UN headquarters. Nevertheless,
Austria remained outside the General Assembly. Within its forum,
Brazil was persuaded to raise the holdup of Austrian negotiations in
1952, and the Assembly voted to call on the powers to accelerate
efforts towards a settlement of the disputes. Following the breakdown
of the Berlin conference in 1954, a second application for membership
was rejected.^
With the signing of the State Treaty and the declaration of
neutrality in 1955 the question arose of the compatibility of
neutrality with membership in the UN. At tne negotiations in Moscow
in 1955, the Austrians sought and received assurances from the USSR
that they did not regard neutrality and UN membership as incompatible,
assurances reiterated by all signatory powers at negotiations for the
State Treaty.
On 14th December 1955, Austria was accepted unanimously into
membership of the General Assembly along with fifteen other states.
This unanimity at international diplomatic level should not blind us
to the legal manoeuvering necessary to reconcile the UN Charter witn
the dictates of permanent neutrality. Indeed the ability of the
international community to rationalize a clear, logical contradiction
in the principles of international law by simply denying the existence
of that contradiction in the face of political desires is highly
instructive.
The problem lies in tne notion of Collective Security. This
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doctrine was adopted at the end of World War II when, as we have
already seen, neutrality's popularity was at a distinctly low ebb.
The UN Charter enshrined the principle that all nations should act
collectively against an aggressor. In 1945 Paul Boncour on behalf of
the French Government proposed that the UN Charter should expressly
not allow neutrality as grounds for evasion of the obligations of the
Charter. Although the resolution was not formally adopted, it was
clearly the spirit behind the Charter. The committee stage of the
Charter states that the incompatibility existed."^ Article 2(5) of the
final document obliges all members to give the UN every assistance.
Thus Kelsen argued that the charter of the UN had made permanent
neutrality obsolete. The first Secretary General of the UN, Trygve
Lie, noted that the UN did not know the word neutrality since it was
nowhere mentioned in the UN Charter. Sweden when joining the UN in
1945 dropped all reference to neutrality, well aware of the negative
climate.
The acceptance of neutrality is a function of international
affairs. Perhaps it is worth quoting the US legal commentator, Quincy
Wright, once more:
"This implies that the states of war and neutrality, recognizing
the power of the constituent part through violence or indifference to
invalidate the will of the whole are by nature inconsistent with
law.
This view is indicative of the spirit of 1945. Certainly the Swiss
felt unprepared to join the UN. This was of course due in part to the
very low esteem in whicn neutrality was held. It was also due to
Swiss experience with the League of Nations which had resulted in them
being faced with the possibility of imposing compulsory economic
sanctions on neighbouring Italy (see chapter on neutrality). In 1935,
Swiss politicians and the entire nation drew the conclusion that no
state can be expected to regard another state as neutral if it is
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faced with 'neutral' participation in economic sanctions of other
nations. This contrasts sharply with the Bundesrat's declaration in
1919 that neutrality did not include any obligation to maintain
equality of treatment in the trade and economics sphere which had
opened the way to acceptance of League of Nations' sanctions. As we
shall see below, Swiss suspicion of the UN remains extreme.
Even writers in neutral countries have had to recognize that at a
literal level, the notion of collective security is incompatible with
the concept of neutrality. Yet after the Korean War and the
experience of ten years of virtually continuous East/West antagonism
at Security Council, tne idea that a third way must be feasible was
widely accepted. This manifested itself in two forms - the emergence
of the non-aligned movement encompassing most of the new states of
Africa and Asia together with Latin America who refused to have their
agendas predecided by the Superpowers and, secondly in the re-
emergence in Europe of neutrality as a legitimate political and
diplomatic stance for the Cold War. The UN had been envisaged in its
charter as a unity, taking this as a presumption. It concerns itself
with the threat to peace from medium and small countries. By 1955,
the disunity of the Superpowers was an established political fact.
The very fact that the Austrian agreement depended on neutrality
rather than reintegration into a unified world community indicates the
degree to which this antagonism was ingrained. Nevertheless, it is
clear that in its essence, a notion of permanent neutrality cannot be
reconciled with the UN Charter.
Austrian political figures (eg., ex-UN Ambassador Jankowitsch)
point out that this change from collective security predates Austria's
accession to the UN. While this cannot be denied, the implication -
that the changes have compromised collective security leaving
neutrality intact - cannot be admitted without the collapse of all the
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aspects of the UN which continue to strive after the fulfilment of
collective security as a doctrine. Neutrality is clearly compromised
so long as the UN continues to espouse collective security as a goal.
Until then the uneasy coexistence of the two concepts, must be based
on the non-functioning of one of them (or even both).
What we have here is a classic example of political pragmatism
overcoming legal objections. It is beyond doubt that were any state
to have an axe to grind, the legal ambiguities would immediately be
brought into play. In the Cold War, there are sufficient larger
threats to successfully divert attention from the problem. It is
clear that where the leading political actors (in this case East, West
and Austria) are unanimous, codified law becomes a somewhat trifling,
if irritating, footnote. It appears certain that the historical and
political necessity for Austrian membership preceded any legal qualms.
This is not in itself objectionable, if we accept that dynamic political
circumstances must always lead static legal dictates. What is
important is to underline that where the political will exists in
enough strength, the law can be dealt with through none-too-convincing
post-hoc rationalizations. We have already seen the genesis of this
process in the EEC debate. It becomes essential where it is argued in
the defence debate that disarmament cannot take place in neutrals
because it is stipulated by international law, when as we see the true
significant objections are political, ie. lack of sufficient
agreement. Put more clearly the truth is that the role of legal
dictates depends entirely on their widespread acceptance. Where a
strong body of opinion exists, the "law" can be overridden.
Kelsen's initial position as we have noted is that Article 2(5) is
in itself insufficient to prevent membership. As we have pointed out
the committee responsible for drafting the charter expressly limited
the role of neutrality:
"the status of permanent neutrality is incompatible with Article
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2(5) in as fat as the State cites the status of a permanent neutrality
to remove itself from the obligations under the Charter."8
This very use of 'as far as' allowed the first attempts at
reconciling the two approaches. Chaumont argued that this article
implied no necessary commitment to sanctions, and hence as long as the
Security Council did not insist on Austrian participation, neutrality
was compatible.
"Neither the text of the charter nor the experience of the UN nor
even the concept of collective security seen from a certain angle
postulate or require an obligatory, uniform or generalized
intervention for tne maintenance of peace."^
Other writers questioned whether the Security Council could ever
free a country for all times without losing its own power. Thus De
Nova argued:
"By doing so the Council would create the framework to create a
legal posture for one member State...which would differ from the legal
position of the majority of the members, wnile the Charter is
dominated by the principle of the legal equality of States."^
Some Austrian observers, influenced by Swiss experience urged
Austria to seek just such an assurance from the UN. Peter Berger
wrote prior to full membership:
"It should be the precondition of our potential membership to
demand above all a dispensation from active and passive participation
in sanctions, as far as such a dispensation would be considered
possible under the charter."-'-^
In order to get around a possible contradiction the notion of
priority was introduced. In admitting Austria the powers were fully
aware of her permanent neutrality. Thus Kunz wrote:
"Austria's permanent neutrality came into existence in
international law by tne recognition of the Security Council and many
other States; recognition binds the recognizing states to respect
neutrality. This respect for permanent neutrality therefore obliges
the members of the Security Council not to call on a permanently
neutral state in economic and military sanctions.""^
Ermacora sees in this a new change.
"The members of UNO, who on the one hand recognize Austrian
neutrality and on the other applauded the entry of Austria to the UN
have thereby further developed modern neutrality law.""^
Verdross maintains that the question is less sure and that the
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Security Council is still the ultimately decisive body:
"There can be no neutrality if the Security Council puts all
members into action."i4
Nevertheless, the Council could exempt some countries from taking
part in the action.
Article 103 of the Charter states that should a conflict between
the obligations of the members under the Charter and obligations under
any other international agreements emerge, then the Charter's
stipulations must have precedence. Some have argued, especially from
Eastern Europe""3, that neutrality is not breached when fighting for
peace through UN-determined collective security. Yet if we allow this
then there is no purpose whatsoever in neutrality. The UN can become
party to a conflict, whereas neutrality cannot.
It is clear then that at the very least the legal position is
confused. In the end, Austrian membership confirms that neither a
pure isolationist neutrality nor collective security adequately meets
the needs of the cold war. Hence the messy compromise. The Austrians
are in a similar position to the Swiss in 1919 when the League of
Nations made an agreement:
"The neutrality of Switzerland in the League of Nations seems to
defeat the purpose of the organization but it is actually justified.
Like all historical institutions the League of Nations is not only
based on abstract principles but also influencedjay the geographical
and historical characteristics of its members."-'-'3
Unfortunately it remains dependent on the compromise not becoming
apparent as it did for Switzerland in 1935, where instead of a
compromise carefully and even generously justified the result was a
nightmare choice, the memory of which has kept Switzerland out of UN
affairs since. As yet Austria has not been faced with this problem.
Some have argued tnat the higher goal of peace unites both neutrality
and UN. The Swiss Bundesrat reported to the Bundesversammlung in
1949:
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"The spirit of the charter does not lead to the conclusion that
there is a basic incompatibility between membership and neutrality.
True, the charter's latent concept of collective security is
theoretically irreconcilable with neutrality... The essential point
remains that both aim to maintain peace. In this sense, neutrality is
in no way opposed to the provisions of the charter, but is in harmony
with its highest objective."17
What is so striking about this kind of argument is that it is so
similar to Soviet arguments that neutrality should be in line with
Soviet 'peace' policy. Nevertheless, one is 'acceptable' tne other
rejected in bourgeois circles.
The point to underline here is the ease with which the dictates of
law can be discarded even by Austrian and Swiss connientators where
'necessary'. The real irreconcilability lies with tne contradiction
of arguing 'unbreakable law' for one aspect (eg. defence) and the
'unity of purpose' for anotner (eg. UN). The notion of collective
security is as least as central to the UN as the concept of armies to
permanent neutrality. The discovery tnat tne UN is a political not
juridical organisation applies also to permanent neutrality in the
Cold War. As a Dutch commentator wrote:
"The UN's position is the product of a majority vote of the members
(or of one of tne "big five") tnough tnis majority does not always
result in the upholding of international law but mostly in producing
political compromise."^
The same is true for permanent neutrality.
On 28th April 1970, the new Socialist minority government under
Dr. Kreisky announced tnat Austria would seek election to the Security
Council, the controlling organ of the UN (Article 28, Charter).
Altnough not elected at the first attempt, the way was clear for
Austria's election at the next juncture. On 20th October 1972,
Austria was elected as a West European member by 115 of 118 votes
cast. This merely strengthened the need for juridical and/or
political justification. In this respect it is interesting to quote
former Vice Chancellor Bock on the reasons for this significant
departure from Swiss practice:
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"Swiss considerations start from the legal standpoint that the
neutral state cannot allow any restriction on her sovereignty. The
Security Council is the organ of tne UN which can decide compulsory
decisions for her members, and can do this repeatedly, if we take a
strict formalistic legal interpretation, Switzerland is correct in her
attitude, but the living practice of World politics no longer
justifies such a strict interpretation of neutrality towards the World
Organization any more in Austrian opinion."-^
Here we have laid bare the dilemma for Austria, finally admitted
in the knowledge that it is relatively uncontroversial in this
context, ie. UN. Membership of the Security Council did
have important implications. Austria was now called upon to judge
over a breach of peace and to decide over military measures against an
'aggressor'.
There followed a short if significant debate in Austria on this
question. As Konrad Ginther puts it:
"In contrast to the much heralded principle of intervention only in
the case of agreed request of the conflicting parties, a neutral state
in the Security Council could find itself in tne position of obligatory
intervention where it could be placed in embarassing and unavoidable
decision-making situations.1
The Social Science Working Group, a group close to the OeVP
expressed fears that membership of the Security Council would mean
that Austria must take up positions on conflicts over and over again,
even where she abstained. This might lead her into conflict with the
power blocs:
"Why therefore do we annoy either the West or the Eastern Bloc
voluntarily, without necessary reason or political profit."^
Most interestingly, the OeVP member Alois Mock expressed fear that
membership of the Securty Council might lead Austria into a partisan
22
position. Neutrals he said could not always usefully take sides.
(This from a future leader of the International Democratic Union, a
federation of Conservative and Christian Democratic Parties including
the US Republicans and Democrats.)
On the other side, the SPOe Deputy Czernitz expressly rejected the
idea that neutrals could not take sides. Kirschlaeger, as Foreign
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Minister responsible for the decision to seek election, saw it thus:
"Only if one is a well known quantity can one have any worth in the
Power Game at our size."23
He was supported by some elements of the OeVP in (Bock, Ermacora).
Ermacora argued that membership of the Security Council could not be
ruled out a priori, and that each issue had to be considered
separately:
"Here it will be the hign art of the politician and the diplomat to
find the correct way. It cannot be said in advance ie. in the
abstract that Austria is acting mistakenly in seeking membership of
the Security Council."24
As the Swiss observer Wildnaber pointed out:
"Austria could be a very suitable member of the Security Council,
precisely because of her neutrality. As an objective non-partisan
active state...Austria will be in the position to play a role of
conciliation and arbitration."2^
On the otner hand, tne arguments of the opponents have to be
recognized:
"The membership of the Security Council is not without neutrality
policy risks, not even without neutrality law risks. In the final
analysis, it is a principle or article of faith whether a permanently
neutral state should follow more of a restrained and cautious policy
or a more risky, active and constructive policy."
In the end, the Austrian Government managed to achieve wide
enough domestic support to take up membership of the Council. In his
first declaration to the Council, Jankowitsch stated (16/1/73)
"It is the firm opinion of the Austrian Government, that the status
of permanent neutrality...provides a secure basis for ner work on the
Security Council." 2^
. ch
Kirschlaeger put its significance into perspective both as part of
the new activism of the SPOe government and as a statement of
Austria's position in the international community when he called it
28
proof of Austria as a perpetually neutral state."
Nevertheless, the pitfalls for traditional neutrality are immense.
No matter that Sweden, Ireland and Finland had already preceded
Austria to the Security Council. In none of these was tnere any legal
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objection in their 'Non-alignment'. The significance of the shift is
twofold. First it symbolizes a fundamental change from Swiss pratice,
and is indeed the most tangible divergence in concrete terms.
Secondly, it is clear that Austria's policies in a forum of such high
profile as the Security Council were now part of the substantive not
optional aspects of neutrality. In every Security Council decision
the credibility of Austrian neutrality is on the line. It can no
longer be credibly held that Austria's neutrality is not founded in
the reality of politics. We shall see below how the Kreisky
government attempted to attract CJN organizations to Vienna as part of
a long-run security strategy. With the Cold War the dictates of
politics have once more been seen to be necessary.
Before we go on to examine the substance of the issues
raised by the UN for Austria, we will now look at a contemporary event
of some siginificance in this context; the Swiss referendum on
membership of the UN which took place in March 1986. The need for
political will, not legal justification, in determining neutrality was
seldom more starkly highlighted.
In late 1984, the Swiss Bundesversammlung decided to call a
referendum in which the government parties proposed to call for
Switzerland to join tne UN. As the tine for the referendum drew
closer, it was clear that there was considerable resistance to the
proposal, not from organized groups but from the grassroots. What
happened on the 16th March 1986 was a very Swiss rejection of rule
from above.
The opponents of the government warned against all adventures
which could eventually even call Switzerland's neutrality into
question despite attempts by the established parties and their
newspapers (eg. Neue Zurcher Zeitung) to insist on Switzerland's
'interdependence';
350
"A realistic view of the UN, which is not a special union, a
realistic view of Swiss development in this system and a sober self-
evaluation without conceit or false modesty point to a Yes vote
without illusions as reasonable, and thus to a step to equal rights in
the community of States."29
In more regimented political cultures the call by three of the four
parties represented in the governing Bundesrat to vote 'yes' (FDP,
CVP, SPS) supported by the trade unions, the consumer organizations,
women's organizations, student organizations and the church groups
would have been sufficient to ensure a fairly convincing margin of
victory. Only the parties of the extreme right (NA) and the SVP
(sixth largest) were strongly in favour of a 'No' vote. The 'No'
campaign itself remained largely a group of committed independents wno
played on fears aoout sanctions. Swiss neutrality, so essential to her
independence in this view, was once more at stake. The arguments of
the establishment went unheeded;
"Neutrality, as an irreplaceable instrument for the maintenance of
Swiss independence, has to prove itself where conflicts take place.
Correctly understood it does not stop us bringing our Swiss concerns
and viewpoints also into international organizations."-^
By implication, tnen, the Swiss people, tne 'root of sovereignty'
in Switzerland, and hence the source of Austria's 'Swiss model', do
not correctly understand neutrality. The underlying assumption that
legalists interpret neutrality was rocked to its core.
As the Neue Zuercher Zeitung reported after the result:
"The No of the 'Volk' and 'Staende' to Switzerland joining tne UN
could not have been more clear cut. More tnan three quarters of those
who voted and the collected cantons and half-cantons have thrown out
the proposal in a relatively high turnout of 50.2%. The, generally
forecast, negative result was not expected to be this massive."3^
In no canton did the 'yes' campaign achieve more than 40.2%
(Jura), and overall averaged only 24.3%. Even in UN Headquarters
Geneva, the proportion of 'yes' votes was a mere 30.2%.31 The Federal
Council was left with no option but to accept this embarassing slap in
the face. Bundesrat Pierre Aubert (Foreign Affairs) said:
"The Bundesrat regrets this decision, but respects the will of the
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sovereign expressed in all freedom...with this decision...Switzerland
rejects an instrument which the Bundesrat and Parliament regard as
important for our foreign policy. Not to be a member of UNO in
today's world is tied up with disadvantages which are hardly possible
to make up."31
The impotence of political elites in Switzerland in such events has
seldom been more effectively demonstrated.
Abroad the reactions were muted if amazed. In Austria the
reaction was mixed.
"Historians see in the Swiss attitude a historically conditioned
reflex reaction more than an act of foresight.... In the Austrian
press there is incredulity over the degree to which a recommendation
of the Bundesrat and all the large parties has been rejected. It is
no exaggeration to see in the independent thinking of the Swiss a
certain calculation and Hatred of foreigners."^
Elsewhere there was a more critical response (eg. Italy, France).
It appears clear that the suspicion of all foreign influence,
historical fears and trust in tne 'fortress' all contributed to tne
result. The potency of these political factors was underestimated by
the elite. The Berner Tagwacht called the 'No' campaign
33
"a campaign which is hard to beat for primitiveness and lies."
Nevertneless the elements of warning for political elites were there;
"The 'No' vote is not least a repayment for a foreign policy which
has all too long been the exclusive affair of the Government,
diplomats and a few interested parliamentarians. All too often Bern
tried to cloak foreign policy actively in silence, broken only with
explanations which said nothing. Foreign policy, emphasized the
experts again and again, is a difficult and complicated business—too
difficult for ordinary people to understand much of it. Then, as it
became important to bring Switzerland into the UN, one expected
suddenly foreign policy maturity from the same people."-^
The distance between elites and their supposedly sovereign citizens
in foreign policy is immense everywhere. As such, the result of the
Swiss referendum is a finely reminder of the long run instability of
such a situation. The right of Governments to interpret neutrality
was fully challenged. The argument tnat the State is neutral but the
people remain free, appears a very unnatural division after 16th
March. The idea that legal experts determine whether neutrality is
compromised by UN membership was given a final push in the referendum.
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In the light of Austrian activism, it widens the cleft between the
models of the two states. One is free to be a Security Council
member, fully rationalized by juridical logic while the other cannot
be persuaded by its own elite that mere membership of the General
Assembly is not a danger to independence and neutrality. It no longer
suffices to call this 'differences of emphasis'. The centrality of
the UN to much of Austrian thinking leads to the conclusion that we
are here dealing with two different models meeting different political
conditions, both past and present. Again the notion that law could be
applied in the same manner to all 'neutrals' appears to crumble.
The only item which still unites them fully is their military non-
alignment, but even this is differently conceived. Swiss neutrality
is clearly not a Cold War phenomenon linked to the failure to solve
the German problem, decided upon and directed by a political elite as
might be argued for Austria.
Before we attempt to examine the role of the UN for Austrian
foreign policy let us look at some of the issues which have involved
her directly. We have already seen how Austria appealed to the UN
during the Hungarian crisis, and received the thanks of the General
Assembly for its humanitarian role througnout 1956 and 1957. The
South Tyrol question was brought before the General Assembly in 1960
and 1961.
"Austria did not hesitate to take the conflict to the United
Nations. Despite the marked reluctance of Italy's western allies to
expose Rome to this type of pressure and despite a similar lack of
enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
clients, Austria, largely owing to Third World support, won its case.
On the basis of General Assembly resolutions in 1960 and 1961 a
genuine process of negotiation was able to start."^
As in the 1980s Austrian impatience with Italy at lack of
implementation of the 1970 "Package" grew—the issue was again raised,
though in speech rather than resolution form.
"In our relations with Italy...the problem of South Tyrol is of
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particular importance... Last year I informed this Assembly of the
increasing importance of this to the South Tyrolean people and the
increased concern of the Austrian government about this delay. I
regret that I must report today that the situation has not improved
since."36
Even as late as 1984, Leopold Gratz was raising the issue:
"Despite a basic agreement reached by May 1983 between the Italian
Government and the minority there has still regretfully been no action
to pass the necessary acts."-^
In 1960, tne UN dispatched troops to the Congo. Austria sent a
medical batallion after considerable internal debate in Austria on the
ability of Austria to participate in these issues. The UN requested
that Austria provide a fieldpost and a veterinary unit. In supporting
tne government's decision to participate at tnis level, Kreisky
pointed to Sweden's prior example. Nevertheless there were many
sections who were unhappy with tnis decision. The conservative
Tiroler Tageszeitung warned
"There must be no Austrian blood spilt in the Congo."^
It became clear fairly quickly that Austrian law, designed to
restrict Austrian troops to Austrian soil in order to inject
credibility of Austrian neutrality did not allow the dispatch of
troops abroad. Nevertheless, the government felt from the records of
Sweden and Finland that there was a considerable role for neutrals as
third parties under the flag of the UN.
In 1965, the Nationalrat passed two laws which enabled the troop
movements under specific conditions.-^ According to this law tne Main
Committee of the Nationalrat has the power to dispatch army and police
units at the request of an international organization. The troops are
all volunteers. The request can only be granted after consideration
of the compatibility of the action with neutrality. This is under
constant review during any period of action.^ Austria attempted to
reduce controversy by insisting on the voluntary agreement of all
participating States.
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"If UN troops are to be sent in in conflicts between States,., tney
can thus not take sides. They can not fight but take up a role as a
thin dividing wall between the opposing lines. They make use of thier
weapons only in self-defence. Mere participation in such action
cannot be considered a breecn of neutrality."41
In 1964 Austria had already sent a small field contingent to Cyprus
as part of UNFICYP. In 1972 this was increased to nearly 300 men.
Also, Austrians took part in units sent to the Middle East both
tnrough UNEF II (1973-5) in Israel, UNTSO (1968-), and most
importantly in UNDOF. In 1983, 61% of UNDOF stationed on the Golan
Heights were Austrian troops (530 men). By January 1984, 18,617
Austrians had seen action under the UN flag.4^ Officially, Austria
counts this feat as one of her greatest practical contributions to tne
UN. Nevertheless this participation was not without those who
questioned both its validity and its usefulness:
"It is important to point out that our neutral example,
Switzerland, only takes part in the Vatican Guard, out not elsewhere.
The Swiss still appear at zones of conflict, but as workers for the Red
Cross... In Austria one believes that Austria's presence in every
international gremium where intervention might be possible (no matter
whether it might be in the Middle East or Cyprus) underlines the
importance of our country and at the same time guarantees our state
international help wnere there is a case for neutrality or defence.
Nobody can measure this assumption against reality. But one thing
should t»e pointed out: for the international press, the death by napalm
bomb of three Austrian UN soldiers in Cyrpus was not worth a
footnote.
One very difficult area for neutral states has been tne problem of
how to react to the imposition of sanctions. The potential problem
has been outlined above. The reality of the problem came to fruition
in 1966 over rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. Sanctions were imposed
by the Security Council on the UDI-State under Ian Smitn on tne
grounds that Rhodesia maintained a policy of white supremacry.
Resolution 232 (1966) included the feared warning that the Security
Counci 1..
"reminds member states that the failure or refusal by any of them
to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of
Article 25 of tne charter.
Once again there was an interesting split between Switzerland and
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Austria on this issue. The Swiss declined to take part in sanctions;
"The Bundesrat has considered the questions which arise for our
country and had come to the conclusion that Switzerland as a netural
country cannot herself stand behind the obligatory sanctions of the
UN."45
In order not to become a clearing house for trade behind the
sanctions the Swiss once again decided on the principle of 'courant
normal1;
"If in relation to the present situation in Rhodesia, the 'courant
normal' is once again called upon, this is in no way something new,
but merely the reestablishment of a principle which showed itself
useful in the framework of Swiss neutrality in the past.""^
Austria as a member of the UN was confronted with the clause
binding all members to its implementation. As a result Austria
reluctantly decided to support the UN. The permanent representative
of Austria at the UN circulated a note "that neither tobacco nor
A£\
tobacco products would be imported into Austria from Rhodesia." As
these made up the vast bulk of Austria's trade with Rhodesia, this was
portrayed as a major step. Certainly tnere were no armaments or
energy contacts between the two countries. The Austrians agreed
"to try to ensure tnat Austrian territory would provide no
opportunities for Rhodesian trade, which would be against the decision
of the Security Council. Austria will not give Rhodesia either
financial or economic aid."^
This policy split again underlines that politics rather than
principles decided attitudes. Historical experience with sanctions
influenced Swiss thinking while Austria experienced considerable
pressure stemming from its commitment to the UN. Some observers even
called for a new neutrality law on this subject indicating how exposed
the neutrals felt on this issue.^
Austria's actual commitment to the boycott was as questionable as
in other Western States. In several cases, e.g. Veitscher Magnisit AG
(Chrome) 1971, Gutstahlwerk Judenourg 1971 and Anna Presshus 1971, the
UN demanded an investigation. In early 1974 the London 'Sunday Times'
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brought to light that the giant state-owned Steel Complex VOEST had
been breaking sanctions. According to UN investigators VOEST had
supplied a complete Linz/Donawitz Steelworks to Rnodesia. This was
4Qdone through secret deals with the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company. 0
The involvement of a State-owned firm in the breaking of sanctions
highlights the problems of neutrality based on separated spheres of
politics and economics in the corporate state of today, with
implications for a notion that neutrality binds the state and not the
individual.
The overall dilemma was clear in Austrian ambivalence towards
sanctions. As elsewhere in the capitalist states, this ambivalence
towards sanctions in general is even more apparent in attitudes
towards proposed sanctions on South Africa. After much protestation
that sanctions do not work as a political tool, Foreign Minister Gratz
announced to the UN General Assembly that Austria would take limited
action by forbidding future investment in Soutn Africa by state
corporations and a ban on imports of Krugerrands. Export credits were
also suspended. As the conservative 'Die Presse' wrote:
"The consequences of the measures will be more symbolic than of anygraspable results and are admittedly a concession to the state ofworldwide opinion.
The majority of Austrian politicians remain extremely wary of
sanctions and their implications. On the political right, as
elsewhere there is a kneejerk reaction to interference with profit-
making;
"In the case of South Africa, this is not a war between legalsubjects, ie it is not a case for Neutrality. It is simply a Stateagainst wnich one wants to impose certain measures. We can do this ifwe wish. Only, I am in principle no friend of Sanctions against SouthAfrica, though against Aprtheid. I believe the South African
government to be extremely unwise. I am nevertheless againstsanctions because tney have proved themselves unhelpful."^
Perhaps Austria's position was best put by Peter Jankowitsch in an
interview when he said that Austria would probably ultimately follow
357
tne directives of the Security Council if it acted collectively.51
An official of the Foreign Ministry underlined the discomfort when he
confirmed that Austria was basically opposed to sanctions, but added
that where the 'entire community of States comes to believe in them,
then they are justified'52 0f course this once again makes the
imposition of sanctions not so much a matter of principle, but rather
a reaction to the depth of opinion elsewhere. The fact is that South
Africa is far enough away to pose no direct threat to Austria. The
phantom of Swiss experience in the 1930s prevents the Swiss from
taking measures even in such a case, but Austria still seeks
international approval of her actions. Austria remains committed to
the UN and the Cold War which dominates it.
It is perhaps worth examining Austria's overall voting pattern at
the UN. Waldheim said
"It would of course be false to create the impression that all the
neutrals within the UN follow similar policies or always have the same
approach in individual questions.1
Yet in a more detailed analysis, various commentators snow that it
is increasingly the case. In 1956 and 57, Austria had a voting record
87% tne same as tne USA, surpassed only by the 89% with the Republic
of Ireland. Even by 1962 the figure had fallen to 67% identity with
tne USA now surpassed by many countries including Italy, Ireland, and
Holland.54 jn 1965 strasser found an identity between USA and Austria
of 82%, compared with 90% for Italy, 87% for Finland and Canada.^ if
voting with the Western Bloc is taken as a base, Paul Luif found that
from 1960-63 Austria was 100% within the West (cf Ireland 81%, Sweden
78%, India 32%, Finland 54%) which had changed by 1977 to
approximately 60%.Heinz Fischer also points out tnat Austria's
closest colleagues by 1980 were Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and
New Zealand.In North-South, this places Austria firmly in the
North as might be expected.
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While on the Security Council 1973-74, Austria participated in a
total of 47 votes. Austria abstained only twice during the period.
In fact, thirty of tne decisions reached were unanimous. During the
two year period several major international crises blew up. The most
serious was caused by the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in October
1973. Austria condemned previous Israeli intrusions into the Lebanon
(Res. 332/1973) and voted for an ending of hostilities after the
outbreak of the war. The international implications of war in the
Middle East were huge. Even the US was persuaded to abstain to allow
the sending of a peace-keeping force to the Golan Heights between
Syrian and Israeli troops (Res. 360/1973).
"Austria was one of the first countries who sent troops at the
disposal of tne new UN peace-keeping force... In June 1974, the
Austrian batallion took over with the Peruvian contingent the task of
building up a peace-observation troop of the UN (UNDOF) ..."57
The second major crisis was the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which
Austria stongly condemned, basing her position on tne sovereignty of
territory. As we have seen they provided a batallion for UNFICYP,
peace-keeping on tne now geographically divided island.
The now chronic problem of South Africa also required a Security
Council decision. Austria underlined tne distance ner politics had
travelled from the Swiss when she voted for Resolution 338/1973 which
condemned South Africa and Portugal for their failure to apply
sanctions to Rhodesia. Austria further backed a motion (Res.
326/1973) condemning provocation and disturbances against Zambia
stemming from Rhodesia and South Africa.
While Ermacora may be rignt in saying that neutrality nas been
developed by UN acceptance, this is clearly only true for one country
of the two permanent neutrals^, i.e. it depends entirely on political
and psychological factors such as goals and a notion of "credibility".
The issue which led Switzerland to be much more cautious (i.e. the
impostion of international sanctions against a close and powerful
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partner) has nappily not arisen at UN level for Austria but we saw
already in the case of technology transfer the difficulties such a
pressure might pose. Austria has adopted neutrality in a new form—a
base from which to act positively, as an honest broker at Cold War
level. But sne must seek to be more tnan a pawn in this game. The UN
provides a forum in which to widen the scope both of issues on which
independence can be established, and a forum of appeal should Austria
feel squeezed by the superpowers. These pressures are much less for
Switzerland, where the internationalist leadership faced considerable
resistance from an independent and structurally powerful domestic
audience.
One further feature has characterized Austria's role in tne UN; tne
use of Austrian territory and indeed the encouragement of the Austrian
Government for the siting of UN agencies and subgroups. Vienna has
now officially become the third centre of the UN housed in the Vienna
International Centre, known widely as UNO-City.
This development began soon after the signing of the State Treaty
wnen in 1957 tne International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) moved to
Vienna into accommodation provided free of charge by the Austrian
government. The development was further enhanced by the decision of
the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to set up its
headquarters in the Austrian capital in 1967. This was later followed
by a decision of the UN to move the Secretariat of tne Scientific
Committee for the Examination of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) to Vienna.
The concept of developing Vienna as an international centre had
long been attractive for many Austrians and in 1967 tne Government and
tne City of Vienna agreed to build an international Conference and
Agencies Centre. Austria financed the building (489 bn) handed over
to the UN in 1979.59 The Conference Centre is now being completed
against the opposition of the OeVP wno organized a mass petition
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against its completion. Despite doubts about its viability Kreisky
and his successors have supported the project both on grounds of
international commitment and as a mechanism for public works
investment in the depressed construction industry. The UN eventually
hopes to house its Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian
Affairs (CSDHA), the International Drug Control Bureau and funds for
Narcotic Abuse ((UNFDAC) as well as its trade law section (UNCITRAC)
in UNO City. Further the Palestinian Refugee Organization (UNRWA) and
fiOl
the Hign Commission for Refugees will also come to Vienna. Austria
has hosted major UN legal conferences which have resulted in a series
of Vienna Conventions covering such areas as diplomatic exchange
(1961), Treaty Rights (1967 and 1968) and the representation of States
in International Organizations.^-'-
In 1983 a major crisis blew up over US attitutdes to the UN. The
American UN Ambassador was reported as saying to the USSR delegation;
"We will stand at the docks and wave off your departure"
The USSR made it clear that they would be quite happy to see the UN
headquarters move to Vienna. The Austrian government aware of the
symbolic value that such a destructive move might have on the UN's
prestige moved quickly to scotch the rumours.^
This attempt to attract international organizations (including
OPEC and IIASA) in Austria has been a marked feature of the SPOe
period. Kreisky is reported in its defence as saying
"A large army would cost us more and bring us less."^
We will look at this strand of policy later, but it is worth
pointing out that this project was part of security strategy.
"The presence of international civil servants is in itself a
security factor, because isolated actions against a country in which
they are staying can only take place in full view of world public
opinion. Thus far it is very important that tnere are 4-5,000
international civil servants in Austria... The worst thing for
Austria in the years 1934 to 1938 was to be squeezed out of the
consciousness of the world's public.... One thing we can do is to be
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constantly present in the awareness of this public... For a small
state there is no presence through military strength. One achieves a
profile by causing the world no worries, by proving that one can
manitain order at home and is prepared to take part in international
action."64
This political defence goes some way in expressing Austrian
thinking on UN policy. Postwar Austria has been very committed to
policy within the UN framework. The symbolic value of the UN for
Austria quite specifically should not be underestimated. The UN was
set up in response to the World War which had meant total breakdown in
Austria. As part of the German Reich trying to reestablish a separate
identity acceptance as an independent operator was of central
importance. Few other countries have so desperately sought the
approval of international opinion as Austria. Secondly as we
established above it provided a forum in which Austria's voice was
relatively equal. It offerred the possibility of escape from Cold War
sterility. There are two competing notions of Austrian statenood: the
one claiming that Austria is a creation of the Superpowers, the other
seeing the Second Republic as the will of the Austrian people. The UN
provides a forum where Austria can further the latter of these
interpretations. At the very least they have established their own
position as no more interdependent than countries in specific
alliances. As Kreisky put it in the South Tyrol debate in 1961:
"Where else should a small State turn wnen it is in a conflict with
a large State except to the universal community of peoples in which
the large and the small state both nave the same vote, the small and
the large also have the same rights. Thus the UN offers the smaller
States, where they believe they are in tne right, the possibility of
mobilizing the conscience of the others."*^
Further, the UN is the largest forum for Austrian activism. As
Jankowitsch put it:
"The Neutrality chosen by Austria has the purpose of proving good
deeds to the international community, that means to do everything
possible to prevent the extension of conflicts, to strengthen
cooperation and to stand for world peace and international
security."66
Again this shows the distance that Austria nas travelled from Swiss
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roots. Austria's role as an honest broker neutral depends at least as
much on her political reliability and credibility as on a nominal
status. As time passes and the policy is ever further developed, the
legal roots become what they always were, guidelines appropriate to a
particular period and offering limited protection in diplomatic debate
but themselves superceded by international practice. As such they are
'processual' not 'static'. We have seen how where political will
exists (eg. at the UN) this is admitted and any seeming contradictions
are merely untidily rationalized. Where sufficient numbers wish to
prevent a particular move (eg. shift away from military defence) the
law is presented as absolute and beyond rationalization. It would be
difficult to present any direct connection between Austria's current
stance on UN membersnip and neutrality and tne view of the
disillusioned Belgian Rolin when he said
"The organization of the community of States is the negation of
neutrality. The Charter of the League of Nations is its death
sentence."
He further predicted tnat when all states were members, the end
would be final. The fact that conflict has now become institution¬
alized does not prevent tne ultimate dilemma, but it has allowed a
positive involvement of states prepared to take a less legalistic
approach to neutrality.
The UNO City, the peace-keeping troops and between 1972-82 the
role of Kurt Waldheim as UN General Secretary were matters of
considerable importance for Austria.
"The election of Dr. Waldheim was not only the successful
coronation of the career of an Austrian diplomat who was able to
collect important experiences in the realm of multilateral diplomacy,
but was also an example for the success of the foreign policy of a
small state."°^
Altnough Waldheim had been a candidiate for the OeVP in the
I
presidential election of 197/2? his candidacy was supported by the SPOe
cVN
government. On his election Kirschlager announced
A
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"Austria is happy and proud to see the Austrian Dr. Kurt Waldheim
in the responsible position of the General Secretary of the United
Nations."69
All of this met tne need of a small country to play a role of some
profile at international level. Given Austria's past history the UN
provided a unique opportunity to prove Austria's commitment to the
concept of international solidarity, even if there were severe doubts
about collective security. The continued dormancy of the latter made
it a chance too good to miss.
Nevertneless there nave been negative voices;
"One will learn to value the caution and sense of the Swiss who
preferred to work within the UN on the technical, apolitical level but
to remain distant from the political forces.""^
The experience of the intermediate thirty years seam to have shown
that independence of this kind, particularly for a trade dependent
country, on the East-West divide with no links to emerging areas and
question marks over her wartime role, was not an option. As a
means of maintaining a trustworthy and independent image, tne UN has
served Austria well, and in commitment to the goal and limited
achievements of tne UN few countries have surpassed tne Austrians.
Whether this affects the long term security of Austria we will examine
in tne next chapter. Nevertheless it plays an essential role.
Jankowitsch's successor Klestil wrote:
"The recognition tnat the entirity of Austrian foreign policy must
be aimed at this one goal, namely to ensure security of our state.
This determines the high priority which Austria accords tne UN."^-'-
In the midst of atomic Europe, the maintenance of the peace appears
to be the only hope for any small state. Within this the UN provides
at least one forum of action. As many have pointed out, if Kurt
Waldheim had been a citizen of a state on either side of the East-West
divide, he could never have been a UN General Secretary. Within the
recent constellation of politics it is ironically tne neutrals and
non-aligned who can push most effectively for the goals of the
364
Charter.
Austria and the Developing Countries
Austria's relations with the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin
America were very underdeveloped until the 1970s. We must truly speak
here of a new and important aspect of international relations which
has developed out of the dynamics of capitalistic expansion, the
increasing political and diplomatic interactions and the particular
interests in the development and impoverishment debates in the
Catholic Church and around Bruno Kreisky. As Foreign Minister Lane
acknowledged in 1983;
"Austria is no isle of the Blest. Europe's security is not ensured
by detente within its continental boundaries. Conflicts in Asia and
in Africa can be a threat."''
Even in 1955, Austria had considerable grounds to feel indebted to
tropical belt states for their intervention on her behalf. This
applied particularly to India whose Prime Minister Nehru intervened at
Austria's request to encourage the USSR to adopt a more positive
stance on a State Treaty. The Brazilians, too, drew up a resolution
supported by, among others, Lebanon and Mexico.
Even by 1980, twenty-tnree years after the State Treaty, Austria's
trade relationships with the Third World were less intensive than many
other small countries (including Switzerland, Sweden and the Benelux
countries). Nevertheless Austria had several advantages in the modern
world. Her lack of colonial background was now a political plus. As
a reestablished state Austria was expanding her relations all over the
world. Nevertneless there was no institution like the Commonwealth
7*3
which might bring political attention to world wide issues. In
1963, Kreisky saw this as an issue of political education.^ By 1970
only 6.3% of all Austrian exports went to developing countries rising
to 10.7% by 1973 and 12.4% by 1976. Capital exports rose by a factor
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of ten between 1967 and 1976.75 ./3 By 1979 the proportion was around
13%, while in Sweden this proportion was 15%, in Switzerland over 22%.
In 1976 9.34% of imports came from LDCs. Of this total 40.6% of
exports and 41% of imports were with the oil-producing states in the
Middle East. Structurally the export trade was made up mainly of
industrial goods (90% = 35-40% mmachinery, transport equipment,
finished and half-finished goods, 10% chemicals, 5% consumer goods)
while the import trade is energy raw materials (ie. oil 50%),
foodstuffs 26% and other raw materials 14% and industrial goods 21%
(all figures 1977).^® In the 1980s a rising trade deficit emerged in
Austrian trade with the LDCs rising from US$ 310 million in 1981 to
$620 million by 1983.^ Total trade with non-OECD and non-Comecon
states had risen to 18.5% of exports and 12% of imports by 1983.^
The pattern in the 1970s was one of increasing trade deficits from
a peak surplus of $288 million in 1975 to a deficit of $368m. Yet this
hides considerable variation within the regions. By 1980 the trade
deficit with OPEC countries was $701.4 million and witn non-European
developing countries a mere $144.2 million. The share of OPEC
countries in trade also must be taken into account and indeed growth
in this area accounts for virtually all the growth in share in
Austrian trade. Indeed export share to OPEC countries rose from 1.8%
(1970) to 6.8% (1976) and 5.1% (1980) while with non-OPEC, non-
European LDCs the figures were 4.6% (1970) 5.5% (1976) and 5.8%
(1980). The figures for imports are even more unbalanced, rising from
0.9% (1970) to 6.5% (1980) in the OPEC area and actually falling from
7Q
5.2% (1970) to 4.9% (1980) in the case of the non-OPEC area.
Since 1972 Austria has operated an 'import preference scneme' for
developing countries despite an overall tendency towards trade
liberalization. This was extended in 1975, the same year as the EEC's
first Lome Convention which makes similar provisions, to affect
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tropical agricultural products, most small scale materials (except
textiles) at a zero tariff. Most other products can be imported at
reductions of 50% from normal tariffs, though this does not include
textiles or clothing where tariffs are only reduced by 35%. The
government includes this in its estimates of help for developing
countries at AS451 billion ($60 million). As Skuhra suggests however
"it must be considered whether the figures could not have been
exaggerated by the government."^
Most of the countries affected by the bilateral agreements are not
among the least developed fifty of the UN. At the UNCTAD V meeting in
Manila in 1979, Austria joined almost all industrialized states
(except Australia) in opposing any improved preference system. In the
trade agreements Skuhra concludes that Austria is neither an
especially hard opponent nor a particularly generous partner.
"The Third World has become the hope of Austrian foreign trade.
All the more because Austria like so many developing countries is
itself trying to reduce her relatively strong concentration of trade
on a few countries, notably West Germany through the acquisition of
new trading partners... Under the name of "partnership", efforts to
sell Austrian goods and know-how to the Third World have been
intensified in a very pragmatic way."*^
This of course is the rule rather than the exception in the North-
South question. In the Austrian case the most striking contrast is
with the political rhetoric,in which the SPOe at least has tried to
line itself up with the group of 'like-minded countries' who have
theoretically adopted a more open-handed attitude in North-South
attitudes. We will examine this below. First let us consider
Development Aid as a component of Austrian policy.
Austria had no real policy of development aid until the 1970s.
Between 1965 and 1969 0.13% of GNP was devoted to official aid
programmes annually. This made Austria the least generous donor in
the OECD beside Switzerland (comparative figures—Holland 0.47%,
Denmark 0.24%, Norway 0.24%, Sweden 0.29%). Although at this stage
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most of the small non-colonial states lay below the OECD average
Austria was one of the least generous. By 1978 the OECD average had
fallen to 0.35%, but the role of other smaller countries had vastly
increased (Holland 0.82%, Norway 0.9%, Sweden 0.9%). Austria remained
anchored at the bottom with 0.27%, compared only to Switzerland (0.2%)
and Finland (0.17%).^"'"
"A Swedisn social democrat maintained recently that the Austrian
has become the meanest person in Europe... Printed in absolute
figures, the public Development Aid in Austria in 1976 was $39 million
or 702 million schillings. In other words 88 schillings per year per
person. For comparison—the Swedish government gives 42,260
schillings per citizen to the developing countries."^
In the 1980s the situation became even more emaorassing when the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) objected to the method of
calculation whereby Austria's 1982 aid was valued at 0.34%, a
considerable increase, moving Austria into the middle field of
09
international aid politics for the first time. Tne result was a
reduction to below 0.3% once more.
There are further problems with Austrian development aid. Part of
the problem in 1983 was the method of calculating credit as aid. The
DAC constantly criticized the fact that Austrian credits nave
extremely tough conditions attached to than, while the number going to
the poorest countries was exceptionally low, particularly if compared
to other countries with Social Democratic governments. In Sweden over
70% of aid goes to the poorest countries. This is far from the case
OA
in Austria where the middle group have benefitted.
The percentage of finance available to LDCs which can be counted
as aid is low (25%) compared with an OECD average of 63% (Sweden 90%).
At the same time while Austria's multilateral financial aid is mostly
paid through the World Bank (IDA—WDrld Bank subsidiary) which is seen
as a relatively sympathetic if 'soft' agency. Nevertheless although
Austria paid $20 million in development aid to the Bank, Austrian
firms received contracts to the value of $27.8 million in 1979 and
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$39.8 million in 1978.»5 , , , . . . . .. . ,OD Again it must be pointed out tnat tnis
situation is by no means unique, but it contrasts unfavourably with
the political rhetoric and with the performance of other 'like-minded'
countries.
None of the political parties has a detailed concept of Austria's
relations to the Third World, although since 1978 it has been a part
of tne SPO's programme. In general, much of the pressure nas come
from the private sector, where Austrian giving puts her eleventh among
European OECD states, compared to seventeenth in State Aid. By 1971
the private groups had developed 'an Austrian concept for development
aid and economic cooperation with developing countries.'
"Although this concept was developed at the request of the
Chancellor, its conclusions found little echo in the concrete practice
of Government policy until the late '70s except in the area of
organization.
Much of the pressure came from the radical wing of the Catholic
Church who developed the most coherent policy well before the parties.
Kreisky has long been defensive about this;
"I must admit here", he told the Socialist International in 1981,
"that Austria has not done anything remarkable for Development Aid,
compared to other Social Democratic governments. I must add however,
that we had a very extensive State Treaty that cost us hundreds of
millions of dollars, that we had to develop a land destroyed by war,
that we took over a land that was backward since 1918 and finally,67
that we are tne fifth largest creditor of Poland."0'
While this might be reasonable in 1971, it is hard to reconcile
with the remarkable economic performance of Austria in the 1970s. The
ritual handwringmg of SPOe politicians on tnis matter snows a
considerable degree of political humbug;
"I would welcome it if we were more generous. The real reason may
lie in tne fact that here development aid has a high church component
and is mainly left to Caritas. The State only became aware of tnis
duty very slowly and there is no sense in hiding the fact that we were
not generous enough - its true"®^
"The Sinowatz government has announced that development aid will
reach 0.7% of GNP by the end of this parliament in 1987. I am rather
sceptical as to whether this will be acnieved, but tne tendency is at
least rising. In any case the practical fulfilment of this trend will
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be made easier if the economy is not stagnant as in the last few years
but rather is improving."^
Mock showed a degree of satisfaction at SPOe failure when he said;
"I always assumed that the SPOe would do more than us on this
issue, but as you see it doesn't turn out that way"90
Perhaps the most honest comment came from former Foreign Minister
Pahr who remarked that as on all issues, the Austrian Socialist
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Party might be socialist but it was primarily Austrian!
We must now turn to the policies which Austria has developed at a
multilateral level. Here the interest and influence of Kreisky was
decisive. As Foreign Minister, he sponsored a conference in Salzburg
with the support of India's Prime Minister Nehru, after whicn the
'Vienna Institute for Development Questions' was founded with
ch
Kreisky's personal participation. This undermines Kirschlaeger's
A
observation that the State and parties were ill-informed on tnis issue
until a later stage. Development questions went beyond the normal
bounds of party debate in Austria.
"Today young Catholics and young Socialists find themselves united
for a radical policy for development. However inside their own SPOe it
is impossible to persuade many older people for a socialist
development policy."^
There was thus at least a degree of personal consistency when
during the oil crisis he said at the 1974 UN General Assembly that it
was the right of all raw-materials producing countries to demand a
fair price for their products.^ In the same year he wrote to his
Social Democratic counterparts in West Germany and Sweden (Brandt and
Palme) :
"It is certainly not enough to complain about the hign price of oil
if one has sold high priced industrialised goods to the countries of
the Third World until now."^^
It was only in the 1970s and particularly after the oil crisis
shifted attention away from the industrialised world that development
became part of the Austrian political agenda. In 1970, Kreisky said
"The coming decade which has been declared the Second Development
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Decade by the UN will make increased efforts by the industrialised
nations necessary in their cooperation with the peoples of the Third
World. Austria will support the efforts of the UN...in tnis extra-
important area of global solidarity, will strengthen her development
aid within the realm of the possible."95
Despite this, Austria failed to do anything substantial.
In 1975 at the Final Act in Helsinki, Bruno Kreisky in line with
the policy of trying to extend the scope of the CSCE beyond the
boundaries of Europe, suggested a pan-European approach to aid.
"I realize that my country has not fulfilled its obligations as we
should have. But I have come to the opinion tnat we could all fulfil
tnese duties more easily if they were part of a concerted and pan-
continental action."^"
This was an important stage in the crystallization of Austrian
thinking on development policy. There is no original document from
whence this idea stemmed, in the Declaration of Government Policy in
1971, Kreisky suggested using unused capacity in the western economy
by expansion into markets in the Third WOrld. This was gradually
linked to Austrian experience from the European Recovery Programme
using the idea of 'drawing rights' for capital exports. In 1976 the
Austrian representatives at the DAC (OECD) outlined the plan in
greater detail.
The idea was to transfer resources from North to South by using
unused capacity in northern economies. Each donor country should
identify its unused capacity. The receivers would then have drawing
rights on those facilities they needed. As under ERP the receiver
countries could sell tnese goods on tne domestic market and tne
national currency generated put into a counterpart fund which could be
used for further development. Industrialized countries snould see
their part as a gift and finance this either through their budgets or
increased debt. As Kramer-Fischer points out the advantages are
intended to accrue as much to the industrialized donors as the
receivers.
"Through the industrial development sought by the New Marsnall
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Plan, one hopes to be able to fight the crisis in the industrial
states at the same time. One of the key roles belongs to the
development of the Third World. The increased transfer of resources
is intended to be in the form of goods worth $1 billion per annum
rather than capital in order to help the overcapacity in the
industrial states.
The Austrian proposal for a new Marshall plan appeared more
concrete than other concepts based on vague parallels.^ Yet it found
no support at OECD. The delegates at the OECD doubted whether the
programme was realizable, fearing inflationary consequences;
"Furtner it was pointed out that the unused production capacity was
to be found precisely in those branches which did not correspond to
the import needs of the Third World."^
Kreisky continued to advocate his plan, speaking often in his role
as Austrian Chancellor. At the International Oil Symposium in Vienna,
Kreisky again drew attention to the importance of counterpart
funds.-^2 did tnis throughout the world culminating at UNIDO in
New Delhi in 1980 when Kreisky despite considerable scepticism on the
part of other states announced that he wished to initiate a pilot
project.
"If only three or six fairly small like-minded European
industrialized states and two or three oil producing countries were to
come together with a few developing countries in order to implement
concrete development projects similar to these that I have suggested,
it could be proved tnat ideas of this kind are capable of making a
contribution to the solution of development problans."-'-^''-
Kreisky was with Mexican President Lopez-Portil lo one of the
leading lights in organizing the World Summit at Cancun 1981 in
Mexico. Altnougn ne did not ultimately cnair the meeting, he once
again emphasized tne importance of counterpart funds.
Criticism remained intense. How far is post-war Europe comparable
with the Third World? Any industrialization in LDCs would require
major cultural and economic restructuring. The goods on offer are not
required in the Third World. How then are counterpart funds to be
generated? The main reasons for overcapacity in tne North are
technology and cheap imports. Why then does the Third World want
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suddenly to buy things it itself produces? Furtner development based
on this type of capital investment (eg. Brazil, South Korea) has not
helped the poorest, and seems to encourage the spread of multinational
control. For some the similarity with the Marshall Plan lies in the
attempt to dump excess capacity and stop the USSR.103
"The impression arises that Austria as a small state whose
generosity in development aid is extremely modest is looking for
parties with the ability to pay in order to jump on an already rolling
bandwagon."-'-1"'*
In many ways the significance of the New Marshall Plan
is not its content but in its existence. It signifies the first
Austrian attempt to formulate a coherent policy on the issue. From
the last section, we observed that Austria's performance in the UN is
in part dependent on establishing links beyond the Cold War. With
tnis development strategy Austria was able to argue with at least some
consistency at UNCTAD and UNIDO. The failure of Cancun and the
altered political climate since the advent of Ronald Reagan as
President, have made this kind of proto-Keynesian policy widely
unpopular. The consistency of Austria's advocacy may win her
political friends, being seen togetner with tne Scandinavian and
Benelux 'like-minded countries' and distracting attention from her aid
performance. Certainly the discovery that ulterior motives lie benind
development policy is not new. A look at Austria's UN position (eg.
in discussions on a New Economic Order) show that although officially
it may be politically supportive of LDCs, Austria is among the
hardliners, although flexible on matters of principle or programmatic
■j nrc
details. Some observers have called Austrian policy a 'free rider
strategy'.
"According to tnis interpretation Austria conceals her genuine
preferences and speaks out in favour of the developing world leaving
the articulation and defence of ner interests as an industrial state
to other states who she expects to be unable to go along with the
demands for major cnanges in the international system."^^
The UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development
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(UNCSTD) took place in Vienna in 1979. Austria's active involvement
in this had also been criticized,
"not because of the conference as such, but because it was part of
the general policy of bringing international organizations to Vienna
(eg.UNIDO) and of becoming a UN centre, the cnief aim of which was to
strengthen Austria's weak position, receiving extra security through
international recognition."!-^
At this conference, Austria and Canada alone supported tne LDCs'
"Group of 77" motion for an separate international technology transfer
organization instead of using current UN agencies. This was
nevertheless attacked as an opportunistic attaempt to woo the
developing countries without real cost to Austria.
This line of criticism is not always useful. At times it is so
convinced of conspiracy that it is impossible to escape from its own
smothering logic. Bruno Kreisky's activities in this field have been
energetic. As in much of the rest of Austrian politics his role is
comparable to that of Palme in Sweden and Brandt in West Germany.
This group has developed a policy of support for 'self-determination'
separate from that of the US. Thus Austria took up distinctly
different positions on events in Iran and Nicaragua, corresponding to
the distance we have already seen over Poland and Afghanistan.
"It has always been Austria's view that a solution to the crisis in
Central America can only be found by the states of the region
themselves... Austria will thus continue to support the Contadora
process as an independent Latin American initiative for peace and
progress, "108
There has been a slow extension of interest and concern on
development issues, with the youth wings of the parties and also
within the Catholic Church which has become tne most consistent
advocate of policy change.
Nevertneless as elsewhere, parliamentary time devoted to
development issues is minimal. After 1973 when development was
brought under the Chancellor's office, an advisory committee was set
up composed of sixty members - one third from private aid organizations, a
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quarter from parties and provinces, five experts and five civil
servants. By 1976 the number of party and provincial representatives
was reduced to two(!) on "the grounds of disinterest."109
Kicker found that the council had no real control, and that the
public had little grasp on the situation, seldom pressurizing
parliament on this issue (unlike Sweden): eg. immediately after Cancun
which Kreisky helped to initiate and organize, only one-third could
give a definition of the "North-South dialogue"."'"09
At the UNIDO Conference, Kreisky explained the policy developed
with State Secretary Nussbaumer in more detail. He placed North/South
as of equal importance with East/West. The New Marshall Plan would
provide infrastructure and motivation for industrialization and create
sufficient advantages for the North to make it "realistic""'""'"0. This
was not what the radicals wanted to hear but it was at least direct.
Austria had been caugnt between two stools on development. On a
diplomatic level Austria has made considerable overtures to the Third
World. Yet aid and economic level performance has fallen pitifully
short of the rhetoric. In all the interviews conducted with SPOe
politicians tnere was a ritual wringing of hands,(see aoove) but still
concrete action at home seems unforthcoming. Despite Kreisky's
entnusiasm Austria has not developed a coherent development policy.
In this she is far from unique. In no way has Austria been neutral in
tne North/South divide. In official circles the fact that there is no
'war' or that North/South is a 'social' not a 'political' issue (a
very interesting liberal division) is cited as reason for this failure
to extend neutrality. At diplomatic level, the like-minded countries
have tried to develop a 'bridge function' between the Third World and
the industrialized states (eg. Cancun, Brandt Report, Swedisn Aid) but
Austria has failed to meet this on the economic level.
Austria's security depends on no North/South war developing even on
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a terrorist level. A 'courant normal' policy would merely convince
the Third World of Austria's northern status. The very same people
who preach fortress neutrality in East/West issues reject any
neutrality in the North/South question. The result of this logic is
once again to suggest that Austrian neutrality is only as permanent as
the Cold War, within which it has a meaning and to which it must
relate, with all the political implications for neutrality which we
have developed elsewhere. At least Social Democratic policy
differences with USA have enabled a development to a 'third party' at
diplomatic level.
In addition to the Neutral/Western dilemma we have now seen a
latent Neutral/Nortnern dilemma. Diplomatic and economic factors seem
to pull SPOe policy in two directions. In tne Palestine question,
over Nicaragua and in relations with the non-aligned movement the
OeVP, more sure where their loyalties lie, have attacked mercilessly.
"This development to a strong 'equidistance' to both the
Superpowers which can be traced to tne middle of the 70s nas been seen
by both the parliamentary opposition parties (pre-1983) as extremely
questionable botn in terms of foreign and neutrality policy, and has
teen sharply criticized.''^
We will now look at two of the most domestically controversial
aspects of policy; non-alignment and Palestine.
Austria and the Non-aligned Movement
The development of wider links with the Non-aligned movement was a
significant feature of Austrian policy in the 1970s. In Lusaka in
1970, Austria toox part as a guest.
In Austria the controversy over 'neutralism' was well established
before the State Treaty (see chapter on Neutrality). Within both
parties there had been a clear attempt to limit the ideological
content of neutrality. When the KPOe began to espouse neutrality pro-
Western elements became extremely supicious. Foreign Minister Gruber
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described the suggestion as a 'Trojan Horse'. Nevertheless the party-
accepted a formula which, it seemed, would allow Austria to be
Western. The one group who supported neutrality throughout the period
of occupation, the so-called 'Democratic Union', accused in its time
of neutralism, pointed out the real implications early on (1952);
"The people's representatives and government would have to accept a
decision in celebratory form, as a result of which Austria, on the day
of the signing of a State Treaty, of the withdrawal of all troops and
the recreation of Austrian sovereignty would be obliged to follow a
policy of neutrality in the sense of international law, in a bloc-free
foreign policy which would make it forever impossible that the finally
freed Austria could ever become a strategic or political instrument of
one or other world power
Other Austrian politicians were at pains to distinguish between
neutrality and neutralism. Yet the Cold War ensured that Austria
would have to develop a policy based on co-existence. This had been
long suggested by many Socialists and left-wing Catholics.
"Their critics accused them even in the 60s of naivete and
utopianism. With the advent of actual detente between East and West,
which meant an acceptance of tne status quo for Europe, especially in
the German question, there was an end in Austria to the fight against
neutralism for the time being. The question became virulent again
only when the Socialist-led government moved closer to the Non-aligned
movement in the '70s. ^
This is not to say that neutrality and non-alignment in their
present contexts are the same. However both are seeking new
perspectives on the East/West question and the neutrals especially
Austria have sought to broaden the scope of their relations both in
order to take advantage of developments in economic markets and in an
attempt to escape an isolation within Cold War Europe. Nevertheless
there are clear differences of empnasis.
"There exists in respect of permanent neutrality a clear cut legal
prohibition to this effect [on joining military alliances]: the
refusal of non-aligned countries to enter into military arrangements
is solely based on a political maxim." 4
In the case of the non-aligned movement membership of the military
alliances around the Superpowers is incompatible with membersnip of
the movement as such. This extends beyond NATO and the Warsaw Pact to
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include CENTO and SEATO although France's agreements on Africa, the
Commonwealth, OAS or OAU do not affect membership.
These principles are not codified and membership can be terminated
unilaterally. Given the conditions under which Austria regained her
independence and the international context of the State Treaty this is
not the case for her, although Sweden may be in a different position.
Traditionally, neutrality involved indifference whereas non-alignment
was seen as an attempt to shift the debate positively. This is no
longer true. The Non-aligned are not indifferent to East/West
questions and do not take a 'neutralistic' ie. 'ideologically neutral'
stance. They nevertheless decide on a more issue-by-issue basis than
military allies. In a Cold War context this has become the substance,
goal and method of Austria as well. As Daniel Frei points out the
development of the N+N group and its activism at CSCE shows that
apparently different policy methods can be reconciled in Europe."*""^
This is perhaps the most important point. The Non-aligned
movement as such is a unity against an outside hegemony of East/West.
It has little internal unity beyond an insistence that the reduction
of world politics to the superpower struggle is sterile and dangerous
both from a general perspective and from the point of view of their
individual interests, as a 'great powers' view of the world tnreatens
to reduce their interests to a minor footnote. This does not specify
which issues should replace East/West but there is sufficient to find
common interest between Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Brazil and India. The
inherent logic of this interpretation is that AT THE MARGIN the
interests of the neutrals and those of the non-aligned states
coalesce. Same might argue that this is true of all states beyond the
Superpowers who constantly wish to emphasize their own powers. It is
certainly more obvious for neutral states barred from membership of
alliances than it is for alliance members. It is also more attractive
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for neutrals more directly involved in Cold War politics (Austria,
Finland) than the older neutrals for wham neutrality has different
roots, traditions, and implications:
"European neutral countries, although they are different by the
character of their neutrality and formally do not follow the policy of
non-alignment in their political actions, proclaim for instance as
follows: respect of sovereignty, independence and equality of all
peoples, repugnance of the policy of force and of interference into
the business of other countries. If one compared the policy of
Yugoslavia...with the foreign policy of Austria, Finland and Sweden,
it is sure that their views on important international questions would
be identical and in many cases even more so than in the case of
particular non-aligned countries.""^
Thus the possibility of overlap exists. This explains why
permanent neutrality cannot be said to be in legal contradiction to
membership of the Non-aligned movement, less so than UN membership.109
As Luif points out, political grounds are the main problem.
The more obvious differences such as the different positions on
North/South from the majority of the Non-aligned movement remain true,
but as the Cold War has continued the neutrals have adopted the non-
aligned notion of active promotion of peace.11*' The financial
pressures involved in poorer countries maintaining large armies has
also led both groups to actively promote disarmament. Despite
disclaimers that neutrality, neutralism, and non-alignment cannot be
confused11^ the continuity between neutrality and non-alignment as
practiced by states such as Yugoslavia is at least as great as the
internal continuity within the Non-aligned movement sucn as Cuba and
Malawi. The proposition that military non-alignment provides the
minimum requirement of a credible permanent neutrality serves our
purposes best.
Austria's UN voting record snows that her connection to small West
European and neutral states is closest. Luif shows that in 1979
Austria's closest identity was with Sweden, Finland in sixth place,
Ivory Coast in twenty-first, USA in fortieth, Yugoslavia in sixty-
tnird, Cuba in one-hundred-sixth, and USSR in one-hundred-fourteenth
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out of one-hundred-seventeen.j_j_8
Austria did not take part in any of the Summit Conferences of tde
non-aligned in the 1960s. In 1964, Finland attended as the first West
European neutral, taking up observer status in Cairo. Austria was at
this stage engaged in extending her connections with Africa and Asia
under the influence of Bruno Kresiky as Foreign Minister. In 1970,
with the SPOe now forming a minority government, Austria attended the
summit in Lusaka. In order to avoid any impression that observer
status might be a precursor to full membership, the Austrians had the
I I Q
special status of 'Guest' created. This status was also adopted by
Finland. In 1973 (Algiers) Sweden also took up Guest status, joined
Colombo
by Switzerland at Col umbo (1976). Austria has always been represented
by a civil servant (Ambassador Jankowitsch in 1970) but in 1979 in
Havana, Finland was represented by a State Secretary (ie. political
representation). Luif concludes
"In terms of numbers, geographical location, economic development
and systems, political structures, legal status and basic positions in
the global conflicts [!!] of our age they are indeed fundamentally
dissimilar" but however "In terms of actual behaviour... permanently
neutral states and non-aligned are not as far apart as tney might be
expected to be against the background of the above distinctions."-^®
By 1980, SPOe Club leader Fischer was reassuring conservatives that
Austria would not join the Non-aligned movement, despite no
fundamental contradiction between neutrality and non-alignment.-^"-
This has ranained Austria's position. We will examine this below when
examining domestic debates on foreign policy.
Austria and the Palestine Question
Austria's far from obvious preoccupation witn Middle Eastern
politics has already been mentioned at CSCE. Indeed Bruno Kreisky
more than perhaps any other non-American outsider has taken up this
issue. In many ways this is a classic example of an individual
influencing foreign policy and underscores the dominance of Kreisky's
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position. Despite disclaimers by close associates that
"it would be exaggerated and mistaken to speak of 'Kriesky's Middle
East Pol icy'"H6
it is clear that he exerted the major driving force behind the
policy. Nevertheless SPOe politicians often feel obliged to deny any
personal domination;
"It is not possible in a democracy. One can force nothing through
in a democracy if one does not maintain at least the passive
understanding of the majority of the voters, otherwise one cannot be
re-elected three times as in Kreisky's case."^
While the passive acceptance of the SPOe on this matter must be
granted, it is quite clear that the obsession was Kreisky's. Although,
as Lane points out, there are parallel interests in developing economic
contacts with the Middle East, and as others are keen to underline
there is some historical connection through the Crusades and contact
with Ottoman Forces in the Balkans, Austria's involvement with Middle
East Affairs in the 1970s and '80s aennot be derived from these facts
alone. This is also widely conceeded.
"This interconnection with Arab matters has a historical root; tne
Kaiser was also King in Jerusalem as well... Kreisky became the
spokesman for the Palestinians. This certainly brought us economic
advantages in Arab countries, but it also caused us political
difficulties, for example with the UN"®^
Kreisky's position as an Austrian of Jewish birth if not practice
perhaps explains his unique position. His first direct involvement in
Middle Eastern affairs was participation in a conference in Cairo as
Austrian foreign minister in March 1964. It was to be the start of
twenty years of personal obsession. In the newly published book Das
1 22
Nahostprob 1 em the development of Kreisky's thought since his most
important single initiative as head of the fact-finding mission for
tne Socialist International (S.I.) in 1976 until the mid-1980s can be
admirably traced. I do not propose merely to precis this work.
Rather I will now concentrate on the degree to which Austria became
invloved in Palestinian affairs and some of the individual events
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wnich affected perception on the issue.
In 1964, Israel was under threat of having the flow of all the
Jordan neadwaters cut off by Arab States. Kreisky's visit was thus
attacked by Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir who asked "why the
first western statesman who had to travel to Egypt had to be an
Austrian Foreign Minister of Jewish background?"!2^ This was the
first sign of strain in the relations between Kreisky and the Israeli
State which were to develop into a long-running saga of hostility.
In the 1967 War, Austria attempted to avoid taking any particular
side. This was difficult to maintain at the UN. Many criticized the
government for being over-cautious. In the end, Austria voted against
a Yugoslav/Indian proposal for an immediate withdrawal from occupied
territories and for a Latin American proposal which called for a halt
and asked parties to reconstruct relations on the basis of good
neighbourliness.!2^ In the event, many Eastern Bloc countries broke
off diplomatic relations with Israel and were represented by neutrals.
Austria took over responsibility for Czech, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian
nationals.
On coming into government, Kreisky quickly brought the Middle East
question to the fore. In 1971 at the Council of Europe he raised the
problem as a necessary part of CSCE. This was a repeated Austrian
theme in the build up to the conference.
Austria's own vulnerability to attack by terrorists became real at
the end of September 1973. Since World War II, Austria had been the
first western stopping point for Jews emigrating from the Soviet
Union. Many passed through the Soviet camp at Schonau near Vienna run
by the Jewish Agancy. It was an important symbol for many Jews,
visited by Golda Meir and Abba Eban among others. Even by 1972,
security chiefs in Austria were showing concern aoout the camp.
"In the last eight years 164,000 Jews have emigrated to Israel by
383
Schonau"125
.. wrote 'Profil' pointing out its central importance. Yet even
before the attack the role of the Jewish Secret Service within the
camp was in question.
"For at least half a year officials in the foreign ministry have
been concerned about Schonau and in the Interior Ministry worries that
the Israeli Secret Service which has built an inner security ring
around the camp have risen considerably."-*-^
'Die Furche' wrote:
"The Schonau camp has never been a problem-free affair. It is
uncontested that armed Israeli Secret Service agents were based in
Austrian territory in and around Schonau... state within a state,
foreign secret service agents in Austria.
Plans for attack were uncovered as early as February 1973. The
attack actually took place on 28th September. A train carrying
refugees from the Soviet Union was attacked by Arab terrorists as it
crossed the border from Czechoslovakia into Austria at the village of
Marchegg. They took four hostages and forced railway officials to
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give them a car which was driven to Vienna airport at Schwechat.
All planes were diverted wnile negotiations took place. The hostages
were freed while the Austrian government agreed to the closing of the
transit camp at Schonau as their part of the bargain. The terrorists
were flown to Libya. International reaction was widespread and
hostile. 'The Observer' wrote;
"Even if Kreisky's resignation were necessary to reverse the
promises to the men with revolvers, it would be a smaller price to pay
than to burden a country with responsibility for a voluntary act of
cowardice."129
Although the Austrians immediately set up a new camp under
Austrian control and the flow of Jews was not stopped the Government's
attitude was condemned as weakness in the face of terrorism and caused
uproar and outrage in Israel. Things were not helped by the official
messages of thanks from Arab countries that the camp had been
closed.-*-^0
Kreisky for his part defended nis government's role on the basis
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that on no account would he allow Austria to become the scene of a
Middle East conflict. The outrage in the Israeli media resulted in a
visit to Vienna by Prime Minister Golda Meir, who tried to persuade
Kreisky to reverse the decision on Schonau. She, like others, had
little success.
Nevertheless, tnere followed a remarkable series of events wnich
pushed the incident into the background:
"Just after Golda Meir's departure from Vienna, President Sadat
sent one of his close associates, Ismael Fahmi...to Austria
[3/10/73]... In a long discussion with the Chancellor, Fanmi declared
that a new Arab-Israeli War was unavoidable and that the outbreak of
war was to be expected before the end of the year."
A matter of days later the Yom Kippur War began, catching Israel by
surprise. At the same time, the Israeli press was preoccupied with
its attacks on Kreisky.
After the War, the S.I. held an emergency meeting in London at
Meir's request. After considerable personal disagreement, Kreisky
persuaded the S.I., against Meir's wishes, that they should set up a
fact-finding mission to the Middle East, under the leadership of
Kreisky, with representatives of eignt (later three, then four) member
countries. In March 1974 the first visits took place in a process
which ended in 1976. Kreisky himself wrote:
"I do not deny that I consider the problem of the Middle East as
the decisive question for world peace in tne present phase of our
history and if we succeed in hastening a peaceful solution then this
peace would be an historic acnievement of such a size tnat has not
been man's pleasure for centuries, and I believe that this possibility
exists for the first time."-'--^
Despite the official acceptance of the mission, the commission
found the Israeli Labour Party suspicious and sceptical. Sadat on
the other hand appeared cooperative.
When the report was published, it had a six point recommendation:
return to 1967 borders, creation of West Bank Palestinian state,
return of Egyptian and Syrian territory, special arrangements for
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Arabs left in Israel, agreement on refugees and Israeli settlements,
and a "Rome" solution for Jerusalem where all would have free right of
access.133
The publication of the report coincided with turmoil in Israeli
politics which resulted in Likud winning power in 1977. Hopes of a
solution based on the report were soon seen to be unfounded. Begin had
himself met the mission and declared his opposition to ever returning
to 1967 boundaries. He had rejected any possibility of ever accepting
the rights of refugee Palestinians. This theme of the Palestinians
now became dominant in Kreisky's thinking. His frustration with Begin
exploded in an interview with a Dutch magazine Trouis when he said:
"Never before was a vision so close to realization. Never before
has shortsightedness on the part of human beings so hindered its
realization."134
His frustration with Israel in the S.I. also emerges;
"I had to accept one defeat after another from Golda Meir. For
years it was taboo to speak of Palestinians in the S.I. I was the
first to speak of Palestinians. I remember how bitterly Golda Meir
reacted: "Palestinians? Who are they?" This is an endless arrogance
which Jews do not recognize in themselves, but it shows how
Palestinians are discussed."-'--^
Most damning of all he dismissed Begin with an arrogance and anger
extremely uncharacterisitic of most of his political pronouncements.
"I went to Israel and met my friends in the Israeli Labour party.
I told them, Sadat is the man who wants to make peace. They thought I
was naive and was poking my nose into everything. But ne (Sadat) had
to deal with idiots, with political idiots (Kramen) like Begin, that
little Polish lawyer or whatever he is. They are so distant from
normality they think in such perverse ways these Eastern Jews. They
have no sense of political responsibility."""'^
This degree of personal emotional involvement in the affairs of a
region beyond the immediate realm of responsibility is obviously very
unusual. Although the Mission had taken place in the name of the
S.I., Austrian persistence at CSCE and Kreisky's dual role show that
Austria's entire policy reflected his opinions. Certainly it is
acceptable to say that Kreisky did use both his positions to create a
united front between Austria and the S.I. Austria's foreign policy
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differed in no respect from the views expressed by Kreisky throughout
the world, though there was some embarassment in SPOe and
Foreign Ministry circles over the degree to which a personal obsession
could become national policy.
Kreisky's most controversial 'intervention' or initiative in the
Palestinian question came in 1979/80 when the Austrian government
became the first and so far only western government to officially
recognize the PLO. In response to a letter from Yasser Arafat, leader
of the PLO, in which Arafat named a representative to tne Austrian
government, the Chancellor's office replied:
"Considering the fact that the PLO is the representative of
Palestinian people, the Austrian Federal Government take note that
Ghazi Hussain has been appointed the representative of the PLO to tne
Austrian Government."135
Israel accused Austria of a one-sided approacn. Within Austria,
the OeVP increased their attacks talking of a clear break with legal
tradition whereby states are recognized not governments or
organizations. Kreisky defended his position at the UN:
"It appears to me that the time has now long come to create some
clarity on this question. If all Arab peoples including Egypt
recognize the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinians, if
the non-aligned group does the same, if the representative of the PLO
has a seat in this Assembly, practically unanimously, then it cannot
take much longer until all states in the great community accept that
the PLO is the representative of the Palestinian people."-^
According to Benedek, the recognition of the PLO was designed to
reach specific goals. Kreisky declared tnat Austria nas cnosen this
path to give other states the opportunity to follow suit. The PLO
greeted Austria's attitude as a 'turning point in the attitude of
western Europe'.
At the Venice summit meeting of the EEC (June 1980), Community
leaders followed the Austrian lead only insofar as they recognized
Palestinian existence and their right to self-determination. Gaston
Thorn was dispatched on a further EEC fact-finding mission, meeting
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with Arafat in Ocruit, hut no recognition resulted.
Kreisky himself broke somewhat with Arafat in the 1980s. Internal
disputes within the PLO lead to the death of Kreisky's personal friend
Sartawi, with Arafat as the suspected killer. Despite continued
support for Palestine and outraged response to events in the Lebanon,
Kreisky has not since met with Arafat.-^ He has withdrawn from
active involvement in Palestine, judging his own performance with both
satisfaction and disappointment.
The spectacle of a non-Zionist Austrian Jew becoming close to tne
PLO and perceived at tines in Israel as being anti-Senitic, something
wnich Kreisky strenuously denies, is indeed unusual. As Thalberg
points out
"The irony of fate determined that Kreisky's efforts for peace in
the Middle East were considerably more successful with the Arabs than
witn the Israelis. The change in Arafat from radical terrorist boss
into a relatively moderate politician is not least due to the
influence of the Austrian head of government."^®®
Even more interesting is the degree to which one man's obsession
shaped a state's policies, moving into a vacuum of disinterest. He
managed to mobilize both Austria and tne S.I. behind his opinions - a
considerable achievement. Snortly after Sinowatz took over he
recognized this when he said:
"We wish to continue in tne same way though I do not want you to
forget that much that was identified with the personality of
Chancellor Kreisky—nis profound involvement witn foreign policy—
cannot continue as though nothing has changed."-'-®^
Domestic controversy over policy issues
During the 1970s and the continued dominance of the foreign policy
arena by the popular Chancellor Kreisky, frustration witn longterm
exclusion from direct formulation of foreign policy began to grow in
the OeVP. Protest was focussed on the supposed deviation by the SPOe
from the principles of foreign policy agreed by the two larger parties
at the time of the Grand Coalition and which had formed the basis of a
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successful alliance of the two parties. The OeVP tnus attacked the
SPOe's neglect of relations with the Superpowers, in particular the
USA, the laxity of SPOe approaches to the EEC, the development of
contacts with the non-aligned movement and Austria's close association
with events in the Middle East through Kreisky. Steiner put the
objection as follows;
"Kreisky left most issues to the administration for a short while,
for example when Ki^pchlaeger was Foreign Minister. He only
intervened in a few cases which appeared to him spectacular, altnough
even then it was with these mad flings to one side or another. At
least when the administration nad reestablished equilibrium he was
glad of it. This equilibrium was totally lacking under Minister Pahr,
and of course with Lane. His statements became more and more accepted
by the administration. Until Ki^bhlaeger's time, despite Kreisky's
occasional interference, the basic principles remained the same, and
this was visible from outside... Kirschlaeger merely continued the
policy of the coalition... Kreisky is an amazing snowman. The 'truth'
he states one second changes the next second... In the last 'Spiegel'
he makes a statement about the mistakes of Austria's South Tyrol
policy 1945-6; he only came back from Sweden in '48! He wasn't even
there - but he knows how it was!.. Recently in a magazine article, he
said something typical for him; 'The truth is when one says what one
thinks.'.. That means I can think up any old nonsense and say it and
it is true. Such statementsare phenomenal!"-'-^
Steiner's frustration is obvious. However what is not so
immediately apparent is the subtle thrust of his critique. According
to his analysis, Kirschlaeger, now widely regarded as a remarkable moral
A
guide in Austrian political life is absolved of most of his
responsibility for the breach of coalition policy. Of course, the
OeVP supported Kirschlaeger as candidate for the presidency at his
cb
second attempt in £974, and Kirschlaeger himself was politically more
popular than the party. As we examine the issues, eg Palestine, Non-
alignment, EEC agreements etc. we will see that divisions between the
parties on foreign policy can in no way be said to stem from the post-
. ch
Kirschlaeger period alone. This small example should at least make us
aware that OeVP critique is much more readily comprehensible as the
frustration of a desperate oppostion than as the call for a more
principled policy.
One of Kreisky's sharpest conservative critics, Andreas Unterberger
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of Die Presse, wrote in 1981;
"Neutrality, Detente and Bruno Kreisky; these are the three things
which have formed Austrian foreign policy over the last decade."^!
Nevertheless we must quickly dispel the illusion that division
emerged only under Kreisky. Certainly given the period of absolute
majority enjoyed by Kreisky's Socialists the split developed further,
however we have already seen that this breakup had begun at least as
early as 1963 with the disagreement over the 'go it alone' to tne EEC.
During the Klaus period, the SPOe openly attacked the Government at
the time of the Czech crisis. In addition the SPOe voted against the
South Tyrol package agreement in Parliament. Together with differing
approaches to the EEC it is clear that party-political divisions on
major foreign policy issues were becoming widespread early on. Pahr
rejects OeVP claims thus;
"This attack is completely false. One only has to look at the
foreign policy disagreements in the time of the OeVP majority
government. These disagreements between 1966-70 took place with the
greatest division, for example over the Czech conflict in '68. These
fights took place in the immediately subsequent period under
Kir^chlaeger over the question of the recognition of China or the
question of Austrian membership of the Security Council. These are
allegations of the OeVP which are based on no evidence. On the
contrary, in fact during my time we began to inform Parliament over
foreign policy events much more than in the past on the one hand
tnrough the Aussenpolitischer Bericnt and on tne other by making
embassy reports available to all three parliamentary groups. Also in
my tine there were regular meetings of the three foreign policy
spokespeople of the parties with the Foreign Minister. All this did
not exist before."^-'-
This analysis is hard to dispute. Nevertheless the impotence and
frustration of the OeVP continued to grow. Until 1975 the chief
machanism for information had been the 'Foreign Policy' section of the
Budget debate. After 1975, the anphasis shifted to an annual 'Foreign
Policy Report'. The OeVP used this forum to attack Government policy
every year. It was in the debate on the report in 1977 that the
frustration boiled over. OeVP chairman Mock attacked almost every
aspect of Government policy. He accused the government of changing
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agreed practice forcing the OeVP to support measures with which they
fundamentally disagreed;
"The reasons for this are mainly historical. For a long time,
foreign affairs were the preserve of the executive.. The notion of
tne autonomy of foreign policy and the necessity of a united approach
seen abroad has maintained its force into the present day. The
emphasis on a united foreign policy is in an attempt to increase
Austria's impression of reliability to outsiders."142
As Rottensteiner points out, apparent unanimity will become a sham
if it merely masks permanent division. Mock traced the roots of the
government's 'shambles' to tne lack of coherent strategy. He thus
proposed a surprise motion of his own, in which he formulated
principles for Austrian foreign policy. Following protest, the motion
was withdrawn, replaced by an OeVP motion to be considered in
committee. The SPOe countered with their own proposals six weeks
later setting off a new debate.141
The OeVP demanded new priorities in policy especially with 'tnose
superpowers decisive for Austria and her region', with neighbouring
States. They demanded increased trade cooperation with Western Europe
and with Eastern Europe as a contribution to stability. In response,
the SPOe maintained that improved relations meant emphasis on
neighbouring States and on the Security Council, but pointed out that
in a global system there could be no fixed areas of concentration.
The centrality of the UN in SPOe thinking contrasts with OeVP
preference for direct dealing with tne superpowers. There is a subtle
difference between OeVP insistence on 'Western Identity' and SPOe
contact with 'tne democratic States of Europe'. Nevertheless the most
striking difference was in the degree of detail and longrun
application of OeVP conceptions set against the SPOe proposal which
was largely a vague statement on the current state of Government
policy. Both proposals were dealt with by committees of the
Nationalrat but the re-election of the SPOe in 1979 effectively ended
the OeVP's motion. As a result no foreign policy doctrine could be
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agreed and the oppositional ism of the OeVP merely increased, in 1984
Khol linked SPOe policy to Austria's difficulties over technology
transfer.144
It is nevertheless true that SPOe policy remained far from radical.
Indeed, it developed along similar lines to that of other Social
Democratic groups in Europe. The frustration of the OeVP at being
dwarfed in the international arena by Kreisky's policy also allowed
them the luxury of maintaining that they had held policies with a
direct lineage to the State Treaty. In reality this is a complete
myth. The main problem for tne SPOe was that tney had virtually no
strength in depth in the foreign policy arena. The short period when
Lane continued Kreisky's policy floundered due largely to lack of
support within the SPOe in 1984. His replacement by Gratz was
motivated more by an attempt to provide the then-prospective
Presidential candidate with foreign policy experience than with a real
cnange in policy. Tne OeVP on the other hand had developed a larger
body of oppositional opinion mobilised and able to influence the SPOe
in the guise of consensus. The difficulties over tne Reder and
Waldheim affairs merely confirmed SPOe inexperience in foreign
affairs. Ermacora almost concedes this;
"There was no money for the military because., in my opinion there
were over-pacifist Ministers. Lane was such a Minister and Salcher.
But we don't have this kind of Minister any more, thank goodness."f"
The fact was that none of Kreisky's Foreign Ministers had been SPOe
members. Kreisky's preeminence was as much due to lack of interest as
vice versa. There are clear cases where change in policy can be snown
to have come from the OeVP rather than the SPOe. In seeking closer
ties to the West, the OeVP sought to justify rather than reject NATO
rearmament. In 1980, Mock warned against;
"the dangerous and unrealistic fantasy., tnat Europe can release
herself from America without putting freedom into question"146
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In 1984 with continued Austro-American strain, Mock seemed to
support the Reaganite view that Detente was an 'illusory foreign
policy concept' which had led to rearmament in the USSR and neglect of
the West's defences. He further blamed Cuba for the situation in
Central America;
"All the states in Central America are united in believing that
Cuba wishes to influence internal development. Thus this region is
dragged into the East/West conflict. Concrete examples of this are
Nicaragua and El Salvador."-^4"''
We have also seen that the OeVP has witnessed a mucn more radical
reassessment of relations with the EEC than the SPOe. The Austrian
'new right' around Khol are now determined on an eventual full
membership for Austria. As he says;
"Today's discussion cannot take place merely with a view to
neutrality... The new aspect is about survival as an industrial
nation.
It is clear that the OeVP is the party which seeks to break the
consensus of the 1960s. We must stand back and see OeVP claims of
SPOe deviance not so much at their face value but part of frustrated
oppositional ism from a conservative position. There are clear
elaiients wno fear that Austria under Kreisky failed to stress its
western leanings sufficiently. Of course, the OeVP objects where
government policy is at variance with the interests of their
supporters. We must conclude that OeVP policy is aimed not so much at
consensus but at an attempt to shift the dominant strand in Austria's
dilemma in favour of the West. We are confronted with the domestic
political reality that the nature of neutrality here too is not so
much a matter of law but of political conception of what is possible
within that lawl
Let us look briefly at controversy on three specific issues; Non-
alignment, Palestine and Detente policy, though a clear separation of
these issues is impossible. The SPOe government based its argument
for participation as a guest in the Non-aligned movement summit on the
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need to extend contacts beyond Europe;
"The Non-aligned movement is today., the largest and most
represntative group of developing countries in the world"]_49
In retrospect, as Luif observes, Waldheim's candidacy for UN
Secretary-General was almost certainly helped by attendance. 150 The
reality was that Austrian contacts outside Europe were negligible. In
seeking to build relations to a wider network, Kreisky and
ch
Kirschlaeger were thus obviously drawn to the Non-aligned Movement.
A
This paralleled the increased awareness in Social Democratic circles
of Development issues and of the global nature of Superpower conflict
emerging in Vietnam.
The decision was nevertneless heavily criticised by tne OeVP.
Karasek sought to emphasise the differences between neutrality and
non-alignment or 'neutralism'.
"The Neutral has to keep out of political groupings of whatever
type- be they East, West or Third World"-^51
By the 1980s of course a significant group within the same party was
prepared to argue that membership of the EEC was quite acceptable
under neutrality!
The approach to the non-aligned was paralleled by involvement witn
the Middle East, recognition of Red China and election to the Security
Council. All this emphasised the new 'Global' aspect of Austrian
policy. At the very least at the Security Council, Austria had to
make decisions on the Middle East, North/South and Development. We .
must see this development not only in domestic terms, but also as
consistent with the general trend of Social Democrat thought as
personified by Brandt and Palme. The development strategy attacked as
over-radical by tne OeVP is viewed as inadequately conservative and
unrealistic from a Third World perspective. The truth is however that
despite OeVP claims, Austria risks at best becoming a marginal
irrelevance or a western attachment if no coherent strategy on world
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issues is developed, classical war in Europe has oeen replaced by the
Cold War. This has had an enormous effect on neutrality. Neutral
States must now also address their foreign policy to the North/Soutn
question, especially within the other centrepiece of Austria's
neutrality, the UN.
The one area wnere Austrian policy was clearly more radical than
elsewhere was on Palestine. Here as Pahr and the rest of Kreisky's
defenders point out, Kreisky's identification of the Palestinian issue
as the crucial one has proved as least as accurate as the views of his
detractors. It is hard in the nuclear age to fault Kreisky's
diagnosis that European security is threatened by superpower conflict
in the Middle East. He thus justifies his own involvement;
"Small and middle-sized States must do all they can to solve
existing conflicts among themselves if they want to avoid the danger
of interference from the Superpowers"^-^
Pahr highlighted the degree to which Austrian policy now has to be
global, by identifying the crises of 1979;
"the revolution in Iran, the situation in the Middle East after the
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the conflict between Vietnam
and China, the tragedy of Cambodia, the growing unrest in Africa, tne
expulsion of the dictatorial regime in Nicaragua, the dangers of a new
arms race in Europe'153
In such a world, guest status of a neutral at the Non-aligned
movement appears as a minimal step. Nevertheless, a domestic
controversy broke out in 1979 over SPOe initial support for Cuba as a
member of the Security Council. The Afghanistan crisis intervened,
but domestic divisions were now exacerbated. The problem, westernism
within neutrality, was unconsciously identified by Pahr in 1980;
"With the proviso of clear maintenance of our ideological alliance
with the Western World, we will continue our foreign policy
equidistance to the Great Powers and both military systems into the
future as we11."154
The debate on non-alignment showed more than in other debates the
degree to which there is a permanent ambivilence in Austria's
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position. The SPOe were now clearly following a policy in line with
Swedish Social Democracy and NOT-alignment. This involved a high
profile activism in peacetime. It is notable that the German SPD in
opposition now reflects similar thinking. This position is
unacceptable to the right of the OeVP, though it may reflect some of
the left/Catholic thinking around figures such as Busek. Unterberger
attacked such thinking as ultimately tending to Moscow. Tnis 'abyss'
1 ss
is justified as the road to independence. He claims to note
a progressive softening of Austrian attitudes to the USSR over
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Kreisky's neglect of
military matters is more important than nis detente policy.
Unterberger proposes an emphasis on military matters (officially a
REempnasis), a careful conduct of relations with the USA and improving
the scope of relations outside Europe. Austria, he claims, has doused
everything with a mistaxenly 'total' view of neutrality.
Yet this is very hard to prove conclusively. Throughout the 1960s
Austria supported coexistence policies. There is more evidence tnat
the opinions of NATO member States changed than that SPOe policy has
undergone radical reassessment. The reality is that OeVP Austria
justified its neutrality by pointing to improved East/West co¬
operation, being neither NATO nor Warsaw Pact. Unterberger seems to
see a similar policy in the SPOe-led 1980s as pro-Moscow.
Additionally, the critique of the USSR over Czechoslovakia came from
the SPOe and not the OeVP. In 1981, Kreisky clashed with both USA and
USSR over Poland. The deterioration of Austro-uS relations paralleled
a deep cleft which developed between the entire European left and the
United States. In NATO countries this only reached party-official
level when the left-parties were in opposition (UK, West Germany),
however its vocalisation in neutral Austria cannot be held to be
evidence of latent softness on Moscow. The same is true of splits
396
over Nicaragua, Olympic boycotts and trade sanctions. Within the
realm of detente, the OeVP position shows more change than that of the
SPOe.
In the end most of the OeVP attacks on the substance of SPOe policy
bare the hallmarks of frustrated oppositional ism. This is not to say
that SPOe policy in the 1970s and '80s cannot be radically criticised,
but rather underlines the paucity of political debate in Austria over
foreign policy. The most coherent contribution came from the New
Right represented by Khol and in part by Ermacora, who argued in
effect for a fundamental societal shift away from neutrality to a non-
military but effective alignment. This debate on the nature of
neutrality has not yet run its course, but its significance lies in
its centring of the debate within peacetime. It is indeed the
assumption of both Khol and Ermacora that war will not happen provided
that deterence holds. As such neutrality, even if admitted as having
peacetime significance, has certainly lost its wartime relevance. The
reaction of the right appears to be to reduce any furtner relevance it
might have.
The SPOe since Kreisky has been overwnelmed by domestic and
international difficulties stemming from the Kreisky period. This
seemed to allow the OeVP appear more coherent on foreign policy than
the ruling Socialists, for the first time since Raab and Figl.
Nevertheless, it will not be possible for any government to restrict
the horizons of Austrian policy to those of the 1960s. As such, the
priorities of the OeVP appear largely impractical.
Final Remarks
Austrian foreign policy under Kreisky clearly developed new
dimensions in the 1970s. In all of these developments (Security
Council, Non-aligned movement, New Marshall Plan, PLO) there has been
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considerable opposition, and the Proporz unity of the State Treaty has
been shattered. The trend has been to a high profile in international
affairs. Kreisky's personality and that of close associates such as
Kirschlager, Lane, Jankowitsch and Pahr has been clearly stamped on
A
much of this development. Certainly, Austria cannot be accused of
lacking initiative in the world stage. The SPOe has used neutrality
as a means of gaining access based on a status as an honest-broker
forged at regional level and now extended to the realm of issues.
Austria under Kreisky can certainly lay claim to being the western
country which was most serious in its search for a solution to the
conflict of the Middle East. In many respects tnese new dimensions
and the record of Austria in detente questions allowed Austria the
illusion that she had escaped her past very effectively. Austria's
international image seemed forged in the present not the past. The
recent affairs (Waldheim/Reder) may have confirmed that despite
Kreisky's efforts, the impression of the 1970s was illusory.
Certainly after the departure of Lane from the Foreign Affairs
ministry, Austrian policy returned to a new calm. Kreisky's very
dominance may have created a highly unstable equilibrium which his
successors have been unable to maintain.
Kreisky has continued in retirement to be active in this new
global sphere. This has by turns been interpreted as helpful and
interfering. Nevertheless in 1986 ne named this area as the sphere of
his abiding interest;
"The foreign policy area in which I still want to get quite
involved in this last period of my life is that called in diplomatic
circles the North-Soutn Question. I mean a new cooperation between
the rich industrial states and the poorer developing countries."-'--^
398
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES - CHAPTER SIX
1. Renner, K., Vienna 5/4/46 in Csasky E-M., 'Der Weg zu Freiheit und
Neutralitaet' OeGA 1980
2. In Pahr, W., 'Austria's Foreign Policy—23 Years of Membership of
UN' 16/12/80, Vienna
3. 'Austria; Permanently Neutral' , Federal Press Service, Vienna, 1983
4. Kelson, The Law of the United Nations, 1950, p.384.
5. Wrignt, Q., 'The Present Status of Neutrality' AJIL 1940, p.615
6. Morgenthau, H.J., 'Politics Among Nations', p.475-80
7. Jankowitsch, p., interview 10/84
8. UNICO Selected Documents 1946, p.498, Report of the Committee
9. Chaumont, 'Nations Unis et Neutralite', Paris, 1956, p.52, Receuil
des Cours I p.5-59
10. De Nova, 'Die Neutralisation Osterreichs' in Friedenswarte 1958,
p.314
11. Berger, P. 'Beitritt Osterreichs zu den VN?' Staatsburger 21/7/55
12. Kunz, J.L., AJIL 1956, p.424
13. Ermacora, 1957 Staatsvertrag in N., p.106-09
14. Verdross, A., 'The Permanent Neutrality of Austria', Verlag fuer
Geschichte in Politik Vienna 1975, p.53
15. Piontek, 'La neutralite permanente et la systeme de la securite
collective' Parstwo, Prawo (french summary)
16. League of Nations 1919
17. OZA 1971, p.136
18. Jacquet L.G.M., 'The role of a small State within alliance
systems' in Schou/Brundtland, Stockholm 1970, p.64
19. Bock, F., 'Wie lange noch Vereinte Nationen?' Die Furcne 30/42, p.3
(1976)
20. Guntner, K., 'Neutralitaetsrecht und Neutralitaetspolitik'
Springer 1975, p.115
21. Profil Sept. 1970, p.52 'Der Schwarmer'
22. Ermacora 1975, p.183
23. OZA Vol.10, 1970, p.172
24. Ermacora, F. 'Die Neutralitaet ist nicht in Gefahr' Die Furche
1970/40 (26), p.3
399
25. Wildnaber, L., 'Die Mitgliedschaft davernd neutraler Staaten in
UNO-Sicherheitsrat' 1971, Vol.11, p.139
26. Ibid p.145
27. Jankowitsch, P. 'Osterreich und die Vereinten Nationen' in
'Festschrift fur Hertha Firnberg-Wissenschaft und Weltbild' Eurpaverlag
Vienna 1979, p.182
28. Jankowitsch, P. 'Oesterreich im Sicherheitsrat' OZA 15/2 1975, p.68
29. NZZ 9/10.3.86
30. NZZ 15/3/86, p.7
31. NZZ 18/3/86, p.17
32. NZZ 20/3/86, p.29
33. Berner Tagwacht 17/3/86
34. Zuercher Tages-Anzeiger 17/3/86
35. Jankowitsch, P. 'Foreign Policy' in Steiner, K. ed. 'Modern
Austria' SPOSS Palo Alto Ca. USA 1981, p.365
36. Pahr, W. 'Statement at 36th Session of the General Assembly of the
UN' 1/10/81 Min. of Foreign Affairs P + 1 dept.
37. Gratz, L., 'Erklaerung vor der 39 G.ver der VN' 2/10/84 Min. of
Foreign Affairs P + I dept.
38. Tiroler Tageszeitung 5/9/60
39. 'Bundesverfassungsgestetz uber die Entsendung Osterreicnscner
Einheiten Zur Hilfeleistung in das Ausland auf Ersuchen
internationaler Organisationen' BGbl 173/1975
'Bundesgesetz uber die Enstendung von Angehoerigen des Bundesheeres
zur Hilfeleistung in das Ausland', BGbl 233/1965
40. see von Grunigen M., 'Neutrality and Peacekeeping' in Cassese A.,
'United Nations Peacekeeping - legal essays', 1975, p.141
41. Strasser W., 'Osterreich und die Vereinten Nationen', 1967,
Braumuller p.107
42. Aussenpolitischer Bericht p.54a 1983
43. Helm, F. 'Die Blauhelm-Il lusion' Die Furche 1973/34, p.l
44. Sec. Genral Res. 232(1966), pt.3
45. Bindschedler, R. 'Problem der Beteiligung dew Schwiez an
Sanktionen der VN im Falle Rhodesiens' ZaoRVR 28, 1968, p.13
46. Zemanek, K. 'Osterreich und UN-Sanktionen besonders im Falle
Rhodesiens', in ZaoRVR 28, 1968, p.27
47. Knauthe, H. in 3er Osterreichischer Juristentage, Vienna, 1967,
400
p.65
48. Sunday Times, 4/74
also Profil Nos. 15, 15, 27, 1974
49. Die Presse 27/9/85
50. Interview with Dr Andreas Khol, OeVP Kluo, Vienna Sept. 1985
51. Interview with Dr. P. Jankowitsch 26/10/84
52. Interview with Foreign Ministry official, Sept 1985
53. Waldheim Eu Rund 1980/2, p.4
54. Strasser op cit, p.407, 615, 419
55. Luif, P., 'Osterreich Zwischen den Bloecken', 1982/2, Vol.11 Eu
Rund p.216-17
56. Fischer, H. 'Muss Oesterreichs Aussenpolitick revidiert werden'
OZA 1981/1, p.5
57. Jankowitsch OZA op cit, p.80
58. Aargauer Tagblatt 17/3/86
59. 'Internationales Zentrum Wien', Min. for Foreign Affairs/Federal
Press Service 1983
60. UN Doc. A/10348
61. Jankowitscn (Firnberg), p.187
62. Profil 1983/60, 3/10/83/ p.69
63. in Stabler, K., 'Tne Kresiky Phenonmenon' p.13-14, West European
Politics, 1981
64. BK in dzidwl p.74-76
65. in Strasser op cit, p. 53
also A/UN/SPC/SR 15/4/61
66. Jankowitsch, UN 16/1/73, I.4.A.34
67.Alberic Rolin, Belgian Academy of Science 1924, in Die Furche
Vol.11 (1955) No.23, p.3
68. Jankowitsch (Firnoerg) p.189
69. WZ 6/10/72
70. Die Furche 1958(14)/43, p.4 Stent es dafuer?
71. Klestil, T., Eine Kritik der Kritik, Die Furche 35/34 (1979), p.3
72. Lane, E., 'Security in an Unsecure World—The Tasks of Austrian
Foreign Policy' 29/11/83 Min. of Foreign Affairs P + I Dept.
401
73. Jankowitsch in OZPW, p.3-9
74. BK in Neu-Koex, p.95-96, Schloss Klessheim 28/7/63
75. Kramer, H. , 'Osterreich und die dritte welt' OZPW 1978, p.321
76. Skuhra, A., 'Oesterreich im Nord-Sued Konflikt waenrend der 70er
Jahren' OZPW 1981/2 pll9-137
77. Survey of the Austrian Economy 1984 p.54, 56
78. Austrian Foreign Trade Statistics in Austria—Partner of
Developing Countries, Vienna FPS 1981
79. Skuhra op cit., p.128
80. Ornauer OZPW, p.14
81. OECD DAC Report, Paris, 1979, p.214-5
82. Entwicklungshilfe Informationsdienst 1977/20, Vienna
83. World Bank Review 1983, p.18
84. Kramer op cit., p. 323-326
85. Die Presse 4/9/79, Vienna
86. Ornauer op cit. p.14
87. BK Amsterdam 29/4/81, Politik braucht vis. p.132
cV\
88. Interview with Dr. R. Kirschlaeger, Hofburg 10.1.85
A
89. Interview with Dr. E. Lane, Zentralsparkasse, 27.11.84
90. Interview with Dr. A. Mock, OeVP, Feb. 1985
91. Interview with Dr. W. Pahr, Bonn, 22.2.85,
92. Lendvai P., Ritschel, K.H. 'Kreisky Portrat eines Staatmannes',
p.202, Paul Zsolnay Verlag Vienna/Hamburg 1974, Econ Verlag
Vienna/Dusseldorf
93. Jankowitsch, p., 'Osterreich und die dritte Welt' in
Bielka/Thalberg/Jankowitsch 'Die Ara Kreisky' p.263
94. in willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky, Olaf Palme: Briefe und Gespracne
1972-75 Frankfurt 1975, p.113
95. Kreisky Reden Vol.11, p.21, Vienna 1981
96. Kreisky at CSCE Eu Arch 1975, p.563
97. Kramer-Fischer, D. in OZPW, p.25
98. The Economist 29/1/77; Le Monde 10-11/9/78
99. Kramer-Fischer D., Eu Rund 1981, 2 Vol.11, p.146
402
100. UN Interregional Symposium on State Petroleum Enterprises in
Developing Countires, ESA/NRET/AC 11/17, 7/3/78
101. Third General Conference of UNIDO, Bruno Kreisky 31/1/80, Min. of
Foreign Affairs/BPD
102. in Politik braucht Visionen. p.152
103. Kramer-Fischer, op cit 1981, p.139
104. ibid, p.131
105. Kramer H., 'Wirtschaftl iche und politische Beziehungen zur 3en
Welt', in Kramer et al 'Oesterreich in internationalen system',
Braumuller 1982, p.145-7
106. Neuhold H./Loibl W., 'The permanent neutrality of Austria' in
Birnbaum/Neuhold, "Neutrality—Non-alignment in Europe" p.85
107. Skunra op cit, p.130-1
108. Gratz, L., 39 GA of UN, 2/10/84, p.6 (BmAA/API)
109. Kicker, R. "Moeglichkeiten und Grenzen verstaerketer
Partizipation an der oesterreichischen Aussenpo1itik" OZA 1981, pt.l
110. Ornauer op cit., p. 17
111. Kramer op.cit. in Kramer op. cit, p.147
112. Die Union, Vienna, 10/4/52, p.l
113. Luif, P., "Die Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten und Osterreich",
AllA 1981, Laxenburg
114. Neuhold, H. "Permanent Neutrality and Non-alignment", OZA 1979
(19) 12, p.88
115. Frei, D. "Neutrality and Non-alignment: Convergences and
Contrasts", Forschungstelle fur Politische Wissenschaft, Zuerich, 1979
114. Vukadinovic v., 'Small states and the politics of non-alignment',
in Scnou/Brundtland op cit p.105
115. Luif P., op. cit p.72-3
116. Luif, P., "Neutralitat—Neutralismus—Blockfreiheit" OZPW Vol.8,
1979, p.279
117. Vetschera, H. "Neutralitat, Neutralismus und Blockfreineit" OMZ
1977/5, p.373
118. Luif op cit (1981), Table 8, p.78
119. see Die Presse 3/6/80, p.3, Jankowitsch
120. Neunold op cit p.98-99
121. Die Furche 36/17, 1980, p.7
403
122. Thalberg, H. "Die Nahostpolitik" in Bielka et al op cit p.293
123. Das Nahost Problem, Bruno Kreisky-Reden, Kommentare Interviews
1985, Europverlag, Vienna
124. see Neuhold, H./Zemanek, K. "Die oesterreiscne Neutralitat in
Jahre 1967" (OZA '68), p.29
126. Profil 12/10/73, p.31
127. Die Furche 1973/40, p.l
128. Die Presse 29/9/73, p.12
129. The Observer 1/10/73
130. Die Presse 4/10/73
131. Thalberg op cit, p.301-2
132. Specialist International Fact Finding Mission 1974-6
133. Politik braucht Visionen p.186
134. reprinted in Die Furche 1978/37, p.7
135. in Benedek "Die Anerkennung der PLO durch Osterreich" ZaoRVR
1980, p.841-2
136. Kreisky B., UN General Assembly 29/10/79 in Benedek ibid, p.843
137. Basta 10/10/84
138. Thalberg op cit, p.314
139. Financial Times 23/8/83
140. Interview with Dr. L Steiner, OeVP HQ, Vienna Feb. 1984
141. Unterberger A., 'Mythologisierung der oesterreichischen
Aussenpolitik', Eu Rund. 1981/1 p89
142. Rottensteiner R., 'Die Wi 1 lensbi ldung in der oesterreichischen
Aussenpolitik' in Fischer H. ed., 'Das politiscne System Oesterreichs'
Europaverlag, Vienna 3rd edition 1982
143. Antrag der OeVP 120/A 19/10/78 11-4314 der Beilagen
Antrag der SPOe 132/A 5/12/78 11-4471 der Beilagen
144. Khol A., 'Aussenpolitik als Realutopie', in Koren S., Pisa K.,
Waldheim K., ed. 'Politik fuer die Zukunft' Boehlaus,
Wien/Koeln/Graz 1984 p460
145. Interview with Dr F. Ermacora, Parlament, Vienna 27.11.84
146. Mock A. Parlamentskorrespondenz, 1/7/80 Pt 5
147. Mock A., 'Aussenpolitische Erklaerung 1984' in Cercle
Diplomatique International 1984/3-4 p26
404
148. Khol 1984 op.cit. p472
149. Jankowitsch P., 'Oesterreich und die dritte Welt', in Bielka et.
al. ed. op.cit. p282
150. Luif P. 1981 op.cit. p79
151. Karasek F., Sten Prot des NR XII GP p2048 14/12/70
152. Thalberg H. op.cit. p320
153. Pahr W., 'Austrian Foreign Policy 1979' 14/12/79 BMfAA/BPD
154. Pahr W. OZA 1980/2 pl62
155. Unterberger A. in Die Presse 13/10/80 p3
156. Basta 10/10/84 op cit.
405
CHAPTER SEVEN
Austrian Neutrality and Defence Policy
"A prince therefore, should have no other
object or thought, nor acquire skill in
anything, except war, its organisation and
its discipline... The art of war is all
that is expected of a ruler... The first
way to lose your state is to neglect the
art of war, the first way to win a state
is to be skilled in the art of war."
N.Macchiaveli, 'The Prince, Ch. XII
The role of the military in neutral States since the war has become
a matter of some controversy. This is particularity true of Austria,
where defence has been a party-political and electoral issue. I will
be concerned with the role of a defence policy under neutrality and
the changes and adaptations which have taken place in Austrian
practice. I will not try to describe Austrian military capability or
strategy in any detail.
During the four-power occupation there was no real development of
an Austrian defence force. National sovereignty and independence had
first to be achieved, in the civilian realm, a police force
(gendarmerie) was organised, but the presence of the allied armies
prevented any credible notion of 'national security'. In any event,
the experience of the war and the starvation years after 1945 had left
a deep impression. The destruction was a strong element in preventing
pressure for any military expansion. As Spannocchi p>oints out;
"the victorious powers... had a relatively easy task convincing a
people of seven million who had mourned 470,000 dead and missing in
action, that the root of all evil in the world was the military."^-
In 1955 the Austrian Second Republic established a Federal Army
(Bundesheer). The basis of this was the so-called B-Gendarmerie set
up after the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and
led by ex-army officers since 1952. By 1955, this troop consisted of
7,000 men, 340 officers and 200 NCOs. The creation of the Bundesheer
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was a matter of some political controversy. The Socialists had an
extremely ambiguous position towards armies. The Arbeiter Zeitung
expressed the feelings of many when in 1945 one of its headlines ran
"Away with the Barracks".^ The memories were not merely confined to
wartime. In 1934, the professional army of the First Republic
dominated as it was by supporters of the right wing Dollfuss, was used
to fire on the homes of Social Democratic Workers in the short Civil
War of February. The OeVP was happy to establish a professional army
in the Second Republic under the notion of the 'apolitical soldier'.
The SPOe insisted on a broader-based institution, with minimum cost
and more democratic organisation, including party representation."^
There was another problem of historical continuity. Officially the
Bundesheer had ceased to exist between 1938 and 1945. Despite the
fact that Austria was (officially) a victim of Nazi aggression, the
regiments fought witn considerable strength for the German Reich. The
new institution of 'Bundesheer' had no official connection to this
fact. Here we see one of the most blatant examples of contradiction
and manipulation of half-truths in the Austrian myth. The only
feasible hierarchy for an Austrian army came from those tainted by
their full participation in the Civil War and/or the Reich Wehrmacht.
In 1984, the FPOe Minister of Defence, praised one regiment as
follows;
"After further great achievements in both world wars, it was
possible to let this historic troop live on in the Landwehr regiment"^
Of course the officers of the new Bundesneer came from the ranks of
the Wenrmacht. The State Treaty did impose some restrictions through
a specific prohibition on the recommissioning of soldiers who had
reached the rank of General or Colonel during the War. The result was
that the new Bundesneer was structured as a miniature reproduction of
the Wehrmacht.
Witn this background in controversy it is not surprising that
Austrian defence policy and more importantly policy-making has had to
develop differently from that in other neutral States. The domestic
environment has been markedly different in Sweden and Switzerland. We
will see also that there has been considerable and remarkably
successful opposition to aspects of the arms industry. All of this
has given rise to considerable political debate in Austria on the
entire role of defence. This has not emerged to the same degree
elsewhere.
Neutrality and the duty to defend.
According to the Swiss notion, Neutrality has always been an armed
concept. Among the duties indicated by the political department, the
prevention of the violation of neutral territory through War, the
transport of troops, munitions or even supplies is an absolute duty of
neutral States. This also applies to overflight in the modern era.^
In general, no neutral should conduct military negotiations or
agreements with outside States.
"A neutral must defend its neutrality and its independence. In
this duty lies the guarantee of the maintenance of neutrality against
other powers and the complementary response for recognition of the
legal status. This is also a practical pre-condition of a successful
neutrality.""
In seeing this absolute obligation to maintain a national defence
system, Bindschedler reflects the tone of the vast majority of legal
experts on this subject. Writing in 1957, tne Austrian observer Peter
Berger wrote;
"In any case, a neutral State like Austria must make efforts in
defence in the sense of the decisive legal principle carried out 'in
good faith"'^
In this he is supported by all the leading legal experts on
neutrality law.8 m the words of Felix Ermacora;
"Today, as before, the duty of a neutral to defend itself
militarily is regarded as an absolute condition for the existence of
permanent neutrality under International Law."^
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Certainly it is the view of all State systems that this is the
case, and the SPOe itself has never officially questioned the need for
an army. In 1955, the speaker for the OeVP in the Neutrality Act
debate, Toncic-Sorinj put his party's position;
"In the long run, Neutrality is only present where there is
strength and a successful will to defend stands behind it. This is the
principle of armed neutrality. This armament is so closely tied to
any true concept of neutrality that it is stated at the very
beginning of Swiss neutrality. There is no neutrality without an
army. This creates one undoubted obligation for Austria; if that
which we are at present planning proves insufficient, then we must
extend our military muscle far enough to be truly effective."-^
The immediate problem with such a harsh definition is that in
making an essential of military strength it effectively precludes any
modern Neutral being successful. The most extreme positions in this
respect have claimed that neutrality is merely military. Gerhard Henk
believed that;
"tnere is only military neutrality; everything else is in my
personal opinion merely legal additions around the core."-'--'-
On the other hand there are those who maintain that neutrality law
implies no direct obligations. The clause in the Xllth Hague
Convention on War at Sea (1907) which imposes defence 'by all the
means at her disposal' is here interpreted as not implying a military
strategy with tne argument that these clauses apply only to wartime
and as such apply to ad hoc as well as permanent neutrals. It is
clear that ad hoc neutrals cannot have any prior obligations imposed
on then and thus;
"In conclusion, one can say that a defence or arms obligation of a
neutral State as a generally applicable legal norm can be deduced
neither from generally nor partially applicable treaties."1^
The only possible basis for a legal obligation comes from the
insistence of the powers in the treaties establishing Swiss and
Belgian neutrality whereby the powers refused to aid the neutral if it
did not participate in its own defence. Nevertheless the Kellogg
Brland Pact and the Charter of the UN has changed the scenario in that
409
the Neutrals' part of the bargain, ie the duty not to start a war has
been extended to all States. Thus this is no longer merely a
principle of neutrality but of collective International Law. Were a
conflict to emerge between States protecting neutrals or obeying the
Charter of the UN, the UN would by normal legal principles have
priority. Yet many writers have overlooked the importance of these
new laws, eg Verosta still wrote;
"Alone among sovereign States, only perpetually neutral States have
given up the right to declare war of every sovereign State.through the
obligations of neutrality."^
Since the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Cnarter, tnis is no longer
the case;
"The statute of permanent neutrality is today protected to the same
degree as the status of every other State; the guarantees of
territorial integrity and sovereignty are the same for all member
States of the UN."-^
All this of course assumes a law no longer capable of controlling
absolutes but in the service of a higher ideal which is variously
described as 'freedom', 'peace' or 'independence'. As we have seen,
many Austrians are themselves insistent that neutrality is not an end
ch
in itself but a means to that end. Kirschlaeger, in support of this
A
said;
"Herr Berger emphasised that he places higher value on independence
and that neutrality is only a means to an end. I can only underscore
this completely and without reservation."-^
This has brought them criticism from many anxious to restrict
neutrality but this logic had already proved essential in the
rationale provided for a new-found compatibility between neutrality
and collective security at the UN; le compatibility of higher ends.
The majority of course see no contradiction between the duty to defend
and the service of higher goals and as such reject any position which
seeks to counterpose them as options;
"Independence is the same as peace for us... Austrian and Swiss
perpetual Neutrality are so strong that they can stop the spread of
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war onto their sovereign territory... "16
But others again accept the contradiction, including ex-Army chief
Spannocchi, who argued that here was a question of the higher good.
We are herewith clearly back in the realms of political and not legal
decision-making;
"On the question of whetner the prohibition of defensive weapons is
not implicitly contrary to International law, I am more of the opinion
that this is true... I am of the opinion that Missiles are totally
prohibited by the State Treaty. It is a question of the higher good.
The higher good is in my opinion the maintenance of permanent
neutrality."-^
It is refreshing to be treated to a direct confrontation with the
underlying question. After the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968,
Foreign Minister Waldheim seemed to move the emphasis away from
military matters;
"In tne past, much was made of so-called 'military neutrality',
which in any event does not exist under International Law. It would
be an all-too simplified interpretation of the concept of permanent
neutrality to see in neutrality only the duty to be neutral in wartime
or to be non-aligned in peacetime and to forbid foreign bases on
sovereign territory. I wish to expressly warn against such over¬
simplification. 'I®
There emerges a somewhat more confused picture than might have been
assumed at the outset. Even the duty to maintain an army can no
longer be assumed an absolute if neutrality can always be interpreted
as a temporary means to a more permanent end. It becomes a decision
of political relevance rather than a legal presupposition. In this
debate, the argument would seam to be bounded not by law but by
possible political absolutes; ie 'total' defence or unarmed
neutrality. Between these poles party-political and international
fasnion and considerations would appear to be decisive.
Before we go on to examine the series of political alternatives, we
must look at another aspect of Austria's legal heritage which has
profoundly affected defence thinking - the prohibition on the
possession of missiles or 'Raketenverbot'. As an integral part of the
State Treaty, Article 13 forbade the possession by Austria of any
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self-propelling or guided missiles. Iq part this was at British
request, because of UK wartime experience with offensive missiles such
as the V2 and VI bombers. Similar clauses had also been part of the
Peace Treaties with other States. Although it is then argued that the
implications of technological developments were unknown in 1955, and
hence that the spirit of the clause (ie the prevention of the
possession of offensive systems) should now take precedence over the
letter, it is certainly the case that as early as 1957 the
implications of the clause were clear. Berger wrote in 1957;
"A serious barrier to the fulfilment of the duty under neutrality
to provide an effective defence is found in the military limits in the
State Treaty, indeed they are directly contrary to this duty."^
The Article itself directly forbids the possession of, testing or
experimenting with Atomic weapons, all weapons of mass destruction
which might be developed in the future, any form of guided missile or
torpedo any submarine or biological or chemical weapons for war
purposes. In addition, the signatory powers maintained tne right to
extend this list in the light of technological change.
Military writers have long tried to change the attitude of the
allies on this issue. Allmayer-Beck wrote;
"Austria was obliged by the Moscow Memorandum... to follow a form
of neutrality "as carried out by Switzerland" and yet one month later
[the Allies] were not prepared to provide the Republic with the means
to secure this."20
This of course merely shows that the nature of the 'Swiss'
connection has been ambiguous from the beginning. We have already
seen how the Russians were prepared to accept Austrian UN uiembership
without further question despite Swiss fears and the legal
contradictions were merely rationalised on the grounds of parallel
aims to achieve the desired political result. Onced again we can see
a pattern emerging; legal arguments appear mutually inconsistent but
are consistent at a political level. The Allies had no intention of
412
creating a strong Austria which many regarded as a part of Germany,
and thus they agreed to military restrictions which suited their own
policies and left the legal implications for jurists to make
consistent. The French were insistent at the negotiations that the
Austrian army should not be restricted in numbers if only because of
remaining fears about the Anschluss. They accepted the need to
restrict offensive weapons even if this resulted in a parallel
reduction in defensive capabilities in some spheres. It is certain
that in 1955, tne division between offensive and defensive weapons was
as imprecise as it was by tne 1980s. As such the argument that the
Article merely intended to forbid offensive weapons is only valid if
we accept that this always entailed defensive implications.
Within military circles and among those who believe tnat the
Balance of Power is the basis of Austria's defence, it is the Article
which is regarded as fundamentally flawed, not neutrality;
"In any case it must be made clear that an eventual revision of
Article 13 of the Austrian State Treaty would raise not only the
efficiency and thereby the credibility of Austria's army, but it would
also improve Austria's unifying function."^
In this view, the nature of neutrality as military cannot be
changed and therefore it is the State Treaty which is wrong, even
though it is the primary document.
"The permanently neutral State has not only tne right but is
obliged to arm its forces in such a way as to achieve its logistical
needs that it can effectively meet an attack from an opponent armed
with the most modern weapons, after calculation of the quantitative
factors."21
Many have argued that Austria should be allowed to change her
interpretation of the Article in the manner of Finland. In Article 17
of the treaty reestablishing Finnisn independence after World War II,
the Finns agreed to a clause of identical wording to Article 13 of the
State Treaty. Through a new interpretation it was agreed by both tne
signatory powers (UK, USSR) to restrict this to a prohibition on
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offensive missiles. Yet Austria has failed to achieve this kind of
international recognition for such an.interpretation. In March 1976,
Possaner wrote;
"If Austria does not attempt a revision of Article 13 of the State
Treaty, then she will have put her troops up as cannon fodder."23
Ermacora, Kaminski and Hummer24 otners have all called
for a similar revision. Ermacora put it thus;
"For me today there are no prohibited weapons due to the State
Treaty. This is a theory which people who don't want weapons use...
It is a purely political question.. The interpretation which forbids
Austria defensive weapons is wrong."16
Mock^^ and Khol^ botn supported this position;
"Missiles are of two types; only speciality weapons are forbidden
by the State Treaty. There are missiles which are speciality weapons
and others which are not. Missiles which are not should and must be
provided"
Nevertheless there is another audience in Austria for whom the
question of disarmament is more important than that of rearmament.
When we examine the most recent policy of the Austrian Government, we
will see that the SPOe has been in trouble with its own supporters
more tnrough policies of militarism than through those of neglect.
This explains the notable caution on the part of the SPOe in its
attempts to justify tne purchase of fighter-interceptor planes in
1984;
"When the question of the purchase of observation aircaft arises,
the question of missile rearmament always rears its head. The
assertion that the possession of tnese aircraft automatically leads to
the purchase of these weapons is not true."27
As one pacifist observer points out;
"Even the State Treaty brought no such obligation for Austria with
it [to rearm]; rather the opposite in fact as it included incisive
prohibitions on armament. In the Allies conception, Austria was not
so much meant to prove its still-to-be-achieved neutrality by having
the best equipped army, as through a neutral peace policy."2°
According to this view, the only obligation for defence canes from
Austria's own declaration of neutrality.
It must be conceeded that this view is a minority position both
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domestically and internationally. The point, nowever, is to
illustrate that this issue lies well within the sphere of what might
be called the 'political' ie a matter of debate and choice. It is
already apparent in the legally confusing decisions of the Allies that
their first concern was to reestablish the Austrian State in such a
way that it would pose no threat to them either alone or in some
future alliance with the opposing bloc system, while at the same time
they wanted to create sufficient independence that the old 'Anschluss'
mentality should disappear, thus successfully 'hiving off' one part of
the Reich from the rest.
When Allmayer-Beck complains that the hypocrisy of the Allies was;
"grotesque, in the sense that they wanted to prevent Austria doing
something which she had no intention of doing, while the Great Powers
were already doing precisely the same thing by rearming Germany..."29
...he unwittingly confirms this hypothesis. At the same tine he
identifies the real alternatives that faced Austria - non-threatening
neutrality was one way to meet Superpower needs, the otner was a split
territory with the rapidly rearming armies of the Bloc systems facing
one another across the Iron Curtain as was happening simultaneously in
the two parts of the former Reich still called 'Germany'. Neutrality
by international agreement must be primarily relevant to the politics
of the participants in this case Austria and the signatory powers. As
such, the 'Raketenverbot' is part of this agreement and neutrality
must be within the scope of these politics. Gertainly SPOe
politicians offered a different view to that of Ermacora and Khol.
"Every limitation of weaponry is a limitation on defence. But we
accepted the State Treaty and we must live with it... I do not believe
that a vacuum exists" 30
"In any case nobody in Austria would seriously suggest that we buy
missiles for ourselves which could keep pace even in the realm of
defence with those of both pact systems... Thus preparation for
neutrality has moved AUTOMATICALLY to the political level and the
military/technical side has sithout doubt a reduced importance." 3"-
When Austrian 'experts' argue that the right of reinterpretation
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allowed to other countries since 1945 must be extended to them, they
neglect the fact that political considerations in this case have not
changed sufficiently. The political infeasibility also defeats tnose
who seek to argue that by accepting neutrality after the State Treaty,
the Allies in fact accepted the negation of Article 13.32 gntil now
the Soviet Union has been unwilling to renegotiate any part of the
State Treaty, possibly for fear of setting a precedent in the
'Anschluss' problem.-*3 jn the case of the UN, the political will
existed on all sides to simply ignore the problems of reconciliation.
This is clearly not available in the question of the State Treaty.
The simple fact is that the three successive treaties or laws - State
Treaty, Neutrality and UN membership - have a political consistency
appropriate to the conditions of the postwar world, ie Cold War and
the existence of the UN, but have no consistency with the legal
principles established in 1815, 1907 and 1921.
One further legal point arises. In the dominant school of thought
the problem of the Raketenverbot lies firmly with Article 13, and not
with neutrality. According to this school neutrals must be the last
to disarm34 and cannot disarm others. Those behind tne volksbegenren
(popular initiative) of 1970 who proposed the abolition of the Army
argued a different position. Maintaining that the goal of neutrality
was to further the cause of peace, the neutrals were thus in a
position to be the first to disarm. This point was developed by Anton
Pelinka when he wrote;
"The unilateral reduction of military aspects of defence and the
upgrading of 'social' defence aspects can be expected most
realistically from a State whose defence measures are negligible to
the military balance. Whether Austria doubles or halves her military
budget.,, is irrelevant for the balance between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact."35
As we have seen, the notion of compatibility of higher goals has
been used by both neutrals and superpowers to reconcile the UN Charter
with permanent neutrality. The extension into the defence spnere
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would appear no more problematic. Why should not neutrality in its
old form give way to the new challenges? As Lane says the armaments
clauses era have become technologically overtaken.31 Austria could
thus be in the forefront of movements to challenge traditional defence
codes.
The reality has remained stubbornly between these poles. This
too, reflects political reality. Foreign Governments have also not
been keen to encourage any tendancy to disarmament. As Zemanek points
out the US State Department put particular weight on the ability of
Austria to defend itself calling it;
"extremely important; it is actually a precondition for the
collective recognition of the neutralisation."^
The French Prime Minister Faure declared to the French National
Assembly;
"We nave accepted the Austrian declaration not to participate in
alliances only with the proviso that Austria is in the condition to
effectively defend herself"-^
The political will for total disarmament does not exist. In the
sense that effective law depends on the willingness of the ruled to
accept the validity of the law it thus becomes legally impossible to
change the law. Nevertheless, it cannot be held that some aspects of
the law (eg collective security) can be reinterpreted in the light of
international consensus, while others cannot (eg military
obligations). What is missing in the second case is not the legal
sanction but the political will, in this case both domestic and
international. At the same time Austrian Governments have not sought
to increase the share of defence in the national budget. They too
have contentedly coexisted with neutrality law and Article 13 for 30
years. The USSR continues to put the brakes on any discussion of the
expansion of the range of weapons in the Bundesheer. According to
Ginther, the strength of Austria's forces was a precondition of
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Western approval for the State Treaty.
"the question was put in a Russian press commentary as to why a
peace-loving Austria would need an increase in its forces."
The fact is, the State Treaty and neutrality contain both these
messages and this is at the very core of Austrian neutrality.
As a postscript to the above, it is worth noting the cryptic nature
of the replies by politicians to interview questions. When asked
whether Austria already trained using missiles, Spannocchi replied
that when asked by journalists about reports of missile parts being
discovered at Bundesheer training grounds he professed ignorance;
"Perhaps an anecdote will be sufficient for you. A few years ago
at a training session for hunter-bombers., a missile lay somewhere
outside tne training place. There was considerable excitement about
this. Where did that thing come from? Stupidly, a divisional captain
said that is a training missile. I was asked the same question at
Army command and I said 'That has absolutely nothing to do with you!"
I contacted the regimental commander and said 'tne next time that
happens', and one cannot be sure that it will not,'if you're asked what
it is say simply 'it is a military version of a cuckoo clock." This
says everything- one doesn't have to talk about everything one has,
and one doesn't need to have everything one talks about."
President Kirschlaeger pointed out that in the event of any attack,
the ban would lose its validity and that in the event, missiles would
be available(l).
"At that moment where a case of defence begins the restrictions
no longer apply, exactly like neutrality. If I defend myself, then
the other has broken my neutrality and then I am no longer restricted
by my obligations as a neutral or by the State Treaty.
The implications for defence policy would appear to suggest at
least three options. The first would emphasise the need to maintain
effective defence against the enemy. By tnis logic, the primary duty
of the neutral is to prevent the creation of a military vacuum; the
ultimate extension of such a theory would require tne neutrals to
possess nuclear wepons to deter the nuclear threat of others. The
second possibility would be to emphasise that neutrality is a means to
an end, i.e. international peace. At its most extreme, the security of
the country is handed over to the international community in a
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unilateral gesture of peaceful intentions i.e. the abolition of the
army. In the Nuclear Age the small States are almost in this position
in any case and hence there is some appeal in this argument. The
government of Austria has continued to maintain a third, less
decisive position which bares a remarkable relation to the ambiguity
of the legal and political agreements at the time of the State treaty.
Every decision is then justified with reference to the flexibility
introduced by the phrase 'all the means at her disposal'.
Austrian defence policy since 1955
It is perhaps worth reiterating that the phrase 'all tne means at
her disposal' leaves the entire range of policy between the poles of
atomic weaponry and military abolition completely open. The result
has been considerable disagreement as to the nature ond organisation
of Austria's defence forces.
"On the one side... the level of defence spending is defined using
such terms as ' all means available' or 'all practicable means, in
good faith'... On the other side - those representing an expansionary
interpretation of the military obligations under neutrality portray
these descriptions as a 'perversion' of the demands of neutrality and
the thesis of 'all possible means necessary or required to meet any
possible threat' set against it."~*®
To make a mathematical allusion the one definition tends to zero,
the other to infinity. The 'Defence Doctrine' of 1965 and 1975
chose a compromise wording;
"with reference to the possible options, [Austria] will make the
necessary contribution"^
Austria is distinguished from Sweden and Switzerland by the
strength of those who tend to minimise the importance of military
defence. In the other neutrals there has been considerably more
support for the other tendency including nuclear armament as a form of
deterrent. Recent revelations of the secret involvement of Swedish
Ministers in discussions in the early 70's in this regard tend to
support such an assertion, in Austria;
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"there is the strong attempt to want to prove that defence of one's
own country in the Atomic Age is impossible and the attempt to achieve
it is foolish."40
According to Daniel Frei;
"Neutrality is in no way less costly than defence oy alliance."41
Yet in Austria's case, it certainly does appear to have been
cheaper. In comparison with other neutral States, Austria's % per
capita GNP spending on defence has been notably low;
1965 1970 1975 1982
Austria 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2
Sweden 4.4 3.4 3.4 3.1
Switzerland 2.5 2.5 1.8 2.1
Finland 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.7
Source, Military Balance,
various years
Thus, even allowing for differences in the actual size of budgets,
the share of spending on the military has been consistently lower in
Austria than elsewhere. At all times, Austria's GNP was less than
that of both Sweden and Switzerland and only a small amount greater
than Finland's so that the difference in actual totals was even more
acute (eg in 1967, 1.1% of Austria's GNP amounted to $138m, whereas
3.9% of Swedens was $917m).
Same observers suggest that rather than a fundamental conceptual
difference, different levels of defence spending are best explained by
the relative strengths of the economies. Yet if we widen the scope of
our comparison to include even the other non-aligned State in Europe,
Yugoslavia, this tneory collapses completely. Witn a lower absolute
GNP than Austria, Yugoslavia nevertheless devotes 4.5% of per capita
GNP to defence. When Grosse-Jutte and Jutte state that;
"from a comparison of defence profiles, the best explanations are
achieved throughout by a comparison of the economic conditions... The
two traditionally neutral States... are simultaneously those with the
most powerful economies botn quantitatively and qualitatively and
whose defence conceptions are the closest."^
they fail to account for differences in the share of defence let
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alone for the difference in aosolute amounts (Sweden's budget 8 times
that of Austria in 1967). Indeed a country with a smaller economy
might be expected to spend a similar level so as to reduce
inferiority. This is borne out if we look at the spending share of
NATO small States, also with smaller economies ( Norway, 3%, Portugal
3.3%, Turkey 5.2% (all 1982)).^ in addition, Austrian defence
spending nas remained around 1 - 1.5% of per capita GNP tnroughout the
1960s and 70s, despite the fact that the Austrian economy outgrew most
of the other OECD economies during this period. Military spending
actually fell to a mere 0.9% at the height of Austria's relative boom
in the mid 1970s. Ireland, anotner non-aligned country in a
strategically much more privileged position than Austria spends 1.8%
of per capita GNP on defence. Indeed only Luxembourg among all
European States, richer or poorer, spends less per head on defence
tnan Austria. We must look elsewhere for an explanation of the low
level of spending. A similar stance on many Foreign Policy issues to
that adopted by Sweden has not been reflected in defence policy nor is
shared legal status with Switzerland a signal for a similar approach
to defence.
Comparison with Switzerland gives a very interesting result. The
total nature of Swiss conscription means that she can call on 625,000
men armed at home witnin 48 hours of any crisis. In Austria the
corresponding figure is 160,000. The Swiss also have 800 tanks
(Austria - 373), eleven times more aircraft and twice tne amount of
money. The missiles totals are of course distorted by the
Raketenverbot.^
In 1980, Austria spent 1652 Austrian Schillings per head on defence
while Switzerland disposed of 4031. It is clear that in defence
policy, despite the propaganda of the Army and the Austrian Government,
the policies on defence are as different as on other foreign issues.
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In Switzerland there has certainly been a greater reliance on the
military. As Fuergler said as early as 1967;
"As long as the Great Powers get no further with disarmament, tnen
the development of a strong defence is our best contribution to peace,
and the old maxim 'if you want peace then prepare for war' is valid
for us."45
In many ways, we must look at historical roots for the differences
in defence policies. Earlier, we identified an idea of significant
time. Experience of the War in Switzerland and in Sweden has left a
very different collective impression from the experience of Austria
and to some extent of Finland. It appears that faith in fortress
defences remains deeply ingrained in Swiss thinking (see referendum on
UN membership in 1986). This is certainly not the case in Austria.
Austria has not had any long tradition of an armaments industry, and
hence there is a danger of slowing growtn by spending in a relatively
unproductive sphere. In addition, Austria's geographical location
means that any attack on her territory would automatically precipitate
an international crisis, even if this took the form of war by proxy
(stellvertreter Kriege). Schulmeister points to;
"....the extremely disadvantageous position of the northern and
eastern areas of the Republic, the impossibility of repelling any
attack in a major war, the need to catch up economically and socially
which precisely because of the importance of internal stability nas a
position of importance set against the savings from a political
approach to neutrality..."^
...as the main factors determining Kreisky's defence policy. Kreisky
explained this at its most basic when he said;
"A large army would cost us more and bring us less."^
The objections of many to concepts of neutral disarmament assume
that this would create a military vacuum. This would act as a magnet
for aggressive forces. As Spannocchi wrote;
"Only from one side, that of neutral Switzerland, can aggression be
totally ruled out. Two of our neighbours belong to NATO and two to
the Warsaw Pact. Militarily the North South divide is closed by us
and this is an operational obstacle for NATO. The Danube Valley leads
in both directions into the deep flanks of possible lines of
conflict. Additionally, the relatively good and geomorphically easy
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connection from Szombathely to Villach by Graz is a possibly tempting
line of attack... to overrun the Upper Italian Plain.
The significance of this so-called vacuum is held to be its
'inviting' nature and the ability of other States to believe that
Austria will defend itself.49 yet this actually begs the question of
the last 30 years ie is it not true that without an effective air
defence and no missiles that Austria has in fact been a vacuum?
"The lawgivers repressed the self critical question as to whether
Austria, in spite of the arms limits in the State Treaty can
effectively protect its borders against the military apparatuses of
the Warsaw Pact and NATO who stand beyond those borders; whether in
fact despite the Bundesheer, Austria has to be a factual vacuum
between the eastern and western blocs. Austria accepted a previously
formed pattern of behaviour uncritically."^
When in 1980, the commander of the Austrian Defence Academy
speculated as to the future of the Raketenverbot, Pravda replied under
the headline 'Came off it, General!'. The inability of the Austrians
to stop the infringement by US aircraft in 1958 is a classic example.
In 1970, the last OeVP Defence Minister Prader indirectly confirmed
this fact when he said;
"An army based on defence must in the first place be able to oppose
the threat of tank and air attack. Thus tank and plane defences are
a further special requirement in the equipping of the Bundesneer."
Yet after 16 years, there has been little or no change in spending
levels or radical improvement of air defences. Bindschedler's maxim
"as long as there are independent States there will be wars... If
the danger of war in Europe is reckoned to be less today then it is
because there is no military vacuum but instead a balance of power
is only true in a qualified sense and certainly can only lead to
a future of permanent sterility. The lesson of the 1980s appears to
be that this oalance is unsatisfactory to both powers and is
fundamentally unstable. It certainly no longer appears as stable as
previously. More centrally, the importance of any invasion of Austria
in these circumstances would be equally significant if Austria was
armed or unarmed.
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The development of Austrian Defence Policy 1955-1980, Domestic debates
As we have seen, the Austrian defence forces were a compromise
between the interests of the signatory powers to the State Treaty.
From the point of view of strategic interest it was long the accepted
view that the Soviet Union had been tne major beneficiary of the
withdrawal of troops in that as a result, NATO was split into two
geographically distinct parts.
"The withdrawal of the red army would not nave disturbed our
neighbours, but that of NATO Powers certainly did. Fran the point of
view of Switzerland, the protective cloak of the Western Powers had
been removed and Austria now proved to be a military vacuum."-^
Gasteyger writing in the 1970s points out that the advantages and
disadvantages now accrue to both sides. Italy is more rather than
less protected by the securing of her flanks now possible.
On the 8th July 1955, Austria was given back her military
sovereignty. The new Bundesneer was to be equipped by the items left
behind by the allies. In September 1955, a new Army Act was passed by
the Nationalrat imposing canpulsory conscription. In October, the
Austrian Parliament passed the new 'Neutrality Act' promising to
defend neutrality 'with all the means at her disposal'.
We must pause to consider the order of events in 1955; In April,
Austrian representatives agreed in Moscow to a type of neutrality like
that practiced in Switzerland. In May, they accepted the State Treaty
including the weapons restrictions, in October neutrality was declared
and recognised and by December Austria was a full member of the UN.
The argument that in 1955 the Allies tried to create a second
Switzerland is simply untenable on the basis of the contradictory
evidence. There is,however, a political consistency appropriate to
the Cold War. One of the most penetrating critiques is that of Kolba
who says;
"Thus began the lifelong lie of the Bundesheer. Ostensibly founded
to defend Austrian Neutrality against external enemies, it is
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precisely this role which it can hardly make credible. How can it?
Surrounded by military blocs with the most modern equipment, limited
by the Armaments clauses of the State Treaty and the relative lack of
will in the population to give out money for the Bundesheer, this army
leaves an impression of a character in an Operetta."55
The first test for the new force came in 1956. Although the
Bundesneer mobilised its 5,000 troops from barracks and the border to
Hungary was closed, there was no need for military action. This tiny
en
force in no way able to withstand any active aggressor was
largely token. One interpretation, that of the establishment, is that
the Bundesneer was the necessary proof that Austria was prepared to
defend itself. A second interpretation might suggest that the fact
that Austria survived was entirely due to the foreign policy and
historical constellation which anchored the security of Europe from
another war in tnat of Austria. In this view, the very fact that the
Russians stopped at the Austrian border, depite the tension of the
tines and in a position of total superiority, shows that the 'military
vacuum1 was not the decisive element in policy.
Within the coalition government, the Defence portfolio nad gone to
the OeVP, where it was to remain until 1970. The SPOe had lost the
debate on a people's militia and were unable to win support for their
plan to restrict military service to 6 months. The final compromise
was 9 months.
The design of the army into 8 divisions was closer to the plans of
the OeVP. As Allmayer-Beck concedes;
"In the higher commands and organisational positions, the
Socialists had only occasional officers and officials whose political
viewpoint was akin to theirs. The result was that the party could
only force itself into an attitude of 'mistrusting suffrance' towards
the army."57
Despite this, the demands of rapid economic growth took priority
even for the OeVP. Facing SPOe and widespread popular opposition,
spending on the army which might affect growth was curtailed. This
choice was apparent even by 1959 when Chancellor Raab stated in the
425
Government's declaration of intent;
"The Federal Government supports an effective defence... and is at
the same time aware that the defence developments must be within the
framework of what is realistically possible."58
In 1958 air defence deficiencies had already been exposed by the
flyover incedent. In July 1961, aware that a mere copy of large power
armies was unsuitable for Austria, the Coalition agreed to the new
doctrine of 'Umfassende Landesverteidigung' (all-inclusive defence
policy) or ULV which extended the concept of defence beyond the purely
military to include economic, educational and civilian spneres.
Despite the government's declaration that defence was a special
necessity which required sacrifice"^ the coalition was unwilling to
increase spending significantly. In 1965, the cabinet produced a more
detailed outline of the ULV60 defining the areas of operation and the
three types of threat Austria might face described in ascending order
as Crisis (international tension), Neutrality (war between otner
States) and Defence (attack on Austria).
Nevertneless, the persistent unwillingness of government and
populace to invest in military expansion was already worrying those
close to the army who began providing legal objections to the state of
affairs. These included Henk and also Pahr who wrote;
"Serious and justified doubt exists as to whether Austria is
sufficiently fulfilling her duties as a permanently neutral State.
The funds which Austria makes available for military uses are to be
calculated not only in absolute terms but also relatively, where they
are far below the amounts which comparable States spend on
armament,
We will return to the question of calculation of amount below.
OeVP politicians like Bock now defended the army not on the basis that
it could compete with tne forces of the blocs, but rather tnat it
could be operative in regional disturbances, while any delay in the
advance of an attacking force was to be welcomed, in tnat it provided
time for the arrival of outside help.
In 1968, following tne perceived failure of the Bundesheer to
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provide an impression of adequate security, tne defence establishment
faced its greatest crisis. Ginther maintains that the tone of
Waldneim's statements in which he denied the existence of a 'military
neutrality' were a major change. More plausibly, it can be argued
that while there was a change in political rhetoric, this was because
the underlying facts of 13 years of lack of investment in the
Bundesheer both through deliberate policy and disinterest made any
other statement look ridiculous.
The government was heavily criticised by the SPOe and in parts of
the press for its decision to halt the issue of Austrian entry visas
to Czechs during the crisis, for its attempts to influence the
domestic press and for its failure to alert the international
community to the danger to Austria.
"The days of the occupation of Czechoslovakia nave made plain how
weak the legs on which Austria's neutrality stand actually are"^
Militarily, the ease with which airborne infringements took place
gave rise to considerable concern. More importantly, a groundswell of
opinion that the Bundesheer was a military and political irrelevance
bagan to develop. In 1963, an SPOe Nationalrat deputy had published a
book entitled 'More security without weapons' which had challenged the
concept of Bundesheer. In December, a group of left-wing Catholics
around the journal 'Neues Forum' began a campaign for the army's
abolition, culminating in the 'Popular Initiative for the abolition of
the Bundesheer'. Although this had little chance of success, being
rejected out of hand by legal conmentators (see Zemanek), the proposal
to put Austrian defence into tne hands of the Security Council and to
establish in international law a new status of unarmed neutrality had
considerable appeal in late 1969 early 1970, especially among young
left wing Catholics and intellectuals within the SPOe. In the 1970
election, the SPOe campaigned using the slogan 'Six months is enough',
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a reference to conscription and symbolic of tbe anti-Bundesneer
climate. This is considered one of the factors which persuaded a
decisive number of less committed voters to vote for Kreisky. Various
neighbouring States, notably Switzerland and West Germany expressed
concern that Austria might become a military vacuum.
Despite this, the emphasis in security policy was now firmly away
from the army and on to the successful conduct of foreign policy.
Although in retrospect Ermacora dismisses the Popular Initiative as an
event not to be taken seriously, the symbolic value lies in the fact
that it was a topic for discussion at all levels and underlines the
lack of public support for the Bundesneer in the late 1960s. It is
interesting to note the degree to wnich this debate parallelled a
similar argument in West Germany.
A reform commission was estaolished leading in July 1971 to a new
Army Act Amendment. To the disappointment of many of the disarmers,
military service was reduced to eight months, six months service plus
60 days further weapons training. Nevertheless access to alternative
community service was made easier.
The SPOe, itself long ambiguous on the question of tne Bundesneer
and without any specific concept, made overtures to more sympathetic
military leaders. By 1971, a military man, Luetgendorf, was made
Defence Minister. The rising star of the army was the head of the
Military Academy, Emil Spannocchi. Later made commanding officer of
the Bundesneer, Spannocchi's ability lay in nis gift for public
relations. An admirer of Swiss practice and aware of the low standing
of the Bundesheer in Austrian society, his ideas were presented as a
new concept for defence.^
The new plan assumed that Austria itself would never be the goal of
any attack. Nuclear wars were declared unlikely - in any case,
Austria could not be defended in such a scenario. As Spannocchi said;
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"In the most extreme and deadly danger of an aimed armed attack,
Austria alone cannot rely on the effectiveness of her materials which
are sufficient only for the defence of neutrality."56
The new concept was based on the calculation that the Austrians
could hope to hold up an invader for up to 3 days. The theory came
from models of guerilla warfare, and the defence of such open areas
such as Vienna, Linz and Graz was declared impossible as such. The
plan involved avoiding standing battles with superior forces,
attacking them at key points and withdrawing into the more easily
defendible areas in the Alps. The war would thus develop into a war
of attrition based on a standing army of 15,000 and a militia to
number 300,000 by 1990. According to this plan, any army tempted to
use Austria as a tnrough-route to other targets would hence be
deterred.^ This is akin to the Swiss policy of 'raising the cost of
entry'. By holding up any attacking troops, resources would nave to
be diverted by the aggressor. According to Spannocchi;
66
"150,000 is decidedly too few for a people of 7 million."
The entire purpose of the exercise is to be achieve the same goal
as Swiss defence and to prove that;
"an attack on Austria will be an adventure with painful long-term
consequences. "67
Despite this, the standing of the Bundesneer remained very low. In
1971, 'Die Furche' wrote;
"The Austrian today believes less than ever in a real function for
the Bundesheer; he mistrusts every statement about the army, whatever
party it may come from... The fact is that from now until early 1972
we will live with an army, that does not even have a quarter of its
forces ready for action."^
Throughout the early 1970s, this feeling continued as the SPOe
struggled to agree upon a defence concept. In 1974, 'Profil' wrote;
"The figures would make a coward of the bravest. Though there were
still 1800 one-year volunteers in the forces in 1969, last year there
were only 300, this year there will be 200. In the past, 80 army
officers graduated from the military academy annually; last year 23
finished, this year it will be 35. Whereas at the end of the 60s
there were 3 classes of 270 NCOs annually at the NCO school in Enns,
in 1973 tnere was one single class with 50 students."69
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Given the nature of confidence, this makes a nonsense of academic
objections to a military vacuum. The emphasis in security policy in
the 1970s had shifted from defence to foreign policy. In 1971, the
Government Declaration of Intent put the SPOe position;
"It is in no way my intention to reduce the significance of defence
when I make the observation that our neutrality and security in
peacetime can be best achieved through a successful foreign policy.""^
This was to be a consistent theme of SPOe policy under Kreisky.
There was a corresponding increase in activity in Detente, at the UN,
in Palestine and in the Non-aligned movement. In defence of the
policy of encouraging international organisations to site their
headquarters in Vienna, Kreisky placed the policy within the realm of
national security;
"Bringing international organisations here is a measure that
certainly has implications for security in Austria. It is certainly
as valuable as great arsenals of weapons which may never be used."
ci"\
Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger also underlined this connection when
A
he said;
"Our strength does not lie in military arms, but rather in our
policy of encouraging peace and in the capacity of our culture to
encourage life. The great task of Austria's foreign policy is so to
anchor Austria in world consciousness., that the international
community accepts that Austria, as it is, is of international value..
If this succeeds., -our hope to be of real value to others - then
foreign policy would appear to me to have made an essential
contribution towards the freedom and security of our country."^
The SPOe continued to support the Bundesheer, which was seen as
7*3
valuable in civil wars, regional conflicts and in war by proxy.
Nevertneless the SPOe accepts that there are limits imposed by the
existence of atomic weaponry. The emphasis in the security policy of
a small neutral in central Europe has now got to be directed to
prevention rather than the treatment of symptoms. As Lane pointed
out, Austria was invaded in 1938 when it possessed an army which was
relatively stronger than the present Bundesheer. What was missing was
not so much defence as the will to resist and international support.^
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In May 1975, tne OeVP brought a motion before parliament wnich
condemned the condition of the defence forces as 'completely
unsatisfactory'.74 They contended that the budget share for defence
in the 1960s had never fallen below 4.13% while under the SPOe it
varied between 3.6% and 3.7%. Ermacora, acting as defence spokesman
for the party further objected to the SPOe's concentration on foreign
policy;
"The position of a small neutral State is not simply dependent on
one's own 'good foreign policy' but is determined by events on which a
small neutral State has no relevant influence.
For non-calculable international events, the Bundesheer remained
the primary metnod of defence. Yet in terms of GNP per capita (a
separate measure to that used by the OeVP in their argument) the OeVP
Government had been equally unwilling to devote resources to the
Bundesheer. The size of the Budget had increased over the period and
this accounted for most of tne change in budget share.
In reality, there is a limit to the degree of security which an
army in Austria can provide; in the final analysis Austria depends on
an unspoken system of collective security at local or even continental
level, whereby an infringement of Austrian territory by tne forces of
one bloc would bring immediate retaliation from tne other. Neither
side would tolerate tne presence of tne other in strategic zones.
Swiss neutrality has never faced the same scenario. The basis of
Austrian neutrality lies in tne existence of two permanently opposed
groups on her borders, formerly actually occupying her territory.
Swiss neutrality is the result of a domestic communal Historical
experience, with the dominant power constellations of 1815 long
superceded.
In July 1975, the Nationalrat unanimously passed a new
Constitutional Law anchoring the ULV in the Federal Constitution (BGBl
1975/368). The SPOe left behind its initial reservations about the
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ULV by arguing that tne core of the Bundesheer was a militia and not a
professional army. As the political tide in the later 1970s changed,
it became customary for SPOe politicians to refer to the 'tnree
pillars of security'; foreign policy, ULV, and domestic stability. In
part, this was also reflected in growing emphasis on an expansion of
the domestic arms industry, which itself was to lead to considerable
controversy within the party in tne 1980s. The OeVP constantly
referred to the neglect of the miltary.
There were a number of attempts to assess the degree of awareness
about neutrality in the wider population. In 1973, Neuhold and
Wagner, in a sample of 1500 found that 90% tnougnt neutrality had
brougnt more advantages than disadvantages to Austria. A further 83%
believed tnat Austria had an obligation under International Law to
maintain an army, while 74% found this sensible. Nevertheless, 72%
felt that the government did enough to protect neutrality. Pernaps
more disturbingly for the SPOe, 60% felt that neutral States should
never take up a position in external conflicts.^® There were very few
variations in response according to age group. Only on the question
of tne relative importance of military issues did OeVP supporters
differ markedly from SPOe supporters.
In 1978, there was a further survey of attitudes to security. In
tnis only 2% believed that there was a high chance of Austrian
involvement in a war in tne near future, tnough only 31% tnougnt it
impossible. When asked to ascertain tne role of a defence force in
Austria, 77% suggested border control against small bands and
terrorists, 73% as a protection against border infringements and only
51% as a deterrent against outside countries. As Gehmacher says;
"The overwhelming majority of Austrians see the essential task of
the Bundesneer in the limited deterrent function of this kind of small
scale border incedent."^
In many ways, tnis accords with the realities facing the
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Bundesheer. Nevertheless the SPOe came under increasing fire from the
right for its position;
"The attitude of the Socialists has quite obviously restricted the
integration of the Bundesheer into society. Demands such as that
currently from the ranks of trade union youth for the abandonment of
the Civilian Service Commission fit into this distorted understanding
of history on the left."78
The fact remains that all governments since 1955 have arrived at
the same position; none has yet been persuaded to invest heavily in
military expansion despite the certainty of the juridical and
political experts who argue that it is an essential. The atomic
threat would seem to have introduced different considerations into
policy-making Austria.
In a furtner survey in 1980 by the Social Science Studies
Association, 60% laid 'very great value' on the foreign contacts of
Bruno Kreisky as a means of protecting Austria abroad. By comparison
only 45% relied on western protection, 40% on international
organisations, 34% on relations with the USSR and only 29% on military
defence. More significantly, 33% found the Bundesheer to be
'irrelevant' for the task.^
All this is far from the Swiss pattern of overwhelming support for
and belief in military defence. It also challenges the renewed
confidence in tne Bundesneer towards the late 1970s, especially the
success of manoeuvres in 1979. Much of the credit for this was given
to Spannocchi, wno was praised for his PR and efficiency;
"Something like a completely new spirit is around in the army,
personified in the form of Emi1 Spannocchi, probably the most popular
army commander in Western (!) Europe at the moment. The old Austrian
aristocrat has succeeded in tne military realm where Kreisky succeeded
politically - he has given the Austrians back their pride in the army
snaken by the experience of the Third Reich.
In the light of the survey above, the arms debacles of the 1980s
and the Reder affair this success has begun to look shaky.
The new army did not escape criticism. From the right
tne critique concentrated on the continued lack of resources and
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materials;
"Any serious trial would be like a fight oetween the Aztecs and the
oa
Spaniards at the present state of weaponry.
Later in 1980, a former chief of the Military Academy, General Duic
published a book^ which attacked Spannoccni's plans as fundamentally
flawed. By appearing to reduce the tnreat from Austria's unprotected
airspace, the plan misled both domestic and international observers.
Duic further argued that the capabilities of the army were severely
restricted by the failure to build a Swiss-style militia.
The 25th anniversary of the State Treaty was a further reason for
inter-party recrimination. The SPOe maintained that after a difficult
period the reforms of the army had succeeded. The OeVP spoke of a
'catastrophic budgetary situation' speaking of '25 years of
insufficient defences'.^
Writing in 'Profil, one commentator concluded;
"With Qnil Spannocci's 'doctrine' Austria at least has an army
which indicates to an environment filled to tne brim with weapons that
there is a credible will to survive and some power of self defence.
Yet as long as comparable efforts are not made to protect the civilian
population and a functioning 'crisis economy' organised then the
saying remains true; 'Swiss defence stands; Austrian defence stands in
the constitution'."^
The issues of air defence, spending and missiles were to become
even more critical in the 1980s, especially after the new SPOe/FPOe
coalition took office in 1983. But by 1980, a new problem had emerged
- the growing alienation of a large section of Austria's youth from
the arms industry.
The Austrian Arms Industry.
The complications for tne armaments industry began in earnest only
after the expansion of VOEST-Alpine and Steyr-Daimler-Puch companies
into tne weapons exporting trade especially in the late 1970s. In
general the problems become most acute for neutrals when there are
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contracts of supply with countries in areas if hign tension. These
have been the inspiration of groups of young people, leftist Catholics
and Socialists, who have persuaded other sections to join their cause.
The first major scandal affected the industry only indirectly in
the Spring of 1977. It emerged that Austria was making clandestine
deals with the Syrian Government during 1976 through the Defence
Ministry. In a letter written in March 1976, Defence Minister
Lutgendorf had suggested;
"The Austrian army is very willing to invite experts from the
Syrian army to get to know the arms wares made and used in Austria at
closer hand. I would be very grateful if you could at some time
inform me as to which items might be of special interest to you. As
you know, tnere are very close contacts between tne defence ministry
and Steyr-Daimler-Puch."^
It emerged that these clandestine deliveries of rifles and
ammunition had taken place while Syria had been at war with Israel.
There were further suggestions that Kreisky might have known more than
was openly admitted.
The public scandal which followed led to the resignation of
Lutgendorf and eventually to a new law on the 'Import, Export and
Transit of War Materials' (BGBl 1977/540). Under tnis law, all arms
transactions became subject to stricter controls. Where Austria's
neutrality 'would be in question', either in International Law or in
foreign policy terms, a licence cannot be granted.
In 1976, Hans Malzacher was appointed new cnief of tne Steyr
concern, a State owned company with interests in vehicles and
armaments. There followed a huge expansion of the arms production
with new markets being sought in Latin America and the Middle East.
Between 1977 and 1982, Steyr had customers in Tunisia, Thailand,
Bolivia, Argentina, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and much wider. Reports
published in 1981 by the Innsoruck based Austrian University Institute
found that Austria was now the world's seventh largest arms
manufacturer although these were greeted with widespread scepticism.
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Malzacher confirmed however that Steyr alone produced arms valued at
AS7 9bn 79 durin9 1976-81. In justifying this huge expansion, Kreisky
tried to bring in neutrality;
"Without a recognisable defence capability, neutrality would lose
its credibility. With this in mind, we cannot overlook the fact that
we must also consider creating an arms industry of note, because
import dependence in the armaments realm would bring the threat of
political dependence."^
It is notable how threatening tnis 'dependence' becomes when job-
creation is involved, while economic dependence on neighbours
apparently has no effect on political dependence!
The next, and most damaging crisis came in the summer of 1980. In
1979, the Government had refused export credits on the proposed export
of AS2bn of tanks to Chile. Nevertheless, Malzacher, with
considerable support from the SPOe rignt wing around Benya (OeGB) and
Deputy Chancellor Hannes Androsch, declared;
"We got this order in the face of the stiffest international
competition. If we are now not allowed to deliver, then I cannot
rule out redundancies."^
This threat to jobs, split tne SPOe. Kreisky himself had been an
active and vocal opponent of Pinochet. In September 1974 he said;
"No form of activities will develop whicn might help the (Chilean)
government such as development aid or cultural exchange."^7
There were considerable objections from the emergent leftwing youth
groups who had gained in confidence after the rejection of the
Government's policy on nuclear power in tne referendum of November
1978. The SPOe split between those on the left (Fischer, Blecha,
Lane) who viewed any deals with Pinochet as destroying Austria's
credibility and those on the Right who supported Malzacher. Soon
arguments about tne requirements of neutrality were floating about.
Malzacher saw in the deal the
"duty of a neutral to recognise the positive development of
neutrality."^
OeVP spokesman Ermacora said;
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"Since we have already supplied Argentina, this new deal with Chile
could contribute to the re-astablishment of military balance in this
area."86
Neutrality can tie used to justify just about any political value!
Others in the OeVP were more critical. Development aid spokesman
Stembacher questioned the whole morality of the involvement of
neutrals in the arms trade;
"He who delivers tanks cannot expect that they will be used as
replacement trams. Weapons are always used one day.
There were major demonstrations in Vienna, including one by Chilean
exiles, one of whom declared;
"My dead comrades would turn in their graves if they knew that
tanks would be delivered to Chile by a Socialist Government.
In 'Die Presse', Defence Minister Roesch declared that his policy
was to approve arms exports when there was no risk that they would be
used against Austria.^0 In the end, despite threats of 500
85
redundancies, the cabinet decided not to grant the export licences.
The result was a considerable blow to the arms industry in Austria.
The next crisis emerged during the Falklands War. As the
'Financial Times' remarked as early as January 1982;
"Anton Benya, President of the Trade Union Federation, actively
supports arms deals as a prop to the economy and Chancellor Kreisky
not only tacitly accepted the deals with the military rulers of
Argentine, but has done his best to promote arms exports to Africa and
the Middle East."92
The outbreak of the Falklands War meant that the contract between
Steyr and Argentina for 70 tanks had to be suspended. The deal had
been very controversial during 1981, leading to street demonstrations,
but this time the SPOe agreed to the sale. The suspension because of
the outbreak of war was thus a considerable embarassment to tne
Government. Heinz Fischer, one of the most vocal opponents of these
sales demanded legislation to spell out that Austrian arms must not be
exported to countries 'guilty of Human Rights violations.'
The continued search for markets merely brought further problems.
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In January 1984, it was reported that ex-Chancellor Kreisky had
intervened for Steyr in Libya. According to 'Profil';
"The de facto nationalised firm wants to export tanks beside
lorries, tractors and mopeds... Whether Austria can sell tanks to
Ghaddafy on grounds of neutrality, Kreisky leaves for the 'Foreign
Office to judge'"^
In 1985 there was a further problem when tanks for Morocco were
refused an export licence due to tne outbreak of conflict in the
Sanara. The indecision of the Austrian Government in this issue was
obviously considerable. When Steyr had originally approached the
Foreign Ministry, then Foreign Minister Lane had refused a licence.
In November 1984, new Minister Gratz was more positive and in January
1985 he wrote;
"that hope of a general settlement in tne conflict in the Western
Sahara exists and if this occurs it would be possible were an
application for the export of Steyr tanks to Morocco to be made, for
the Foreign Ministry to react positively."^
When war broke out in February, the application was rejected, it
was reopened in April 1985, and was finally closed in June. As one
commentator observed;
"The thesis thrown around from Sinowatz (SPOe) to Mock (OeVP) that
the Bundesheer needs a domestic weapons industry is turned around; the
weapons makers need the Bundesheer far more than the other way
around."95
When in 1986, there was further controversy over the exports to
VOEST to Libya and Iran (Gulf War) 96 there was open speculation on the
future of tne Austrian armaments export trade. The 1980s nad seen a
considerable reverse for the arms trade in Austria. Both Steyr and
VOEST suffered losses, Steyr laying off 1000 Workers and losing over
AS600m in 1983/4. The sales of armaments slumped from a high of AS8bn
in 1978 to less tnan AS4bn in 1984. As with most European firms,
Austrian firms found 90% of their new markets in the developing world
1983/4.^ It was clear that many were unhappy with tne uncertainties
of the export laws.
All in all, the position of neutral Austria with respect to weapons
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exports has become very difficult. Compared to tne exports of Sweden
and Switzerland, the military concentration in Austria is remarkably
small. The increased problems in the domestic political arena have
undermined the credibility of the industry and have made it a matter
of some embarassment to many Socialists. The employment question is
of course the biggest obstacle for SPOe politicians. Kreisky himself
has had an ambiguous relationsnip to arms production;
"'Doing without a red-white-red (Austrian) tank production was
always my opinion' says the old chancellor. 'We must move from this
production to something new. A management must be capable of
this.'
The arms trade highlights tne impossibility of a clean division
between State, economy and neutrality. The export of arms has clear
political and security implications for a State's credibility as a
neutral, made more blatant if the firm is State financed. The
realisation of tms in the field of armaments must now be extended
into a concept of dependence throughout the economy. It is apparent
however that the simplicities of neutrality in its old form provide no
guidance. The growth of interdependence has forced a fundamental
change in neutrality to suit the less clear cut choices of the 1980s.
Air Defence and Missiles Controversies in the 1980s
The question of air defence, linked as it is with tne question of
missiles remains the obsession of the military and tneir supporters.
As we nave seen, an interesting argument has developed to justify
this; air defence is required by neutrality. To make it effective
missiles will be required, which are an unfortunate breach of tne
State Treaty. In this logic it is always the treaty not neutrality
wnich needs to be changed.
In December 1974, the cabinet agreed to set up a system of airspace
monitoring to be called 'Goldhaube'92 The Defence and Interior
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Ministries agreed tnat this should have joint military and civilian
use, although it is clear that the chief purpose of the system is
military. The system was to be controlled by the Bundesheer. This
powerful radar system was to give Austrian monitors radar vision into
Poland, West Germany and Yugoslavia. Equipment was provided from
Italy and Japan. Despite rising costs, (from AS 1.3bn in 1974 to a
real cost of AS4bn) and delays in installation, tnis provided the
Bundesheer with a powerful system. In March 1977, the Defence
Advisory Council unanimously called for the installation of aircraft
which could take an active role in monitoring.^9 Nevertheless, the
SPOe continued to stall in the actual ordering of new aircraft.
Various types of plane came into question; the OeVP preferred the
American F-5E 'tiger' although tne Bundesneer tended towards tne
French 'Mirage 50'. In March 1980, General Duic told 'Salzburger
Nacnrichten';
The procurement of 24 fighter-interceptors of Mirage 50 type from
France appears to be fairly certain."10^
Because the Austrians were hoping to buy secondhand fignters tney
intended to make the whole purchase part of a wider trading deal. In
May 1980 Defence Minister Roesch returned from France witn the
proposal that France would take the atomic waste from the unopened
power station at Zwentendorf. By 1980, nowever, the approaching
recession was putting brakes on any purchase of new equipment. In the
meantime, the price of potential planes was accelerating. In June
1981, the Defence Advisory Council decided on the purchase of 'Mirage
50' fighters. The USA did not appear satisfied with tnis solution.
Anxious to avoid confrontation, OeVP spokesman Ermacora came up with
one of the most amazing proposals in postwar Austrian history. He
suggested that the Swiss Air Force defend Austrian airspace;
"We must be aware that from the point of view of a 'total war
stategy' Austria is regarded as a buffer for Switzerland in every form
of conflict. What happens if Austria is not in a position to protect
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its airspace? Would we prefer that NATO or Warsaw Pact aircraft
protect our airspace? I don't believe so. I believe that here,
cooperation with a permanently neutral State would double neutrality
and I can imagine that certain interception functions would be taken
over by Swiss Air forces to protect neutrality."101
FPOe spokesman Josseck described such speculations as 'grotesque'.
It is all the more surprising because it was put forward by one of the
leading conservative 'legalists'. Portraying Austria as a buffer zone
for Switzerland shows clearly from which direction the Austrians
expect an attack. The principle of Western orientated military
defence is in this view more important than the obligation not to
undertake military alliances. This surely establishes beyond doubt
that those people who presently portray tnemselves as supporters of
'legal' neutrality are using the law merely as a veil to hide
political choices.
In any case, Kreisky announced that in 1982 tnere would be no money
for planes, repeating his assertions that foreign policy was the most
effective form of security.
In 1983, the SPOe lost its overall majority and entered a coalition
with the FPOe, who claimed the support of 50% of the professional
army. There were still strong elements in tne SPOe opposed to tne
purchase of the aircraft. Finance Minister Salcher and Foreign
Minister Lane both opposed FPOe Defence Minister Frischenschlager's
plans. As late as June 1984, Lane said;
"Interceptors will merely make possible the identification of
aircraft detected by radar and then enable us to protest afterwards.
A further solution does not come into question for Austria because of
the State Treaty. Even if one could achieve the ending of the
Raketenverbot, we would have to ask the question whether such guided
missiles would raise Austria's security. The danger would then emerge
that the bases for these weapons would become enemy targets, as would
the people living there!"1^2
Yet by July Lane fell in with party pressure leaving Salcher as the
only opponent;
"A part of the existing law, even if it is technologically obsolete
in my opinion, obliges the perpetually neutral State to defend itself
not only on the ground but in the air."^
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In September both were removed from Cabinet positions. In October
1984 the praesidium of the SPOe voted for the purchase. They still
felt it necessary to assure their supporters that missiles were not
imminent. They argued that as the Saab 105OE in use since the late
60s were now obsolete, the purchase of fighters constituted a
'standing still';
"The replacement of tnese aircraft is not rearmament but the
continuation of the task of Austria's neutrality policy."102
There was nevertneless considerable opposition to the purchase.
Opinion Polls showed a majority against. The decision to buy Saab
Draken aircraft led to further opposition in the provinces which were
intended to be the bases for the new additions. As one West German
newspaper commented;
"Now no Austrian Province wants to let the Saab Draken, reputed to
be extremely noisy and nign polluting onto their territory. Styria
in particular is resisting vehemently the place where Defence Minister
Frischenschlager would like to see the 24 aircraft based at Graz-
Thalernof.
There were further fears in the OeVP that their opposition to these
aircraft might stir up anti-Bundesheer feeling. As a result, the OeVP
was at pains to distance itself from the leftwing opponents of the
planes.The issue had become a test of party political strength,
especially of the ability of the FPOe to push tnrough its proposals.
Despite the Reder affair, Frischenschlager pushed on with his plans.
The result was a Popular Initiative supported by Styrian Provincial
Governor Krainer, which gained the active signature of a third of the
Styrian population.-^ The Government seemed resolved nowever and the
contracts were signed.
In the longer term, tne aircraft debate has raised a number of very
serious issues for Austrian defence. Firstly, there is the fairly
clear resistance in the population to a large increase in funding for
the Bundesheer, especially at a time of cuts. As 'Profil' editor
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Lingens wrote in 1985, to propose an increase
is almost treason.... Not even in Tyrol and Vorarlberg where
there is more support for the army than in eastern Austria would the
Government gain a majority for more spending.
Secondly, there is the extreme difficulty of defending Austria with
or without missiles and aircraft. Army commander Bernardiner, when
asked whether 24 Interceptors would improve Austria's defence replied;
"No, in the case of a war they would hardly be sufficient to
protect Austrian airspace even to the extent that one could delay or
prevent the entry by enemy aircraft. For that, 24 would not be
enougn nor three nor ten times as many."^^^
In addition, opponents have pointed out the geographical and
strategic problems facing Austria; an aircraft of Draken type requires
13 minutes from East to West. To emphasise the exposure to NATO
planes in Tyrol, Tyrol can be overflown in less than one minute.
Additionally, Austria has no buffer zone. She cannot react until
enemy planes nave actually crossed her borders. Thus any attacker
would have deeply penetrated Austria before the Bundesheer could even
react. The Swiss on the other hand do have a buffer to the East in
Austria.
Thirdly, the problem of missiles has only begun, despite the
assertions from certain quarters to the contrary (eg Frischenschlager
Sept. 1985) .m In part this is due to domestic opposition to
spending. More importantly, there is a large group in Austria which
remains sceptical of the value of military defence. These have
managed with the help of widespread disinterest, to ensure that the
arguments about vulnerability in the case of a military vacuum look
shaky after 30 years. As Lingens points out, the purchase of 14
second-hand fighters does not show any commitment to expansion;
"In reality, tne Government has shown through the purchase of this
aircraft that it is merely paying lip-service to defence."
As Defence Minister Roesch said in 1981, to avoid being a military
vacuum, Austria should have bought planes 26 years previously.
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The argument that Austria's air defences are radically improved by
the purchase of interceptors is highly dubious. The point here is not
to argue one side or the other, but ratner to underline how each side
attempts to co-opt the 'law' in its political wrestling match. The
very lawyer who has for years insisted on the need for sovereignty in
defence (Ermacora) suggests a quasi-alliance with Switzerland.
Furthermore, the argument that missiles are a defensive purchase is
clearly grossly unrealistic. They maintain an offensive and a
defensive capacity and a clear division between the two is impossible.
Is the nuclear bomb an offensive or defensive weapon? The purchase of
missiles runs clearly against tne text of the State Treaty; today's
missiles retain all the ambiguity between defence and attack of those
forbidden in 1955. The defensive aspect has not replaced the
offensive category, it has supplemented it.
As things have stood, Austria has certainly not survived 30 years
because of the deterrent effect of the Bundesheer. Would
international tension have been reduced had the Austrians snot down
the infringing aircraft of 1968 or 1956? In the end, the
international scenario which required a three-way Treaty (Austria-
Eastern Bloc-Western Bloc) for the setting up of the State has not
changed, in the final analysis, Austria is not an isolated unit
either self-determined or determined from abroad. The strategic role
of Austria at present ensures that she is a concern not only to
herself but to both East and West, both as a political and military
goal and as the only symbol of successful postwar co-operation in
Europe. The present military situation in Austria is only partially
the result of the 1955 agreement. It is also attrioutible to the
actual political priorities of both the large parties in Austria.
During the heyday of detente, the Western powers too put little
pressure on Austria for rearmament. The political function was not
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dependent on military strength. It too suited tne political priorities
of the era.
Final Remarks
The military argument remains unchanged;
"Without the help of more sophisticated weapons, there is less
chance of countering a full scale attack on Austrian territory."
As a final comment it is worth looking at the comments of Benelux
writers on this subject, whose experience of neutrality and its
abandonment precedes the genesis of the Austrian model. Writing in the
1980s one Dutch writer wrote;
"As was the case for the Benelux counties in 1914 and 1940, tne
European neutrals are threatened primarily by the strongest military
power in Europe, wnich is the USSR. Individually they are unable to
resist this threat. All they can hope to achieve by these foreign and
defence policies is to convince the Kremlin that it is more
advantageous from a military point of view to bypass their territories
in the case of war."-'-^
This rather cynical view reflects the Benelux experience tnat
attributes Switzerland's survival to its strategic difficulty and
overall irrelevance. For the same reason Holland survived in 1914-18
while Belgium was the showplace of much of the war. Yet even if we
accept this analysis, there remains another option; an active peace
understanding. This indeed has been the real conception of the
Austrians. Few would hold out much hope of survival in tne event of
all out war. The sovereignty of the State is thus only secure as
long as wartime neutrality does not emerge. The State must tnerefore
work to remove all pretext for war. Within a two-power system such as
the cold war, neutrality is not irrelevant, freeing tnose States not
bound in advance to one side or the other to undertake different
roles; eg local detente, small scale brokerage. The real choice is
not between defence or no defence but between neutral status in
peacetime and battlefield status in any war.
In Austria's case, there has been no willingness to seriously
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divert resources into the armed forces. The attempts in the 1970s to
suggest that Austria breached neutrality law by falling short of the
regional norm on military investment were quickly dismissed by
politicians wishing to maintain the scope of Austria's choices under
neutrality.113 This j_s not to say SOme future party programme
will not seek to justify future spending plans as an 'obligation under
International Law.'
The intentions of the negotiators at the various stages in 1955
were not based on concepts of precedent. This has seriously
complicated the field for political argument. The present near-vacuum
can be proved to conform to international law yet others argue that
rearmament is a necessity if Austria is to fulfil her legal
obligations.
The SPOe continues to be split between its two groups on this
issue. The confusion over the arms trade highlighted this. What is
emerging is a new form of neutrality by consensus. By relating
Austria's status to that of Switzerland its function and success in
staying out of wars was rooted. Nevertheless tne new neutrality was
based on those powers which invested most in its success; the Austrian
political elite and by proxy the electorate, the bloc powers and
international diplomatic effort. As such it was largely externally
orientated. Swiss neutrality on the other hand is rooted in 'tne
Sovereign' ie the electorate and culture and only by proxy in the
elite. They have maintained it twice in the face of the opposition of
the international community and hence it is from them that Switzerland
defines its policy.
The result in Austria was a very untidy compromise on defence. The
restrictions recall that Austria was formerly an integral part of the
Third Reich. On the other hand, the powers did not truly countenance
'unarmed neutrality' a foreign notion in the 1950s, the heyday of
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Great Power Realism. They themselves appear to have been unconcerned
about the confusion of signals. The SPOe justifies its own present
position by arguing tnat defence spending cannot be increased without
endangering the other pillar of ULV, inner stability;
"The question is whether one could have done more without
endangering one of the other elements. The money for defence is
limited; if I spend more on defence then I have less for Social
Services and thus the inner stability comes under threat, it would of
course have been desirable for every government to do more."
Of course, the SPOe found money for Abfangjaeger in the recession
wnere none had been available in tne boom! Austria can now be seen as
a unique if unplanned experiment. The disaster of 1945 left a
distaste for war and its paraphernalia, stronger than in the victorious
allied powers. There is a discontinuity between 1815 and 1985 caused
by the emergence of the Cold War in the shadow of Armageddon. Post-
nuclear Austria could not simply adopt Swiss practice which recognised
no discontinuity. This was particularly true with reference to tne
military and military technology.
The constant use of 'obligation' and 'law' in this context must be
set against the ease with which they are ignored at other points. Khol
talks about the debate over missiles as a "discussion oetween
idiots".26 of course he as a working politician would at the same
tine like to assert the unbreacnable nature of the laws on armed
neutrality while merrily ignoring the conditions of the State Treaty.
The contradictions of collective security and traditional perpetual
neutrality were set aside. Participation in the world community has
become a central plank of modern Austrian foreign policy. The nature
of defence policy under this contradiction has not been tested.
As yet the political consensus does not exist to create unarmed
neutrality. What is important is that we recognise that it is a
political argument in whicn the 'law' does not invalidate one position
rather than the other for all time. Ultimately there is no court to
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validate or invalidate 'legal' perceptions, merely political
consensus. The emergence of a new approach to neutral defence in
Austria may be an historic change; the result of a defence policy set
up after Hiroshima in West European conditions. This has relativised
the value of sacrificing economic and diplomatic success in order to
build up a powerful military.
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Conclusions
" 0 Philosopher, you who see nothing
save the things of the moment, how
limited is your vision! Your eyes
are not made to follow the
underground workings of passion."
Frau von Goethe
At the outset, we identified the task as the deconstruction of tne
existing versions of Austrian postwar activity which would also entail
a reconstruction of sorts. In concluding, we must now examine tne
nature of the model of Austrian development which has emerged out of
our analysis.
In considering 'conclusions' on the development of a political
/cultural community, we must always bear in mind that they will always
be provisional in tnemselves. In the process of researcn for this
project, several events have occurred which have confirmed, in a manner
more radical than might have been expected, that tne official version
of Austrian history since 1955 is no longer tenable in relation both
to neutrality and to Austrian involvement in World War II.
Both the SPOe (Reder-Frischenschlager) and the OeVP (Waldheim) have
snown their primary loyalty to political pragmatism and nave preferred
to try and defend their immediate power base rather than confront the
now obvious crisis. The most far-reaching result to date has been
sweeping gains for the FPOe under joerg Haider at the National rat
elections of 1986.
Political commentators nave pointed to two processes at work benmd
this electoral shift; first Haider manipulated rightwmg populism so
long dormant in Austria, but made respectable by the OeVP's campaign
for Kurt Waldheim, and secondly there was a protest vote against the
stifling effect of the permanent power of the Proporz parties. In
either case, the processes I have attempted to outline with their
origins in 1955 or earlier would seem to be confirmed.
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Austria's development since 1955 as an actor on the international
stage has been conditioned, as ever, by the historical circumstances
out of which it came and into which it was catapulted. In facing
four-power occupation, Austria shared the fate of Germany, but unlike
the Germans sustained an internal coherence in tne face of this
situation. In no other country was there the same degree of ambiguity
in relation to the occupiers; Austria's status as part of the Third
Reich or as the first victim of Hitlerian aggression remained in
doubt, in retrospect it is clear that the order of tne day was tne
invention of an explanation which would credibly justify the policies
of tne occupiers and tne occupied. To this extent, tnere was a
collusion between the Allies who sought to ensure a permanently
weakened Germany and tnose in the new political elite for wnom the
creation of an Austrian State was a goal in itself.
The circumstances into which the new State was catapulted can
loosely be circumscribed by the term 'Cold War'. As it became clear
that this was a longterm condition, the primary goal was to ensure
that Austria did not become part of Stalin's post-Yalta 'sphere of
influence'. 'Anschluss to the West' was effectively achieved wnen
Austria joined the OEEC, and domestically secured with the defeat of
two KPOe-inspired strikes. Nevertheless, the presence of Soviet
troops in the Lower Austrian heartland ensured that the Soviet
presence continued to overshadow the debate.
From this rather sketchy outline it is clear that the Austrian State
was thus not only amoiguous aoout its past , but also about its new
circumstances. With this background, we can now see the concept of
neutrality for Austria as an attempt at one and the same time to
bridge, break and disguise these ambiguities.
By pointing to a Swiss model, the Austrians also ensured that their
destiny could not be decided alone, i.e. any policy directed against
455
tnem could be said to have implications for Switzerland and nence
would become not just a matter for Austria and her powerful partners
but a wider issue for the international community. It is in this
sense that we can understand the Austrian insistence on the Swiss
model, and in tnis sense that we can understand why Austria's actions
must always be seen to be justified in terms of this law.
The Austrian legal tradition can now oe seen as a system designed
to rationalise political necessity. This tradition managed to perform
excellently as a filter of the 'undesirable' in official positions,
but ultimately its purpose has been to disguise the ambiguities
arising out of Austria's background. Austria is not unique in tnis
phenomenon, but, as we have seen, there are few (if any) States in
Europe whose postwar status nas been more ambiguous. Tne scope for a
complex system of ex-post-facto justifications was enormous, and so it
has proved.
The pre-eminence of 'stability at all costs' thinxing and tne
massive electoral majority of the parties committed to a particular
version of events nas resulted in attempts to stifle otner versions,
variously dismissed as cranky, ridiculous or illegal. The result is
of course that 'stability', far from being ensured, is permanently at
risk, and ultimately destined to collapse as the myths expounded by
the large parties are snown to oe untenable.
The complex rationalisations required to make the underlying
ambiguities consistent and the increasingly fine distinctions required
to bring practice into line with theory are evidence not only of
preciosity but more importantly of tne increasing unreliability of the
position, in our study we have been confronted witn a large number of
these contortions. There is an inherent disequilibrium where tnere
are large areas of societal and cultural 'taboo' so that practice is
justified in terms of ultimate law. The problem has remained because
456
any acceptance of tnis 'loose' view of the role of law would seem to
provide only instability. Given the nature of the problem, it must be
admitted that this fear is not without foundation. Nevertheless, this
state of affairs may reasonably be described as an 'incitement to
rationalise'. We have recently seen the USA justify the bombing of
Libya as self-defence under UN Charter Article 51. Previously,
Austria successfully argued that collective security is not in
contradiction to permanent neutrality. In tne Austrian case, the
rationalisation was also accepted by the international community.
From these two examples alone it becomes obvious that law can be made
tne servant of political necessity, and tnis is what the Austrians
have sought to do.
A classic example of the contorting effect of legality in tnis form
lies in the legal arguments over the status of the Moscow Memorandum.
Austrian legalists have agonised over this problem for many years.
Because the Memorandum was signed by a group of politicians
(Chancellor, vice Chancellor, Foreign Minister etc.) and not ratified
by a law-giver (Nationalrat) it cannot be International Law. Yet it
clearly has a central role, leading directly to tne State Treaty i.e.
it cannot be separated from the process and is not reversible or open
to alteration in tne manner of otner political agreements. In a world
of categorisation, this is a subversive discovery which illuminates
the ambiguity and highlights the pretensions of any 'absolute of
category'. Yet we cannot get away from the central importance of the
Memorandum wnose relevance is more total tnan many laws, even the
State Treaty and Neutrality Acts themselves.
The same ambiguity exists for 'Cold War'; not war but hardly peace
and with an immediate relevance for every European. As we have seen,
those who in some areas stand for the absolute of codified law in the
military sphere have found it necessary to insist that the Cold War
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poses no threat to Austrian association witn the EEC because it is not
War. In fact, the notion of Austrian neutrality becomes irrelevant,
were Austria to join the EEC in the shadow of tne Cold War. Swiss law
was based on assumptions drawn from nineteenth century patterns of
trade. As external economic relations become central to tne internal
functioning of all individual economies, so the complexities of the
politics nignlight the inadequacies of tne law. Neutrality was not
developed to overcome problems of trade. The Swiss discovered this in
1935 (Abyssinian Crisis), and responded by re-emphasis on the 'courant
normal'. The problem of the EEC in postwar Europe provides a more
intractable problem, however.
The underlying ambiguities existent at the foundation of the State
have never been truly faced. Thus in Austria we have seen a growing
dichotomy between tne apparent and tne real, tne official and tne
actual highlighting the perceived need to re-express everything in
terms of law. Officially, neutrality is primarily relevant to war:
actually it is relevant to crisis or Cold War. Officially, there is
no contradiction between western ideology and neutrality: actually
there is a central problem. Officially, neutrality was self-chosen:
in fact it is part of an international consensus ete-. efce-.
It is our contention that all these seeming contradictions can be
reconciled if they are seen in a political context. Thus the
insistence on the primacy of bourgeois law developed for nineteenth
century Switzerland must be seen as a political choice. In 1955,
'neutrality' seemed to allow bourgeois Austria its independence in
return for certain military guarantees. It seemed also to distance
Austria from Germany and create a new sense of 'national' identity.
This became the consensus myth between Austria, USSR and the West.
Nevertheless, at times of policy divergence, this consensus breaks
down, and where the Austrian position is compromised by the ambiguity
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of her own position, so national credibility is also destroyed.
We have seen that even on the basic question of the role of tne
military, Austrian and Swiss practice has diverged, in general, the
blocs treat Austria as a territory 'neutralised' between them which is
not the case for the Swiss. As sucn, Austria has moved to the
sidelines only so long as the policy of either of the blocs is not
openly confronted. Hence, in periods of calm (e.g. detente era)
Austria has developed largely unobserved, but in times of crisis
pressure from tne superpowers is considerably more tnan is tne case
for Switzerland, e.g. EEC, technology transfer, Reder-
Frischenscnlager, East-West trade, Waldheim, South Tyrol etc. At such
times, Austria falls back on the rationales provided by the agreement
of 1955 i.e. leans heavily on her status as a victim of Hitler and/or
on the 'rights' of Neutrals according to International Law.
Austria has found ner most vital role not within Swiss 'fortress'
practice but within the Cold War into which tne Second Republic was
born. As a non-bloc State entirely devoid of adequate means to defend
herself Austria can perhaps lead the world in the recognition that in
tne Nuclear world the military tnreat is collective. Thus Austrian
neutrality was not adopted, as Swiss was, merely to stay outside
others' conflicts (fortress) but rather was a child of that conflict
itself (i.e. involved) and was incapable of extricating or exempting
itself by merely protecting borders. Austrian Neutrality was not
fundamentally a question of security but of existence. From the start
or at least by 1956, the Austrians were aware that they would not or
could not escape the consequences of others' conflicts once they had
begun.
The norms of political realism regarding the need for a
powerful military now appear somewhat irrelevant in the light of the
increasingly more equal tnreat to all European States. Of course, tne
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nuclear war decision remains in the hands of a very few individuals,
but the effects are likely to be similar everywhere. For political
observers this may be the most important implication of Austria's
experience of neutrality. This recognition of collectivity has led
Austria to the forefront in the detente debate, seeking rapprochement
with her neighbours.
However, there is a more deeply rooted Austrian delusion about
the role of Austria in World War II. Verosta managed to 'prove' that
in legal terms Austria was the first victim of Nazi aggression and not
an integral part of the Third Reich. This is a classic case of non-
recognition of the actual because it cannot be justified officially.
As a result everything must appear to confirm the official view.
Thus, the Austrian State Treaty negotiators fought tooth and nail
for the removal of any reference to 'War Guilt', Austrian officials
insist that West Germany is just another neighbour and reject all
outside attempts to argue otherwise while Kurt Waldheim claims he had
no part in Nazi Balkan atrocities, to the point of rather sad lies or
'rationalisations'. Unfortunately for the Austrians, where the
conflict predates the Second Republic, the aggrieved groups have no
reason to suppress their objections. Thus while Belgrade may see good
reasons not to press the Slovene case, the Slovenes in Carinthia do
not. Despite superpower policy to encourage Austria in all moves away
from her 'German' past, Jewish groups refuse to stay silent on the
question of whether Reder was a good soldier or not or on Waldheim's
suitability as Austrian President, while even Adenauer sniped bitterly
when Austria appeared to be accorded a role as 'honorary wartime ally'
rather than German heartland. The fact of Austrian popular collusion
with Nazism severely compromised Austrian claims over South Tyrol and
the Allies were unwilling to punish Italy for Austria's benefit.
The official story no longer convinces. For some time, the Cold War
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and Austria's new and creative role within it have drawn attention
away from 'minor' areas eg Slovenes, Austro-West German Trade,
repressed history etc. Austria's successful economy, role in East-
West trade and rapprochement with Hungary have seemed to confirm 1938-
45 as an aberration of relevance only to the past. This was helped by
the speed with which the Cold War superceded the Second World War and
tne degree to wnicn Austria was a snowpiece for this confrontation.
Every cause now appeared to require a superpower advocate or be
classified 'irrelevant'. If a superpower could be persuaded to drop a
cause, its very existence appeared in doubt. Thus when Tito broke
with Stalin, the Slovene question was 'solved'.
In the sane manner, the 'Swiss mytn' is used to divert attention
from Austrian historical ties with Germany. To uninformed foreign
observers, Austria's size and geography, not to mention the
preponderance of Alps in botn, may suggest a natural comparison
with Switzerland. Yet until neutrality, Austrian ties with
Switzerland were limited to Vorarloerg, wnich is itself linguistically
separate from the rest of Austria. Neutrality put Austria into the
category of 'Neutral' rather tnan 'Post-Reich'. Neutrality is tnus
key to Austria's historical 'escape'. This is indeed as it was
planned, it reflects precisely the interests of those who seek to
ensure that Anschluss can never happen again, i.e. the postwar
Austrian elite and the victorious allies. On tnis issue tne Soviet
Union and the West agree.
Older issues were marginalised in the all-consuming importance of
the Cold War. Local conflicts became precisely that - local. Yet the
issues do not necessarily die. When the OeVP decided to run a
campaign of jingoism to ensure the election of its candidate for the
Presidency, it made acceptable hitherto taboo or marginalised issues.
In the hands of a skilful populist sucn as Haider, they may once again
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become issues relevant to the centre.
Under Kreisky, the preeminence of issues of wider international
importance (Detente, EEC, North-South, Palestine) served to provide
Austria with a new moral glow emphasising Peace and the UN. It must
again be said that the wartime allies encouraged this as a further
step away from Germany. Kreisky's widespread popularity and his
Jewish heritage served to allay any fears about remnants of anti-
Semitism in Austria. His attempts to reintegrate the FPOe now appear
to nave badly misfired, with a resurgent Party now in the hands of the
rightwing. It is clear that accusations of closet-Nazism cannot stop
until there has been a tnorough examination of the past. That is wny
rightwing resurgence in Austria has even more significance than
resurgence elsewnere.
It is clear tnat tne image of tne 'island of tne olessed' is no
longer valid. The election of Waldheim brought back international
derision in a manner both unexpected and largely unforeseen. This
indicates the degree to which the Austrian political establishment
underestimated the deptn of the problem. From our study, it is clear
that tne 'day of reckoning' with the Nazi past had to come. In some
senses, tne 'affairs' of Reder and Waldheim were 'accidents waiting to
happen'.
The primary point is not tnat Austria has hidden some closet Nazism
for forty years, but rather to point out that the past has come back
to haunt the present because the official rationalisations always
tried to present the fundamentally unclear as a consistent story. In
not admitting the links with Hitler, tne ambiguities of being neutral
and western, the impossibility of applying nineteenth century notions
of defence to Austria's twentieth century situation etc. etc., tne
actual situation was made more vulnerable than ever. A challenge to
the Austrian myth can or could have come from any quarter and the
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whole amoiguity would have been exposed. This has only been exposed
openly of late. Austrian history is more complex than was officially
admitted.
The attempt to present a coherent model for Austrian practice in
the twentieth century based on pre-World War One concepts of
neutrality has failed. For a realistic understanding both of tne
meaning of International Law and of Austrian policy we must examine
the historical circumstances in which neutrality has been implemented.
At present it is difficult to make a meaningful appraisal of the
nature of Austrian neutrality within tne confines of tne old
assumptions, and the contortions required to achieve consistency
witnin that old system merely become less and less credible.
Nevertneless, very few powerful States have an interest in
critically re-evaluating aspects of International Relations which
might show-up their complicity and we shall probably see continuing
gaps between practice and theory punctuated by 'snock' revelations
from the past about identified individuals. This was the case with
Waldheim. It would be easy to end merely attacking Austria as a State
on the same grounds, to little useful purpose. Both such attacks could
easily be degenerate into simplistic scapegoating.
In effect, tne politics of the post-1955 era can be seen as an
attempt to 'realise' tne myths, i.e. to resolve the amoiguities in tne
desired form. Neutrality has been used effectively as a positive tool
in tne search for an identity separate from Germany. The hign-profile
of Kreisky also created an identity for Austria free of association
with a particular past, and his attempts to reintegrate tne last
remnants of tne 'Germanic nationalists' into the new system can be
regarded as oeing aimed at a similar outcome.
The ambiguities could only be resolved finally, however, if this new
perspective afforded a more honest confrontation with the past.
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Instead, despite some movement in tnis direction, the recent events
have conspired to produce such a shocking effect as to leave the
impression that the Austrians have repressed the truth for forty years.
It is clear that the time was not used to prepare the nation for
a new open reappraisal of tne past but, ratner, the period 1934-45 had
been presented as an aberration, about which one would rather not be
reminded.
Attacks from abroad nave led to a reinforcing of tne ambiguities,
now openly expressed by different sections of Austrian society in a
manner that is far from wnolly positive. Nevertheless it presents an
opportunity for a realistic reassessment of Austria's status in the
twentieth century. We have sougnt to reappraise Austria's development
as a neutral State; ultimately it is a process to whicn the Austrians
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